The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. vs Raghunath Mahto

Atkinson, J.—The plaintiffs in this suit, namely, the Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ld., seek to eject the defendant from certain lands held by him under a Prodhani Pattah lease dated 1882. The interest of the lesser in that lease has now by divers mesne assignments become vested in the Tata Iron and Steel Co., and of that there is no question at all. The lease that was made to the defendant as Prodhan was made by the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum while the owner of the estate was a disqualified proprietor. The lease covered an area of 64 bighas odd of cultivated lands in the village of Beldih for a period of 15 years, subject to an annual rent of Rs. 25-99. The lease was subject to certain conditions, namely, that the Prodhan was to maintain the sal jungles for the benefit of the lesser, and also that he was to pay his rent according to the stipulations contained in the lease, kist by kist, and that he was to collect no rent from the bastu lands in excess of the rent stated in the doul jamabandi, and that if in the discharge of his duties as Prodhan he was proved unfit, then the lesser for the time being would be entitled to eject him from the lands and also from his office as Prodhan. Irrespective of the lands comprised in the lease, the defendant has also a right to certain other lands and in respect of which he is a raiyat; but Mr. Pugh disclaims on behalf of the plaintiffs any intention to eject the defendant from such raiyat lands. The plaintiffs'' claim is conversant only with the ejectment of the defendant from the lands covered by the lease of 1882; and for which he pays a reserved rent, subject to the due discharge of his duties as Prodhan.

The case was originally instituted by the plaintiffs in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Singhbhum; and in that Court the defendant raised the contention that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction inasmuch as the claim was governed by the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act of 1808; and that therefore the only Court that had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of that suit was the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum. The learned Subordinate Judge held that by reason of the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, this suit was cognizable only by the Court of the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum The plaintiffs accepted that contention, without demur, and accordingly instituted the present suit on the 23rd February 1916 in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, relying on the contention that the cause of action sued upon was one governed by the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, and as such cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner.

Before the Deputy Collector to whom the case was properly assigned for disposal, the defendant took up a novel position and urged that the Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to hear the case; having raised before the Subordinate Judge formerly the contention that he (the Subordinate Judge) had no jurisdiction but that the Deputy Collector only had, jurisdiction. It would be interesting to inquire if the Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction and the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction, then what Court had jurisdiction to try the case and grant the relief claimed in this suit? The question as to jurisdiction does not seem to have been pressed before the learned Assistant Judicial Commissioner in appeal. The Deputy Collector, however, proceeded to try the case, holding that there was jurisdiction inasmuch as the plaintiffs were seeking to eject a tenant, and that the facts as proved before him warranted the plaintiffs'' right to eject the defendant; and he accordingly granted a decree to the plaintiffs. The learned Deputy Collector found on the question of fact submitted to him that there had been breaches by the Prodhan of the conditions of the lease which justified his eviction; and on the issues of fact raised by the parties before him, the Deputy Collector decided in favour of the plaintiffs. No question as to limitation was raised before the Deputy Collector. On appeal whether any, and if so which, party raised the question of limitation does not appear; but the learned Judge decided that the plaintiffs'' suit was barred under the provisions of section 231 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, inasmuch as the specific breaches relied upon by the plaintiffs to warrant the eviction of the defendant under the terms of the lease were breaches which occurred more than a year prior to the institution of the suit. We are not called upon now, having regard to the view we take, to consider the propriety of that decision; but we take leave to say that inasmuch as the question of limitation was not taken expressly in the pleadings or before the Deputy Collector at the trial, the learned Judicial Commissioner, if he intended to hold that the suit was barred by limitation, might very properly have given the plaintiffs an opportunity to establish by proof that the specific breaches of the lease alleged to have taken place were within one year before the institution of this suit.

