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Judgment
Manjula Chellur, J.—Heard on either side.
This Appeal is directed against the judgment and Award dated 5.4.1995 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Chikodi, in LAC. No. 19/1994.
The undisputed fact is that all the schedule lands in LAC. No. 19/94 originally belong to one L.B Desai-1st First Respondent herein, who was an Inamdhar of these lands. It is also not in dispute that by preliminary notification dated 2.3.78 and final notification dated 3.6.78 these lands came to be acquired for the rehabilitation scheme in order to provide residential accommodation to the persons who were displaced because of the construction of the Hidakal dam. An award came to be passed on 31.1.81 in LAQ/SR/176. It is also not in dispute that Mr. L.B. Sandesai filed an application u/s 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 12.10.84 seeking reference to the Civil Court for enhancement of compensation. It is also not disputed that on 26.10.84 the very same claimant filed an application under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act before the Civil Judge seeking compensation. The application filed under Sections 30 and 31 came to be numbered as LAC. 196/1984. On 24.7.85, this application came to be dismissed observing that the very application is not maintainable, as it was not on a reference from the Land Acquisition Officer and held that as all the lands were vested with the Government free from encumbrance, the only right available to the landlords u/s 44(7) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and not for any other compensation. It is noted that LAC. A. 12/95 came to be filed by the first Respondents-claimants challenging the orders of the Civil Judge in LAC. 196/1904 dated 24.7.1985. However, the said Appeal came to be dismissed for non-prosecution.
Meanwhile, as the application filed u/s 18(1) of the LA Act was not referred to the Civil Court within the statutory period, another application u/s 18(3)(b) of the Act came to be made, which was numbered as LAC. 2/1988. The said application came to be filed on 11.1.88. On 8.3.94, the said matter came to be allowed on merits by the Addl. civil Judge, Chikodi in LAC. 2/1988. By virtue of this Order, the learned Additional Civil Judge, Chikodi directed the office to register the reference application with the Special Land Acquisition Officer before the Reference Court. This Order of the learned Civil Judge was contested by the State Government, wherein they had seriously taken the stand that the reference teas not being within the period of limitation provided under the Act. So also regarding vesting of the land, the learned Judge on merits held that the application was in time and so also the reference and ultimately directed for registration of reference for enquiry to know whether the claimants were entitled for enhancement. This order of the Civil Judge dated 8.3.94 was not challenged by the State Government and it has reached finality.
Thereafter, LAC.19/94 came to be registered by virtue of the Orders in LAC. 2/88 on 30.8.94. In this LAC.19/94, the Appellant-State filed objections re-iterating the sane objections as stated in LAC.2/1988. The learned Judge after giving opportunity to both the parties, ultimately allowed LAC. 19/94 partly enhancing the compensation as per the Award dated 5.4.1995.
Aggrieved by the said Order and the Award of the learned civil Judge, this appeal came to be filed contending that the reference Court was not justified in directing the reference to be registered and further, there was no scope for enhancement of compensation, as the claimants were not at all entitled for any compensation, in view of the lands being vested with the Government, which was confirmed in LAC 196/1984 dated 26.10.84.
On earlier occasion, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the Appeal on 11.9.2002 confirming the judgment and Award of the reference Court in LAC.No. 19/1994. The State being aggrieved, preferred SLP (Civil) 5246 to 5249/2004, wherein the first Respondents 2 and 3 got impleaded themselves as parties before the Hon''ble Apex Court by virtue of the Order dated 12.3.2004.
Subsequently, the Civil Appeals 1891 -1904/2004 arising out of the above SLPs were disposed of remanding the matter back to this Court to dispose of the Appeal afresh on two Issues. Meanwhile, the first Respondent died and his L.Rs are brought on record. The Hon''ble Apex Court raised the following two issues as points for consideration.
Whether the lands in question had already been vested with the State Government?
