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Judgment
Somasundaram. J.
The respondent 1 and 2 in W.P. No. 1601 of 1981 are the appellants in W.A. No. 917/87. The petitioner and the 3rd respondent in W.P. No.
1001 of 1981 are the respondents in W.A. 917/87. The respondent in W.P. No. 7853 of 1982 is the appellant in W.A. No. 918/87. The
petitioners in W.P. No. 7853 of 1982 are the respondents in W.A. No. 918/87. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to by the
nomenclature given to them in the writ petitions.
The prayer in W.P. No. 1001/81 is for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order dated 26th January 1981 issued by the
second respondent and for directing the petitioner''s reinstatement. In W.P. No. 7853/83 the petitioners challenge the Regulation Nos. 21 and 31-
G of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Officers and Servants Conduct Regulations, 1972 and pray for issue of a writ of
declaration declaring the said regulations as illegal and unconstitutional in so far as the petitioner are concerned.
The first respondent in W.P. No. 1601/81 and the respondent in W.P. No. 7853/82 is the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board,
which is a statutory body created under the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Act, 1970 (Act IV of 1971). The concerned
employee in both the writ petitions is a workman. Section 73 of the Act IV of 1971 empowers the respondent-Board to frame regulations. Before
going to the merits of the case, it is advisable to extract Regulations 21 and 31 of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Officers and
Servants Conduct Regulations, 1972 and they stand extracted as follows :
Taking part in politics and elections : (1) No employee shall be a member or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any
organisation which takes part in, subscribe in aid of or assist in any other manner any political movement of activity.
(2) It shall be the duty of every employee to endeavour to prevent any member of his family from taking part in, subscribing in aid of, or assisting in
any other manner any movement or activity which is, or tends directly or indirectly to be, subversive of he Government as by law established, and
where an employee is unable to prevent a member of his family from taking part in, or subscribing in aid of, or assisting in any other manner, any
such movement or activity he shall make a report to that effect to the Managing Director or to the officer to whom he is subordinate.
(3) If any question arises whether any movement or activity falls within the scope of this regulation, the decision of the Board thereon shall be final.
(4) No employee shall canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or take part in an election to any legislature or local
authority.
Membership of service association : No officer or servant shall be a member, representative or office-bearer or any association representing or
purporting to represent officers or servants of the Board or any class of officers or servants, unless such Association satisfies the following
conditions, namely :
(a) membership of the Association shall be confined to a distinct class of Board''s servants and shall be open to all Board''s servants of that class;
(b) the Association shall not in any way be connected with any political party or organisation or engage itself in any political activity;
(c) the Association shall be recognised one and such recognition shall be accorded by the Board;
(d) the Association shall be recognised one and such recognition shall be accorded by the Board;
(e) except with the previous sanction of the Board, the Association shall not publish any representation on behalf of its members, whether in the
press or otherwise;
(f) the Association shall not in any way, be connected with any election to a Legislative body, whether in India or elsewhere or to a local authority
or a body; and
(g) the Association shall not pay or contribute towards expenses of any trade union which has constituted a fund u/s 16 of the c1926 (Central Act
XVI of 1926) "".
The petitioners challenged Regulations 21 and 31(g) of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage board Officers and Servants Regulations,
1972 on the following two grounds :
(a) Regulations 21 and 31(g) referred above are unconstitutional as they are offending Art. 19(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution.
(b) The respondent-Board is not only an industry as defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act but is also an industrial establishment
within the meaning of Section 2(e)(i) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1946 and
therefore, by virtue of Section 12-A of the Act of 1946 prescribed model Standing Orders shall alone apply to the respondent-Board and
consequently the respondents regulations referred above would not prevail over the model Standing Orders.
With regard to the question whether the impugned regulations offend Article 19(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution, the learned Single judge found
that the impugned regulations do not offend Art. 19(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution and upheld the constitutional validity of Regulations 21 and
31(g) referred above. However, the learned Single Judge held that the respondent-Board is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and it is an Industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 2(e)(i) of the Act of 1946 and, therefore, by virtue of
Section 12-A of the Act of 1946, the prescribed model standing orders alone shall apply to the respondent-Board and the respondents regulations
would not prevail over the model standing order. The learned Single Judge further held that the impugned regulations cannot govern the workmen
employed by the respondent-Board and, therefore, the proceedings taken against the workmen under the impugned regulations are illegal and
without jurisdiction. Consequently the learned Single Judge by a common order allowed both the writ petitions. As against the common order of
the learned Single Judge the respondents have preferred the present writ appeals.
