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Judgment
The petitioner, stated to be a corporate educational agency under the Kerala Education Act, 1958, has filed the captioned writ petition seeking to challenge certain proceedings issued by the Government, by which the steps taken by the petitioner terminating the 8th respondent from service were not ratified.
The short facts necessary for the disposal of this case are as follows:-
The 8th respondent was appointed as H.S.T. (Mathematics) in the petitioner’s school with effect from 21.06.1993. He was due to retire on superannuation on 31.03.2021. The 8th respondent availed Leave Without Allowance (LWA) for taking employment abroad for a period of five years from 01.09.2005. This period was got extended till 31.08.2015 by the Government directly. The 8th respondent submitted Ext.P1 application seeking further extension of the LWA from 01.09.2015 to 31.08.2020. Ext.P2 communication was issued by the Headmaster of the school to the petitioner, informing him that the application submitted as above is not being forwarded to the Office of the District Educational Officer (DEO). On receipt of the afore, the 8th respondent sent Ext.P3 letter from his address at USA, where he was admittedly working, dated 21.08.2015, informing that in 2010 the Manager did not forward the leave extension request, and it is only when the Government intervened, the application was forwarded, and that 8th respondent was not in a situation to depart from USA due to the immigration issues as well as his children were studying there and hence, seeking for extension of leave as prayed for. In the meantime, the leave sanctioned expired on 31.08.2015. The petitioner sent Ext.P4 to the 8th respondent, directing him to rejoin duty within 15 days, failing which disciplinary proceedings were proposed as contemplated in the Rules. This letter was received by the 8th respondent on 10.10.2015, and he submitted Ext.P5 letter to the Manager, repeating that he is not in a position to leave USA and that he requires to continue with the teaching job in USA. Therefore, the Manager sent Ext.P6, directing the 8th respondent to rejoin duty, followed by Ext.P7 show cause notice seeking an explanation as to why he should not be terminated from service. Admittedly, no reply was filed to Ext.P7, and hence, Ext.P8 was issued finalising the disciplinary proceedings in tune with the memo of charges and the show cause notice and taking a provisional decision to terminate the 8th respondent from service. This is confirmed by the Manager pursuant to Ext.P9 dated 02.11.2016. However, the DEO issued Ext.P10 to the 8th respondent, directing him to appear, proposing steps for termination. On that basis, the Manager, as well as the DEO, issued:
Ext.P11 memo of charges
Ext.P12 statement of allegations dated 19.12.2016.
Ext.P13 statement of allegations dated 07.02.2017.
Letter dated 14.03.2017 granting one more opportunity to the 8th respondent on 05.04.2017.
However, the 8th respondent did not participate or respond. Ext.P15 enquiry report was finalised with a copy marked to the 8th respondent. On the basis of this, the 7th respondent issued Ext.P16 hearing notice to the 8th respondent, to which also the 8th respondent did not respond. However, after all the above, the 8th respondent submitted Ext.P17 dated 20.12.2017, pointing out that he will be coming to Kerala during June, 2018 and therefore, informing that he may take steps for rejoining and also for completing the retirement formalities voluntarily.
However, even after all the above, the petitioner states that Ext.P18 was issued by the 7th respondent, holding that the procedure prescribed under Rule 75 of Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (KER) was not being followed, and hence, denying the request for terminating the 8th respondent made by the Manager. Pursuant to the memo of charges issued by the Manager dated 13.07.2018 and 18.06.2018, the 8th respondent issued Ext.P20 reply. In the meantime, Ext.P21 show cause notice was issued by the Manager, followed by Ext.P22 request for initiating steps under Rule 75. By Ext.P22(a) dated 17.06.2019, the DEO informed the Manager that the leave application was not processed, and hence, disciplinary action cannot be taken. The petitioner, in response thereto, submitted Ext.P24 enquiry report, followed by Ext.P25 communication to the Government. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Ext.P26 judgment, the Government was directed to consider and pass orders on the application filed as above. The 8th respondent, thereafter, sent Ext.P27 e-mail informing that he is ready to retire on any date, even prior to the official retirement date. All the above were considered by the Deputy Secretary, leading to Ext.P29 Government Order dated 05.12.2020, finding that since the leave applied for by the 8th respondent has not been sanctioned, he requires to be terminated, for which the Deputy Director requires to take effective steps in accordance with law. On that basis, the petitioner issued Ext.P30 charge memo and statement of allegations to which Ext.P32 reply was given by the 8th respondent, and after conducting an enquiry, Ext.P33 enquiry report was also finalised, which was also communicated to the 8th respondent. The enquiry report was acted upon, and the DEO was also directed to take appropriate steps in the matter. On the basis of this, DEO issued Ext.P35 letter permitting further action against the 8th respondent. The 8th respondent was thereafter found guilty pursuant to Ext.P35 enquiry report, on the basis of which, a show cause notice at Ext.P36 was issued, to which Ext.P37 reply was given by the 8th respondent, on account of which, the Manager issued Ext.P38 order dated 12.08.2021, terminating the 8th respondent from service. The 8th respondent challenged those proceedings before the Government. The petitioner also filed a representation seeking the finalisation of the proceedings against the 8th respondent. In the meantime, the petitioner had appointed other teachers to fill the vacancy. The Government issued Ext.P42, finding that finalisation of the disciplinary action after the retirement of the 8th respondent in the meantime on 31.03.2021 cannot be approved. The revision petition filed by the 8th respondent against Ext.P29 is also dismissed as infructuous.
It is in such circumstances that the petitioner has sought to file the captioned writ petition seeking to challenge:
Ext.P18 order dated 10.04.2018 holding that the mandate under Rule 75 was not followed while imposing penalty on the 8th respondent.
Ext.P22(a) order issued by the DEO containing the very same finding.
Ext.P29 order of the Government holding that the Manager is to take further steps to terminate the 8th respondent.
Ext.P42 order holding that the 8th respondent cannot be removed from the service retrospectively, after retirement.
I have heard Sri.A.L.Navaneeth Krishnan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as Sri.T.R.Rajesh, the learned counsel for the 8th respondent herein. I have also heard Smt.Pooja Surendran, the learned Government Pleader for the respondents.
The issue arising for consideration, as noticed earlier, is whether the proceedings initiated by the Manager for terminating the 8th respondent could be sustained or not. The Government, in the first instance, has found that the Manager has proceeded against the 8th respondent without following the mandate under Rule 75 of Chapter XIVA of the KER. True, the Manager has issued fresh memo of charges/statement of allegations on that basis. However, it is contended by Sri.Navaneeth Krishnan that there was no requirement for any disciplinary proceedings since the 8th respondent had abandoned/voluntarily given up the service of the petitioner. Therefore, the first question to be considered is as to whether the 8th respondent has voluntarily abandoned the service.
In this connection, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgments of the Apex Court in Vijay S.Sathaye v. Indian Airlines Ltd. and Others [(2013) 10 SCC 253], Manju Saxena v. Union of India [(2019) 2 SCC 628], Vinod S. v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Others [2020 (6) KLT 628], Aligarh Muslim University and Others v. Mansoor Ali Khan [(2000) 7 SCC 529], etc. However, Sri.Rajesh, the learned counsel for the 8th respondent, would submit that with reference to the proceedings under Rule 75 of Chapter XIVA of the KER, mandatorily the procedure thereunder requires to be followed as laid down by this Court in Seetharam Upper Primary School v. State of Kerala [2012 (2) KLT 338].
In Vijay S. Sathaye (supra), the Apex Court considered a case where the employee in spite of an intimation that she should continue in service till such time the decision in the VRS application is taken, did not rejoin and joined another organisation. Considering the afore, the Apex Court found as under:
“8.Even otherwise, the petitioner was asked to continue in service till the decision is taken on his application. However, he did not attend the office of the respondents after 12.11.1994. In view of the above, as the petitioner had voluntarily abandoned the services of the respondents, there was no requirement on the part of the respondents to pass any order whatsoever on his application and it is a clear cut case of voluntary abandonment of service and the petitions are liable to be dismissed.
9.It is a settled law that an employee cannot be termed as a slave, he has a right to abandon the service any time voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively, not joining the duty and remaining absent for long. Absence from duty in the beginning may be a misconduct but when absence is for a very long period, it may amount to voluntarily abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end automatically without requiring any order to be passed by the employer.”
(Underlining supplied)
To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court in Manju Saxena (supra), wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that abandonment of service requires to be inferred from the existing facts and circumstances. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Vinod S. (supra) found as under:
“17.An employee cannot be termed a slave. He has a right to abandon the service any time voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively by not joining the duty and also by remaining absent for long. Absence from duty initially or for intervals or for compelling reasons may be misconduct or grounds to proceed for alleged misconduct. But when absence is for a long period it can indicate voluntary abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end automatically without requiring any order to be passed by the employer. It is a unilateral action by the employee and the employer has no role whatsoever. In M/s. Jeevanlal (1929) Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen [1961 KHC 739: AIR 1961 SC 1567: 1962 (1) SCR 717: 1961 (1) LLJ 517], it was held that there would be the class of cases where long unauthorized absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such services were intended to be abandoned by the employee. There is a difference between abandonment of service and termination of service. Abandonment of service is a unilateral action by the employee and the employer has no role to play in such an action. Termination is a positive action by the employer.”
In Aligarh Muslim University (supra), the Apex Court considered a situation where a Library Assistant sought for two years leave for joining an employment in Libya, and when he applied for extension of leave, the leave was only granted for a lesser period, directing that no further extension can be granted. In spite of this, the employee did not rejoin in India and continued in Libya. In the afore factual situation, the Apex Court applied the useless formality theory as under:
“25.The “useless formality” theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of “admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion” referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta [(1999) 6 SCC 237] referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case.
26.It will be sufficient, for the purpose of the case of Mr Mansoor Ali Khan to show that his case will fall within the exceptions stated by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] , namely, that on the admitted or indisputable facts, only one view is possible. In that event no prejudice can be said to have been caused to Mr Mansoor Ali Khan though notice has not been issued.
27.Our reasons for saying that the case of Mr Mansoor Ali Khan falls within the exception can be stated as follows: Admittedly, leave was sanctioned only for 2 years from 18-4-1979. When before the expiry of the period, Mr Mansoor Ali Khan applied on 18-4-1981 for extension of leave by 3 more years, the University wrote to him on 17-9-1981/23-9-1981 granting extension only for one year from 18-4-1981 and also stated that he was required to resume duties by 18-4-1982. It did not stop there. It further forewarned Mr Khan as follows:
“Please note that no further extension in the period of your leave will be possible and you are advised to make preparation for resuming duty positively by 18-4-1982.” In other words, he was put on advance notice that it would not be possible to give any further extension i.e. beyond one year on the ground of continuance in the job at Libya and he was to resume duty by 18-4-1982. In fact, thereafter some special consideration was still shown in his favour by way of granting him joining time up to 1-7-1982. It was clearly said that otherwise he would be deemed to have vacated the post. If he had, in spite of this warning, gone ahead by accepting a further contract in Libya, it was, in our view, his own unilateral act in the teeth of the advance warning given. That conduct, the learned Single Judge thought and in our view rightly to be sufficient to deny relief under Article 226.
28.We may state that the University has not acted unreasonably in informing him in advance — while granting one year extension, in addition to the initial absence of 2 years — that no further extension will be given. We have noticed that when the extension is sought for three years, the Department has given him extension only for one year as he had already availed 2 years' extraordinary leave by that time. It has to be noticed that when employees go on foreign assignments which are secured by them at their own instance, in case they do not come back within the original period stipulated or before the expiration of the extended period, the employer in the parent country would be put to serious inconvenience and will find it difficult to make temporary alternative appointments to fill up the post during the period of absence of those who have gone abroad. However, when rules permit and provide for an employee to go abroad discretion must be exercised reasonably while refusing extension. In this case, giving of further extension only for one year out of the further period of three years sought for is not unreasonable. In such a situation, if the employee has entangled himself into further commitments abroad, he has to blame himself.” Therefore, it was found that no prejudice was caused to the employee, as he was overstaying abroad.
Viewed in the light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments, this Court finds that, as is evident from Ext.P4 letter dated 09.09.2015 and Ext.P6 communication dated 13.01.2016, the 8th respondent was directed to rejoin duty. Thereafter, show cause notices were issued, followed by the provisional order at Ext.P8 and the final order at Ext.P9. However, even after receipt of all the above communications, the 8th respondent did not think it fit to rejoin duty. Instead, he informed the Manager that, for various reasons, he could only continue to reside in the USA. In my opinion, this conduct clearly amounts to abandonment of service, and there is no requirement to initiate any further disciplinary proceedings against the 8th respondent, as held in the afore judgments.
