The Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad and Others vs D. Murali Krishna

Anjaneyulu, J.—This is an appeal against the judgment of our learned brother, Ramaswamy, J. The judgment under appeal is reported as D. Murali Krishna Public School, Champapet Vs. Regional Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad and Others, . The Regional Joint Director of School Education, the District Collector, Ranga Reddy and the Director of Social Welfare, are the appellants herein, while the writ petitioner, D. Muralikrishna Public School, represented by its Secretary Smt. Devaki, is the respondent.

1-A Under the auspices of Shashikant Educational Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, a primary school known as "D. Muralikrishna Public School". was established at Champapet in the outskirts of the city in Ranga Reddy District. Sri S. Tulasi Das, an advocate belonging to scheduled caste, is the Chairman of the Society and his wife, Smt. Devaki, is the Secretary and Correspondent of the school. The school was established in the year 1982 for imparting education in English medium to the children belong to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes living in Champapet village. The school is situate in Harijanwada. Permission was accorded to open classes 1 and 11 in proceedings dt. 19-3- 84 of the Regional Joint Director of School Education. Temporary recognition was also accorded for the school for conducting classes, during the years 19&3-84 and 1984- 85.

Right from the start, the school has run into rough weather. Protesting against GOMS. No. 181 dt. May 15, 1984 issued by the Government relating to the reimbursement of fees collected by schools from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes students, the management with the help of Harijan Parents staged Dharnas etc. The Correspondent did not produce the records called for by the District Educational Officer, Ranga Reddy District. The management of the school alleged that the Government is following an anti-Harijan Policy , and consequently it was resolved not to hand over any records to the Government till there is a change in the attitude of the Government.

Noticing the above matters, the Regional Joint Director of School Education issued a notice bearing RC. No. 1078/B2/ 85 dt. 27-2-85, requiring the Correspondent of the school to show cause why the permission to open Classes 1 and 11 issued in the Regional Joint Directors proceedings dt. 19-3-84 should not be withdrawn with immediate effect. questioning this show cause notice, a writ petition was filed on 29-3-85. The respondent (writ petitioner) sought directions for the grant of recognition to the school and sought a declaration that the show cause notice dt.; 27- 2-85, issued by the Regional Joint Director of School Education, was null and void. The respondent also sought directions to the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the Director of Social Welfare, to accord sanction of tuition fees for seven months from November, 1984 to May, 85.

In the judgment under appeal, the learned single Judge quashed the show cause notice dt. 27-2-85, and issued the following directions :

a) to recognize the institution of the writ petitioner from LKG To Class : V; b) c) to grant the entire amount due as per rules within six weeks; d) e) to secure as expeditiously as possible adequate site for construction of a permanent school nearer to locality., and f) g) the Director of Social Welfare shall provide necessary funds for the construction of a permanent school building and providing other amenities. h)

Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned single judge, th e present appeal was filed. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent filed an application-WAMP. No. 705 of 86 seeking directions to the appellants to release the funds to the respondent-institution for seven months from November, 1984 to May, 1985. On June 17, 86, orders were passed on the above petition, directing the respondent-institution to produce all the relevant records before the appellants to enable them to release. the tuition fees for the months of November, 1984 to May, 1985. A direction was also issued to the appellants to scrutinise the relevant records and to ensure that, whatever payment is due by way of reimbursement-or otherwise from November, 1984 to May, 1985, is made to the respondent-institution, as expeditiously as possible. it has since been reported by the appellants that the respondent-institution declined to, produce all the relevant information and consequently the reimbursement of tuition-,fees for the period from November, 1984 to May, 1985 could not be made. The respondent filed separately a Contempt Case bearing No. 272/86, alleging that the appellants wilfully disobeyed the directions of this court, regarding the release of the funds. This Contempt Case is being separately dealt with.

We have heard the learned Advocate General on behalf of the appellants and Sri K. R. K. Varaprasad, learned counsel for the respondent.

Learned Advocate-General pointed out that, although the writ petition was filed challenging the show cause notice dt. 27-2- 85, the show cause notice ceased to be effective, during the pendency of the writ petition,-and the learned single judge ought not to have, therefore, quashed the show cause notice. Attention is invited to the counter filed in the writ petition that Smt. Devaki, Secretary of the respondent- institution, sent a reply dt. 12-3-85 to-the show cause notice and stated that she was unaware of the developments in the school as she was hospitalised for delivery. She also stated that she had no objection to produce the records. She further requested the authorities to verify physically the records at the institution. Learned Advocate General points out that, in view of the aforesaid pleas of the respondent, the Joint Director of School Education, Hyderabad, has granted Recognition for the years 1983-84 and 1984-85 vide proceedings Dt. 2-4-85. It is, therefore, urged by the learned Advocate General that he cause of action did not survive by the time the learned single judge disposed of the writ petition.

As regards the directions given by the learned single judge, learned Advocate- General pointed out that the direction to recognise the institution from LKG To ''lass: V is not supportable even with reference to the writ petition, because the I am for recognition was only for Classes 1 and 11 and there was no question of ,cognition for LKG and Classes Ill to V. It is therefore, pointed out that the learned single Judge was in error in giving a direction to recognise the respondent-institution from KG to Class . V. As regards the direction to ''ant the entire amount as per rules, learned Advocate-General submits that there was gross violation on the part of the respondent in complying with the requirements, relating to reimbursement of fees collected from the scheduled casts and scheduled tribe candidates, and consequently the direction should not have been given at all. It is pointed out finally by the learned Advocate General that the direction to secure adequate site for construction of permanent school buildings and for providing other amenities is outside the scope of the writ petition, as the writ petition did not contain any such pleas. It is stated that the learned single judge went beyond the scope of the writ petition, in making the aforesaid directions.

