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Judgment
Varadachariar, J.—The Taluq Board of Koilpatti sued ''the Sivagiri Zamindar for a declaration of rights and for recovery of money on foot
of an agreement, Ex. A, executed on 6th June, 1895, by a former Zamindar of Sivagiri in favour of the Tinnevelly Taluq Board in whose territorial
jurisdiction Sivagiri was then included.
The correspondence exhibited in the case established that the then Zamindar was keen upon having a Taluq Board Hospital established at
Sivagiri, the headquarters of his Zamindari, but the Taluq Board was not prepared to do so unless the Zamindar agreed to make a contribution
both towards the cost of construction and towards the expenses of its maintenance. The Zamindar having accepted this condition, the hospital was
opened in September, 1894, in a building temporarily occupied for the purpose; but, before beginning the construction of a permanent building, the
Board insisted on and obtained a registered document Ex. A from the Zamindar. By this document, the Zamindar on behalf of himself, his heirs and
successors bound himself ""to pay to the Board an annual contribution of Rs. 500 on or before the 30th day of September every year in
consideration of the establishment and maintenance by the said Taluq Board of a dispensary at Sivagiri"" and also ""pay to the said Taluq Board Rs.
2,000 towards meeting the cost of construction of a building for the dispensary when the work shall be begun"". A building was accordingly
constructed by the Board, the Zamindar paid his contribution of Rs. 2,000 and he as well as his successors continued to pay the annual
contribution of Rs. 500 till September, 1924. The defendant who had by this time come into possession of the Zamindari declined to make any
further contribution on the ground that the Taluq Board was realising quite a large sum by way of cesses, and no longer stood in need of a
contribution from him for the purpose of the hospital. Hence this suit.
The learned subordinate Judge has held that on a true construction of Ex. A, it only bound the then Zamindar and, not his successors in the
estate. He was also of opinion that so much of the agreement as related to the annual contribution, of Rs. 500 did not amount to a contract
because there was no corresponding obligation on the part of the Board to continue to maintain the hospital for all time: he held that this portion of
Ex. A was only in the nature of a continuing offer which could be revoked and had been revoked by the defendant. Finally he held that the
obligation, if any, imposed by Ex. A upon succeeding Zamindars could not be enforced as against the estate because of the provision of Section 4
of the Madras Impartible Estates Act (II of 1904) and he was of opinion) that the present case did not fall, within the exceptions saved by Section
He accordingly dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal'' by the Taluq Board.
The first ground of the lower Court''s decision may easily be disposed of. It is perhaps possible to criticise Ex. A as introducing the reference to
heirs and successors"" in an appropriate place but reading Ex. A as a whole, we have no-doubt that it was the intention of the parties to enter into-
the arrangement not merely on behalf of the then Zamindar but also on behalf of his heirs and successors in the estate. Whether he could validly do
so is another matter. We do not pursue the point further, because Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar, who appeared for the respondent before us, did not
attempt to support this ground of the lower Court''s decision.
In dealing with the second point, we cannot agree, with the lower Court in splitting up Ex. A into two independent parts, one relating to the
construction of the hospital, and the other relating to its maintenance. Not merely the substance of the thing but even the collocation of words in Ex.
A suggests that the Taluq Board agreed to establish a hospital at Sivagiri only on condition of the Zamindars agreeing to contribute annually a part
of the expenses of its maintenance. To say that there was one offer to contribute towards the costs of the construction and this was accepted by
the Board and the whole matter terminated on the construction of the hospital, leaving the question of its maintenance to be governed by a separate
offer and acceptance does not seem to us a reasonable construction of Ex. A. It is obvious that it was not worth while bringing a hospital into
existence-the correspondence makes it clear that the Taluk Board would not have put itself to the trouble and expense of constructing a hospital at
Sivagiri-without some definite arrangement for meeting the cost of its working expenses. The learned Judge''s theory that for the expenses of each
year there is a separate offer by the Zamindar of a contribution which must be deemed to be accepted by the Board by maintaining the hospital for
that year seems to us wholly artificial and unnatural. It might as well be said that the offer is one from day to day or even hour to hour. We are not
prepared to uphold the power of revocation claimed by the Zamindar on this basis.