The first question we have to examine in these writ appeals is, whether the respondent-Board is ''an industrial establishment'' within the meaning
of Section 2(e)(i) of the Act of 1946. Section 2(e)(i) of Act of 1946 defines Industrial Establishment as follows : ""Industrial establishment means an
industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Act IV of 1936). According to Section 2(ii)(g)
of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, ""industrial establishment"" means any establishment in which any work relating to the construction,
development or maintenance of buildings, roads, bridges or canals or relating to operations connected with navigation, irrigation, or the supply of
water or relating to the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity or any other form of power is being carried on. The learned
Advocate-General on behalf of the respondents would contend that the respondent-Board does not supply water, but only executes water supply
and sewerage works on behalf of local bodies and hands them over to the local bodies after such completion and, therefore, the respondent-Board
cannot be called an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 2(ii)(g) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. This contention of the
learned Advocate-General cannot be countenanced because it runs counter to the plain meaning of Section 2(ii)(g) of the above Act According to
Section 2(ii)(g) any establishment in which any work relating to operations connected with - supply of water - is being carried on will be an
industrial establishment. The preamble to the Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1971 under which the respondent-Board is created states that it is an Act to
provide for the establishment of water supply and drainage Board and the regulation and development of drinking water and drainage in the State
of Tamil Nadu. It is also useful to refer the statement of objects and reasons for enacting the Act IV of 1971. The statement of objects and reasons
runs as follows :
The importance of providing for protected drinking water and adequate drainage facilities to urban and rural areas alike has been engaging the
attention of the Government for quite some time past. At present, matters connected with drinking water supply and drainage schemes are being
dealt with by several Departments. The Government considered that for effective planning and execution of drinking water and drainage schemes,
it was essential that these were brought under the purview and control of a single agency for purposes of investigating, preparing and executing
water supply and drainage schemes. Accordingly the Government constituted the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board to achieve the
above object.
Government are of the view that if the Board could be set up as an autonomous body on a statutory footing, it will conduce to speedier planning,
investigation and execution of schemes and also enable it to raise substantial resources from financing institutions and in the open market, with a
view to providing drinking water and drainage facilities to urban and rural areas in the State or Tamil Nadu within the shortest possible time. The
Bill provides for the constitutions of an autonomous Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board to be entrusted with powers and functions to
investigate, prepare and execute water supply and drainage schemes throughout the state and matters connected therewith"".
Section 16 of Act IV of 1971 describes the powers and functions of the respondent-Board Sub-clauses (2) and (3) of section 16 would clearly
indicate that one of the functions of the Board is to execute the water supply and drainage schemes under a phased programme for the provision of
drinking water and drainage facilities, within the areas of the local authorities to which such schemes relate and also to establish and maintain
schemes incidental to water supply and drainage such as testing of water, designing of plant for purification of water, conducting research relating
to water supply and maintaining such schemes. A careful examination of the preamble to the Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1971, the statement of objects
and reasons and section 16 of the Act of the 1946 will clearly show that the respondent-Board is an establishment in which works relating to
operations connected with supply of water is being carried on and consequently the respondent-Board is an industrial establishment within meaning
of Section 2(ii)(g) of the Payment of Wages Act. Consequently we agree with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that Act of 1946 would
apply to the respondent-Board. If the Act of 1946 is attracted, in the absence of certified Standing Orders, Model Standing Orders will apply to
the respondent-Board. Then we have to examine the question whether the regulations framed by the respondent-Board in exercise of the powers
conferred by section 73 of the Act IV of 1971 will prevail over the Act of 1946 and the model Standing Orders. We have already opined that
once when Act of 1946 is attracted, in the absence of certified Standing orders, Model Standing Orders shall govern.
