The State of Madras vs K.M. Shanmugha Mudaliar and Others

Natesan, J.—The State of Madras has preferred this appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Salem on a reference u/s 18 of

the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894).

The acquisition relates to an extent of 19 acres 45 cents of dry land situated in Alagapuram mitta for the Salem Fair Lands Co-operative

Buildings Society Limited, Salem. Notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was published on 12th July 1949. The enquiry u/s 11 of the Act was held on

16th May 1950. But meanwhile Alagapuram mitta was notified under the Madras Estates Abolition (Act XXVI of 1948) on 19th December 1950

and a petition, Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 486 of 1950, appears to have been filed in the High Court challenging the notification. In Civil

Miscellaneous Petition No. 487 of 1950, there was stay of further proceedings pursuant to the notification till the disposal of Civil Miscellaneous

Petition No. 486 of 1950, by an order of this Court, dated 8th January 1951, and, though the society for which the acquisition was made had

deposited the probable cost of the acquisition on 13th September 1950, the award was pronounced only on 19th November 1951. Despite the

notification of the mitta under the Abolition Act, the proceedings for acquisition were pursued with by both the mittadars, i.e., the melwaramdars

and the kudiwaramdars as claimants for compensation. The melwaramdars, the first Respondent in the appeal and Palaniappa Mudaliar the

predecessor-in-interest of Respondents 10 to 18 herein, claimed before the officer a one-third share of the compensation payable in respect of the

value of the entire interests in the land. They claimed that the land as a whole, that is, the melwaram and kudiwaram interests, should be valued at

Rs. 3,000 per acre, and that they should be paid Rs. 1,000 per acre. It was pleaded by them that the mittadars had a right to collect money when

agricultural lands were used for building purposes and that their interest in the land was not confined to collection of rent only. As for a similar

acquisition in the same mitta the claim for a one-third share of the compensation in the land had been found against on a reference u/s 18 of the Act

by the Subordinate Judge of Salem, the land acquisition officer limited the compensation payable to the melwaramdars to Rs. 520-11-1, the

capitalized value of the net rental income they got out of the land acquired. In respect of the kudiwaram interest he assessed the compensation

payable for lands with road frontage at Rs. 1,500 per acre and for the remaining lands at Rs. 1,300 per acre. The kudiwaramdars were content

with the compensation awarded to them, but the melwaramdars claimed a reference to Court u/s 18 claiming enhanced compensation at one-third

of the value of the totality of the interest in the land. The land acquisition officer referred the matter to Court u/s 18 of Act I of 1894 on 17th June

1952, intimating the deposit of the compensation awarded to the melwaramdars for their interests in the Sub-Court, Salem, in view of the

Government notification under the Abolition Act and the stay order of the High Court. Even though the melwaramdars had claimed that the entire

interests in the land should be valued at Rs. 3,000 per acre at the trial before the Subordinate Judge, in view of the paucity of evidence, they were

willing to accept fifty per cent of the compensation awarded in respect of the kudiwaram interest as compensation for their melwaram. In substance

it came to this : the value fixed by the land acquisition officer in respect of kudiwaram interest was taken as the basis for valuing the entire interests,

taking the interests of the kudiwaramdars at two-third of the whole and that of melwaramdars at one-third. By the time judgment had been

pronounced by this Court on the appeal from the earlier reference, and this Court had observed that the rights of the melwaramdars were not

confined to the rental from the land only, that they had other recognized rights, and that they were entitled to compensation for loss of those rights.

The judgment was marked as exhibit A-2 in this case. Following the decision the learned Subordinate Judge fixed the compensation for the

melwaram interest at Rs. 750 per acre in respect of the lands with road frontage, and Rs. 650 per acre, in respect of the remaining lands and

interest was awarded to the melwaramdars on the compensation amount from 1st December 1949, holding that possession had been taken from

them on that date.

The learned Government Pleader appearing for the State of Madras has raised three contentions before us: (i) As the estate had been notified

and taken over by the Government, the melwaramdars are not entitled to any compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and they can get

compensation only under the Estates Abolition Act. (ii) Even if the melwaramdars can get any compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, it

cannot exceed the compensation they are entitled to under the Abolition Act. (iii) The compensation should be assessed for all the interests in the

lands as a whole and apportioned and the compensation for the melwaram interest should be assessed only by capitalization of the net rental

income. According to the learned Government Pleader, the melwaramdars can get at the most one-third of the aggregate compensation arrived at

by adding together the compensation fixed for kudiwaram interest and the capitalised value of the rental income in respect of the melwaram

interest.

