The Union Of India & Ors. vs Dr. Neelam Sinha

(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOURENDRA PANDEY)

Date : 11-08-2026 The present writ application has been filed challenging the order dated 08.04.2025 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna (in short, learned Tribunal) in O.A. No. 050/00722 of 2017, whereby the learned Tribunal has allowed the original application filed by the respondent herein, has set aside the order dated 11.04.2016 passed by the competent disciplinary authority as well as the appellate order dated 04.09.2018 and directed the petitioners to grant consequential benefits to the respondent.

The present application has been filed by the petitioners seeking following reliefs:-

The relevant facts of the case is that the respondent was appointed on the post of A.D.M.O. in the month of November, 2000 and subsequently promoted as D.M.O. and then as Senior D.M.O. It is alleged by the petitioners that while in service, the respondent, despite receiving Non-Practicing Allowance and being bound by the service conditions, was indulging in private medical practice from her official railway residence. Based on the said fact, a vigilance check was conducted on 06.04.2008 at the official residence of the respondent situated at Quarter No. P/60, Railway Colony, Sonepur. During the course of the said check, two lady constables, namely, Smt. Sangeeta Kumari and Smt. Anita Sinha, were introduced as pseudo-patients. It is alleged that both of them were examined at the residence of the respondent and a sum of Rs. 50/- each was collected from them as consultation fee by one Shri Ranjan Kumar, who is stated to be working as a compounder. It is further alleged that another patient, namely, Smt. Prativa Singh, had also been treated by the respondent on 28.02.2008 and had paid a fee of Rs. 50/- to the said compounder. It was next alleged that prescriptions were issued from the official residence of the respondent and that the respondent was using the letterhead printed in the name of her husband, Dr. Sunil Kumar. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent by issuance of charge memorandum bearing No. ECR/HRD/GAZ (Con)/74/157 dated 15.10.2008. The charge against the respondent, in substance, was that during the year 2008, she had indulged in private practice at her official residence by taking fees from patients despite receiving Non-practicing allowance and had thereby also used the railway quarter for commercial purposes.

The respondent submitted her statement of defence on 09.01.2009, following which an Inquiry Officer, Presenting Officer and Defence Assistant were appointed. After the preliminary hearing on 16.03.2012, the regular departmental inquiry proceeded. During the inquiry, Smt. Sangeeta Kumari and Smt. Anita Sinha were examined in support of the charges. However, Shri Ranjan Kumar, who is alleged to have collected consultation fees from patients, was not examined. The Inquiry Officer, by a report dated 17.05.2013, held that the charges were not proved. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings and issued a disagreement memo, along with the inquiry report, inviting the respondent’s representation. The Disciplinary Authority, upon consideration of the material available on record and the representation submitted by the respondent, provisionally held the respondent guilty of the charges. Since the penalty proposed was beyond the competence of the General Manager, the matter was remitted to the Railway Board, being the appropriate disciplinary authority, in terms of the applicable rules.

The Railway Board, after considering the inquiry report, the disagreement memo, the representation of the respondent and the other relevant materials on record, imposed upon the respondent the penalty of reduction of pay by two stages for a period of three months, without cumulative effect, by an order dated 11.04.2016. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred an appeal. The appellate authority obtained the advice of the Union Public Service Commission dated 02.07.2018 and thereafter, rejected the appeal of the respondent by an order dated 04.09.2018. The respondent thereafter, approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna by filing O.A. No. 050/00722 of 2017. The learned Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 08.04.2025 has allowed the Original Application and set aside the disciplinary order of punishment dated 11.04.2016 as well as the appellate order dated 04.09.2018, directing the petitioners to grant consequential benefits to the respondent.

Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from errors of fact as well as law. It has next been submitted that the disciplinary authority, after considering the entire material on record and the defence of the respondent, had rightly disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. It has further been submitted that the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority is strictly in accordance with the applicable rules and having regard to the gravity of the charges found proved against the respondent.

Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has further submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the material evidence available on record. It has been next submitted that the statements of the witnesses, the search conducted at the official residence of the respondent, the availability of medical equipment, prescriptions and other documents seized during the vigilance proceedings clearly establishes that the respondent was engaged in private medical practice from her official residence. It has been contended that the evidence on record further indicates that fees was being charged from the patients and were being collected through the compounder, Shri Ranjan Kumar.

Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the learned Tribunal principally proceeded on the ground that the punishment has been imposed after a considerable lapse of time and that such delayed punishment was unsustainable. It has next been submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider the fact that the departmental proceedings has been conducted after affording all possible opportunities to the respondent and that the delay, by itself, could not invalidate an otherwise lawful disciplinary proceeding.

Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the order passed by the learned Tribunal and submits that the disciplinary proceedings suffer from serious infirmities. It has next been submitted that the Inquiry Officer, after considering the evidence adduced during the departmental inquiry, had categorically recorded a finding that the charges against the respondent were not proved. It has further been submitted that the principal allegation regarding collection of fees was not established against the respondent. It has been pointed out that the amount of Rs. 50/- is alleged to have been collected from the alleged patients by Shri Ranjan Kumar, who was the material witness in relation to the alleged collection of fees, however he has not been examined before the Inquiry Officer. It has also been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the Inquiry Officer has considered the evidence in its entirety and had arrived at a reasoned conclusion that the charges were not proved.

Learned counsel for the respondent contends that the disciplinary proceedings had remained pending for an unduly long period and the punishment was imposed after considerable lapse of time. It has further been contended that the advice of the Union Public Service Commission was relevant to the appellate proceedings and that the respondent was entitled to a fair opportunity in relation to the same. It has lastly been submitted on behalf of the respondent that the writ jurisdiction of this Court is limited and no interference is warranted with the well-considered order passed by the learned Tribunal, particularly when the Inquiry Officer himself had found the charges to have not been proved.

We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have perused the order passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal and the materials placed on record.

The short question which arises for consideration in the present writ application is whether the learned Tribunal was justified in interfering with the order of punishment passed against the respondent by the Disciplinary Authority, who had differed from the inquiry report whereby, upon appreciation of the evidence adduced before the inquiry officer, he had recorded a categorical finding that the charges levelled against the respondent were not proved.

Before examining the evidence, it would be apposite to notice the settled parameters of judicial review in disciplinary matters. There is no dispute with the proposition that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not ordinarily sit as an appellate authority over a disciplinary proceeding. At the same time, it is equally well settled that the existence of some evidence having a rational nexus with the charge is a condition precedent for sustaining a finding of guilt.

In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judicial review is directed towards the decision-making process and not ordinarily towards the merits of the decision. The Court may, however, interfere where the conclusion is based on no evidence, where the principles of natural justice have been violated, or where the conclusion is such that no reasonable person could have arrived at it.

The principle was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610, wherein the parameters governing judicial review of disciplinary proceedings were restated. The Apex Court made it clear that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence as an appellate court, but equally it cannot permit a finding of guilt which is unsupported by evidence or which is founded upon material which could not legitimately be relied upon in the disciplinary inquiry.

The present case, however, is not one where the learned Tribunal merely substituted its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the disciplinary authority. The Tribunal was required to examine whether there was legally acceptable material before the disciplinary authority upon which the serious finding of misconduct could reasonably be sustained.

We have noticed that the Inquiry Officer, after examining the evidence brought before him, did not find the charges to have been proved. Significantly, Shri Ranjan Kumar, Compounder, who according to the department was the person who had actually collected the consultation fees from the patients, was not examined in the departmental inquiry. The three patients/witnesses were examined, but the person whose alleged conduct constituted the immediate link between the respondent and the alleged receipt of consultation fees was not produced as a witness.

In our opinion, the non-examination of the said person assumes significance because the charge was not merely that the respondent had examined persons at her official residence. The essence of the charge was that she had undertaken private medical practice and had charged fees despite being in receipt of Non-Practicing Allowance. Moreso, in view of the categorical stand of the respondent to the effect that by way of professional ethics, she used to see patients without taking any fees from them, on the honorary basis. The allegation of payment of consultation fee was sought to be established through the alleged collection of money by the compounder. In such circumstances, the non-examination of the compounder cannot be treated as an inconsequential omission.

We are conscious that the strict provisions of the Indian Evidence Act do not govern a departmental inquiry. A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and the technical rules of evidence applicable to a court of law are not required to be followed with the same rigidity. However, this does not mean that a finding of guilt can be sustained on material which has neither been proved nor properly brought on record in the inquiry. We find that the Vigilance report states that there were many persons at the residence of the respondent at the relevant time, however barring the two witnesses, who are lady constables and stood as decoy patients, no other independent witness was called by the Vigilance and they relied on only the so-called independent witness, Sri. Ram Prasad Chaudhary, who is also an officer of R.P.F.

