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Judgment
A.R. Lakshmanan, J.—The writ appeal is directed against the order of Y. Venkatachalam, J., dated 10.1.1996 in W.P. No. 13298 of 1985
allowing the writ petition and setting aside the impugned order under the Land Acquisition Act, The 3rd respondent in the writ petition is the
appellant in this appeal.
The learned single Judge proceeded on the basis that the 1st respondent/Coimbatore Diocese Society has ownership rights over the property
but failed to see that the land acquisition proceedings initiated were in accordance with the legal formalities and were completed consequent to the
application made for acquiring the land by the appellant, to the 3rd respondent. The learned Judge has proceeded to consider the case of the 1st
respondent as though it is a case of eviction proceedings. In this case, the appellant is in possession of the building in question and using the same
as post office for the past 70 years, and is rendering postal service on behalf of the Government of India, which fact has been totally aside by the
learned Judge. The conclusion of the learned Judge that al-ternative place is available in and around the present premises where the post office
could be located is not at all correct. In any event, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that no other place will suffice
the interest of the general public as the post office is in existence for the past 70 years. The learned Judge has not noticed the fact that in the land
adjacent to the compound wall of the Red Fields Post Office, commercial complex has been constructed consequent to the land acquisition
proceedings and therefore, the intention of the 1st respondent was otherwise and not the one as stated in the writ petition. Without considering the
rival claims put forward in the affidavit and counter affidavits in their proper perspective, the learned Judge has proceeding. We, therefore, feel that
the order of the learned Judge impugned in the writ appeal is not correct and the same is liable to be set aside. However, in order to decide the
question at issue, we directed the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/writ petitioner to argue the case on merits with
reference to the pleadings and the other documents relied on.
Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent has made the following submissions for our consideration:
(a) Though the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act states that an extent of 13,608 Sq. ft. is required for a public purpose, such a large
extent of land is not required since the post office is located and being run for the past 70 years only in a building of an area of 2.730 Sq. ft. The
said building was leased out to the Postal Department and the Department is running its Red Fields Post Office on a monthly rent of Rs. 400.
Therefore, the notification u/s 4(1) is bad in so far as it relates to the proposal of acquisition of the entire extent of 13,608 Sq. ft. In any event, the
notification should have been issued only for the extent of 2,730 Sq. ft.
(b) Mr. A.L. Somayaji also contends that the future expansion is a very vague term and therefore the acquisition should be confined only to 2,730
Sq. ft.
(c) Inviting our attention to the various notifications and orders issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, Mr. A.L. Somayaji contended that the
1st respondent is a minority institution viz., Roman Catholic Mission, which is running schools, other educational institutions, orphanages, hos-
pitals, etc., for the uplift of the poor people irrespective of caste, colour or creed from out of the income realised from the properties belonging to
the said society. When the 1st respondent society themselves require the very same land for the purpose of constructing a Church, the said land
cannot be acquired for any other public purpose except when it becomes inevitable and when no alternative land is available.
(d) Since alternative site is available adjacent to the subject matter of the land under acquisition, the Government should have initiated proceedings
for acquiring that alternative site and ought not to have initiated proceedings for acquiring the land belonging to a minority community, which is
required by that community for the purpose of constructing a Church, which is a place of public worship.
(e) When the inspecting authority viz., the District Revenue Officer, who inspected the place on 12.7.1974, has recommended in his report that the
said site is suitable for the construction of a Church, the said report ought to have been accepted by the Government and further proceedings
dropped.
(f) The Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is also bad, in that, it does not mention the existence of the superstructure when admittedly
the superstructure was occupied and utilised by the appellant for the purpose of run-ning the post office for the past so many years.
Arguing contra, Mr. V.T. Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that all the procedures and formalities have
been strictly complied with and therefore, the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities concerned for acquiring the land of the 1st
respondent for a public purpose cannot be easily interfered with in the absence of any procedural irregularities or illegalities pointed out by the 1st
respondent.
As rightly pointed out by Mr. V.T. Gopalan, there cannot be any difficulty with reference to the public purpose for which the land is now sought
to be acquired. In the instant case, all the procedural formalities have been strictly complied with. After completion of the enquiry u/s 5-A, the
Government of Tamil Nadu issued the declaration u/s 6. Section 6(3) of the Land Acquisition Act states that the declaration is made to the effect
that when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made u/s 5-A, Seb-section (2), that any particular land is
needed for a public purpose, such a declaration is conclusive proof of the Government''s intention to acquire the land in question for a public
purpose and that therefore, such a declaration cannot be called in question, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this context, a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Scindia Employees
Union v. State of Maharashtra (106) 10 S.C.C. 150 can be beneficially looked into. The Supreme Court in the above judgment has held that the
only scope of the enquiry u/s 5-A is, whether the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose and whether the land is suitable for the
purpose or is an arable land, and that the publication of declaration u/s 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is, therefore, for the
appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and that the Court cannot sub-stitute its
opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. The Supreme Court has further held that the very object of compulsory
acquisition is in exercise of the power of eminent do-main by the State against the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the
land. Therefore, so long as the public purpose subsists, the exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be questioned. Publication of
declaration u/s 6 is con-clusive evidence of public purpose. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the Government have
exercised the power of eminent domain and had published the notification u/s 4(1) and after conducting enquiry u/s 5-A, declaration u/s 6 has been
made, which is conclusive evidence of public purpose.
The contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji that the places of worship pertaining to all religious institutions shall not be acquired for public purposes
except when it becomes inevitable and no alternative land is available can now be dealt with. It is true that the notification says that the State
Government authorities shall ensure that as far as possible places of worship are not acquired for public purpose. But, we are of the view, that such
notifications or Government Orders are only in the form of guidelines and in the nature of administrative instructions to the authorities con-cerned.
The notification only says that as far as possible the places of worship pertaining to the religious institutions shall not be acquired for any public
purpose. In the instant case, the land acquisition becomes inevitable for two reasons. The premises in question is occupied by the postal
department for the past 70 years and that the alternative site suggested by the 1st respondent has been the subject matter of proceedings initiated
under the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act. It is stated that the said adjacent land owner has already put up some structure and
has also applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for exemption of the said land from the purview of the said Act. Thus, it is clear that even the
alternative site suggested by the 1st respondent is not readily available and therefore considering the said suggestion by the Government of Tamil
Nadu does not at all arise.
With reference to the contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji that the subject matter of acquisition includes vast extent of vacant land, which can be
used by the 1st respondent for the purpose of constructing a Church for public worship by the minority communty, which is also serving a public
purpose and which is much more useful and important than the one tor which the land is being acquired, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in
the decision reported in Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. ect. etc. Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, we cannot go into the comparative
utility of the public purposes and once we are satisfied that the acquisition is for a public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the
ground that the land maybe re-quired or be used for some other beneficial purpose. This contention also, therefore, fails.
In regard to the contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji that the report of the District Revenue Officer rec-ommending the site which is sought to be
acquired, for constructing a Church, we are of the view that the said contention has no merit. As already noticed, the very object of compulsory
acquisition is in exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State against the wishes or willingness of the owner or person interested in the
land. The report of the District Revenue officer is only recommendatory in nature. It is for the appropriate Government to take a final decision
whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the public purpose to that of the
appropri-ate Government. This contention also, therefore, fails.
The next contention of Mr. A.L. Somayaji is that in the notification u/s 4(1), there is no reference to the existence of the superstructure in which
the post office is being actually run by the appellant. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel merits acceptance. Mere nonmentioning of the
existence of the post office does not in any way take away the rights of the 1st respondent to claim compensation for the superstructure as well.
We, therefore, direct the authorities concerned to fix the value of the superstructure as well and pay the appropriate compensation to the 1st
respondent.
Mr. A.L. Somayaji then contended that the specific purpose for which the land is required has not been mentioned or notified and therefore the
notification u/s 4(1) is bad. We are unable to agree with the said contention. It must be remembered that what is vague is a question of fact to be
decided in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. By saying that the public purpose in the said notification is vague,
what the 1st respondent really means is not that it is not a public purpose but that since the public purpose is expressed in vague terms and is not
particularised with sufficient specificity, they are not in a position to make an effective representation against the proposed acquisition. In our
opinion, the nonspecification of the use to which each and every bit of land so notified would be put to does not invalidate the notification issued.
The notification u/s 4(1) in this case clearly mentions that the property specified in the schedule is needed for a public purpose viz., for the
construction of Red Field Post Office in Puliakulam village, Coimbatore taluk, for the Post and Telegraph Department. There is no ambiguity b the
learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent. This contention also is, therefore, rejected. There are no merits in any of the contentions raised by
the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent.
In the result, the writ appeal is allowed, the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court has reserved the right of the 1st respondent herein in W.M.P. No. 2392 of 1989 in W.P.
No. 13298 of 1985 by order dated 9.2. -1989 to resort to civil proceedings requesting for a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act if the
1st respondent is not satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded. We have already made it clear that the 1st respondent will be entitled
to compensation for the super-structure as well. Therefore, the 1st respondent is given eight weeks time from to-day to approach the concerned
authority to seek a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. On such reference being made by the authorities, the Sub Court concerned shall
consider the same on merits and decide the same in accordance with law after giving opportunity to both parties.