Whether the first Respondent No. 1 was not entitled to file an application u/s 18 of the L.A. Act, as the application filed by him tinder Sections 30 and 31 of the Act had been rejected by the Civil Judge concerned.
After remand of the matter to this Court, in order to decide the two issues raised by the Hon''ble Apex Court, this Court allowed the application of the parties to lead further evidence and sent back the file to the Civil Judge only for the purpose of recording additional evidence. By virtue of the orders of this Court, the concerned Court allowed the parties to lead further evidence and Ex.D.4 to Ex.D.18-xerox copies of the RTC extracts of all the lands referred to in LAC.No. 19/94 came to be marked. After recording the evidence along with the additional documents, the evidence of the parties is sent back to this Court for disposal of the two issues as stated above on merits.
We have heard the learned Government Advocate Mr. C.S. Patil, learned ASA appearing for the Appellant-State, Sri. Suresh S. Gundi for R.1 and R.2, Sri. C. Skothavale S.N. Hatti for R.1, so also Sr. Counsel Mr. Ramadas appearing for the legal representatives of Mr. L.B. Deaai i.e., R.2 and R.3 and Sri. V.Y. Kumar for R.4.
From the above facts, it is noticed that though the claimants challenged the orders in LAC. No. 196/84 dated 24.7.1985, the appeal came to be dismissed for non-prosecution and therefore, the orders dated 24.7.1985 has reached finality. Then the question would be whether the orders in LAC. 196/1984 is a bar against the claimants to seek enhancement of compensation in view of the learned Addl. Civil Judge holding that all the lands vested with the Government as on the date of acquisition, therefore, they were entitled to only for the benefits available to them u/s 47 of the Act and not other benefits.
Apparently, the State Government has also not challanged the orders dated 8.3.94 directing the LAO to refer the matter, which ultimately was registered in LAC.19/94. The fact remains in LAC.2/88 the Appellant-State did raise the question of limitation and so also maintainability of the application in view of the orders in LAC.196/84 under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act. Therefore, whether in the absence of challenging the orders in LAC.2/1988 dated 8.3.1994, the State could agitate the question of maintainabillity and vesting of the lands with the Government as held in LAC.196/1984.
So far as the orders dated 24.7.1985 in LAC No. 196/84, the said application was directly filed before the Civil Judge and not by reference from the Land Acquisition Officer.
Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as under:
30 Dispute as to apportionment - When the amount of compensation has been settled u/s 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the court.
Reading of Section 30 would make it clear that whenever a dispute arises as to the apportionment of entire compensation or part thereof when the matter was pending before the said Land Acquisition Officer, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. Apparently, there was no such dispute before the (sic) Land Acquisition Officer for the decision of the civil Court in the above said matter and the same was an application directly made to the Court. Reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad vikas Pradhikaran and Anr. reported in 2003 (5) SCW 561 as under:
(7) It is well established that the Reference Court gets jurisdiction on the matter is referred to it u/s 18 or 30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition Officer and that the civil court has got the jurisdiction authority only to decide the objections referred to it. The Reference Court cannot widen the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it. This question was considered by various judicial authority and one of the earliest decision reported on this point is Pramatha Mullick Bahadur v. Secy. of State. This was a case where the claimant sought a reference u/s 18 of the Act. In the application filed by claimant he did not dispute the measurements of the land given in the award. Before the Reference Court, the claimant raised objection regarding measurements of the land and sought for fresh measurements. This was refused and the claimant applied to the High Court for revision of this or objection regarding measurements and the High Court rejected it. Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held thus: (AIR p.65)
"Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of these sections. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to Collector''s award and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Once therefore it is ascertained that the only objection taken is to amount of compensation, that alone is the ''matter'' referred and the court has no power to determine or consider anything beyond it."
"8. In another case, namely, Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra this Court observed: (SCC p.584, para 25)
"25. Every Tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such Tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction and where a tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the Tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that Tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise.
In K. Kanakarathamma v. State of A.P. the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference u/s 30 for the apportionment of the compensation amount amongst the various claimants. Six of the Appellants did not accept the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and made application to him for referring the matter for determination by the court, but no reference was made by him pursuant to this application. When the matter came up before the court, it proceeded on the footing that the reference made to it was not merely limited to the apportionment of compensation but also with respect to the amount of compensation. No objection, however, was raised by the State before the Reference Court regarding the absence of reference. When the matter came up before the High court, the Government Pleader raised this objection. Though the High court allowed the plea to be raised before it, but ultimately it negatived the plea. The Appellants contended before the High Court that pursuant to the failure of the State to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge as to the absence of a reference, the state must be deemed to have waived the point. Rejecting this contention, this Court held (AIR p. 306, para 3)
The matter goes to the court only upon a reference made by the Collector. It is only after such a reference is made that the court is empowered to determine the objections made by a claimant to the award. Section 21 restricts the scope of the proceedings before the court to consideration of the contentions of the persons affected by the objection. These provisions thus leave no doubt that the jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. No doubt, the Land Acquisition Officer has made a reference u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act but that reference was only in regard to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the various claimants. Such a reference would certainly not invest the court with the jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with it. This is really not a mere technicality for as pointed out by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan wherever jurisdiction is given by a statute and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained therein it is a universal principle that those terms should be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction and if they are not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction and the failure of the State to object to the proceedings before the court on the ground of an absence of reference insofar as the determination of compensation was concerned cannot amount to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when thee is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by acquiescence.
It is clear from the above case that when the matter is not referred to the Reference Court, it cannot be held as a valid reference and the out come of such proceedings is of no consequence. As a matter of fact, there was no reference at all. It was an application directly presented to the Court. As a matter of fact, the learned Judge did say that it was not a valid application and not maintainable. Having said so, he should not have entertained the matter on merits. He should have rejected the very application as not a valid reference. Though he holds that the application is not maintainable but proceeds to make some observations with regard to the vesting of the lands with the Government. Whether this observation is of any consequence or has any binding effect on the subsequent proceedings, coming in the way of claim of the claimants, we have to refer to the jurisdiction of the courts etc. When a Court passes an order, being '' not competent to pass such an order or a Court having no jurisdiction to pass an order passes an order or a Court lacking inherent jurisdiction entertains the matter, what would be the consequences of such decision made by such Court. For this, we refer to the following decisions:
In the case of Ajudh Raj and others Vs. Moti, reported as under:
The principle for deciding the question of limitation in a suit filed after an adverse order under a Special Act is well settled. If the order impugned in the suit is such that it has to be set aside before any relief can be granted to the Plaintiff the provisions of Article 100 will be attracted and if no particular article of the Limitation Act is applicable the suit must be governed by the residuary Article 113, prescribing a period of three years. Therefore, in a suit for title to an immovable property which has been the subject matter of a proceeding under a special Act if an adverse order comes in the way of the success of the Plaintiff he must get it cleared before proceeding further. On the other hand if the order has been passed without jurisdiction, the same can be ignored as nullity, that is, nonexistent in the eye of law and it is not necessary to set it aside; and such a suit will be covered by Article 65. In the present case the controversial facts have been decided in favour of the Plaintiff-Appellant and the findings were not challenged before the High Court. The position, thus, is that the Plaintiff was the owner in cultivating possession of the land and the Defendant Moti was merely a labourer without any right of a tenant or a sub-tenant. The question is as to whether in this background it is necessary to set aside the order passed in favour of the Respondent u/s 27(4) of the Act before the suit can be decreed or whether the Plaintiff can get a decree ignoring the said order as void, in which case the suit undoubtedly will be governed by Article 65.
