The Secretary of State for India in Council vs P.A. Madurai Chetty and Another

Waller, J.—The appellant in this case is the Secretary of State for India. The respondent was the transferee of 800 maunds of salt belonging

to a licensee named Chengalraya Chetty. On 27th February, 1923, he applied for permission to remove the salt, paid the duty of Rs. 1,000 at the

rate then current of Rs. 1-4-0 per maund and got orders for delivery. The salt was, however, not removed till 1st March, by which time the duty

had been doubled. By a rule framed u/s 85 of the Salt Act, the duty payable is that in force on the date of removal. The respondent was called

upon to pay the deficient duty of Rs. 1,000 but refused to do so. Coercive steps were taken against him u/s 84 of the Act, whereupon he paid. He

then sued to recover the sum of Rs. 1,000 plus interest and obtained a decree from the City Civil Court.

As I understand the Lower Court''s reasoning, it proceeded on some ground of supposed hardship of which the respondent had been the

innocent victim. For reasons which do not appear and as to which it is idle to speculate, the Commissioner issued instructions on 23rd February

that the hours of removal should be restricted to four a day. The Lower Court thought that but for the restriction, the respondent could have

removed his salt on 27th or 28th February, and that he should not be penalised for a delay for which he was not responsible. That seems to me to

be entirely beside the point. A perfectly valid rule had been framed u/s 85 of the Act, laying down that the duty payable is that in force at the time

of removal. The respondent cannot escape from the operation of that rule by alleging that, but for certain restrictions, he might have removed the

salt earlier. The restrictions were not designed to prejudice him in particular. They were imposed, presumably, for general administrative purposes

by an authority competent to impose them. They may have caused a delay for which the respondent has to suffer, but the rule is there and he

cannot avoid its effect. The Lower Court relied on the ruling reported in Brito v. The Secretary of State for India in Council ILR (1881) B 251. It

does not appear from the facts of that case whether there was a rule in force in Bombay similar to the one with which we are now dealing. I agree

that the respondent, when he paid the old rate of duty, acquired a right to remove the salt, but if the rate was enhanced before removal, the rule is

clear that he had to pay at the enhanced rate. I find on the first issue that the respondent was bound to pay duty at the enhanced rate.

The Lower Court was further of opinion that the authorities were not entitled to resort to coercive processes against the respondent u/s 84 of

the Act. It relied on an unreported decision of a Bench of this Court in C.C. C. A. No. 14 of 1918, which held that the charges referred to in

Section 43 of the Act carried no personal liability and could not be recovered under 84. With great respect 1 am unable to follow that decision.

Section 43 is statedly subject to rules framed u/s 85. Rule 81 imposes on the licensee (and consequently on his transferee) the liability to pay the

duty in order to get an order for delivery. If the duty is not paid, it is due from him and recoverable, in the first instance, from any money owing to

him by the Commissioner or from any salt belonging to him that may not have been removed. Failing recovery in either of those ways, it is

recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. 1 find that the deficient duty was recoverable from the respondent u/s 84 of the Act.

The appeal is allowed, and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout.