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J. Kanakaraj, J.—The Respondents filed the writ petition W.P. No. 21721 of 1993 seeking the issue of a writ of certicrarified mandamus to quash the proceedings of the second Respondent dated 19.11.1993 and to direct the Appellants/ the Respondents in writ petition, to pay compensation for the lands in question. They having succeeded before the learned single Judge, the Respondents in the writ petition viz. the Government of Tamil Nadu and its officers have filed the present appeal.
The first Respondent claims to be the owner of a vast extent of land viz. 197-36 acres in Malaiyadipudur and Kalakkad Villages Nangurneri taluk, Tirunelveli district. The said extent of 197.36 acres are said to have been endowed to Shri Vanamamalai Ramanuja Mutt in the year 1874 by a gift deed executed by one Thiruvenkatadri in favour of Sri Vanamamalai Jeer Swamigal Sannidhi. The gift was for the purpose of carrying out several items of religious and charitable service mentioned in the gift deed. They leased out the lands to the 2nd Respondent and the lease was to subsist till 30.6.2002. The lessee had agreed to conduct certain festivals which the said Vanamamalai Mut had to perform under the gift deed. The annual lease amount was Rs. 7,620/- whereas the annual expenditure in respect of the festivals was only Rs. 1000/- it is their case that as per the lease, the second Respondent had re-claimed the land to the extent possible and raised coffee, tea and cardamom plants in about 80 acres. Just about the time when the crops started to yield, the Government notified the lands along with several other lands as a Wild Life Sanctuary by a notification G.O.Ms. No. 185 dated 6.3.1976. The same was followed by notice of proclamation as Wild Life Sanctuary on 13.8.1978. In the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 (hereinafter called as the "Act") under which the notifications were made, there is a peculiar procedure, to which we will make a detailed reference a little later for payment of compensation to private lands, which are included in a Wild Life Sanctuary. For the purpose of calculating the compensation, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are adopted.
The award enquiry was fixed on 21.1.1991 and notices were issued to the Respondent. It is at this stage, that the parties were not quite aware of their rights and the manner in which they will be affected by the said notification. Nor did the parties foresee the implications and the outcome of the notifications. They were not in a position to guess as to whether they will be richer or poorer by the completion of the acquisition proceedings. It was a stage when a Doctor was called upon to diagnose the malady or illness suffered by a patient. As in the case of the medical profession, in this case also, the experts made a wrong diagnos as will be seen from the following facts.
As soon as the notice for award enquiry was received, the immediate response of the Respondents and apparently helped by legal experts was to question the very acquisition by the issue of the notification. Writ Petition No. 685 of 1991 was filed by the first Respondent questioning the validity of the notification. On 30.7.1991, the said writ petition was dismissed and against that a writ appeal W.A. No. 1071 of 1991 was filed. It was at this stage, the parties realising their mistake in questioning the validity of the notification promptly withdrew the writ appeal on 20.1.1992. While dismissing the writ appeal, directions were given to pass the award for payment of compensation. Again a notice was issued for the award enquiry to be held on 9.3.1992. After the completion of the award enquiry, proposals were sent by the authority seeking approval of the terms of the award. Since the Respondents/Appellants herein, were delaying the matter W.P. No. 6931 of 1993 was filed seeking the issue of the writ of mandamus to pass the award. On 11.8.1993, the writ petition was allowed and direction was issued to pass the award within four weeks from the date of the receipt of the order. The Appellants sought for extension of time in W.M.P. No. 27924 of 1993 and in that application, they had indicated that there was a proposal to drop the acquisition. Even so, an order was passed on 26.10.1993 extending the time for passing the award. On 12.11.1993, the Government wrote a letter addressed to the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration with copies to the Collector of Tirunelveli, to the Government of India and the Wild Life Warden, Kalakad indicating that the Government did not consider the acquisition of the lands was necessary for the Wild Life Sanctuary and directed the authorities to take appropriate action. On 17.11.1993, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration passed an order directing the Collector to take action according to Clause (a) of Sub-clause (2) of Section 24 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 so as to exclude the lands in question from the limits of the proposed sanctuary. Consequently, the impugned proceedings of the Collector was issued on 19.11.1993. It is under these circumstances, that the Respondents came to file the writ petition for the reliefs already referred to.
In support of the writ petition, several grounds were raised by the Respondents herein and we will make a reference to the same while adverting to the arguments of the Learned Counsel. A detailed counter was filed by the Appellants/Respondents. They denied the allegations made in the writ petition and submitted that the impugned notifications are valid and not liable to be quashed.
A Contempt Application 340 of 1994 was filed by the second Respondent complaining about the disobedience of the order of this Court made in W.P. No. 6931 of 1993 dated 26.10.1993. In this Contempt Application, counter-affidavits have been filed stating that there was no disobedience of the orders of the Court. Both W.P. No. 21721 of 1993 and Contempt Application 340 of 1994 were taken together by learned single Judge of this Court. Orders are passed on 13.9.1995 allowing the writ petition and finding the Appellants guilty of contempt and imposing a fine of Rs. 1000/- each on each of the Appellants.
Learned Government Pleader, arguing the case for the Appellants contends that the impugned notification can be sustained on each one of the three grounds urged before us:
(1) The power invoked in the impugned proceedings is good enough to sustain the notification namely Section 24(2)(a) of the Wild Life Protection Act.
(2) Alternatively it is contended that u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, the withdrawal could be sustained because possession has not been taken of the subject lands.
(3) The third argument is that in any event Section 21 of the General Clauses Act will come to the rescue of the Government and on the basis of the said Section 21, the notification is valid and legal.
On the other hand, Mr. N.R. Chandran Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents argues that none of the above provisions of law would be able to sustain the action of the Government and both on law and on facts, the impugned notifications had been rightly set aside by the learned single Judge.
To understand the scope of the arguments we will proceed to refer to the records as well as the provisions of law. We will first refer to the provisions of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972. It has to be noticed that the Act had undergone significant changes in the year 1991 by the enactment of the Central Act, 44 of 1991. We will however for the present refer to the amended provisions of the Act and later on, refer to the unamended provisions which will govern the facts of the present case. Section 2 (26), after amendment, defines as follows:
"Sanctuary" means an area declared, whether u/s 2, or Section 38 or deemed....
Section 18 of the Act enables the State Government to declare any area as sanctuary for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wild life or its environment. The notification u/s 18 shall specify the situations and limits of such area with reference to well known boundaries. Section 19 enables the Collector to enquire into the rights of any person over any land in the sanctuary. Section 21 calls upon the Collector to issue a declaration in the regional language specifying limits and also requiring any person claiming any right u/s 19 to prefer a claim before the Collector within 2 months from the date of proclamation. Section 21 relates to the manner of enquiry and decision by the Collector. Section 23 refers to the powers of the Collector in asking such an enquiry. Section 24 is important for our purpose, and it in extracted below:
Acquisition of rights: (1) In the case of a claim to a right in or over any land referred to in Section 19, the Collector shall pass an order admitting or rejecting the same in whole or in part.
(2) if such claim is admitted in whole or in part, the Collector may either -
(a) exclude such land from the limits of the proposed sanctuary or
(b) proceed to acquire such land or rights, except where by an agreement between the owner of such land or holder of rights and the Government the owner or holder of such rights has agreed to surrender his rights to the Government in or over such land, and on payment of such compensation, as is provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894(1 of 1894).
(c) allow, in consultation with the Chief Wild Life Warden, the continuance of any right of any person, in or over any land within the limits of the sanctuary....
