The State of Tamilnadu vs S. Noor Mohammed and The Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal

V.S. Sirpurkar, J.—The Government in this case has challenged the order of the Tribunal, whereby the Tribunal has directed reinstatement

of the first respondent.

At the relevant time, the first respondent herein was a public servant serving as General Manager, District Industries Centre, Dharmapuri. He

allegedly demanded bribe from one Govindaraju, son of Munuswamy. The matter was reported to the Vigilance and Anti Corruption department

and a trap was arranged and on 16.6.1997, the first respondent was caught red-handed while accepting the bribe. He was arrested and produced

before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri. The first respondent was remanded to custody and he got bail on 30.6.1997. He was suspended

with effect from the date of his arrest and he challenged his suspension order by O.A. No. 1734/98, which application was dismissed taking the

view that there was no limitation for the continuation of the suspension and that as per Clause 6(ix) of G.O. Ms. No. 40, Personnel and

Administrative Reforms Department dated 30.1.1996, there would be no question of limiting the continuation of suspension.

It is obvious that thereafter, by a subsequent order dated 8.7.1998, his suspension was continued till the final orders were passed in the

proposed departmental proceedings or as the case may be, the pending criminal prosecution. The first respondent did not do anything with this and

instead filed another application being O.A. No. 10676/98. The Tribunal allowed this application on the ground that since the suspension was

continuing for more than two years, it was liable to be revoked and the first respondent was liable to be reinstated into service. He was directed to

be taken into service within two weeks from the date of that order. It is this order of the Tribunal which is in challenge before us.

Learned Special Government Pleader very strenuously urges that there is absolutely no basis for the order of the Tribunal as the Tribunal has

arbitrarily held that the period of two years is an unreasonable period for the continuation of suspension. Learned Special Government Pleader

points out, and in our opinion rightly that there is a graft case pending against the first respondent under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption

Act and also an ensuing departmental enquiry. He says, unless that case was completed, there was no question of revoking the suspension and the

Tribunal was entirely in error in making an observation that since the suspension continued for two years, the incumbent was liable to be reinstated.

In our opinion, the learned Special Government Pleader is undoubtedly right in making this statement because, in our opinion, the Tribunal could

not have found this fancy period of two years as unreasonable and could not have arbitrarily fixed any such period being an unreasonable period.

The Tribunal has not bothered to mention any facts in the order nor has the Tribunal bothered to support its view by any case law or any rule or

any Government order. In fact, the Government orders are clear that where the criminal prosecution is pending, there would be no question of

limiting the suspension to a particular period. It is only in the case of departmental enquiries where there are no criminal prosecution that there are

certain rules for limiting the period of suspension. They do not apply universally to even the cases where the criminal prosecution like the serious

offence of bribery are pending. In that view we are not at all satisfied with the order of the Tribunal and would choose to set it aside. The record

shows that from time to time the Government has been reviewing the suspension in keeping with the suspension rules. As we find on record, the

second review was undertaken in the year 1999 wherein the suspension was still further ordered to be continued.

In short, the order of the Tribunal in directing reinstatement is patently illegal and therefore the order is set aside. The writ petition is allowed and

the Original Application filed by the first respondent is ordered to be dismissed. Under the circumstances, we would inflict costs of Rs. 2,000/-

(Rupees two thousand only) though the first respondent has not chosen to appear before this Court. WMP 20847 of 1999 is closed.