The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Ramesh

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 29/12/2012 passed by Sessions Judge, Sessions Division, Chhindwara, in Sessions Trial No. 209/11, whereby respondent has been acquitted of the offence punishable u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC").

Prosecution case, in brief is that, on 28/6/2011 at about 2 p.m., Jagdish (since deceased) had gone with the respondent on his Motorcycle for obtaining documents of vehicle. At around 10 p.m., their family members came to know that some mishap had occurred with both of them and, upon search, they found that Motorcycle of deceased was lying on Khunajhir road while his dead body was lying nearby in the valley. Upon investigation, it surfaced that, while riding pillion, respondent had dealt hammer blows on the head of Jagdish, due to which both of them fell and as Jagdish tried to run, respondent chased him and continuously beat him with Hammer until he died. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Government Advocate submitted that the impugned judgment was passed without proper appreciation of evidence on record and the same deserved to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Government Advocate, impugned judgment and record of the trial Court were perused.

Entire case of the prosecution was based upon circumstantial evidence. After taking into consideration the evidence of, as many as, 35 witnesses, and material available on record it was held by the trial Court that prosecution had failed to establish the complete chain of events. Though last seen was proved, yet, from the evidence on record, probability that, some unknown Truck had dashed their Motorcycle leading to death of Jagdish, injury to the respondent and damage to the Motorcycle, could not be ruled out. Moreover, motive behind the offence that wife of deceased had won the election and therefore respondent had threatened to kill him, was also not proved. In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.