High CourtsSingle Bench(2013) 11 P&H CK 0189

The State of Punjab vs Om Parkash Aggarwal

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 21 November 2013 · Citation: (2014) 2 PLR 508

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sat Paul Bangarh, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 231 of 1991

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Judgment

21 paragraphs · 1,308 words

S.P. Bangarh, J.—Om Parkash Aggarwal, respondent, herein, was serving as Labour Inspector Grade-I in the department of Labour and Employment, Government of Punjab. His two annual grade increments were stopped without cumulative effect, vide order dated 14.10.1983, passed by the Secretary of the department, in the name of President of India. Aggrieved against the same, the respondent, herein, challenged the legality and propriety of the order (supra), before the trial Court, in a suit for declaration to the effect that the order dated 14.10.1983 (supra) is illegal, null and void and, notwithstanding the same, he continues to be in service as if the impugned order (supra) had not been passed.

2.

Before filing this suit, the respondent served notice u/s 80, Code of Civil Procedure, upon the appellants, herein, but reply, thereto, was not given by them to the respondent. The main grouse of the respondent was that the impugned order of punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect was passed by the President of India, who is not his punishing authority, while, on the contrary, the impugned order of punishment was required to be passed by the Labour Commissioner, who was the competent punishing authority. It is his case that the Government, who passed the impugned order of punishment, in the name of President of India, was his appellate authority. The impugned order of punishment has deprived him of his right of filing administrative appeal against the same, before the Government.

3.

The suit was contested by the appellants by filing joint written statement, averring, therein, that the respondent was given full opportunity to see the record. It was further averred that the respondent was posted as Labour Inspector Grade-II from May, 1965 to October, 1968. Writing of letters by the appellants to the respondent dated 9.10.1980 and 24.10.1980, was admitted, but receipt of fetter dated 21.10.1981 was denied: It was admitted that the respondent was held responsible for missing challans of Ludhiana Circle and he wrote to the Labour Inspector Grade II, Ludhiana, for seeing the relevant record. A letter was also written to the respondent, asking him to inspect the record at Ludhiana, Bathinda and Abohar. Vide his letter dated 12.8.1981, the respondent intimated that the available record has been seen and the other record was not available. Serving of charge-sheet to the respondent was admitted, but it was claimed that the orders on file had been passed by the Secretary to the Government and Deputy Secretary merely conveyed it to him. It was averred that it was not necessary to supply the list of documents relied upon, to sustain the charges. However, documents were supplied. Interim reply of the respondent was considered and, then, a show cause notice was issued to him, who could not give documentary proof regarding filing of 520 challans of Ludhiana and 84 challans of Bathinda. It was further averred that 114 challans of Abohar had actually been filed in Court.

4.

Reply to the show cause notice on 24.3.1983 was admitted. It was further averred that the respondent was charge-sheeted for major penalty, but, on considering his reply, a lenient view was taken and punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect was awarded. It was averred that the notice u/s 80, Code of Civil Procedure, was received, but it was not valid one. Rest of the averments made in the plaint were controverted and prayer for dismissal of the suit was, thus, made.

5.

In the replication, pleas taken by the respondent in the plaint were reiterated and those of the written statement controverted.

6.

On pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed, on 17.11.1984:-

1.

Whether the order dated 14.10.83 passed by President of India is null and void, non-est, without jurisdiction, unconstitutional, illegal, inoperative and ineffective ? OPP

2.

Relief.

7.

The respondent led his oral as well as documentary evidence, while the appellants only produced documents. The respondent also appeared as witness in rebuttal.

8.

After hearing both the sides, the trial Court decided issue No. 1 against the appellants and in favour of the respondent, and decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 19.11.1985.

9.

Aggrieved against the same, the appellants, herein, filed Civil Appeal No. 235 of 15.2.1986, that, too, was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 13.9.1990.

10.

Aggrieved, there against, the appellants, who were defendants before the trial court and appellants before the lower Appellate Court, have come up in this Regular Second Appeal with prayer for acceptance, thereof, and for reversal of the judgments of the courts below, and for dismissal of the suit of the respondent, who was plaintiff before the trial Courts and respondent before the lower appellate Court.

11.

Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and record of the trial Court perused with their assistance.

12.

Learned counsel for the appellants, mainly, contended that the lower appellate Court wrongly relied upon the judgment in Baldev Krishan Sharma v. The State of Haryana through The Chief Secretary Haryana State, Chandigarh, 1969 SLR 249, for the proposition that the punishment order cannot be passed by an authority superior to the punishing authority.

13.

The question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellate authority in case of the respondent for awarding punishment, could be the punishing authority, or not ?

14.

The answer shall be. ''no''. Indubitably, the punishing authority of the respondent was Labour Commissioner. The appellate authority in the case in hand was State Government. Indubitably, the impugned order of punishment for stoppage of two annual grade increments of the respondent without cumulative effect, was passed in the name of President of India, who was not punishing authority of the respondent.

15.

Learned State counsel failed to point to any provision of law, where under, it could be held that the appellate, authority of the respondent could be the punishing authority.

16.

As already noticed, in the case of the respondent, Labour Commissioner was the punishing authority. The impugned order of punishment against the respondent was passed in the name of President of India. By doing so, the respondent was deprived of filing the administrative appeal before the State Government. So, the appellants transgressed their own rule and, instead of getting the impugned order of punishment passed from the Labour Commissioner, got the same passed in the name of President of India, bearing the signature of the Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Labour and Employment. When the impugned order of punishment was passed by the Secretary of the State Government, in the name of President of India, the respondent was deprived of filing his appeal before that authority.

17.

The lower appellate Court rightly placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Baldev Krishan Sharma (supra), passed by this Court, wherein, power of dismissal of the delinquent vested in the Chief Engineer, but the impugned order was passed by the Government and that order was quashed, as not having been passed by the competent authority.

18.

The same error was committed by the appellants in the case of the respondent, who could be punished by the competent punishing authority i.e. Labour Commissioner, and not by the appellate authority i.e. President of India through Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Labour and Employment.

19.

There is, thus, no illegality or impropriety in the impugned judgment and decree, passed by the lower appellate Court confirming, therein, the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree, that suffer from no illegality or impropriety, must be upheld and affirmed. Resultantly, the instant Regular Second Appeal, being devoid of merit ought to be and is, hereby, dismissed, with no order as to costs. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are, hereby, upheld and affirmed.