A bare reading of Section 24 suggests that once the claim of a person with reference to the lands in the sanctuary is admitted by the Collector, he has an option to do one of two things. He can either exclude the land from the limits of the sanctuary, or proceed to acquire the lands and pay compensation by adopting the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The third option relates to limit the rights of the owners and the right of the Chief Warden to permit the owners to exercise such limited rights in the sanctuary. Section 25 indicates the extent to which the Land Acquisition Act can be applied. While we do not propose to extract the Section, we will only refer to the salient features of the section of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Upto Section 9 of the Act are deemed to have been complied with. In other words, the validity of the acquisition cannot be challenged on any ground and the acquisition is deemed to be an acquisition for public purpose. It is thus clear that beyond the award of compensation and the liberty given to the owner to seek for enhanced compensation u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, no provision of the Land Acquisition Act will apply. Section 26-A is again an important section which says that after the disposal of all claims u/s 18 of the Act, the State Government shall issue a notification specifying the limits of that area which shall be comprised within the sanctuary and declare the area as a sanctuary on and from such date as may be specified in the notification. Sub-section (3) of Section 26-A is relied on by the Respondents and it is as follows:
...(3) No alteration of the boundaries of sanctuary shall be made except on a resolution passed by the Legislature of the State....
Sections 27 to 32 relate to the consequences of a declaration u/s 26-A and the restrictions that are imposed on the general public.
The question of preservation of lion tailed macaque which is one of the endangered species was instituted by the Tamil Nadu forest Department on the studies undertaken by one Mr. Steevan Green. It was found to be restricted to the evergreen forests of the Western Ghats in the South India. The then Chief Conservator of Forests found the existence of the said species in the ex-Singampatti estate. In fact, the Kalakad Reserve Forest was proposed to provide a home for the lion tailed macaque. As a first step, the felling of the trees in the area by the then lessee of the said area, namely, Bombay Burma Trading Corporation in the ex-zamin of Singampatti village was ordered. The Kalakad Reserve Forest was also ordered to be preserved by preventing shooting and the felling of trees. On 16.2.1976, the Chief Conservator of Forests addressed a letter to the Tamil Nadu Government seeking notification for the formation of a sanctuary in Kalakad forest to provide a home for the lion-tailed macaque. Necessary funds were also sought for, for the notification and the compensation to be paid to the lessee. On 12.12.1975, the Chief Conservator sent a draft notification u/s 18(1) of the Act for the approval of the Government. In this letter the reference is only to the protection of the lion-tailed macqaue. In March, 1996, there was a reference to the areas in Tamil Nadu and Kerala being policed as tiger sanctuary. As a result of the above scanty correspondence, the Government issued G.O.Ms. No. 183, Forests and Fisheries dated 6.3.1996. It only says that the Government approved the proposals of the Chief Conservator to notify Kalakad forest as a sanctuary for the protection of wild life. The Collector of Tirunelveli was authorised to perform the duties as required under Sections 19 to 25 of the Act. The report to the above notification mentions 22358 hectares and clear boundaries are also indicated. Thereafter, a declaration was issued u/s 18(1) of the Act and published in the Government Gazette dated 6.3.1976. The Government of Tamil Nadu was apparently lured by the assurance of the Government of India to provide Central assistance for the sanctuary. The assurance at that time was only to the tune of Rs. 4.25 lakhs during the year 1976-77. When the Manimuthar Hydro Electric Project was introduced, the Conservator of Forest sent a report saying that it will interfere with the survival of the endangered species in Kalakad Forest area. It may be noticed that the lease in favour of the second Respondent was granted on 15.11.1971 in an extent of 197.36 acres. Though the actual records relating to the proceedings conducted under Sections 19 to 25 have not been placed before the Court, from a perusal of contemporary documents, the Court can take note of the following events. The officers authorised to perform the functions of the Collector under Sections 19 to 25 of the Act were being changed from time to time. It is seen that about 8 claims were made after the publication of the notification u/s 18 of the Act. The agent of the first Respondent was enquired into at the time of the enquiry. The claims made u/s 19 were rejected and a decision was taken u/s 24 of the Act to acquire the lands. These facts are admitted in the counter affidavit of the Government in W.P. No. 685/91. Even as early as 13.9.1989, the agent of the first Respondent seems to have represented that compensation may be paid at an early date. In other words, the first Respondent was able to see that instead of holding on to the lands, it was better to receive monetary compensation.
