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Judgment
V. Ratnam, J.—The tenant is the petitioner in this civil revision petition, which is directed against the order of eviction passed by the
authorities below, on an application u/s 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVIII of 1960, as amended by
Act XXIII of 1973(hereinafter referred to as the Act) filed by the respondent herein which is the union of The South India Bank Employees.
According to the respondent, the building in question was purchased by the union from one Subramania Pillai on 24th May, 1974 and even at that
time, the petitioner was in occupation of the building as a tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 60 payable on or before the 5th of every succeeding
month. Claiming that the building in question is a non-residential one and that the union has no building of its own to house its office to conduct the
meetings and carry on the business of the union, the respondent filed an application u/s 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act for an order of eviction against the
petitioner, after issuing a notice terminating the tenancy. That application was resisted by the petitioner herein contending that while the petitioner
was arranging to purchase the property from Subramania Pillai, the union had purchased the same and that the union is now housed in a spacious
place where it is carrying on its business smoothly and without any hardship. The further case of the petitioner was that he has been carrying on
business in dyeing and weaving and that he is aware of the functioning of the union which is a corporate body which cannot ask for an order of
eviction on the grounds stated by it.
The learned Rent Controller (Principal District Munsif), Tirunelveli, who enquired into the application held on a consideration of the oral as well
as the documentary evidence that the union had established that it requires the building for its own activities and occupation and that such
requirement is also bona fide. On this finding, an order for eviction was passed against the petitioners. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner preferred an
appeal in C.M.A. No. 98 of 1977 before the Appellate Authority (Principal Subordinate Judge), Tirunelveli. The Appellate Authority also
concurred with the conclusion of the Rent Controller and held that the holding of the meetings of the union, general body meeting, committee
meetings, etc., would amount to carrying on of the business of the union in connection with which the respondent is entitled to secure possession of
its own building under the provisions of Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act. Consequent to this finding, the order of eviction passed by the Rent
Controller was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this revision.
The only contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that an entity like the respondent-union cannot be conceived of as carrying on
any business as such within the meaning of Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act and, therefore, the application filed by it under that section is not
maintainable. On the ether hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the word ""business"" used in Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act
should be construed in the sense of activities that occupy the time, attention and labour for the purpose of livelihood or profit and considered in this
light, the activities of an union will also be comprehended within the term ""carrying on business"" and, therefore, the petition for eviction filed, by it is
maintainable. Section. 10(3) (a) (i) deals with residential buildings, while Sections 10(3) (a) (ii) and (iii) deal with nonresidential buildings. It may be
pointed out that the Act by itself does not define a residential building or a non-residential building. With'' reference to residential buildings, if the
requirements of Section 10(3) (a) (i) of the Act are satisfied, then the landlord will be entitled to recover possession of the same from the tenant.
With reference to non-residential buildings, the-Act has made provision with reference to a non-residential building used for the purpose of keeping
a vehicle or adapted for such use and other non-residential buildings. The former category of non-residential buildings would fall within Section
10(3) (a) (ii) of the Act, while all other non-residential buildings would be covered by Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act. The present case is one
where the building would fall under Section. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act. It is only on account of this the respondent also filed the application under
that section.
The nest question that arises is whether the landlord is not occupying for purpose of a business which it is carrying on, a nonresidential building in
the city, town or village concerned which is its own. It is not in dispute that the respondent is not occupying; any other building of its own, but is
now housed in a rental premises and consequently, this requirement u/s 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act is also satisfied. The only other requirement that
must be fulfilled before the respondent could seek to recover the premises in the occupation of the petitioner is that the respondent should be
carrying on a business. The word ""business'''' is also not defined in the Act. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, ""Business"" means.--
the state of being busily engaged in anything""; ""activity"", that about which one is busy""; ""functions"".; ""occupation""; ""that with which one is concerned
at the time.
Bouvier''s Law Dictionary states that ""business"" means:
that which occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit.
In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word ""profit"" is stated to mear:
to make progress""; ""to advance"";
to improve""; ""to be of advantage"".
to benefit, further, promote"".
The activities of a bank employees'' union like the respondent herein comprise of several facets. Apart from the holding of periodical committee
meetings and general body meetings, the activity of a bank employees, union is also directed towards securing benefits and privileges for the
purpose of such bank employees. It is common knowledge that as a result of the sustained efforts of such bank employees'' unions, the wage
conditions, leave and other benefits of the bank employees and a host of other privileges like extra allowances, holidays, medical benefits, etc.,
have been secured to the bank employees. Undoubtedly, the process of securing those benefits had occupied the time, attention and labour of the
union for the purpose of the profit of its members. To tie down the applicability of the expression ""business"" only to commercial activities involving
profit-making would, in my view, exclude a host of other activities falling under the broader definition of the word ""business"", as in the present case.
