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Judgment
This appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the appellant/State assailing the judgment and order of acquittal dated 26.07.2022 passed in SC ATR No.23 of 2016 (State of M.P. vs. Anil Kumar Soni) by the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Head Quarter Waidhan), District Singrauli (M.P.), whereby the respondent/accused person have been acquitted of the offences under Sections 457 and 354(k) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(B-1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 27.05.2016 at about 01:00 PM, the prosecutrix accompanied by her husband Chhotelal Prajapati, appeared at Police Station Bargawan and lodged a report alleging that on 26.05.2016 at about 08:00 PM, while she was present in her room, the respondent/accused entered the room, caught hold of her waist, pushed her onto the bed and attempted to outrage her modesty by touching her breasts and making unwelcome sexual advances. Upon her raising an alarm, Rambhajan Prajapati and Babulal Prajapati rushed to the spot, whereupon the respondent/accused fled from the spot. On the basis of the aforesaid report, a case was registered at Police Station Bargawan for the offences punishable under Sections 457, 354 and 354-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(B-1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The investigation was entrusted to Rajesh Singh Parihar, Deputy Superintendent of Police.
During the course of investigation, the respondent/accused was arrested and upon completion of the necessary investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against him for the offences punishable under Sections 457 and 354-A of the IPC and Section 3(1)(B-1) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Devsar. Since the offence under Section 3(1)(B-1) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is exclusively triable by the Special Court/Sessions Court, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Pursuant to the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Singrauli (Headquarters Waidhan), the matter was thereafter transferred to the trial Court concerned for trial. Upon consideration of the material available on record, charges were framed against the respondent/accused for the aforesaid offences. The charges were read over and explained to him, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined the prosecutrix (PW-1), husband of the prosecutrix (PW-2), Babulal Prajapati (PW-3), Rambhajan Prajapati (PW-4), Aarti (PW-5), Dr. Arun Kumar Sharma (PW-6), Mahendra Sharma (PW-7), Bhuvaneshwar Prasad (PW-8), Archana Dwivedi (PW-9) and Rajesh Singh Parihar (PW-10) and placed Ex.P/1 to P/12 and Ex.D/1 and D/2, the documents on record. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent/accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and pleaded false implication on account of previous enmity. He claimed to be innocent and asserted that the prosecution witnesses had falsely deposed against him.
5 . Learned trial Court after recording the evidence of both the parties acquitted the present respondents/accused persons. Hence, this appeal.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/State contends that the prosecutrix (PW-1) has fully supported the prosecution case and her testimony inspires confidence. It is submitted that her version finds corroboration from the testimony of Babulal Prajapati (PW-3), who has supported the prosecution story on material particulars. Although the husband of the prosecutrix (PW-2) has not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile, the same does not materially affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence. It is further submitted that merely because no external injury was found on the person of the prosecutrix, her testimony cannot be discarded, particularly when it is otherwise cogent, consistent and trustworthy. Learned counsel further submits that the FIR was lodged promptly on the very next day of the incident, which lends assurance to the version put forth by the prosecutrix (PW-1) and rules out any possibility of false implication. On the strength of the aforesaid evidence, it is contended that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges against the respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt. In such circumstances, the findings and observations recorded by the learned trial Court after due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, cannot be said to be perverse, erroneous or contrary to law. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed, the impugned judgment of acquittal be set aside and the respondent/accused be convicted and sentenced in accordance with law.
7 . Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/accused has supported the impugned judgment of acquittal and submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and has not committed any error warranting interference by this Court. It is further submitted that the view taken by the learned trial Court is a plausible and reasonable view based on the evidence on record. In an appeal against acquittal, unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are shown to be perverse or wholly unsustainable, no interference is called for. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record meticulously.
The star witness of the prosecution namely the prosecutrix (PW-1) has supported the prosecution case in her examination-in-chief. Her testimony also finds corroboration from the statements of her husband (PW-2) and Babulal Prajapati (PW-3). However, insofar as the independent witnesses are concerned, Rambhajan Prajapati (PW-4) and Arti (PW-5) did not support the prosecution version and were declared hostile. Further, Dr. Arun Kumar Sharma (PW-6), who medically examined the prosecutrix (PW-1), deposed that no external injury was found on her person at the time of medical examination.
The testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) does not find support from the independent witnesses examined by the prosecution. Although Babulal Prajapati (PW-3) has supported the prosecution case in his examination-in-chief, in his cross-examination he admitted that it was darkness at the time of the alleged incident and that he had not actually seen the respondent/accused at the spot. The witness further admitted that a dispute existed between the husband of the prosecutrix and the respondent/accused. In view of the aforesaid admissions, the testimony of Babulal Prajapati (PW-3) does not inspire confidence as that of an eyewitness to the occurrence.
Even the husband of the prosecutrix (PW-2), in his cross-examination, admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged incident and that the entire occurrence was narrated to him by his wife i.e. the prosecutrix (PW-1). He further admitted that at the time of the alleged incident he had gone out for work and was not present at the spot. In view of the aforesaid admission, it is evident that the testimony of PW-2 is not based on his direct knowledge of the occurrence and, therefore, he cannot be treated as an eyewitness to the incident. His evidence is thus hearsay in nature to the extent it relates to the occurrence itself.