Mr. K. Chandru, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the Act of 1946 is a special law in regard to matters enumerated in the
schedule to that Act and the regulations made by the respondent-Board with regard to any of those matters in exercise of the powers u/s 73 of the
Act IV of 1971 are of no effect unless the said regulations are either notified by the Government u/s 13-B or certified by the certifying officer u/s 6
of the Act of 1946. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the decision in U.P. State Electricity Board v., Hari Shankar Jain
1978-II-LLJ-399. In the above decision, the Supreme Court has held as follows (p. 405) :
We have already shown that the Industrial Establishments (Standing Orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a specific subject, namely the
conditions of service, enumerated in the schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that parliament sought to
abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Establishments (Standing Orders) Act embodying as they do hard won and precious rights of workmen
and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure including a quasi-judicial determination, by a general incidental provision like S. 79(c) of the
Electricity Supply Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing Orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and
Parliament never meant that the Standing Orders Act should stand pro tanto repealed by S. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of
the view that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act must prevail over S. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the
Standing Orders Act applies"".
Learned Counsel also relied on the decision in L. I. C of India v. D. J. Bahadur 1981-I-LLJ-1. The Supreme Court dealing with the question
which of the two Central Acts viz., the Industrial Disputed Act of 1947 and the Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956 is a general law and which
is a special law, held as follows :
(pp. 22-23)
The crucial question which demands an answer before we settle the issue is as to whether the L.I.C. Act is a special statue and the I.D. Act a
general statue so that the latter pro tanto repeals or prevails over the earlier one. What do we mean by a special statue and, in the scheme of the
two enactments in question which can we regard as the special Act and which the general ? An implied repeal is the last judicial refuge and unless
driven to that conclusion, is rarely resorted to. The decisive point is as to whether the I.D. Act can be displaced or dismissed as a general statue. If
it can be and if the L.I.C. Act is a special statue the proposition contended for by the appellant that the settlement depending for its sustenance on
the I.D. Act cannot hold good against S. 11 and S. 40 of the L.I.C. Act, read with Reg. 52 thereunder. This exercise constrains me to study the
scheme of the two statues in the context of the specific controversy I am dealing with.
There is no doubt that the L.I.C. Act, as its long title suggests, is an Act to provide for the nationalisation of life insurance business in India by
transferring all such business to a Corporation established for the purpose and to provide for the regulation and control of the business of the
Corporation and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Its primary purpose was to nationalise private insurance business and to
establish the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Inevitably, the enactment spelt out the functions of the Corporation, provided for the transfer of
existing life insurance business to the Corporation and set out in detail how the management, finance accounts and audit of the Corporation should
be conducted. Incidentally, there was provision for transfer of service of existing employees of the insurers to the Corporation and, sub-
incidentally, their conditions of services also had to be provided for. The power to make regulations covering all matters of management was also
vested in appropriate authorities. It is plain and beyond dispute that so far as nationalisation of insurance business is concerned, the L.I.C. Act is a
special legislation but equally indubitably, is the inference, from a bare perusal of the subject, scheme and sections and understanding of the
anatomy of the Act, that it has nothing to do with particular problem of disputes between employer and employees, or investigation and
adjudication of such disputes. It does not deal with workmen and disputes between workmen & employers or with industrial disputes. The
Corporation has an army of employees who are not workmen at all. For instance, the higher echelons and other types of employees do not fall
within the scope of workmen as defined in S. 2(s) of the I.D. Act. Nor is the Corporation''s main business investigation and adjudication of labour
disputes any more than a motor manufacturer''s chief business in spraying paints.
In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject matter plus the particular perspective. For
certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer
points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes - so too in life. The I.D. Act is a special statue devoted wholly to investigation
and settlement of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for the nature of industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an
infrastructure for investigation into solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement
of awards and settlements. From alpha to omega the I.D. Act has one special mission-the resolution of industrial disputes through specialised
agencies according to specialised procedures and with special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming within the definition of
workmen. Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the I.D. Act is a special statue, and the L.I.C. Act
does not speak at all with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand, its powers relate to the general aspects of nationalisation of
management when private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing
employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of
and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the L.I.C. Act. And whenever there was a dispute between workmen and management the
I.D. Act mechanism was resorted to.