It is thus clear that the authorised Officer namely, the Collector had taken a clear decision u/s 24 of the Act, to proceed to acquire the lands of the Respondents and pay compensation for the same, under the Land Acquisition Act. In other words, the authorised Officer had clearly taken a decision u/s 24(2) (a) not to exclude the lands, but, on the other hand to proceed to acquire the same. Once this stage is over and a decision had been taken to acquire the lands, we are unable to see how the authorised officer could exercise powers u/s 24(2)(a) to exclude the lands. Further, the power u/s 24 has to be exercised by the authorised officer namely, the Collector in a quasi-judicial manner. No higher authority can influence the Collector in taking, decision u/s 24 of the Act. On the other hand, we have clearly seen that the Government wrote a letter to the Special Commissioner on 12.11.1993 and the Special Commissioner passed orders on 17.11.1993 directing the Collector to take action u/s 24(2)(a) and exclude the lands in question from the limits of the proposed sanctuary. It goes without saying that the impugned order of the Collector dated 19.11.1993 was passed on the dictates of the Government and cannot be sustained as an order passed on the basis of evidence, as a quasi-judicial authority. Therefore, both on the grounds of lack of power and on the ground that the order was influenced by the directions of the Government, the argument of the learned Government Pleader relying on Section 24(2)(a) of the Act has to be rejected.
The second argument is based on Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and we have already pointed out that Section 25 of the Wild Life Protection Act does not incorporate any other provision of law, except those provisions relating to the payment of compensation. There is absolutely no scope for the application of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and the second argument of the learned Government Pleader is accordingly rejected.
Before considering the crucial argument advanced u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act, we have to notice the unamended provisions of law which alone govern the present case. The unamended Section 2(26) defines a sanctuary as meaning an area which was declared as such, whether u/s 2, or Section 38, or deemed, under Sub-section (3) of Section 66. Section 18 itself, was as follows:
...18. Declaration of Sanctuary: (1) The State Government may, by notification, declare any area to be a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating wild life or its environment.
(2) The notification referred to in Sub-section (1) shall specify, as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such area.
Explanation: For the purpose of this section, it shall be sufficient to describe the area by roads, rivers, ridges or other well-known or readily intelligible boundaries.
It will be thus seen that as soon as the Government issued notification as u/s 18, the area is declared as sanctuary. Even under the unamended provision, the Collector had to determine the rights of the claims in a sanctuary. So far as Section 24 is concerned, it was not amended and it gave power to the Collector to exclude lands claimed by certain persons or in the alternative, to proceed with the acquisition of such lands and pay compensation under Land Acquisition Act. The all important Section 26-A was not available prior to the amendment Act 44 of 1991. Therefore, the arguments based on Sub-clause (3) of Section 26-A also pale into insignificance.
If we now imagine the situation as presented by the unamended provision of law, we will realise that once a declaration is made u/s 18 and a decision is taken u/s 24 to proceed with the acquisition of private lands, there is no provision at all in the Act for the Government to alter or withdraw its notification. Even if circumstances make it impossible for the Government to proceed with the acquisition like "act of God" etc. it is with this background of the unamended Wild Life Protection Act that we have to consider whether the Government can invoke Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. No doubt in this case, the Government had not applied its mind properly and had simply directed the Collector or prescribed authority to proceed u/s 24(2) (a) of the Act. We have already stated that the said provision of law will not enable the Collector to exclude the lands in question.
Considerable arguments were advanced regarding the applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Reliance is placed on The State of Bihar Vs. D.N. Ganguly and Others, . That was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, where a dispute had been referred to a Tribunal for adjudication u/s 10(1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Government sought to supersede the reference pending adjudication of the Tribunal. The Apex Court pointed out that such a power cannot be conferred because if such a power was conferred it would amount to terminating the proceedings before Tribunal at any stage. Further, having regard to other provisions of the Industrial Disputes and the maintenance of industrial peace the Supreme Court observed as follows:
... We have no hesitation in holding that the rule of construction enunciated by S, 21 of the General Clauses Act in so far as it refers to the power of rescheduling or cancelling the original order cannot be invoked in respect of the provisions of S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act....