The sole eyewitness to the alleged incident is the prosecutrix (PW-1). In her examination-in-chief, she deposed that the respondent/accused came to her house and after entering the premises, caught hold of her, placed his hand on her waist and pushed her onto a bed. She further stated that the respondent/accused asked her to engage in sexual relations with him. According to her testimony, the respondent/accused thereafter pulled her towards him and pressed her breasts with the intention of committing rape. The prosecutrix (PW-1) further stated that the respondent/accused, being enraged, attempted to outrage her modesty. In Paragraph 3 of her examination-in-chief, she deposed that on an earlier occasion also the respondent/accused had threatened and attempted to commit similar wrongful acts with her, but she had rebuked him. Despite the same, the respondent/accused again attempted to commit such acts. She further stated that she had informed her husband regarding the earlier incident and that her husband had warned the respondent/accused. Nevertheless, the respondent/accused persisted in his conduct and again attempted to commit the alleged acts. According to the prosecutrix, the respondent/accused also threatened to kill her and falsely implicate her husband in such killing in the event she refused to accede to his demands.
The aforesaid testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1) is full of material contradictions, omissions and variations, which are evident from Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of her cross-examination. In Paragraph-6 of her cross-examination, the prosecutrix categorically admitted that the alleged incident occurred during the night and that there was no source of light inside the house at the relevant time. She further admitted that it was dark and that a person could not be identified in such darkness. In spite of the aforesaid admission, the prosecutrix has not offered any satisfactory explanation as to how she was able to identify the respondent/accused as the perpetrator of the alleged incident. Further, in Paragraph-8 of her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that Ex.D/2 bears her photograph and pertains to an agreement relating to marriage. The said document prima facie indicates that the prosecutrix had agreed to reside with the respondent/accused as husband and wife. The existence of such a document casts a serious doubt upon the prosecution story and assumes significance while appreciating the evidence on record. Apart from the above, the material contradictions, omissions and improvements reflected in paragraphs 5 to 7 of the testimony of the prosecutrix remain unexplained. In the absence of any plausible explanation for such inconsistencies, the veracity and reliability of her testimony become doubtful, thereby rendering it unsafe to place implicit reliance upon the same.
As observed hereinabove, the husband of the prosecutrix (PW-2) and Babulal Prajapati (PW-3) are not eyewitnesses to the alleged incident. Their testimony is based either on information received from the prosecutrix or on circumstances subsequent to the occurrence. Furthermore, their evidence is also afflicted with material contradictions, omissions and variations, for which no satisfactory explanation has been brought on record by the prosecution. The husband of the prosecutrix (PW-2), in his cross-examination, admitted that Ex.D/2 bears the photograph of his wife; however, he expressed his inability to state whether the document bears her signature. This admission assumes significance in view of the defence set up by the respondent/accused. It is also pertinent to note that the FIR (Ex.P/1) was lodged after a delay of one day. According to the prosecution case, the alleged incident occurred at about 08:00 PM, whereas the FIR came to be lodged on the following day at about 01:00 PM. The Police Station was situated at a distance of merely six kilometres from the place of occurrence. Despite the availability of sufficient opportunity to report the matter promptly, no cogent, plausible or satisfactory explanation has been offered by the prosecution for the delay in lodging the FIR. The aforesaid circumstance, when considered in conjunction with the inconsistencies and infirmities appearing in the prosecution evidence, creates a serious doubt regarding the veracity of the prosecution case. In the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be erroneous, perverse or contrary to law so as to warrant interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal.
In sum and substance, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The statements of the witnesses do not inspire confidence and suffer from material contradictions and inconsistencies, thereby rendering the prosecution version doubtful. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and represent a plausible view of the matter. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, when the view taken by the trial Court is a reasonably possible view, the appellate Court ought not to interfere merely because another view is also possible. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of acquittal does not call for interference.
In H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows:
“8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8 . 3 . The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” (Emphasis Supplied)
In Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC Online SC 561, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to relevant precedents, has observed as follows:-
“39.Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
(a)That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
(b)That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record;
(c)That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.
40.The appellate Court, in order to interfere with the judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial Court.” (Emphasis Supplied)
In case of Sadhu Saran Singh vs. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 397 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
"20.Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, in Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] has held : (SCC p. 415, para 7)
“7.The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial court. It is only when the approach of the trial court in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal.”
21.This Court, in several cases, has taken the consistent view that the appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If the appellate court, on scrutiny, finds that the decision of the court below is based on erroneous views and against settled position of law, then the interference of the appellate court with such an order is imperative."
Similar, in case of Harijan Bhala Teja vs. State of Gujarat , (2016) 12 SCC 665, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
"12.No doubt, where, on appreciation of evidence on record, two views are possible, and the trial court has taken a view of acquittal, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. However, this does not mean that in all the cases where the trial court has recorded acquittal, the same should not be interfered with, even if the view is perverse. Where the view taken by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record, or perverse, it is always open for the appellate court to express the right conclusion after re-appreciating the evidence if the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt on record, and convict the accused."
Recently in case of Mallappa & others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544, the Hon'ble Apex Court has again summarized the principles while deciding the appeal against acquittal which are as follows :-
"42.Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarised as :
(i)Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive — inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii)Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii)If the court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv)If the view of the trial court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;
(v)If the appellate court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi)In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the trial court."...
In the light of the aforesaid discussion and the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in aforesaid cases, on careful analysis of the evidence, the observations made by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment are not found to be faulty. The learned trial Court on proper appreciation of evidence available on record has rightly acquitted the respondent/accused. There is no ground for interference with the findings of the trial Court.
2 2 . Ex. consequenti, while affirming the findings of acquittal of present respondents by the learned trial Court, the appeal being bereft of merit is hereby dismissed.