The main discussion before us now has been whether or not the Deputy Collector in point of law had jurisdiction to try this case. It is necessary, first, in determining this legal consideration that we should ascertain what is the nature of the relationship which exists between the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendant on the other. Is he a tenant, if so, what class of tenant is he? Is he an occupancy raiyat or a non-occupancy raiyat? If the defendant fulfils neither of these qualifications, then is he a tenure holder? I asked Mr. Pugh what class of tenant the defendant was and Mr. Pugh candidly confessed, I do not know what class of tenant is he." I think myself, having regard to the definition of tenant provided by section 4 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, that the defendant was not in the position of either a non occupancy Raiyat or an occupancy Raiyat qua the lands held as Prodhan under the lease. The furthest that it could be pushed would be to contend that the defendant was a tenure-holder holding lands under the plaintiffs. Mr. Pugh contends that with regard to the 64 bighas odd of cultivated lands which were covered by the lease of 1882 the defendant is a tenure-holder. But the plaintiffs'' claim in this suit is not merely to recover these 64 bighas of land but also to eject the defendant from his office as Prodhan and to have it declared that the defendant has ceased to exercise the right of Prodhan, so far as his rights are concerned outside the mere collection of rents of the lands occupied by tenants. We think the defendant occupies the position of a quasi service tenure holder, that he is a tenure holder of a kind; but certainly not one within the definition of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. If the defendant is a tenure-holder, and not a raiyat, then there is no power vested in the Deputy Commissioner to eject him under the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. The Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act gives express power to deal with the eviction of occupancy raiyats and non occupancy raiyats. But there is no provision, so far as we can find, to justify a Court, constituted to hear suits under that Act, to eject a tenure-holder. Section 68 says that "no tenant shall be ejected from his tenancy or any portion thereof except in execution of a decree, or in execution of an order of the Deputy Commissioner, passed under this Act."

Section 22 also bears upon this consideration relative to the position of occupancy and non-occupancy raiyats under the Act. But the Deputy Collector acquires a special jurisdiction only in suits specified in section 139 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act. The suits set out in the sub-clauses of that section are suits which he alone has jurisdiction to try and which no other Court has any jurisdiction to try.

It is contended before as that this suit, if maintainable, would be maintainable under the provisions of section 139, sub-clause (6). But we are clearly of opinion that sub clause (6) of section 139 has no application to the facts of this particular case; although that section does provide that "suits by or against headmen of villages for declaration of title in, or for possession of their office or agricultural lands" may be maintained in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner irrespective of the fact whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists. This enactment involves nothing more than a provision which empowers the Deputy Commissioner''s Court to hear suits between the Prodhan on the one hand and rival claimants on the other with regard to the right to hold the office coupled with the possession of the agricultural lands attached thereto, and it provides that such a suit is maintainable although it is a suit between parties between whom the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist. And thus this section in our view gives jurisdiction to the Deputy Commissioner to deal with disputes as between parties claiming the office of Prodhan coupled with possession of land attached to such office in a civil proceeding between parties other than landlord and tenant, which would otherwise be apparently outside the scope of the Act. The present suit is clearly not within the express provisions of sub clause (6). The only other sub-clause in respect of which this suit could be maintained would be clause (8) of section 169, and that clause runs as follows:--

All suits and applications in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by this Act on the Deputy Commissioner.

Is the present suit one in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by this Act? Yielding to Mr. Pugh''s argument that there is no kind of tenancy existing between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other, except some kind of tenancy in the nature of a tenure-holder''s interest, then as there is no jurisdiction conferred on the Deputy Commissioner by the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act to eject a tenure-holder, this suit cannot be maintained under the provisions of sub-clause (8) of section 139. In our view it is manifestly clear that there was an utter absence of jurisdiction in the Deputy Collector to try this suit. Mr. Pugh contends on the other hand that by some principle of equitable estoppel the defendant having forced the plaintiffs to obtain such relief in the Deputy Commissioner''s Court, that we should recognize the decision of that Court. It is quite impossible to accept this argument, having regard to the authorities which lay down clearly that in cases where there is an inherent absence of jurisdiction no subsequent action or conduct will validate the institution of a proceeding instituted without jurisdiction. Accordingly we must reluctantly hold, that in this particular case, the Deputy Collector had in law no jurisdiction to dispose of this suit and consequently this appeal must be dismissed.

This decision, of course, involves the dismissal of the present suit instituted by the plaintiffs. As at present advised, we are inclined to think that the fact that the suit has been dismissed for the reasons stated, will not operate as a bar to any fresh suit which may be instituted by the plaintiffs in a Court having competent jurisdiction to try and decide it on the issues raised between the parties. But having regard to the attitude adopted by the defendant, it is equitable and just that he should not receive costs in any Court. Accordingly the plaintiffs'' suit must be dismissed without costs in the Deputy Collector''s Court, without posts in the Judicial Commissioner''s Court, and without costs in this Court.

Chapman, J.

I agree.