Taking up the first two contentions, it seems to us that it is not open to the Government Pleader to contend in the reference u/s 18 of the Land

Acquisition Act at the instance of the melwaramdars that the melwaramdars are not entitled to any compensation under the Land Acquisition Act

Statedly and specifically the proceedings have been for the acquisition of their interests in the land and, despite the notification under the Abolition

Act the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were continued. If the land or the melwaram interest had already vested in the Government

under the Abolition Act, the Government should not have proceeded under the Land Acquisition Act with the melwaramdars as claimants for that

interest. The melwaramdars contend that in this case the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were initiated prior to the notification under

the Abolition Act, and that, before taking over of the Estate on 3rd November 1952, the award had been made on 19th November 1951. The

scope of the enquiry on a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is limited. In Pramathanath Mallik v. Secretary of State for India in Council

ILR (1929) Cal. 1148, 1152 (P.C.) it was held that on a reference made to the Court u/s 18 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Court was confined

to considering and pronouncing upon the objection which had been raised in the written application for the reference. Their Lordships of the

Judicial Committee observed:

By Section 20, the function of the Court upon a reference being made is ''to determine the objection'' and only persons ''interested in the objection''

are to be summoned before it, and, by Section 21, the scope of the enquiry is to be ''restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons

affected by the objection.''

Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts, under this Act, is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these

sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector''s award, and it is confined to a consideration of that objection.

Once, therefore, it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation, that alone is the ''matter'' referred, and the Court,

has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it.

In this case the reference to the Court has been made stately on the objections to the award by the melwaramdars, and the only question raised

by them was the amount of compensation they were entitled to. The application for reference made by the melwaramdars, as well as the reason for

reference given by the land acquisition officer refer only to the contention of the melwaramdars that, except the right of the ryot to use the land for

agricultural purposes all other rights were with them, and that as such the land should have been valued as a whole and one-third of compensation

thus ascertained should be paid to them. The application for reference was made on 20th November 1951, and the matter was referred to the

Court by the Land Acquisition Officer on 17th June 1952. At no stage of the proceedings was it mooted that the melwaramdars had lost their

interest in the melwaram and were not entitled to any compensation. If the position was, as contended for by the State, the proper thing that ought

to have been done was to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, as under the Act the Government could

acquire only outstanding interests.

As pointed out by Jagadisan J., in State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar (1961) 74 L.W. 338 there is an estoppel against the Government from

denying the absence of any interest in the claimants whom they had made parties to the proceedings. Referring to the contention of the learned

Counsel appearing for the State Government that it was not open to the claimant in that case to assert any title to the acquired lands as against the

State Government, which became vested with the lands by force of operation of the statute, Madras Act XXVI of 1948, it is observed at page

342:

Before examining the above contention urged on behalf of the State Government we desire -to point out that the State Government is not

competent to put forward its own alleged title to the acquired properties in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. The scheme of the Land

Acquisition Act emerging from its relevant provisions rests on the basis that the lands acquired belong to others and not to the State Government

itself. By acquisition of land under the Act, the State Government comes under the obligation to pay the market value of the acquired lands as

compensation to persons deprived of the properties. The notion of the State Government acquiring its own lands and paying compensation to itself

is extremely ridiculous. Section 30 of the Act enables the Collector to refer to the Court any dispute which may arise as to the apportionment of

the compensation amount or as to the person to whom the amount or part thereof is payable. Section 31 , Clause (2) provides that if there be any

disputes as to the title to receive the compensation or to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation in the

Court to which a reference u/s 18 would be submitted. In the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act the dispute referred to under Sections 30 and

31 of the Act cannot be a dispute between the State Government on the one hand and the claimant on the other in regard to the title of the

property acquired but only a dispute between two or more rival claimants claiming the compensation amount. There is no machinery under the

Land Acquisition Act for the settlement of any dispute between the State Government, the acquiring authority, and the claimant who puts forward

title to the property acquired. The State Government having availed itself of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for compulsory acquisition

of lands for a public purpose treating the subject matter of acquisition as not belonging to itself but to others is estopped in the course of such

proceedings from putting forward its own title to the properties so as to defeat the right of persons dispossessed from the lands as a result of the

application of the Act.