This decision was relied on by the Gujarat High Court in Consumer Education and Research Society, Ahmedabad and etc. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . No doubt, before the Gujarat High Court, the very provision of the Wild Life Protection Act was in question. But that case arose after the Act was amended in the year 1991, by Central Act, 44 of 1991, which came into force on 2.10.1952. The Government in that case had substituted a notification of the year 1981 with two notifications issued on 27.7.1993. The latter notifications were called in question, even though in that case, the notifications had been issued specifically u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act. Having regard to be amended provisions of the Wild Life Protection Act especially Sub-section (3) of Section 26(A), the Gujarat High Court held that the power u/s 21 of General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. According to the Gujarat High Court, once a sanctuary is notified u/s 26-A, the power of the Government to alter its boundaries had been taken away and the same could be done only by the State Legislation. We are therefore of the opinion that the said judgment cannot be applied to the facts of the case.
Two other judgments ; one by the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ajay Singh and others, and another by the Gauhati High Court in Gauhati Transport Association v. State AIR 1978 Gau 33 were also relied upon. The Apex Court was dealing with the provisions of the Commission of Enquiry Act and held that the power to fill any vacancy in the office of a member of the Commission is expressly provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act. Similarly, the power to discontinue the existence of the Commission when it becomes unnecessary, was possible u/s 7 of the Act. In view of these provisions, the Apex Court held that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked. So far as the unamended provisions of the Wild Life Protection Act is concerned, we have no hesitation in holding that the Act does provide for a situation like the one before us and therefore the ratio of the Apex Court judgment will not apply to the facts of the present case. Gauhati High Court also held that the State Government had no power to cancel or vary a notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section (sic)...of the Motor Vehicles Act, because certain conditions had been fixed in Sub-section (2) and (3). In view of the facts that adequate provisions have been made, to meet the particular contingency, the Court held that Section 21 of the General Clauses cannot be invoked.
We are left with the option of deciding this case on the peculiar facts of the present case and on the basis of the unamended provisions of the Wild Life Protection Act. To recapitulate the facts, the extent of land had been gifted only for the purpose of doing certain festivals in Sri Vanamamalai Mutt. Even according to the lease deed, the expenditure relating to the festivals would amount only Rs. 1,000/- per year. May be the expenses would have escalated as on date. It is very clear that when the Respondents decided to withdraw their Writ Appeal and accept the acquisition they had taken note of the fact large compensation was payable under the Land Acquisition Act and it would be more advantageous to receive the monetary compensation than to hold on to the forest lands. The unexpected turn of events, which the Government had never expected, could be noticed now. The Field Director in respect of the Project in question in his reference No. 1100/90-D1 dated 23.7.1993 addressed to the Chief Conservator of Forests writes as follows:
The total land to be acquired in the Kalakad and Mundanthurai Sanctuaries is 11972 Acres (4848 has). As seen from the reports available in this office file, the compensation recommended is Rs. 1.20 crores for a mere 197 acres of land. But the total amount allotted by the Government of India for the purpose of land acquisition is only Rs. 1.50 crores and 1 have already been clearly told by the Director, Project Tiger, Government of India that while they may be in a position to allot a few lakhs rupees more for this purpose large sums of money should not be expected from them and whatever is the remaining amount required must be raised from the resources of State Government only. It we go by the compensation fixed so far the estimated amount of money that would be required for acquisition of lands would come to approximately Rs. 100 crores or even more....
This is again explained in the next letter dated 11.9.93 as follows:
... The Kalakad Mundanthurai Tiger Project extends over an area of 817 sq. km. There are number of enclosures inside the project Tiger area, the total extent of which is 11972 acres (4848 has.) Under the Project Tiger Scheme, the Government of India have allotted a sum of Rs. 85 lakhs for land acquisition alone and another Rs. 63 lakhs for shifting two tribal villages and for land acquisition. Thus a total amount of Rs. 1.48 crores are available both for land acquisition and for shifting two tribal villages outside the project area. These amounts have been kept under the P.D. Account with the Collector, Tirunelveli district. The Government of India have now declined to allot any more amount for this purpose and have asked us to raise the remaining amounts from the sources of the State Government only....
Secondly, he pointed out, in letter dated 23.7.1993 as follows:
... Moreover the land for which compensation value has been arrived at actually falls in the lowest priority of the lands to be acquired by the Government since the utilisation of these lands is being one in a manner least prejudicial to the ecological stability of the Tiger Reserve. The reason is their extreme inaccessibility which makes commercial exploitation of these lands prohibitively costly....
We have already pointed out that the entire notification u/s 18 was decided upon by the Government on scanty materials for the purpose of protecting lion-tailed macque based on studies of one Mr. Steven Green. How the project- came to be called as a "Tiger Project" is a mystery. The Court cannot be blind to the difficulties of the Government created by the thoughtless action of some of its officers. For a project which appears to be on the face of it worthless, why our public money to the extent of Rs. 100 crores be spent? Are there not better projects and schemes which require funds and which if implemented would benefit the public. Nobody is against the promotion of tourism in this country. But the authorities must choose the proper place and develop the proper projects. It is this situation which has been brought about by hasty decisions initiated by and based upon certain studies undertaken by one Mr. Steven Green, which embarrassed the Government. We have absolutely no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that being faced with such a situation, the Government decided to back out and wisdom dawned on the authorities, though at a very late stage. Here again, the Government had not been advised properly and they had not studied the provisions of the law before undertaking the withdrawal proceedings. It appears to us on the facts and circumstances of the case, at least so far as the unamended provisions of the Act, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was applicable and could be invoked.
It may however be argued that Section 25-A had been introduced with effect from 2.10.1992 and the impugned proceedings of the Collector was passed on 19.11.1993. Therefore, Mr. N.R. Chandran, Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents pressed into service Sub-clause (3) of Section 26-A. We are of the opinion that this argument cannot be accepted because when the notification was issued u/s 18, it was under the unamended provisions and that notification had a different legal effect. In this case, no declaration at all has been issued u/s 26-A of the Act because the sanctuary was notified and declared under the unamended provisions of the Act. Further, we are also of the opinion that Sub-section (3) only relates to the alteration of a boundary of a sanctuary and not to the exclusion of certain lands which is provided for only u/s 24 of the Act at a particulars stage. Therefore, the argument based on Sub-section (3) of Section 26-a is rejected.
We do not propose to say that the Government is blemishless. On the other hand, the Government had acted thoughtlessly both at the stage of the notification u/s Section 18 and at the stage of withdrawal from the notification. The Government must suffer the consequence of their action, both in issuing declaration u/s 18 and in committing inordinate delay in passing the award and ultimately withdrawing from the notification. But the damage suffered by the Respondents on account of the Government''s act of commission and omission has to be proved in a Court of law. The Respondents have no doubt, valid case against the Government for their acts of commission and omission. The question is what the actual remedy of the Respondents. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy), is no doubt applicable on the facts of the present case. But we are only pointing out that the remedy of the Respondents is elsewhere. They have no right to insist on the Government completing the acquisition proceedings and proceeding with the project as a sanctuary. On the facts and the circumstances of the case, we concede the power of the Government to withdraw from the notification and refuse to pass an award under the Land Acquisition Act. We keep it open to the Respondents to take appropriate civil action for quantifying their damages and for this purpose, it is certainly open to them to rely on the provisions of the Limitation Act for excluding the period during which they had been prosecuting the matter in this Court.
