The State Of Maharashtra & Ors. vs Radhyesham Manghale

Since the petitioners in all these writ petitions are same and the reliefs sought therein are identical, the petitions are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment..

As the facts and questions involved in the petitions are substantially similar, Writ Petition No. 2508 of 2026 is treated as the lead petition.

Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

The present petitions are filed by the State of Maharashtra challenging the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court at Akola the details of which are as under:

The facts as can be seen from the lead petition, i.e., writ petition No. 2508 of 2026 are as under:

The respondent herein is an employee and claims to have been appointed by the petitioners to the post of watchman. He filed a complaint before the Industrial Court on the basis of various Government Resolutions, wherein the Government had issued directions that the employees who are working as daily wagers should be granted regularization.

In the said complaint, the petitioners herein filed their written statement and stated that there exists no master-servant relationship and the employee concerned was appointed on a monthly honorarium of Rs. 1,200/-. Furthermore, it was contended that there is no sanctioned post of peon and there is no valid source of recruitment. The parties led evidence, and the Industrial Court, vide its judgment dated 07.04.2025, was pleased to allow the complaint, thereby directing the petitioners herein to send a proposal for regularizing the services of the complainant. The said judgment is challenged in the present petition.

I have heard Ms. K. H. Bhondge, learned AGP for the petitioners, as also Mr. Pratik J. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent.

The learned AGP for the petitioners submitted that the Industrial Court has gravely erred in law in allowing the complaint. She submits that the respondent was appointed temporarily and therefore could not claim any right in public employment. Furthermore it was a specific defence of the petitioner that it is not an ‘industry’ within the definition of Industrial Disputes Act.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would support the impugned judgment.

I have gone through the record of the matter, including the judgment of the Industrial Court. In my considered opinion, the reasoning in the impugned judgment of the Industrial Court does not take into consideration the specific documents and the defence raised by the petitioners herein. It relies only upon certain admission in cross-examinations and does not take into consideration the fact that a specific defence was raised that the respondent employee was not recruited by following the due process of law. In para 10 of the impugned judgment, the Industrial Court has unnecessarily ventured into aspects which are not worthy of any consideration by a court of law. Furthermore, clause 3, which directs the respondents therein to send a proposal to respondent No. 4 for grant of permission to regularize the services of the complainant, is certainly outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court.

As can be seen fro the impugned judgment, the Industrial Court has not spelt out any justifiable reasons to record finding regarding the petitioner being an ‘industry’. Likewise, the Industrial Court even though records a finding that the respondent was a daily wager and goes on to conclude it suggests that the petitioner herein are in need of the work. In addition to this no reasoning is seen in the impugned judgment to arrive at a conclusion that the respondent was appointed by following a valid recruitment process. The judgment flows entirely on the cross-examination of the witness of the petitioners. The said exercise in my considered opinion is erroneous.

In my considered opinion, therefore, the matter needs to be relegated to the Industrial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. In view of the fact that I am relegating the matter to the Industrial Court, the various citations pressed into service by the respective parties are not being taken into consideration. In that view of the matter, the following order is passed.

The judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court at Akola in Complaint ULP Nos. 94 of 2017, 93 of 2017, 95 of 2017, 92 of 2017, 91 of 2017 are quashed and set aside.

The matters are relegated to the Industrial Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

The Industrial Court is directed to grant an opportunity to the parties to submit such additional documents or other material in support of their respective contentions.

Since the matter is relegated and pertains to the year 2017, the Industrial Court, Akola, is directed to decide the said complaint till 31.12.2027.

With these directions, the petitions are allowed and disposed of.

Rule accordingly.