The South India Synthetic Stones Manufacturers and Dealers Association vs State of Tamil Nadu and Others

M.N. Chandurkar, C.J.—We are giving reasons for dismissal of this appeal at the admission stage because the learned counsel has

vehemently contended that a ruling on the question, whether an interim injunction granted by one learned judge can be vacated by another learned

judge in the absence of any counter filed on behalf of the State Government or by other respondents in the writ petition, should be given by the

Bench. If an interim injunction is so vacated, then to quote the words of the learned counsel, ""the judge steps into the shoes of the Government

Pleader"". We are not taking a very serious note of the manner in which the contention is advanced, having regard to the fact that the counsel does

not appear to have sufficient experience of arguing matters in this Court.

It is rather astounding that it should be argued that the power of the court to vary, modify, confirm or set aside an interim order must depend

upon whether a counter has been filed or not. There may be any number of matters in which it could be demonstrated by the other side even

without a counter that interim orders should not be passed or confirmed. This could be demonstrated on admitted facts or on the position of law as

it was applicable to the facts of the particular case. It may be that, where facts are needed to be gone into, a counter may become necessary but

the filing of a counter can never be a condition precedent for the court to exercise its powers in the matter of dealing with interim orders. Any

number of interim applications on which interim orders have been passed are awaiting disposal, because the practice followed was that unless

counters are filed, the interim orders must continue. Often no counters or applications for vacating interim orders are filed either at all or for more

than two or three years. In many cases, interim orders have become infructuous and many matters can be dealt with without filing counters by any

of the parties on the basis of the documents already there or on the basis of some provision of law to which attention of the court may not have

been invited at the time when the interim orders were made. To insist on an application for vacating an interim order in a case where it can be

demonstrated on the record that the interim order should not have been made is to make the exercise of the judicial power of the court dependent

upon what a party may or may not do. This is how matters are not being taken up to deal with interim orders which have been pending for a very

long period.

It is also difficult to appreciate the contention that where an interim order is made by one learned judge another learned judge cannot vacate that

order. Appropriate order in any matter can be made by the learned judge who is at the material time dealing with that matter.

It is also impossible to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the order of the State Government dated 22nd December, 1982 has

conferred permanent benefit on the petitioners or its members by way of relieving them of any tax liability. This contention is based on a total

misconception about the effect of the order dated 22nd December, 1982. That order is made on representations made to the Government with

regard to continuing the exemption originally granted and had been withdrawn. The order reads as follows :

Pending issue of final orders in the matter, the Government direct that the subordinate officers be instructed not to take any action to levy, assess,

or collect the tax consequent on the cancellation of the exemption.

This appeal is only against an order vacating the injunction. The main contention in the petition is that this order quoted above operates

absolutely and it has the effect of wiping out tax liability absolutely. It is contended that while in the case of a stay order which is granted by an

appellate court, the effect of vacating the stay order will be that the position as it was before the stay order will be restored. This is not so in the

case of an administrative order which stays recovery proceedings pending consideration of the representation made to the Government of

reconsider the matter regarding tax liability. The argument is that withdrawing an administrative order adversely affects the citizens and the State

Government cannot now recover the tax. The argument merely needs to be mentioned to be rejected. The opening words of the order ""pending

issue of final orders"" have to be given some meaning and it is obvious that the Government had ordered a stay of recovery of the tax pending the

representation made to the Government. If these words are ignored as the learned counsel wants them to be, the effect will be the order will have

to be read in a truncated manner which would not be permissible. Whether an interim order of stay is made by an appellate court or whether it is

made by the State Government, the effect of either cancellation or withdrawal of such orders is the same. All interim orders have only a temporary

effect and they can always be withdrawn or revoked by the court or the authority which makes them. In our view, there is no substance in these

appeals.

As an argument of last resort, it is submitted that some appeals have been admitted against similar orders vacating the injunction. We do not

think that in the light of what we have said above that should be a consideration for admitting these appeals especially when the point appears to us

to be so clear that it does not need any further consideration. The result would be the same if we were to admit these appeals and dispose them of

immediately.

Both the appeals are dismissed.

Appeals dismissed.