What are we confronted with in the present case, so that I may determine as between the two enactments which is the special ? The only subject
which has led to this litigation and which is the bone of contention between the parties is an industrial dispute between the Corporation and its
workmen. If we refuse to be obfuscated by legal abracadabra and see plainly what is so obvious, the conclusion that flows, in the wake of the
study I have made, is that vis-a-vis ""industrial disputes"" at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the Corporation the I.D.
Act is a special legislation and the L.I.C. Act a general legislation. Likewise, when compensation on nationalisation is the question, the L.I.C. Act is
the special statue. An application of the generalia maxim as expounded by English text-books and decisions leaves us in no doubt that the I.D. Act
being special law, prevails over the L.I.C. Act which is but general law.
On the other hand, the learned Advocate general would contend as follows : As between the two Central enactments such as LIC Act and I.D.
Act, the LIC Act and the Act of 1946, and the Electricity Supply Act and the Act of 1946, the principal generalia specialibus non-derogant will
apply. But as between the Central Acts, even if it be the Act of 1946 and the state enactment touched an item in the concurrent List No. 3 in the
9th Schedule to the Constitution of India and having received the assent of the President of India, the State Act shall prevail by virtue of Art. 254
of the Constitution of India. The regulations made pursuant to the power conferred on the respondent-Board u/s 73 of the Act IV of 1971 shall
prevail over all the central enactments including the Act of 1946. The learned Advocate General further contended that in any event the impugned
regulations limited to the employees of the respondent-Board will be a special enactment vis-a-vis the Act of 1946, which is applicable to all
workmen in all industrial establishments throughout India. We are unable to countenance the above contention of the learned Advocate-General in
view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in U.P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain (supra) and the Full Bench decision of this Court
in Bagianathan, S v. The Secretary to the Govt. of Tamil Nadu etc. 1984-II-LLJ-273. In U. P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain
(supra) the Supreme Court held that the Industrial Establishments (Standing Orders) Act is a special law in regard to matters enumerated in the
Schedule and the regulations made by the U.P. State Electricity Board with regard to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations
are either notified by the Government u/s 13-B of the Standing Orders Act or certified by the certifying officer u/s 5 of the Standing Orders Act. In
regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the U.P. State Electricity Board having been notified by the Governors, the Standing
Orders Act shall continue to apply. It is worthwhile to extract the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the above decision 1978-
II-LLJ-399 :
In Thiruvenkatasami''s case (1968-II-LLJ-361) Kailasam, J., also observed that the Industrial Establishment (Standing Order) Act was a special
Act relating exclusively to the service conditions of persons employed in industrial establishments, and therefore, its provisions prevailed over the
provisions of the District Municipalities Act. We entirely agree"".
In Bagianathan v. The Secretary to the Govt. of Tamil Nadu 1984-II-LLJ-273 a Full Bench of this Court considered the question whether the
provisions of the Standing Orders Act will prevail over the provisions of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act and the rules framed there-
under in their applicability to such municipal electrical undertaking. The Full Bench, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P.
State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain (supra) answered the question referred above in the following terms (pp 279-280) :
In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to earlier, it will be convenient now to taken up question No. 3, set forth at the outset.
Earlier, we had seen how Kailasam, J., (as he then was) in construing the question whether the Standing Orders Act would be a special enactment
relating exclusively to the service conditions of persons employed in industrial establishments and such a special Act, would prevail over the
provisions of the District Municipalities Act, generally dealing with the administration of municipalities, concluded that the Standing Orders Act
would prevail over the provisions of the District Municipalities Act. This view was not accepted by the Division Bench in Coimbatore Municipality
by its Commissioner, v. K. Thiruvenkatasami ILR 1973 Mad 405. In doing so the Division Bench examined in extenso the contention raised that
by virtue of S. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to Art. 254 of the Constitution of India, the provisions contained in the
District Municipalities Act, will have to give way to the provisions of the Standing Orders Act and held that the Standing Orders and the Model
Standing Orders thereunder would be a general Central enactment applicable throughout the territory of India in respect of ''industrial
establishments'' coming within its scope and that the rules framed in the exercise of the powers conferred under S. 74 of the District Municipalities
Act would constitute special law and on the appreciation of the principle that special law will exclude the general, the rules made by the
Government under S. 74 of the District Municipalities Act, will prevail over the Standing Orders Act or the Model Standing Orders thereunder.