We are reminded of the judgment rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable to departmental proceedings, the material brought on record must nevertheless constitute evidence upon which a finding of guilt can reasonably be founded. The Court specifically cautioned that the material collected during investigation, by itself, cannot be treated as substantive evidence in the disciplinary proceeding.

The said principle assumes greater significance in the facts of the present case because the person (Ranjan Kumar) alleged to have collected the consultation fees was not examined. The departmental authorities could not simply proceed on the assumption that the allegations contained in the vigilance material stood proved merely because such material had been collected during the vigilance exercise.

It is true that two lady constables were examined as witnesses but their evidence, as noticed by the Inquiry Officer, did not conclusively establish the essential ingredients of the charge against the respondent. The mere fact that patients were allegedly examined at the official residence cannot conclusively establish that the respondent was carrying on a regular private medical practice for consideration.

The distinction between suspicion, however strong, and evidence capable of sustaining a disciplinary finding cannot be lost sight of. A departmental proceeding may proceed on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but there must nevertheless be material from which the conclusion of guilt can reasonably be drawn.

In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that even in a departmental proceeding, the finding must be based upon material on record and that the Inquiry Officer cannot arrive at a conclusion on the basis of irrelevant considerations, surmises or conjectures. The Court reiterated that the standard is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but preponderance of probabilities.

In the present case, the Inquiry Officer, had the benefit of the evidence adduced during the inquiry and therefore, recorded a finding that the charges were not proved. The Disciplinary Authority, however, disagreed with the said conclusion and thereafter, proceeded to hold the respondent guilty. There is no quarrel with the general proposition that the Disciplinary Authority is competent to disagree with the Inquiry Officer, provided the procedure prescribed by law is followed.

This reminds us further of the Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled this aspect of the law that where the Disciplinary Authority proposes to differ from a finding favourable to the delinquent, it must record its tentative reasons for disagreement and give the delinquent an opportunity to make a representation. Not only the compliance with that procedural requirement is to be ensured but the authority is not dispensed with the further requirement that the ultimate finding of guilt must itself be supported by evidence on record.

Thus, the fact that a disagreement memorandum was issued to the respondent cannot, by itself, validate the subsequent finding of guilt. The reasons recorded in disagreement must have a rational foundation in the evidence actually produced before the Inquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority’s observation in the last part of Para-3 and Para- 4 of Disagreement Memo as contained in Annexure - 4 of the paper book speaks for itself. Para - 3 of the Memo records - “..... From the statement of witnesses, photographs taken at the residence of CO, prescription of patients and other records and documents it indicates that the CO charges fees for her private practice from the patients and it was collected by her compounder Shri Ranjan Kumar but …..”. The opinion in Para- 4 says it all when it records “....I am of the opinion that the CO utilized her official residence for commercial purpose and might have indulged in private practice despite being NPA and ……”. (Emphasis supplied)

The punishment order thus cannot be said to have been arrived at with concrete and impeachable evidence of the finding of guilt qua the charges.

In the present case, the evidence upon which the charge of receipt of consultation fees was sought to be established was found insufficient by the Inquiry Officer and the person alleged to have actually collected the money was not examined. The petitioners have not demonstrated before us any material which would justify the conclusion that the Inquiry Officer’s finding was perverse or that he had ignored some decisive piece of evidence.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra), has underscored that an inquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function and that findings have to be based upon material brought on record in the inquiry. A mere reference to investigation material cannot substitute for proof of the facts constituting the misconduct.

We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the petitioners that the learned Tribunal has re-appreciated the evidence in the manner of an appellate authority. In our considered view, the Tribunal was examining the foundational question as to whether the finding of guilt is legally sustainable in the absence of the principal witness and in view of the finding of the Inquiry Officer that the charge had not been proved.

We also take note of another aspect which cannot be ignored. The vigilance inspection was conducted on 06.04.2008 and the charge memorandum was issued on 15.10.2008. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report only on 17.05.2013, while the final order of punishment came to be passed on 11.04.2016. Thus, the disciplinary proceeding remained pending for about eight years.