It cannot be disputed that as a result of the activities and efforts of the union, the working conditions of the bank employees had been improved
and they have been considerably benefited as a result of the exertions of the union. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the
contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the word ""business"" in Section 10(3) (a) (in) of the Act must be confined only to the profit
aspect of the business activity. Considering the question whether the carrying on of a thanneerpandal activity is a business u/s 10(3) (a) (iii) of the
Act,. Kailasam, J. as he then was, in P. Vairamani Ammal Vs. K.N.K.R.M. Kannappa, . observed thus:
The Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word ""business"" as ""being busy, task, duty..... habitual occupation, profession, trade, serious
work"". It is, therefore to be seen that the word has a very wide import and Would cover every activity where men keep themselves busy. In
Halsbury''s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 38, the word ''business'' is stated as a wider term than and not synonymous with trade and
means practically anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure........In this context ""the term"" for purposes of a business"" will
have to be construed. There can be no objection to the landlord carrying on a business which is not strictly commercial as for instance, using the
building as a place of Worship or Bajana. Mandapam or Thanneerpandal. These are absolutely legitimate objects to which the landlord can put to
use his building. The object of the enactment being one to regulate the occupation of residential and non-residential buildings, I can see no
prohibition against the landlord putting the, buildings to any legitimate use and also requiring the building bona fide for any legitimate use. So, long
as the object is a legitimate one and so long as the requirements of the sub-section are fulfilled, I see no reason for restricting the meaning of the
term ""for purposes of a business"". If the legitimate activity by the landlord will be his business the ordinary meaning of the word ""business"" applies,
and there is no warrant for construing the word ""business"" in the very restricted, way and to confine it to commercial activities or activities of trade
alone.
The learned Judge proceeded to consider Rolls v. Miller (1884) 27 Ch. D. 71. where it was held that the word ""business"" meant almost anything
which was an occupation as distinguished from a pleaure, anything which was an occupation or duty which required attention was a business. In
P.K. Kesavan Nair Vs. C.K. Babu Naidu, . the term ""business"" was held not to have a technical meaning but that that expression has to be read
with reference to the object and intent of the Act in which it occurs. The Supreme Court of India had occasion to deal with the import of the word
business"" in relation to the carrying on of the profession of law by a lawyer in S. Mohan Lal Vs. R. Kondiah, . While affirming the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S. Mohanlal Vs. R. Kondaiah, . the Supreme Court observed thus:
It is needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the various dictionaries except to say that everyone of them notices a large number of
meanings of the word. In a broad sense it is taken to mean ''everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of
livelihood or profit''. In a narrow sense it is confined to commercial activity.
In view of the above decision, the Word ""business"" has to be understood in a very broad sense as an activity which occupies time, attention and
labour for the purpose of livelihood or profit and it has already been pointed out that the activities of the respondent-union are such that it occupies
the time as well as the labour and are intended to improve the service conditions of the bank employees and to promote and advance their welfare.
Such activities on the part of the respondent would also be within the scope of the broader sense of the meaning of the expression, ""business"". In
G. Papachary v. Country Tobacco Merchants Association (1974) 2 An WR 91. Ramachandra Rao J., had occasion to consider the question of
the entitlement of an association of persons for an order of eviction from the premises owned by it on the ground that it required the premises for its
own business. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that though the association as such did not carry on any business, yet, its objects and
activities were such as would amount to carrying on business activities which would fulfil the requirement of the provision. In St. Joseph''s Armoury
Gunasmith, by its partner Mr. Jacob v. Com. Venkidu, Secretary, Communist Party of India (Marxist), Coimbatore G.R.P. No. 924 of 1979,
dated 25th July. 1980. Nainar Sundaram, J., had occasion to consider the question whether the Communist Party of India can seek an order for
eviction in respect of its own premises in the occupation of a tenant on the ground that it requires the premises for its own business. The learned
Judge held that being a political party, its business is to carry on activities to progress, to advance and to improve its cause in the political sphere
and it must have an office and it is only to serve this requirement, eviction was sought for u/s 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act and such an application was
perfectly maintainable. As pointed out earlier, in the present case also, the union is the means through which the progress, advancement, and
improvement of the conditions of service of the bank employees is sought to be achieved and for the purpose of locating its office in the premises,
the respondent sought an order for eviction against the petitioner. The requirement in the instant case also would fall within Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of
the Act, as the respondent requires the premises for the purpose of a ""business"" which it is carrying on and consequently, the orders of the Courts
below have to be maintained. The result is, the civil revision petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.
The counsel for the petitioner prays that some time may be given to enable the petitioner to vacate the premises and the learned Counsel for the
respondent has no objection to grant three months'' time for this purpose. Accordingly, the petitioner will have three months'' time from today, to
vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondent.