The State Of Bihar & Ors. vs Dr. Anup Kumar Roy

(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOURENDRA PANDEY)

Date : 17-08-2026 Heard learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 01.09.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 10688 of 2020, whereby the writ application preferred by the respondent-writ petitioner has been allowed and the order of punishment contained in Memo No. 07 dated 27.04.2020 has been quashed.

The brief facts of the case are that while the respondent-writ petitioner was working as Junior Assistant Research Officer in the Animal Health and Production Institute, Bihar, Patna, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him in connection with certain alleged irregularities relating to purchase of laboratory equipment vide memo No. (5) 127/2014-188 Patna dated 24.04.2015 and memo of charges dated 12.09.2014 was served upon him. The allegations principally related to alleged violation of the conditions of the tender notice, including the manner in which the price of the equipment and applicable taxes were quoted and alleged violation of Rule 131 of the Bihar Finance Rules, 2005. In the departmental proceedings, the Director, Husbandry, Bihar, was appointed as the inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer was also appointed. The respondent submitted his defence before the inquiry Officer. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 23.10.2017 holding the charges against the respondent to have been proved.

The respondent was thereafter, issued a second show-cause notice dated 30.11.2017 by the disciplinary authority to which he submitted his reply dated 05.12.2017. During the pendency of the proceeding, the respondent superannuated on 30.09.2016, hence the proceeding was subsequently converted under Rule 43(B) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules, 1950’). The disciplinary authority, upon consideration of the inquiry report and the defence of the respondent, passed an order of punishment dated 27.04.2020, whereby 50% of the pension of the respondent was ordered to be withheld permanently. The respondent’s review application dated 22.05.2020 too did not find any favour and the same stood dismissed by an order dated 31.08.2020, as communicated through Letter No. 185 dated 01.09.2020, issued by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Animal and Fisheries Resources Department. The respondent challenged the aforesaid punishment order dated 27.04.2020 as well as the order in review dated 01.09.2020, by filing a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 10688 of 2020.

The learned Single Judge, after considering the materials placed before the Court, came to a conclusion that the departmental proceeding suffered from procedural infirmity and further noticed absence of any allegation of quantified loss. Consequently, the order of punishment dated 27.04.2020 was quashed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the State authorities have preferred the present appeal.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge exceeded the permissible limits of exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that there were grave and serious charges against the respondent as also did not take into account that a proper and reasonable opportunity has been given to the respondent to defend his case. It has further been submitted that the inquiry Officer had considered the materials placed before him and has recorded a finding that the charges have stood proved, whereafter the disciplinary authority, after considering the inquiry report and the respondent's reply to the second show-cause notice, had imposed the punishment, as aforesaid.

Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon the settled principle of law to the effect that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not ordinarily act as an appellate authority and cannot re-appreciate the evidence merely because another view may be possible, as has been held in the case of State of M.P. and Ors. vs. M.V. Vyavsaya & Co., reported in (1997) 1 SCC 156.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in the departmental proceeding, provisions of evidence act is not applicable and even the evidence which is not acceptable as per the evidence act in the stricter sense, can be relied upon in a departmental proceedings to arrive at the given finding. It has next been submitted that the appellants have granted adequate opportunity to the respondent and that the inquiry had been conducted in accordance with the provision of Rule 17(14) of the Bihar Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005.

The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the power of Judicial review is limited and the Courts cannot go into the merits of the decision of the authority, rather it has to ensure that the decision arrived at is in accordance with law.

The Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that the Inquiry officer neither examined any witness nor granted any opportunity to the respondent to produce defense witness in the Departmental proceedings and submitted an inquiry report dated 23.10.2017 whereby and where under the Inquiry Officer has found the respondent guilty of the charges in the departmental proceeding. It has next been submitted that the inquiry report has been submitted on the basis of surmises and conjectures without referring to any evidence in the Inquiry report.