The cases relied upon by the High Court do not support the impugned judgment. In State v. Sadh Ram the compensation Officer had passed an order u/s 27(4) of the Act, transferring the proprietary right to the cultivating tenants of the land, excluding the trees standing thereon. The transferee tenants filed a suit in respect of the trees and the High Court held that the suit was barred by limitation either under Article 100 or Article 113. The grievance of the tenant was not against the exercise of the power of the Compensation Officer u/s 27(4) of the Act, rather he relied upon the same. The observations, mentioned below, from the judgment of Pathak, C.J. (as he then was) are enlightening and supporting the view expressed by us:
This is not a case where the order made by the compensation officer is a nullity. If the compensation officer had ab initio no jurisdiction to take the proceeding and make an order therein, he would have no jurisdiction to make any order at all. In that event, the entire order made by him, including that part of it which is in favour of the Plaintiffs, would be a nullity.
In the Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Gangu v. Mahanraj Chand the decision on the question of limitation went against the Plaintiff on account of the special facts and circumstances of the case, as is clear from the enunciation of the proposition (at page 389, column 2) to the effect that if it is necessary for a Plaintiff to get rid of an order made by an officer of the government, which stands in his way before he can obtain a certain relief and in order to obtain that relief he does not specifically ask for the setting aside of the order but merely for a declaratory decree still the suit should be deemed to be one to set aside an order falling within the ambit of Article 14. It is material to note that in that case, it was essential for the Plaintiff to have got the order of the Collector set aside, before asking for a decree.
In the case of Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, as under:
The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a Court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District court of Monghyr was ''coram non judice'' and that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.
Sushil Kumar Mehta Vs. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) through his Lrs., as under:
This Court has held that it is a well established principle that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.
Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, after adjudication on merits of the rights of the parties, operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings and binds the parties or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings its validity cannot be questioned. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or on other grounds which goes to the root of its exercise or jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction. It is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is defect in its exercise which does not go to the root of its authority, such a defect like pecuniary or territorial could be waived by the party. They could be corrected by way of appropriate plea at its inception or in appellate or revisional forums, provided law permits. The doctrine of res judicata u/s 11 CPC is founded on public policy. An issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. Thus the decision of a competent court over the matter in issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or proceedings or in other proceedings between the same parties and those claiming under them. But the question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of a court unrelated to questions of fact or law or mixed questions does not operate as res judicata even between the parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvious; a pure question of law unrelated to facts which are the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a facet of procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority or when the earlier decision declares a transaction to be valid despite prohibition by law it does not operate as res judicata. Thus a question of jurisdiction of a court or of a procedure or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties founded purely on question of fact in the previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. A question relating to jurisdiction of a court or interpretation of provisions of a statute cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of a court. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree of nullity. It the court inherently lacks jurisdiction consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction.
There is one more controversy before us. The Government having acquired the land by notifying the owners and the interested persons thereunder could it turn back and say the land acquired was wrong as the land has already vested with the Government. If the land belongs to the Government, question of acquiring its own land would not arise. As a matter of fact, we note from the records that no tenancy question ever arose before the Land Tribunal wherein any of the alleged tenants of the claimants had made application for grant of occupancy rights. It is not even the case of the Appellant State that such and such person was a tenant under the landlord. Similarly, because of an observation made by the Land Acquisition Officer in the original award at para 3 that compensation could be paid to such of the persons on production of grant of occupancy rights from the Land Tribunal, the Appellant State has come up with the defence of vesting of lands with the Government as they are tenanted lands. They also place reliance on the entries in the RTC extracts which are now produced by way of additional evidence at Exs. D.4 to D.18.
We have also perused the original revenue records produced before us today. Some of the lands have entries for 1967-68 and these entries are up to 1973-74 and also for subsequent years. So far as column No. 9, ve notice that it is shown as "sarkara" (Government). Then the same is rounded off. But there is no endorsement on what date it came to be rounded off and under what procedure. Below the said "Sarkara", the name of Sir L.B. Desai is shown. Below the said name, some numbers are noted. We are unable to understand what these numbers connote and for what purpose they are mentioned.