According to the records before us, possession appears to have passed only by virtue of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and

not otherwise. The State could have experienced no difficulty in withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings and later on taking proceedings for

the acquisition of the outstanding interest, namely, the interest of kudiwaramdars. The decision in State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar (1961) 74

L.W. 338 does not stand in the way of such acquisition and the decision only discountenanced the argument on behalf of the State that the ryot

having not obtained any patta was not entitled to any compensation. It is not and cannot be disputed that the effect of the Abolition Act being to

bring about a ryotwari settlement, after the vesting under the Abolition Act, the State Government cannot proceed against the kudiwaramdars for

acquisition of their interests. As noticed by Chandavarkar J., in The Government of Bombay v. Esufali Salehai ILR (1910) 34 Bom. 618 to acquire

a land is not necessarily the same thing to purchase the right of fee-simple in it but means the purchase of such interests as clog the right of

Government to use it for any purpose they like. Reference in this connection may also be made to Section 186 of the Madras Estates Land Act (I

of 1908) which provides for the acquisition of the kudiwaram interest under the Land Acquisition Act for the benefit of melwaramdars. We are not

deciding in this case the right of the State Government as against the melwaramdars in respect of the compensation deposited under the Land

Acquisition Act, if the melwaramdars were not entitled to it by reason of their having lost all interest in the land at the relevant point of time, that is,

when their right to be paid compensation under the-Land Acquisition Act accrued. We leave the question open; certainly the melwaramdars

cannot get compensation for their melwaram interest both under the Abolition Act and under the Land Acquisition Act.

As regards the contention that the question of compensation payable to the melwaramdars should be limited to the compensation they can get

under the Abolition Act, the aforesaid reasoning would equally apply to it. The present proceedings are under the Land Acquisition Act and

compensation has to be determined and awarded in terms of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is quite a different matter if they are not

entitled to the same by reason of the estate having vested in the Government. But in these proceedings compensation has to be ascertained

according to the principles laid down under the Land Acquisition Act only and not otherwise.

Now the last question remains for consideration. The learned Subordinate Judge has assessed the melwaramdar''s interest at half the

compensation fixed for the kudiwaram interest. In doing so, he has purported to follow the judgment of this Court relating to the same

melwaramdars and in respect of the same mitta marked as exhibit A-2 in this case. As noticed in Narayana v. Annapuranamma (1941) ILR Mad.

753 it has been decided in more cases than one that even as much as one-third of the compensation paid for the entire land can be apportioned as

the share of the melwaramdar, and reference was made therein to Natesa Ayyar v. Kaja Maruf Sahib ILR (1926) Mad. 706, 709. In Natesa

Ayyar''s case ILR (1926) Mad. 706, 709, the landlord had parted with his kudiwaram interest in the land to certain individuals for some cash and

provision for payment by the vendees of rupees four every year to the landlord. The entire land, inclusive of the melwaram and kudiwaram

interests, was acquired by the Government, and the matter came up before Court, as there was dispute as to the apportionment of the

compensation between the landlord and the tenants. The contention on behalf of the tenants was that the landlord has reserved in himself at the

time of acquisition only the right to receive rupees four from the tenants, and that he had right to be compensated only for that sum of money, that

is, he was entitled only to the capitalized amount which would bring him rupees four at a reasonable rate of interest. The learned Judges observed

that, by selling his kudiwaram interest in the land, he did not part with all his interests in the land, that the melwaram interest was with him, and that

it was difficult to say exactly what these two interests were. They pointed out that the melwaramdar had got not only right to receive rent, but he

had also several other rights. They observed that it was not an easy thing in any case to apportion the value of land between the two persons who

had got somewhat indefinite rights in the land such as the melwaramdar and the kudiwaramdar, and upheld the division by the lower Court of the

compensation between the landlord and the tenants as one-third and two-thirds. No doubt the land did not purport to be in an estate under the

Madras Estates Land Act. Odgers J., observed as follows with reference to this:

Now the difficulty in this case is largely caused by the expression used in Exhibit A, ''Kudiwaram'' and ''Melwaram'', because it is only faintly

suggested that this is a settled estate such as would fall under the Act of 1908. There was no question that it is not so.