This is particularly so since the 8th respondent was aware that his request for extension of LWA with effect from 01.09.2015 had not been approved by the competent authority. Even then, as noticed earlier, the 8th respondent chose to continue his stay abroad.
The next question arises is as to whether the 8th respondent could be terminated without any disciplinary proceedings. In view of the finding as above that the conduct of the 8th respondent amounts to abandonment; needless to say, there is no requirement for any disciplinary steps as have been found by the various judgments referred to above. However, this Court notices that disciplinary proceedings were taken pursuant to the directions of the DEO as evidenced by Ext.P11 charge memo, and Exts.P12 and P13 statement of allegations, culminating in Ext.P15 enquiry report. This Court further notices that though a hearing was scheduled on the basis of the enquiry report, as evidenced by Ext.P16, the 8th respondent chose not to respond. Later, a fresh charge memo was issued pursuant to the directions in Ext.P18. In response, Ext. P19 e-mail was sent by the 8th respondent stating that he was unable to leave USA. This is followed by Ext.P20 from the 8th respondent, informing that voluntary retirement may be permitted. On the basis of the afore, enquiry was also continued and completed. Therefore, the fact that more than two sets of disciplinary proceedings were taken against the 8th respondent is proved. Hence, the 8th respondent is not justified in contending that he is sought to be terminated without carrying out the disciplinary proceedings under the KER. At this Juncture, reference also requires to be made to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Shaji P. Joseph v. State of Kerala and Others [2022 (1) KHC 203], wherein this Court considered the question as to whether teachers in private aided schools can seek for leave for more than 5 years without affecting their continuance in service in view of the provisions under Rule 56(4) of Chapter XIVA of KER. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Deepa S. v. State of Kerala and Others [2010 (4) KLT 795], in this regard, had opined that Rule 56(4) is to be harmoniously construed and read along with the provisions under Appendix XIIC Part II of Kerala Service Rules, 1959, which enable the Government servants for extension of leave up to 20 years. It is doubting the afore dictum, the matter was referred for consideration by the Division Bench. The Division Bench, considering the afore, found as under:
“5.On a consideration of the rival submissions, we are of the view that on the facts in the instant case, the provisions of R.56 of Chapter XIVA KER have to be seen as carving out an exception in the matter of sanctioning of casual leave and all other kinds of leave to teachers of aided schools. While R.56(1) suggests that in the matter of casual leave and all other kinds of leave, the teachers of aided schools shall be governed by the same Rules as those applicable for teachers of Government schools, sub-R.4 of R.56 clearly carves out an exception for teachers in aided schools by making it clear that the said teachers would cease to be in service after a continuous absence of 5 years whether with or without leave. In our view, the effect of sub-R.4 of R.56 would be that, on the expiry of the continuous period of 5 years, there would be no requirement of referring to the KSR for determining the leave entitlement of the teacher in an aided school whether it be casual leave or any other kinds of leave. This would be because the reference to the KSR envisaged under R.56(1) would be required only for the time limited permitted by the provisions of R.56(4), and on expiry of the period of 5 years mentioned in R.56(4), the teacher of a private aided school cannot look to the KSR for determining her leave entitlement. We, therefore, disapprove of the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Deepa S. v. State of Kerala and Others, 2010 (4) KHC 820 : 2010 (4) KLT 795 : ILR 2010 (4) Ker. 825 : 2010 (3) KLJ 812 to the extent it holds otherwise. We also find that, at any rate, there was no consideration of the interplay between the two sets of Rules in the said judgment, as the learned Judge despite noticing a conflict between the rules, felt it was not necessary for the purpose of disposal of the Writ Petition to resolve that controversy.”
In the light of the afore proposition, there cannot be any dispute that the 8th respondent herein is also bound by the mandate under Rule 56(4). When that be so, the 8th respondent could not seek for extension, overlooking the interdiction contained thereunder. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the 8th respondent cannot seek refuge under the provisions of the Kerala Service Rules.