The argument of the learned Government Advocate is the name of Government finds place at column-9, therefore, there is a presumption that the lands vested with the Government in view of the entries on different persons. At column-12 there is name of the landlord. If the lands stood in the name of Sir L.B. Desai and then the land vested with the Government, the name of Sir L.B. Desai must be rounded of and then the name of the government should appear. But it is not so. Though an opportunity was given to the State Government to lead further evidence, no clarification whatsoever pertaining to these entries has come on record. On the other hand, from the above said entries at RTC extracts, we can presume that as the lands were originally Inam lands granted to Sir L.B. Desai who was the Jahagirdar of these villages and other villages, the name of the Government is rounded off and then the name of Sir L.B. Desai is entered. This would only indicate that these lands in all probability were regranted to the Inamdar.
Then coming to the entries at column-12, if there is a presumption u/s 133 of the Land Revenue Act, the said presumption is to the effect that whose name finds place at column 12 they are presumed to be the tenants. The presumption is with regard to the position of the parties with reference to the column under which such entries are made. If entry at column 9 is made, the presumption is such person whose name finds place at column-9 will be the owner or kathadar. Even if the name of any person is shown at column-12, presumption is that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property. Column-12 refers to the person who is in occupation and cultivation of the land. Therefore, u/s 133, there is no presumption to presume that the person whose name is shown at column-12 is a tenant. It is also well settled that the presumption u/s 133 is rebuttable presumption.
When we go through these RTC extracts up to 1972-73, the lands are shown to be in possession and cultivation of the kathadar. Later on, third party names are entered. Apparently, those persons have not filed any application like form No. 7 or 7A claiming tenancy rights. Ho one has approached the reference court claiming compensation and so also seeking apportionment of compensation before the Land Acquisition Officer. In that view of the matter, merely somebody else''s name finds a place at column-12, there is no presumption that such person is tenant and the lands in question are tenanted lands. It was well within the power of the State to bring on record such evidence if they wanted to substantiate their defence of vesting of the lands with them. We rely upon reported decision in the case of Smt. Sanjivi @ Lmxmi Amma v. State of Karnataka reported in 1975 (2) KLJ 68. In this decision, it was held that even if an application for grant of occupancy rights is filed, there is no presumption as such that the lands shown in the application have vested in the State Government. That fact being the subject matter of dispute between the landlord and the person claiming to be a tenant, has to be determined by the Tribunal at the very threshold of the enquiry before taking over the question of registration of the tenants as occupants. In that view of the matter, mere entries in the name of third parties in the column 12 of RTC extracts as on 1.3.1974 or prior to said date will not be of any assistance to the state to contend that all the lands in question vested with the Government as they were tenanted lands. So far as the legal position that the Government cannot acquire its own land, we refer to following decisions:
In the case of State of U.P. and Others Vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead), as under:
We find ourselves in full agreement with the view of the law taken in the decisions cited hereinabove. It is pertinent to note that the Respondent is not claiming a lease in perpetuity or right to successive renewals under the covenant for renewal contained in the 1887 lease. The term of 50 years under the 1887 lease came to an end in the year 1937 and the option for renewal was exercised by the Respondent as assignee of the original lessee which exercise was honoured by the lessor State executing a fresh deed of lease belatedly on February 20, 1945. This lease deed does not set out any fresh covenants, mutually agreed upon between the parties for the purpose of renewal. Rather it incorporates, without any reservation, all the covenants. Provisos and stipulations as contained in the principal lease as if they had been herein repeated in full. Sot only was a fresh deed of lease executed but the conduct of the parties also shows that at the end of the term appointed by the 1945 lease, i.e., in or around the year 1987, the lessor did not exercise its right of re-entry. On the other hand, the Respondent exercised his option for renewal. The officials of the Appellant state i.e., the Collector and the Board of Revenue, all recommended renewal and advised the State Government to expedite the renewal. The State Government was generally renewing such like leases by issuing general orders/instructions to its officer. At no point of time prior to the filing of the counter-affidavit, on the present litigation having been initiated, the State or any of its officers took a stand that the right of renewal, as contained in the principal deed of lease, having been exhausted by exercise of one option for renewal, was not available to be exercised again.