The argument has also been put in a slightly different form, namely, that as there is no obligation on the part of the Taluq Board to maintain the
hospital, there is no ''consideration'' for the Zamindar''s promise and there is accordingly no legal or enforceable contract. It may be conceded that
where a promise by A is consideration for a promise by B, the former, so long as it remains executory, will not amount to consideration in the eye
of the law unless it involves a legal obligation which A may be compelled to perform. In this connection some arguments were urged before us to
show that the Taluq Board has not bound itself and could not bind itself to maintain the hospital. We do not propose to enter upon a discussion of
this question because for the purpose of this argument we are prepared to assume that the Taluq Board was not compellable to continue the
hospital at Sivagiri. Even where the promise on one side does not involve a legal obligation, there can be little doubt that its performance will
constitute sufficient consideration, that is, as an'' executed consideration, for the promise on the other side.
A comparison of Westheard v. Sprosen (1861) 6 H & N. 728 : 158 E.R. 301, referred to in this connection with Morrell v. Cowan (1887) 6
Ch. D. 173 and Morrell v Cowan (1878) 7 Ch. D. 151 will suffice to show that once the executed promise becomes the consideration, it is not for
the Court to examine the quantum or adequacy of the consideration except where the language of the document is ambiguous. A mere promise to
supply goods to another on credit where there is no obligation undertaken to do so may not amount to consideration in law for a guarantee in
respect of past debts due by such other person. But if the merchant does in fact supply goods on the strength of the guarantee, the benefit of the
guarantee may, if the language of the document is clear enough, attach not merely to the goods supplied after the date of the guarantee but also
prior debts. If, as we have already held, the proper construction of Ex. A is that in consideration of the Zamindar''s promise, the Board has fulfilled
its promise at least to the extent of constructing the hospital there can no longer arise any question of absence of consideration for the Zamindar''s
promise. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar asked whether, in this view, it would not follow that the Board could claim annual contribution from the Zamindar
even if it should cease to maintain the hospital. We do not think it would. The very idea of a ''contribution'' and the reference to ''maintenance'' in
Ex. A imply the continued maintenance of the hospital by the Board, but to reach this result it is not necessary to treat the matter as a question of
''consideration''. It may well be regarded as a ''condition'' or limit of the obligation itself.
There remains the question whether the obligation imposed"" on himself and his successors by the then Zamindar under Ex. A is binding on the
successors in title to the Zamindari of Sivagiri. Though the lower court has regarded the question as concluded by the provisions of the Madras
Impartible Estates Act, it was realised in the course of the arguments before us that the point involved wider issues. It was agreed that if Ex. A
could be construed as creating a charge on the zamindari, the answer to this question would be easy enough. The learned Advocate-General
accordingly relied on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Rajah of Ramnad v. Sundara Pandiyasami Thevar (1918) 36 M.L.J. 164 : L.R. 46
IndAp 64 : ILR 42 Mad. 581 , in support of his contention that Ex. A must be held to create a charge. Their Lordships do not go into the reasons
for taking that view in that case, apparently because they were prepared to adopt the reasons given by Seshagiri Iyer, J., in the High Court (See
Rajarajeswara Dorai alias Muthuramalinga Dorai Avergal Rajah of Ramnad Vs. V. Sundarapandiaswami Thevar, . Giving the matter our best
consideration, we are unable to hold that either the language of Ex. A or the surrounding circumstances suffice to import the creation of a charge on
the Zamindari. Several of the reasons relied on by Seshagiri Iyer, J., in Rajarajeswara Dorai alias Muthuramalinga Dorai Avergal Rajah of Ramnad
Vs. V. Sundarapandiaswami Thevar, , do not exist here. If the obligation is to be held to rest merely on covenant, it seems to us far fetched to rely
upon the analogy of nibandha in the Hindu Law to make the obligation valid and perpetually binding on all persons coming into possession of the
Zamindari, whether by inheritance or by survivorship or by alienation. We do not rest our conclusion on the provisions of the Madras Impartible
Estates Act, because Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar admitted that if the obligation under Ex. A would not fall within the exception enacted in Section 7 of
that Act, it would not also be covered by the prohibition enacted in Section 4. We do not think that we can describe the obligation as amounting to
a ''debt'' in the natural or usual sense of the term. It is'' not by any means analogous to the case of a present debt payable by instalments. On the
ground that an obligation of this kind resting only on covenant cannot be enforced against the Zamindari in the hands of persons who have
succeeded to it by survivorship and those coming after them, we affirm the decree of the lower Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Mockett, J.