The learned Government Pleader is not much interested in questioning the proportion; but his contention is that this proportion must be given

out of the aggregate of the entire compensation by taking the value of the kudiwaram interest as ascertained and the value of the melwaram interest

by capitalization of rental income. The emphasis is that so far as melwaram interest is concerned, it should be valued only by capitalizing the rental

income and not otherwise. It is pointed out that, where more than one person has interest in a parcel of land, there should be only one award and

compensation for all the interests must be ascertained in the aggregate. In the present case no reference was made at the instance of the tenants,

and so far as they are concerned, the compensation awarded to them has become final. Though they are parties to these proceedings, they can

neither be benefited nor affected by these proceedings. Reference was made in this connection to the observations of their Lordships of Judicial

Committee in Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra ILR (1932) All. 286, 292 (P.C.).

The Act does not appear to contemplate that where more than one person is interested in a parcel of land there should be more than one award

relating thereto.

Their Lordships do not by this mean that the whole of the land at any one time to be acquired under the Act must necessarily be dealt with in one

award; but only that any one piece of land (forming part of the whole) in which more than one person has an interest for which he can claim

compensation, ought not to be made the subject of more than one award. Each award should contain within its four corners the fixing of the value

of the land with which it deals, and the apportionment of that value between the various persons interested in that land.

In the present case the difficulty has arisen from the fact that the officer has dealt with the land by two documents, and, so far as the 495 square

yards, are concerned, that particular parcel of land figures in both. Their Lordships however think that the two documents (latter of which

specifically refers to the earlier) must be read together as constituting one award in relation to that parcel of land, by which the Officer awards the

compensation to be allowed for that land at a figure of Rs. 8 per square yard and awards the apportionment of that compensation in the proportion

of three-fourths to the Appellant and one-fourth to the tenants.

We agree with the contention of the learned Government Pleader, that, when there are various interests in the land under acquisition, the

normal method of valuation would be to ascertain the market value of the land with all the interests combined and then apportion among the several

interests. But the mode of valuing the unified interests suggested by the learned Government Pleader appears to us to be just the contrary. He

would have the melwaram valued by capitalizing the rental, and the kudiwaram by reference to the market value of similar lands in the locality and

take the aggregate or amalgam and then apportion. If the values could be and have been ascertained separately why then club again and apportion.

They have been apportioned at the determination itself. In the instant case there is only one-award; but the Land Acquisition Officer has valued the

two interests separately, adopting different methods of valuation. Despite the principle enunciated that all the interests must be valued together, the

plea of the Government Pleader is that the melwaram interest must be valued separately on a different basis from the kudiwaramdar. The learned

Government Pleader does not contend in this case that there must be capitalisation of the income in respect of all the interests and then

apportionment effected. Here, melwaramdars and kudiwaramdars together would exhaust the totality of interests in the land and the value to be

ascertained would be the value of the fee simple in the land. It could be ascertained if circumstances warrant by capitalising the income from the

entirety of the interests or if that is not fair and feasible by ascertaining the market value of the fee simple. No decision has been placed before us

where in respect of an acquisition of both the interests, the two interests have been separately valued and then the aggregate apportioned.

For the contention that the melwaram interest should be valued only by capitalizing the net rental income, reliance is placed, on the decision

Collector of Kistna v. Zamindar of Challapalli ILR (1938) Mad. 431. But that case does not decide that the only method of valuing melwaram

interest is by capitalizing net rental income. No question of apportionment of compensation, between the different interests arose in that case. The

acquisition was of the melwaram interest only and the Land Acquisition Officer had multiplied the net income by twenty and assessed the

compensation. On a reference, the learned District Judge, unable to find out a better method, thought that the net income should have been

multiplied by thirty. The question for consideration by this Court in the appeal against the order of the District Judge on the reference was as to the

number of years purchase for capitalizing the net income. Newsam J., observed at page 434:

But it is clear that the number of years purchase must depend upon the rate of interest prevailing on gilt-edged securities at the time of the

acquisition, i.e., on the date of the notification u/s 4 of the Act. The higher the rate of interest on that date, the fewer will be the number of years

purchase. Twenty times the net income would be fair if the prevailing rate of interest was five per cent but if it was two and a half per cent nothing

less than forty times the net income would be adequate compensation.