How that the covenant for renewal has been referentially incorporated without any reservation in the lease deed of 1945 the exercise of option for renewal cannot be denied to the Respondent. However, in the lease deed to be executed for a period of 50 years commencing May 20, 1987, the covenant for renewal need not be Incorporated and therefore, the term of the lease would come to an end on expiry of 50 years calculated from May 20, 1987. This view also accords with the view of the law taken in Green v. Palmer (supra).
The other two pleas raised on behalf of the Appellant State merit a short and summary burial. The Appellant''s plea that the land having been acquired there could be no renewal of lease has been termed by the High Court as ''ridiculous'' and we find no reason to take a different view. Suffice it to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Another, wherein it has been held that the Land acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be invoked by the Government to acquire its own property. It would be an absurdity to comprehend the provision of the Land Acquisition Act being applicable to such land wherein the ownership or the entirety of rights already vests in the State. The notification and declaration under Ss.4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the land i.e., the site below the bungalow are meaningless. It would have been different if the State would have proposed the acquisition of leasehold rights and/or the case may be. But that has not been done. The renewal of lease cannot be denied in the garb of so called acquisition notification and declaration which have to be just ignored.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are held devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. They are dismissed accordingly. As the Respondent has chosen not to appear we make no order as to the costs. Appeals dismissed.
Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Another, :
To sum up, the State is not a "person interested" as defined in Section 3(b) of the Act. It is not a party to the proceedings before the Collector in the sense, which the expression "parties to the litigation" carries. The Collector holds the proceedings and makes an award as a representative of the State Government. Land or an interest in land pre-owned by the State cannot be the subject-matter of acquisition by the State. The question of deciding the ownership of the State or holding of any interest by the State Government in proceedings before the Collector cannot arise in the proceedings before the Collector [as defined in Section 3(c) of the Act]. If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land, which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil court for determination either u/s 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference made by the Collector to the court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to have rejected the same. All the proceedings u/s 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil court suffer from lack of inherent jurisdiction and therefore a nullity liable to be declared so.
In the present case, the embargo sought to be brought on the claim of the land owner by the Appellant State is with regard to the orders on their application u/s 30. It is well settled that even when an application u/s 30 by way of reference is made, the Court has jurisdiction only to say on the apportionment of compensation among rival claimants and it has no jurisdiction to redetermine the quantum of compensation or give a finding on anything else other than reference. The scope u/s 30 is very limited (sic) does not include scope to determine the rights of the parties especially the question of tenancy. Whenever a question of tenancy arises, even a Civil court cannot decide the said issue and the said issue has to be determined only by the land Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and it has to be disposed of in accordance with law. From the facts of this case, we note that by ignorance or innocence, before their application u/s 18(1) could be referred by the Land Acquisition Officer, in a hurried manner, the claimants approached the Civil Court u/s 30 directly. The Civil Court without the matter being referred to it by the Land Acquisition Officer, proceeded to dispose of the matter when it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the very application and even the inherent jurisdiction was lacking to decide the dispute of the lands being vested with the government. If the said Court made any observation in application which was not at all maintainable as the Civil Court had no inherent jurisdiction to decide the said question, it is nothing short of an order which is nonest in the eye of law. We refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K. Kankarathnamma and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, as under:
In Alderson v. Palliser (1901) 22 KB 833 the Court of Appeal held that where the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings it cannot be waived. In Seth Badri Prasad and Others Vs. Seth Nagarmal and Others, this Court has held that even the bar of illegality of a transaction though not pleaded in the courts below can be allowed to be pleaded in this Court if it appears on the face of the pleading in the case. The High Court has, however, based itself largely upon a decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1931 39 (Privy Council) . In that case there was in fact a reference by the Collector to the court but that reference was made by the collector not upon the application of the person legally entitled to compensation but by a person whose claim to ownership of property had failed before the civil court but who was still a party to the land acquisition proceedings. In our opinion that decision is distinguishable on the short ground that whereas here there is no reference at all by the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer, in that case the Collector had made a reference though in making it he had committed an error of law in that he acted upon the application of a person who had been found to have no interest in the land. Disagreeing with the High Court we, therefore, hold that the court had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation and thus go behind the order of the Land Acquisition Officer.