On the whole, I am of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Hence, this writ petition would stand allowed. The impugned orders at Exts.P18, P22, P29, and P42 are set aside. It is declared that the 8th respondent, having abandoned the service, was rightly terminated by the petitioner herein. In view of this declaration, the competent among the respondents to take note of the appointments effected by the petitioner and approve such appointments in accordance with law.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO.28358 OF 2022
PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 31.08.2020 SUBMITTED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT FOR LWA WITH ENCLOSURE.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 13.08.2015 ISSUED BY THE HEADMISTRESS OF THE SCHOOL TO THE 8TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 21.08.2015 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT TO THE GOVERNMENT.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 09.09.2015 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 8TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 10.10.2015 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 13.01.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 8TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 20.04.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 8TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. 09/2015 DATED 23.07.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.09/2015 DATED 02.11.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. B4-6245/16 DATED 13.12.2016 ISSUED BY THE D.E.O.
EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO OF CHARGES DATED 19.12.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS DATED 19.12.2016 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P13 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS DATED 07.02.2017 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P14 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. B4/6245/15 DATED 14.03.2017 ISSUED BY THE DEO.
EXHIBIT P15 TRUE COPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT DATED 10.04.2017 WITH COVERING LETTER NO. B4/6245/15 ISSUED BY THE DEO.
EXHIBIT P16 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE NO. B5/14342/17 DATED 07.11.2017 ISSUED BY THE 7TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P17 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 20.12.2017 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P18 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. B5/14342/2017 DATED 10.04.2018 ISSUED BY THE 7TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P19 TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL COMMUNICATION DATED 25.06.2018 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P20 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 21.07.2018 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT TO THE MANAGER.
EXHIBIT P21 TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDING NO. 001/6/18 DATED 13.07.2018 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER.
EXHIBIT P22 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 06.09.2018 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER WITH ENCLOSURES.
EXHIBIT P22 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. B4/5778/2018 DATED 17.06.2019 ISSUED BY THE DEO.
EXHIBIT P23 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. B4-5778/2018 DATED 07.12.2018 ISSUED BY THE DEO.
EXHIBIT P24 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY NO.25/2019 DATED 15.02.2019 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER TO THE DEO, WITH ENCLOSURES.
EXHIBIT P25 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 04.10.2019 ISSUED BY THE THEN MANAGER OF THE SCHOOL TO THE GOVERNMENT.
EXHIBIT P26 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 06.12.2019 IN W.P.(C)NO.33238 OF 2019 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT.
EXHIBIT P27 TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL COMMUNICATION DATED 28.08.2020.
EXHIBIT P28 TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL COMMUNICATION DATED 31.08.2020.
EXHIBIT P29 TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER NO. GO(RT)NO. 3227/2020/G.EDN DATED 05.12.2020.
EXHIBIT P30 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO OF CHARGES DATED 21.12.2020 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER OF THE SCHOOL.
EXHIBIT P31 TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS DATED 21.12.2020 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER OF THE SCHOOL.
EXHIBIT P32 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 03.01.2021 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT TO THE MANAGER OF THE SCHOOL.
EXHIBIT P33 TRUE COPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT DATED 25.01.2021 SUBMITTED BY THE MANAGER.
EXHIBIT P34 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. B5/26492/2020 DATED 12.04.2021 ISSUED BY THE 7TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P35 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. B4/344/2021 DATED 16.07.2021 ISSUED BY THE DEO.
EXHIBIT P36 TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 26.07.2021 ISSUED BY THE MANAGER.
EXHIBIT P37 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 09.08.2021 ISSUED BY THE 8TH RESPONDENT TO THE MANAGER.
EXHIBIT P38 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 12.08.2021 PASSED BY THE MANAGER OF THE SCHOOL.
EXHIBIT P39 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.B4/6527/2015 DATED 11.07.2018 ISSUED BY THE 7TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P40 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.B4/3349/2017 DATED 24.09.2018 PASSED BY THE DEO.
EXHIBIT P41 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO.B5/26492/2020 DATED 29.09.2021 ISSUED BY THE 7TH RESPONDENT TO THE GOVERNMENT.
EXHIBIT P42 TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER GO(RT) NO. 2782/2022/G.EDN DATED 05.05.2022.