For the reasons already given, we do not think that the Appellants had committed contempt of Court in not passing the award as per the directions given in W.P. No. 6931 of 1993 dated 26.10.1993. Even in the application for extension of time, the Appellants had pointed out that there were proposals to withdraw from the notification. We have also pointed out the dilemma in which the Government was placed having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. We do find that the Government has acted with circumspection, especially having regard to the interest of the public in mind. One must be happy that at least wisdom dawned on the Government at a very late stage. We cannot say that the Government had acted wilfully or wantonly to disrespect the orders of the Court. Such an order of the Court directing the passing of an award could not be understood as denying the Government the power to withdraw from the acquisition. If such a power vests in the Government. That would be the proper way of interpreting the statutory provisions read with the Court orders. Now that we have upheld the power of the Government u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act, we have to necessarily hold that the Appellants could not be punished for contempt. In this view of the matter, the order of the learned Single Judge allowing Contempt Application No. 346/94 is set aside. The said Contempt Application No. 340 of 199 will stand dismissed.
We have taken certain basic decisions on the facts and circumstances of the case regarding the rights of the parties, but still certain finer points of law are projected before us. We will consider such arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondents. One of the arguments is that the reasons given in the impugned order relating to lack of funds is factually incorrect. The argument is that the Central Government had undertaken to meet the entire costs and therefore, the State Government is not justified in giving an excuse that the acquisition would result in huge expenditure. There are two answers to this point. The first is that the Respondents did not implead the Government of India as a party to the present writ petition W.P. No. 21721 of 1993. Therefore, it is not possible to confirm whether the Government of India would meet any expenditure arising out of the declaration of the lands in question as a sanctuary. No doubt in the early stages of protecting the lion-tailed macque there were assurances from the Government that they were prepared to meet any requests for monetary assistance. This is conveyed in Government of India''s letter No. 25/70-71/ FB/IBWL dated 29.8.1972. This is again repeated in a letter of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation dated July 1975. Argues Mr. N. R. Chandran, the Learned Senior Counsel that if the cost of acquisition has since been enhanced, it is always open to the State Government to apply to the Government of India. Such an argument cannot be accepted, because if the Central Government rejects, the State Government will be seriously embarrassed. We have already pointed out that the money involved is not a small amount and may run upto Rs. 150 crores. It is public money and the Government should think twice about the continuance of the project. We have already expressed our doubts about the uselessness of the project.
The second question relates to the order of the Collector being influenced by the directions of the Government. This question only arises if we hold that the Collector has the power u/s 24 of the Act. We have already rejected the contention that the Collector has no power to exclude the land and if he had exercised such a power it would be a quasi-judicial power. But we are actually upholding the decision of the Government to withdraw from the acquisition and to exclude the subject lands from the notification relating to the sanctuary. We are construing the letter of the Government in Letter No. Ms. No. 377 EDF dated 12.11.1993 and the consequential order of the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration in R.O.C. No. H2/34854/92 dated 17.11.1993 as constituting the decision of the Government to withdraw from the inclusion of the lands of the Respondents in the sanctuary, and the consequential acquisition of the said lands. We are exercising our discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in holding that in the above two letters, the Government had taken a categorical decision to withdraw from the notification and the consequential acquisition. Therefore, we do not propose to take the order of the Collector dated 19.11.1993 for any purpose, as it simply follows the directions of the Government. Since the notification and declaration was issued by the State Government u/s 18 of the unamended Wild Life Protection Act, it is the Government and the Government alone which can cancel or modify the notification by invoking the power u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act. It is in this view of the matter we uphold the decision of the Government to exclude 197.36 acres of lands belonging to the Respondents and another extent of 148.55 acres from the limits of the proposed sanctuary, as perfectly in order and within the powers of the Government. Consequently, the prayer sought for in W.P. No. 21721 of 1993 cannot be granted and the writ petition will stand dismissed. The appeal is allowed in the above manner, leaving it open to the Respondents to agitate their rights in an appropriate forum. Contempt Appeal No. 6 of 1995 is also allowed. There will be no order as to costs.