When an order is nonest in the eye of law, the question of claimants claiming to set aside such an order would not arise which was the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of Ajudh Raj and Ors. v. Moti S/o Mossadi.
Then coming to the second point which requires to be answered by this Court as per the directions of the Apex Court whether claimants were entitled to file application u/s 18(1) of the Act by virtue of rejecting of application u/s 30 and 31, we have already discussed above that the very application u/s 30 was not maintainable and the Court having no jurisdiction to entertain the same, the out come of such entertainment is not binding on any of the parties. In that view of the matter, the said decision in application u/s 30 of the Act would not come in the way of the claimants seeking reference of the application u/s 18(4) of the Act. As a matter of fact, as noted above, application u/s 18(1) was much earlier to the application filed u/s 30. We have also already held that either due to ignorance or innocence, the Applicants have filed application u/s 30.
We also note from the records that during the pendency of this appeal, there was a direction to deposit Rs. 50,00,000/- in the Court part of the compensation awarded. We also note that the Land Acquisition Officer unfortunately issued a cheque in favour of the party but the cheque was directly given to the parties without depositing the same in the court. However, we are not going into the said controversy as the same is not the subject matter of dispute before us. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, we hold that the orders dated 26.7.1984 in LAC No. 196/84 is not an embargo on the right of the claimants to seek enhancement of compensation.
Then coming to another factual controversy raised by the Appellant State that the RTC relied upon by the claimants before the Reference Court do not reflect the actual entries with regard to the nature of crops grown at the relevant point of time i.e., 1977-78, claimants contended before the Reference Court during the enquiry for enhancement of compensation that they were growing sugar cane in the lands acquired as on the date of preliminary notification and final notification. This is categorically denied by the State. However, they did not produce any documents before the Reference Court when the enquiry was conducted prior to the State coming before this Court in an appeal. Even after the remand for the limited purpose of recording additional evidence they have not brought any material to show that the entries at Exs.P.4 to P18 with regard to the nature of crop grown at the relevant point of time was an interpolation of record.
On the other hand, when we go to the contents of Bx.D.4 to D.18 produced by the State Government, we are surprised to see both the xerox copies and originals of Exs. D.4 to D.18 not having entries of any nature at column 12 so far as relevant period i.e., 1977-78. Up to 1974-75 the entries are there and strangely, the entries are from 1989-90 in some case in one or two RTC and in others it is subsequent to 1992-93. In that view of the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of the Appellant State to say that the claimants have mislead the courts by bringing on record RTC with entries made by them suitably supporting their claim. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the RTC extracts produced by the claimants before the Reference Court marked at Exs.P.4 to P. 18 are genuine and certified copies of the originals. On the other hand, the State is not in a position to establish any aspect of their defence to substantiate their contention that the claimant did not grow sugar cane crops during the relevant period 1977-78 the year of both preliminary notification and final acquisition notifications. In that view of the matter, having regard to the entire material as a whole, we are of the opinion that the Appellant State has failed to establish that the lands in question were already vested in the State Government and therefore, the claimants were not entitled seeking enhancement of compensation in view of rejection of their application u/s 30. On the other hand, we are of the opinion that the judgment and award of the Reference Court dated 5.4.1995 deserves to be confirmed. Viewed from any angle, in view of the above discussion, we find no good grounds to interfere with the judgment and award under challenge.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.