This view of the Division Bench does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court at the time when the decision in the U.
P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar (supra) was rendered by it. Even so, the attention of the Supreme Court had been drawn to the
decisions of this Court in Raman Nambissan v. State Electricity Board 1967-I-LLJ-252 and Thiruvenkatasami v. Coimbatore Municipality 1968-
I-LLJ-361 and the Supreme Court, while expressing its agreement with the conclusions in both these cases, had made a pointed and particular
reference to the observations of Kailasam, J., (as he then was) in Thiruvenkatasami v. Coimbatore Municipality (supra) and stated at page 74 that
the Standing Orders Act was a special Act relating exclusively to the service conditions of persons employed in industrial establishment and
therefore, its provisions will prevail over the provisions of the District Municipalities Act or the rules framed by the State Government under S. 74.
In view of the approval by the Supreme Court of the view expressed by Kailasam. J., (as he then was) with reference to the provisions of the
Standing Orders Act, being a special enactment prevailing over the provisions of the District Municipalities Act, the decision contra by the Division
Bench in Coimbatore Municipality Rep. by its Commissioner, Coimbatore v. Thiruvenkatasami ILR 1973 I Mad 405 to the effect that the
provisions of the District Municipalities Act or the rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred under S. 74 of that Act would constitute
special law and would exclude the applicability of the Standing Orders Act, which would be in the nature of general law applicable to all industrial
establishments throughout the territory coming within its scope, cannot be sustained.
Applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the U. P. State Electricity Board and Another v. Hari Shankar Jain and Others (supra)
referred to earlier, we hold on the third question set out at the beginning that the provisions of the Standing Orders Act, if applicable to a Municipal
undertaking as an ''industrial establishment'' defined in the Standing Orders Act, being in the nature of a special enactment, will prevail over the
provisions of the District Municipalities Act, and the rules thereunder and to this extent, the decision of the Division Bench in the Coimbatore
Municipality rep. by its Commissioner, Coimbatore v. Thiruvenkatasami (supra) is not correct.
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in U. P. State Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain (supra) and Bagianathan, S v. The Secretary
to the Govt. of Tamil Nadu etc. (supra) are applicable to the facts of the present case and we fully agree with the conclusion of the learned Single
Judge that the Act of 1946 is a special law vis-a-vis regulations framed under the general law viz., the Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1971, and it will
prevail over the regulations framed by the respondent-Board in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 73 of the Act IV of 1971. The learned Single
Judge also rightly held that the respondent-Board is an ''industrial establishment'' within the meaning of Section 2(e)(i) of the Act of 1946, that the
regulations framed by the respondent-Board in exercise of the powers u/s 73 of the Act IV of 1971 will not be applicable to the workmen
governed by the Act of 1946 and that the disciplinary action taken by the respondent-Board against the workmen based on the regulations have to
be struck down.
Coming to the question of the Constitutional validity of Regulations 21 and 31(g) of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and drainage Board Officers
and Servants Conduct Regulations we are of the view that such question need not be gone into in these writ appeals since no instances of any one
other than the workman being proceeded against under the impugned regulations has been brought to our notice. The apprehension of the
petitioners that in case the regulations are notified, they may be invoked against a workman is also in the sphere of contingency which may or may
not happen. In case of impugned regulations are notified u/s 13-B of the Act of 1946, the vires of the regulations can be challenged provided if any
party is aggrieved. It is true, findings have been rendered by the learned Single Judge against the petitioners on the question of the constitutional
vires and the concerned regulations. Such findings rendered by the learned Single Judge need not stand and they are hereby vacated as totally
unnecessary. The discussion of ours as above, obliges us to dismiss the writ appeals. Accordingly, both the writ appeals are dismissed, but, in the
circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.