Venkatasubba Rao J., observed at page 436:

The only real question that these appeals raise is, what is the number of years purchase at which the rental of the lands acquired should be

capitalized?

Proceeding further, the learned Judge observed:

It will thus be seen that the rule of the number of years purchase is not a theoretical or legal rule, but depends upon economic factors, such as, the

prevailing rate of interest. That there is no uniform or rigid principle in regard to the number of years purchase is illustrated by several decisions.

The return from landed property, generally speaking, reflects the prevalent rate of interest on money investments.

In this case no reference is made to Natesa Ayyar''s Case ILR (1926) Mad. 706 As pointed out already, in Narayana v. Annapurnamma ILR

(1941) Mad. 753 reference is made to Natesa Ayyar''s Case ILR (1926) Mad. 706 and at page 758 it is observed:

Reference was made to the fact that in the claim made by the Respondent she stated that she would be entitled to not less than fifty times, the

kattubadi payable for the land it was argued that nothing more than this amount should be awarded, namely, fifty times the kattubadi. It is however

seen that she did claim rights in the land other than the right to collect kattubadi namely, her right of reversion, etc. Presumably the words ''et

cetera'' would include mining rights....

On the merits there is really no reason to interfere because it has been decided in more cases than one that even as much as one-third of the

compensation paid for the entire land can be apportioned as the share of the Melwaramdar.

In Revenue Divisional Officer Vs. S. Varadachari, the decision in Collector of Kistna v. Zamindar of Challapalli ILR (1938) Mad. 431 came

up for consideration. In that case the Land Acquisition Officer based his award upon the sale price of two plots of land situate about a furlong from

the land acquired. The learned Subordinate Judge on reference considered that it was not proper to estimate the market value of the land by such a

method and that the Land Acquisition Officer should have capitalized the annual profits at thirty years'' purchase. The Government appealed to this

Court against the decision of the Subordinate Judge and contended that the basis adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer was the correct one. In

the course of his judgment, the learned Judge observed:

The learned Subordinate Judge is clearly wrong in thinking that The The Land Acquisition Officer Vs. S.V. Subba Rao and Another, intended to

lay down a rule that even if the value of the land could be directly estimated that value was irrelevant and that the proper way of calculating the

compensation payable was always to multiply the annual profits by thirty...Perhaps the learned Subordinate Judge was misled by a passage in the

judgment in that case in which it was said:

It is clearly laid down in the case already cited Collector of Kistna v. Zamindar of Challappalli ILR (1938) Mad. 431 that it has long been the

practice of the courts in this presidency to calculate the profits made by investing money in gilt-edged securities.

Reference may also be made to the decision in Sub-Collector, Bajahmundry v. Parthasarathi ILR (1943) Mad. 127. In that case, the contention in

the High Court on behalf of the Government was that the learned Judge in the Court below was in error in proceeding to fix the market value with

reference to the rent which was received from the property acquired. It was argued that the sale deeds of neighbouring properties furnished the

true basis for award of compensation. At page 132 it is observed as follows:

After all the function of the Court in awarding compensation is to ascertain the market value of the land at the date of the notification u/s 4(1).

Where definite material is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of neighbouring land at or about the date of the notification or otherwise, the

Court can only proceed to do the best it can under the circumstances. In the present case we think we shall not be erring on the wrong side if we

say that the market value should be fixed by capitalising the net annual income at twenty years'' purchase.

As noticed in M.S.O.S.P.V. Velayudam Chettiar and Others Vs. The Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition, Madurai at Madurai Town, .

