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Judgment
N.S. Ramaswami, J.—This appeal is filed by the second respondent in claim petition No. 37 of 1966 on the file of the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, Tirunelveli. The appellant is the insurer of the vehicle which was involved in the motor vehicle. The claimants are the widow and
children of the Lucas Hass morais who died in the motor accident that occurred at about 2 p.m. on 1-2-1966. The motor vehicle involved in the
accident is a taxi bearing registration No. MDU 8441, and owned by the first respondent to the claim, petition. The claimants prayed for a total
compensation of Rs. 25,000 towards loss of benefit as a result of the death of Lucas Hass Morais. The two respondents to the claim petition
resisted the claim. But, ultimately the Tribunal held that the accident was as a result of rash and negligent driving of the motor vehicle, that the
claimants are entitled to compensation and fixed the quantum of compensation at Rs. 9,600. It has passed an award for such sum against the
owner of the vehicle as well as the insurer. The Insurance Company has preferred this appeal and the only contention raised before us is that as per
Section 95(2)(b) of the Motor Vehicle Act, as it stood prior to 1969 amendment, the maximum amount to which the insurer can be made liable, in
this case, is only Rs. 4,000. The contention is that the Insurance Company cannot be asked to pay the entire sum of Rs. 9,600 awarded as the
compensation.
The claimants had not preferred any independent appeal claiming enhancement of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. But, they have filed a
cross objection to the appeal filed by the Insurance Company in which they have claimed enhancement of compensation against the insurance
company as well as the owner of the vehicle. It may be noted that the owner of the vehicle who was the first respondent in the claim petition has
been impleaded as pro forma respondent in the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company. Now, in the cross-objection the prayer is for
enhancement of compensation not, only against the insurance company, who is the appellant, but also against the owner of the vehicle, who is one
of the respondents to the appeal.
There can be no doubt that the appeal of the Insurance Company has to be allowed. Section 95(2)(b) as it stood prior to 1969 amendment
provided that the maximum liability of an insurance company in respect of a vehicle which carries passengers is limited to Rs. 20,000 in respect of
all passengers who travelled in the vehicle and there is the further restriction that in respect of all in respect as of an individual passenger, the
maximum liability of the insurance company is Rs. 4,000 in the case of vehicle carrying six or less passengers and Rs. 2,000 in the case of a vehicle
carrying more than six passengers. The vehicle which is a taxi was to carry less than six passengers and as per the said provision, the maximum
liability, regarding the death of one of the passengers on the Insurance Company is only Rs. 4,000 as the law stood then. Therefore, the appeal of
the Insurance Company has to be allowed.
Regarding the cross-objection two preliminary objections were raised. The first is that the appeal being one arising under a special statute and
the CPC not being applicable to the Tribunal constituted under the said statute, viz., the Motor Vehicles Act, no cross-objection can be filled. It is
pointed out that u/s 110-D though there is provision for any of the aggrieved parties to file an appeal, there is nothing in the section permitting a
respondent to an appeal to file cross-objection.
In support of this contention, three decisions were relied on. The first is Vedantacharsami v. Sri Muthiah Chetti, (1955) 68 MLLW 66. The
other two decisions are not reported and they are in A.A.O. No. 317 of 1967 (Mad.) (Srinivasan v. Subbiah Chettiar) and A.A.O. No.222 of
1970(Mad.)(Govindaraj v. Venugopal). One of these two decisions (A.A.O. No. 317 of 1967) is rendered by Somasundaram J., and the other is
rendered by Maharajan J. We are of the view that the above contention raised against the maintainability of the cross-objection is untenable. u/s
110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, an appeal lies to this court. It must be remembered that when once an appeal is entertained by this court, all the
provisions relating to the appellate jurisdiction to this court are attracted. It is true that all the provisions of the CPC are not applicable to the
Tribunal, because it is a creature of the statute, but the appeal against the order of the Tribunal is to the High Court and not to any other Tribunal
constituted under the statute. In Secretary of State v. Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21, the question was whether the ordinary rules of the CPC would
apply to appeal to the District Court against the decision of the Forest Settlement Officer u/s 10(2) of the Madras Forest Act. The Privy Council
pointed out that the appeal being to the District Court which is one of the ordinary courts of the country, the ordinary rules of the CPC apply.