In State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that unexplained and inordinate delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings may cause serious prejudice to the delinquent employee and that the Court must consider the facts and circumstances of each case, including the reasons for delay and the prejudice caused thereby. Though, the Court did not lay down an inflexible rule that every delayed proceeding must necessarily be quashed.

In the present case, the delay assumes importance as a circumstance to be considered along with the weak evidence to prove the charge. The incident dates back to 2008, whereafter the Inquiry Officer’s report came after several years and the punishment was ultimately imposed in the year 2016. The respondent cannot be faulted for seeking protection against a finding of guilt where the evidence, even after such prolonged proceedings, was not sufficient to establish the charge to the requisite standard applicable to departmental proceedings. This aspect of the matter has not been seriously opposed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners.

We are also not persuaded by the submission that the availability of medical equipment, prescriptions or other material at the official residence, by itself, establishes the charge. We are aware of the fact that not only the delinquent/respondent but her husband were doctors, hence mere presence of medical equipments or prescriptions cannot be treated as conclusive proof of private practice. What had to be established was as to whether the respondent was involved in the alleged private practice and had accepted money from the two lady constables for examining them, which the Inquiry Officer found not to have been satisfactorily established.

It is important to take note of the fact that the alleged collection of fees was attributed to Shri Ranjan Kumar, yet he was not examined. If the department’s case was that the respondent was carrying on private practice for consideration and that the compounder was collecting fees on her behalf, the evidence of the compounder was naturally material. His non-examination is of significance particularly when the respondent disputed the charge. Thus, the facts of the present case, the omission becomes important because the witness not examined was the very person alleged to have received the money, while the Inquiry Officer, upon appreciation of the remaining evidence, has found the charge to have not been proved.

We further find that even the Appellate Authority at the advice of the Union Public Service Commission has gone on to hold the respondent guilty of the charge, however the Appellate Authority as well as the Union Public Service Commission have failed to appreciate that the evidence which was the very foundation for coming to the finding of guilt was not enough to hold the respondent guilty of the said charge. The Appellate Court also did not venture into the fact that the disciplinary authority had given its disagreement note on 05.12.2013 and had proposed for imposing punishment upon the respondent, however the punishment order was passed after more than two years four months on 11.04.2016. This inordinate delay in imposing the punishment upon the respondent has prejudiced the respondent and the judgment of N. Radhakishan (supra) is attracted in such circumstances. We may further point out that not only the punishment order was passed with delay, even the appeal took almost more than two years five months before the same was rejected by the Appellate Authority.

On a careful consideration of the entire matter, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal has taken a possible and legally sustainable view of the matter. We also find that two views were possible in the present case, even if the allegation of accepting fees by the compounder of the respondent is accepted for the sake of arguments, inasmuch as the compounder might have been collecting fees on the instructions of the respondent or he might have been doing it on his own without the knowledge of the respondent, however in absence of evidence of the compounder, everything becomes hypothetical and based on speculation, nonetheless if we take into account the former view then only the respondent can be held guilty, however if the latter is considered then the respondent cannot be held guilty of the said charge. The finding of the Inquiry Officer that the charges are not proved is based upon appreciation of the evidence led during the inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority’s disagreement note does depict any startling disclosure to as to cure the basic deficiency to the effect that there is lack of any evidence, whatsoever to prove the factum of the respondent having taken fees from the patients for examining them, thus indulging in private practice, though she was receiving non-practicing allowance, inasmuch as the principal witness competent to prove concerning the allegation of collection of fees was not examined, apart from the fact that the materials available on record do not satisfactorily establish the essential charge of private practice for consideration.

We are thus, of the view that the petitioners have not been able to demonstrate that the order of the learned Tribunal suffers from perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error or violation of any statutory provisions warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the forgoing reasons, we find no ground to interfere with the order dated 08.04.2025 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna in O.A. No. 050/00722 of 2017, whereby and whereunder the disciplinary order dated 11.04.2016 and the appellate order dated 04.09.2018 have been set aside, hence the writ application is, accordingly, dismissed.

Consequently, the order dated 08.04.2025 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna in O.A. No. 050/00722 of 2017 is hereby affirmed. The respondent shall be entitled to the consequential benefits in terms of the order of the learned Tribunal.