Valuation of immovable property is not an exact science. It is an enquiry relating to a subject abounding in uncertainties, where there is more than

ordinary guess work and where it would be very unfair to require an exact exposition of reasons for the conclusion arrived at. It has been held

repeatedly that in all valuations, judicial or otherwise, there must be room for inference and inclinations of opinion which being more or less

conjectural are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others and it is unfair to require an exact exposition of reasons for the

conclusions arrived at. In short, the question of fair compensation is not an algebraic problem which would be solved by an abstract

formula...Certain methods of valuation have however been recognized by the various judicial decisions, viz., (a) the price paid, within a reasonable

time for the land; (b) rents and profits of the land received shortly before the acquisition; (c) price paid for adjacent lands possessing similar

advantages; and (d) the opinion of valuators or experts.

It is observed further that on account of the fact that dry lands cultivated as such had been acquired in that case as building sites, method (b) was

inapplicable, and that, in regard to method (d) in this State opinion of valuators and experts was not normally adduced.

It is apparent from the above discussion that capitalizing rent by a number of years'' purchase is not a hard and fast rule and is resorted to only

when no other method is available. It is clear that it would be an unsafe method where rents are low or very high. If there are other interests than

rents, this method can have no application whatsoever, as those interests would not go into the computation.

The right of the melwaramdar in an estate is not merely a right to get a fixed rent for all time in perpetuity. Besides the right to rent he has other

interests and his position in so far as this State is concerned, has been equated to that of a co-owner. In Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi

Kotayya ILR (1897) Mad. 299 it is observed at page 302:

Hence the well-known division in these parts of the great interests in land under two main heads of the melwaram interest and kudiwaram interest.

Hence also the view that the holder of the kudiwaram right, far from being a tenant of the holder of the melwaram right is a co-owner with him.

The Supreme Court in a recent case refers to this aspect of the relationship between Sunkavilli Suranna and Others Vs. Goli Sathiraju and

Others, There is no dispute in this case that the Mitta in question is an estate as defined under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The village has

been notified under the Abolition Act, and it follows that this is a pre-1936 estate. Under the Estates Land Act, the right of melwaramdar or land-

holder is not limited to realization of rent from the ryoti lands. He has other interests. To refer to some of them; u/s 10 of the Estates Land Act, on

the death of a ryot intestate without heirs, he could induct any other person in the land as tenant; he could keep the land in his own possession; but

it will retain its ryoti character. When admitting a ryot to possession of ryoti land, he could receive premium from him u/s 25 of the Act. He can

claim enhancement of rent, if during the currency of the existing rent there has been a rise in the average local prices of staple food-crops in the

taluk or zamindari division, or if during the currency of the existing rent the productive powers of the land held by the ryot have been increased by

an improvement effected by, or at the expense of, the land-holder or if the productive powers of the land held by the ryot have been increased by

fluvial action. There is his claim to claim minerals and quarries and the land-holder could also eject a ryot from his holding if the ryot has materially

impaired the value of the holding for agricultural purposes and rendered it substantially unfit for such purposes and could also claim compensation

in addition to or in lieu of ejectment. Under 186 he can require the District Collector to acquire the ryot''s interest for some reasonable and

sufficient purpose having relation to the good of the holding, or of the estate, including the use of the land for building purposes or for any religious,

educational, communal or charitable purpose or for the opening and working of mines. It is, therefore, apparent that the melwaram interest in the

land is not limited to the rent the landholder is realizing from the kudiwaramdar. It is something more and, therefore, his interest in the land cannot

be valued by merely capitalizing the rents realized from the kudiwaramdar. In this connection reference may be made to the observations of the

learned Chief Justice in the judgment of this Court in Appeal Suit No. 786 of 1951 (exhibit A-2).

The rights of the melwaramdar are not confined to the rental from the land only. They have got other recognized rights, which have been described

in several decisions of this Court. He is entitled to get some compensation from the loss of such rights.

We hold, therefore, that, in the circumstances of this case, it was not incumbent on the Subordinate Judge to adopt capitalization of the net rental

income and the basis he adopted of valuing the melwaramdars'' interest at half of the kudiwaramdars, cannot be said to be erroneous as to warrant

revision.

The learned Subordinate Judge has awarded interest on the enhanced compensation from 1st December 1949 in the view that possession was

taken in November 1949. We do not find any record of taking possession prior to the date of the award. We, therefore, award interest to the

melwaramdars from the date of the award only. Subject to the above modification, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.