National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. (J. and P. Coats Ltd., Assignee), is a case under the Trade Marks Act,
1940. u/s 76(1) of the said Act, an appeal shall lie from any decision of the Registrar under that Act to the High Court having jurisdiction. The
question arose whether an appeal under Clause 15. Letters Patent is maintainable against the decision of a single Judge of the High Court in an
appeal u/s 76(1) of the said Act. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that as the said Act had not made any provision with regard to the
procedure to be followed by the High Court in hearing the appeal under the said Act, the High Court has to exercise its appellate jurisdiction in the
same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and therefore when such jurisdiction was exercised by a single Judge, his judgment was
appealable under C1. 15 Letters Patent. As we pointed out earlier, Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act contemplates an appeal to the High
Court. Once an appeal is entertained by this court, all the rules in the CPC would be applicable, to such an appeal in as much as no other
procedure is prescribed under the said Act. That means Order 41, Rule 22, C. P. Code would be applicable and the respondent in an appeal
would be entitled to present a memorandum of cross-objections are provided under the said rules, Venkataraman J., in disposing of A.A.O. No.
162 of 1972 (Mad.) (Venkatesan v. Ranganayaki) has taken a similar view and we agree with the same. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Manjula Devi Bhuta and Another Vs. Manjusri Saha and Others, and the Delhi High Court in W.S. Bhagsingh and Sons and Another Vs. Om
Parkash Kaith and Another, have taken the same view.
(1955) 68 MLW 66 arises u/s 51 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. (Act XXVI of 1948). Under that
section, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Abolition Tribunal may appeal to a Special Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High
Court nominated from time to time by the Chief Justice in that behalf. The question arose whether the respondent in an appeal filed u/s 51 of that
Act can file a cross-objection. A Division Bench of this court held that such a cross-objection cannot be entertained. but this decision has no
application to the facts of the present case. As already seen, u/s 51 of the Abolition Act, the appeal contemplated is not to the High Court as such
but only to a Special Tribunal consisting of two Judges of the High Court, Such a Special Tribunal, even though consisting of two Judges of the
High Court, is a creature of the statute and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Tribunal. Section 51 of the Abolition Act itself did not
contemplate the filing of cross-objections by a respondent in an appeal under that section. It was under those circumstances, a Division Bench of
this court held that the cross-objection cannot be maintained. It is pointed out there that Section 51 confers a special rights on the aggrieved person
in certain cases to appeal to a special Tribunal, constituted by the Chief Justice and that there is no provision in the Act attracting the entire
procedure laid down in the CPC including the right to file cross-objections. The very reasoning contained in that decision would go to show that in
the present case, a cross-objection is maintainable because the appeal contemplated u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act is not to a special
Tribunal but to the High Court. Undoubtedly all the provisions of the CPC would be applicable to any proceeding before this court even if it is an
appeal under any special stature.
Somasundaram J. in disposing of A.A.O. NO. 317 of 1967 (Mad.) has purported to follow the above Bench decision (1955) 68 MLW 66 in
holding that no memorandum of cross-objections is entertainable in an appeal under Sec-110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. There is no further
discussion by the learned Judge in coming to that conclusion. All that the learned Judge says is that there is no provision in the special Act attracting
the entire procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, including the right to file the cross-objections and therefore the memo of cross-
objections does not lie. The learned Judge has overlooked the fact that the appeal is to the High Court to which the CPC applies. For the reasons
stated supra, we are of the view that this decision of the learned Judge, (Somasundaram J.) and that in A.A.O. No. 222 of 1970 (Mad.) by
Maharajan J. following the above decision are not correctly decided. We hold that a cross-objection would lie and the first preliminary objection is
not tenable.
The second preliminary objection is that whatever be the right of the cross-objector against the appellant, namely, the Insurance co., there
cannot be a valid cross-objection against the owner of the vehicle who is also a respondent in the appeal. However, we think it is unnecessary to
consider whether this objection is tenable or not, for on merits, the cross-objection has to fail.
The finding of the Tribunal below is that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs. 150 per month. He was aged 39 years at the time of his death.
Considering his age and the income, we do not think that the sum of Rs. 9,600 fixed as the total compensation payable to the claimants towards
loss of benefit calls for any interference, even though the reasoning of the Tribunal below does not appear to be quite sound. The result is the
appeal is allowed and the liability of the appellant (Insurance Company) is restricted to a sum of Rs. 4,000. The cross-objection is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs either in the appeal or in the cross-objection.
Appeal allowed.