I agree with my learned brother for the reason given by him that as between the Taluq Board and the Zamindar, there was an enforceable
contract by which the Taluk Board was entitled, so long as it maintained the Dispensary, to claim from the Zamindar the sum of Rs. 500 annually.
But the real question is, how far that contract binds the Zamindar''s successors. The respondent has before us raised a contention which was not
pleaded in the Court below and which is not mentioned in the grounds of appeal. It is argued that under Ex. A, a charge is created on the
Zamindari and reliance is placed on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Rajah of Ramnad v. Sundara Pandiyasami Thevar (1918) 36 M.L.J
164 : L.R. 46 IndAp 64 : ILR 42 Mad. 581 , a case in which the Board held that a charge was created on the estate of the Rajah of Ramnad. This
argument was essential to the appellant''s case as I do not understand that it was contended that it was possible for the Zamindar to bind his
successors except by a charge on the estate. Whether an intention to create a charge exists, naturally depends upon the document in each case
together with its surrounding circumstances, Janardhan v. Anant (1908) 32 Bom. 386. In this case the oral evidence for the plaintiff is in no way
explanatory of the facts from which Ex. A emerged, being confined to proof of documents. But paragraph 4 of the plaint refers to Sivagiri as having
a ''dense population'' but no dispensary and paragraph 5 states that the Zamindar realised the urgent necessity for a medical dispensary there.
Whether the Taluq Board realised this too is not stated but it is stated that the Board could not afford a dispensary. That is, they could not then
afford it. It is of course the duty of the Board to provide such dispensaries especially in places with dense populations.
We are dependent almost entirely on the correspondence and other documents. Ex. A unquestionably purports to bind the Zamindar and his
heirs and successors. But it is important to note that the dispensary is to be under the control of the Taluq Board and is open to any class of
parties. There is therefore no question of the dispensary being for the treatment exclusively of the Zamindar''s retainers. In Rajah of Ramnad v.
Sundara Pandiyasami Thevar (1918) 36 M.L.J. 164 : L.R. 46 IndAp 64 : ILR 42 Mad. 581 , the facts were that there was a claim to the
Zamindari which was compromised on terms that one party gave up his claim and agreed to receive Rs. 700 a month in perpetuity from the other.
So, in exchange for his claim, one party who was to receive a money payment from the other in the words of the compromise ""from generation to
generation"". The English record of Compromise reads thus:
The plaintiff having thus completely relinquished all right and claim, the defendant and her heirs holding the Zamindari shall, from 1st November,
1860, pay to the plaintiff and his heirs a monthly allowance of Rs. 700.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J., whose judgment met with the approval of the Board, held that the above constituted a charge. In this respect he differed
from Sir John Wallis, O.C.J. His reasons were expressed as follows:
It must also be'' borne in mind that Sivaswami claimed the whole Zamindari and it is hardly conceivable that he would have been content to take a
personal covenant for payment of; the allowance when he had laid claim to the Zamindari itself. Further if no charge is intended to be created upon
the Zamindari, it was hardly necessary in these two documents to use the expression ''the defendant and her heirs holding the Zamindari''.
Moreover the grant was in the nature of one for maintenance and it is well understood that maintenance ordinarily comes out of an estate in the
possession of the promisor.
The learned Judge goes on to hold that from the surrounding circumstances the party who gave up so large a claim intended to secure the
maintenance by a charge. In an earlier case, also a decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Narayana Ananga v. Madhava Deo (1893) L.R.
20 IndAp 9 : ILR 16 Mad. 268 , their lordships took the view that in the settlement of a dispute between rival parties interested in an impartible
Zamindari estate, the language of the document and the facts, showed that the interests of the disputant were intended to be protected by a charge.
It does not appear that the present case is analoguous to the above authorities. I do not think it was intended to lay down that in all circumstances
where a Zamindar purported to contract to bind himself and his successors, it would follow that his successors were bound by a charge on the
estate. So to hold would appear to put Zamindars in a different category to other persons. The Taluq Boardhadno claim on the Zamiridari. In the
cases cited the whole basis of the charge was to satisfy such a claim. I think this contract must be dealt with like any to other contract. I do not
think it can be gathered from the surrounding circumstances that1 a charge Was ever intended to tie created and in view of the late stage at which
this contention has been raised. I am not in the; least satisfied such a charge was created or has been proved. The plaintiffs can, if they think fit
close the dispensary thus restoring the; status quo. Herein is another marked difference between the position of a person who has given up all his
rights in a Zamindari and the facts before us. I agree therefore that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.