The Learned counsel for the respondent submits that a purchase committee, consisting of four members, was constituted for the purchase of complete Bacterial vaccine production plant including Autoclave(processor based), electric boiler, filling and sealing machine and related Accessories and only after detailed inquiry the tender was issued in favour of M/S J.H. Bio Innovation, who had quoted an amount of Rs. 1,41,51,000/-, however the inquiry officer erroneously compared this tender with the tender applied by one Matrix Eco Solution, which had quoted price of only one equipment and not of complete plant.

It has been submitted that the government has cancelled the aforesaid tender and there is no misappropriation of funds by the respondent. It has next been submitted that the appellant without going into the details of the tender, recorded its findings which are not based on documents available on the record. It is submitted that a bare perusal of the enquiry report, evidence on record and the order of punishment would show that there is no finding of guilt qua the respondent hence no order of punishment could have been passed against him. It is also submitted that the findings as contained in the order of punishment dated 27.09.2020 are at variance with the charges levelled against the respondent, hence the order of punishment stands vitiated. Lastly, it is contended that the order of punishment purportedly passed under Rule 43(b) of the Rules, 1950 is not sustainable in law inasmuch as the same does not depict any allegation of quantified loss having been proved qua the respondent.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. We find that it is a well settled law that in a disciplinary proceeding, adherence to the procedure prescribed by the applicable statutory rules is an integral part of a fair decision-making process. It is necessary to bear in mind that the charge against the respondent was founded upon alleged irregularities in the tender and purchase process. The punishment ultimately imposed is withholding of 50% of pension. Such an order has civil consequences and, therefore, must be supported by a proceeding conducted in accordance with law and a finding which should be based on material evidence. It is a settled law that the fact that the disciplinary authority possesses jurisdiction to impose a punishment does not dispense with the requirement that the findings leading to such punishment must be reached through a lawful and fair process. A bare perusal of the enquiry report, evidence on record and the order of punishment would show that there is no finding of guilt qua the respondent hence no order of punishment could have been passed against him.

We further find that the findings as contained in the order of punishment dated 27.09.2020 are at variance with the charges levelled against the respondent, hence the order of punishment stands vitiated.

The contention of the appellants that the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered merely because another view was possible cannot, therefore, be accepted as an answer to a finding of procedural infirmity. We fully concur with the observations of the learned Single Judge as made in paragraph-9 of the impugned judgment which reads as under:

We too have noticed that there is no allegation with regard to any quantified loss having been suffered by the appellants. In this regard it would be apropos to reproduce hereinbelow Rule 43(b) of the Rules, 1950:-

The scope of interference in an intra-court appeal against an order passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction is also circumscribed. Unless the view taken by the learned Single Judge is shown to be manifestly erroneous, contrary to the record, or legally unsustainable, interference would not be warranted merely because another view is possible.

The reliance placed by the appellants upon the decisions laying down the restricted scope of judicial review does not help their case. Those decisions themselves recognise that judicial review is available where the disciplinary proceeding is vitiated by violation of statutory procedure or principles of natural justice, or where the finding is otherwise legally unsustainable.

In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. The Court has held that judicial review is directed towards examining the manner in which the decision has been made and not ordinarily towards re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate court.

Likewise, in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the Court would not ordinarily reassess evidence led in a departmental inquiry or interfere merely because another view is possible. Interference, however, remains permissible where the inquiry is vitiated by violation of natural justice or statutory requirements, or where the finding is clearly perverse.

The limitation on judicial review does not mean that every disciplinary proceeding is immune from judicial scrutiny. Where the prescribed procedure has not been followed, where the principles of natural justice have been violated, where the finding is based on no evidence, or where the conclusion is perverse or suffers from an error of law, the High Court is competent to interfere.

In the facts of the present case, the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction of judicial review on the ground of procedural infirmity. We find no sufficient reason to take a different view.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that in the present case the findings of the disciplinary authority is apparently at variance with the charges framed against the petitioner, as also the charge-sheet does not specify any allegation of pecuniary loss having been caused to the Government by the misconduct or negligence of the respondent, which is a necessary ingredient for the purposes of inflicting punishment under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 and moreover, the respondents have failed to quantify the loss, if any caused to the State exchequer, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 01.09.2022, passed in 10688 of 2020, hence the present appeal stands dismissed.

Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.