Sri Vara Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent, made his submissions only in one direction 11 is said that the respondent''s claim for payment of tuition fee, in respect of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students, is not by way of any reimbursement. Learned Counsel drew attention to the fact that, in the writ petition, a categorical Submission was made that no fee was being collected from the students. Attention is also invited to the report of the Commissioner- Advocate, appointed by the learned single Judge, who reported after enquiring to parents of the students that no fee was (sic) being run on donations given by philanthrophists. Learned counsel contended that till November, 1984 the tuition fee was in act paid to the respondent-institution and it only from November, 1984 the payment of tution fee was stopped. Learned counsel invited attention to the averments in the counter filed by the Regional Joint Director f School Education, in support of the plea that the Director of Social Welfare sanctions tuition fee to all the Institutions in the State and makes payment against genuine claims.

The contention of the learned Advocate General, regarding the quashing the impugned notice, has to be upheld. It not denied that, on account of the presentations made by the Secretary and respondent of the respondent-institution, commission to run Classes 1 and 11 was continued. In the proceedings dt. 2-4-1985, e Regional Joint Director of School Education, not only continued the permission run Classes 1 and 11, but also accorded permission for opening Class 111 during the year 1984-85. It is stated that this position continues even till today. Thus, the show cause notice dt. 27-2-85 did not survive for consideration at all.

As regards the direction to recognise the respondent-institution from LKG To Class : V, it is not the respondent''s case that recognition was sought for and it was refused. It is open to the respondent to seek recognition of the respondent-institution by complying with necessary formalities and the application for recognition shall be considered by the appellants on merits. As there is no material on record to indicate whether the respondent made any application for recognition and complied with necessary formalities, the only direction that can be given is to consider the respondent''s application for recognition as and when made. We are unable to uphold the direction to straightway recognise the respondent- institution from LKG To Class : V. It is also relevant to point out that the question of recognition to LKG and Classes: IV and V does not arise, as it is not pleaded that the respondent-institution is running classes in LKG and Classes: IV and V.

As regards the directions to secure adequate site for construction of a permanent school nearer to the locality and to provide necessary funds for the construction of the buildings and providing other amenities, it is not denied that there were no pleas to that effect in the writ -petition filed by the respondent. The contention of the learned Advocate General that the aforesaid directions went beyond the scope of the writ petition filed by the respondent-institution has, therefore, to be upheld.

That leaves only with the direction to grant the entire amount due to the respondent as per rules. A perusal of the judgment of the learned single judge would clearly indicate that the claim for payment of tuition fee is in respect of reimbursement of fee collected from the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students. Before the learned single judge, the respondent''s grievance was that GOMS. No 181 dt. May 15, 1984 which set out various conditions to be fulfilled for securing reimbursement was impossible of compliance by an institution of the respondent''s kind. Learned single judge referred to the 13 conditions specified in the aforementioned G. O. and observed that the respondent could not possibly fulfil these conditions. The learned single judge further observed that "the authorities should be realistic and pragmatic to the situation and in appropriate cases they should tailor their actions to relax them so as to subserve the purpose of the constitution and the Act". It was not the respondent''s case before the learned single judge that an outright grant by way of tuition fee was due to it from the Director of Social Welfare. The claim is based only against the reimbursement of fee, by satisfying the conditions specified in GOMS. No. 181 dt. May 15, 1984. In the writ petition, there is no reference to the effect that the Director of Social Welfare was under an obligation to make any outright grant by way of tuition fee in respect of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students. For the first time now before us, learned counsel for the respondent raised the plea that what was claimed by the respondent-institution from the Director of Social Welfare was not reimbursement of fee allegedly collected from the scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students, but some outright grant. It seems to us that the present stand of the learned counsel for the respondent is inspired by the averment made in the affidavit accompanying the writ petition that no fee was being collected from the students and that the respondent institution was being run out of funds collected from philanthrophists and also from the report of the Commissioner-Advocate to the same effect.

There is enough material on record to support the allegation that the respondent was collecting tuition fee of Rs.20/- per student per month and applications were made to the Director of Social Welfare for payment of the corresponding fee so that it can be reimbursed or paid back to the students from whom the fee was initially collected. Our attention is invited to pro forma No. V and VII, submitted by the respondent, wherein it was clearly. shown that fee of Rs.20/- was collected from each scheduled caste student for each month. For instance, for the year 1984-85, it was shown in pro forma No. V ll that the amount of tuition fee collected was Rs.44,440/- against. which the expenditure incurred on teaching staff was Rs.37,632/- non-teaching staff Rs.1,800/- and miscellaneous expenditure Rs.5,000/-. Similarly, in pro forma (vii) submitted for the year 1983-84, the tuition fee was shown as Rs.34,480/- against which the expenditure incurred on teaching staff was declared as Rs.19,008/- non-teaching staff Rs.1,800/- and miscellaneous expenditure etc., w as Rs.23,680/-. These particulars recorded in the statements submitted by the respondent would be the assertion that no fees were collected initially from the scheduled caste students. Then again a representation dt. 17- 6-86 was submitted by 81 persons claiming to be the parents of the students in the respondent-institution addressed to the Chief Justice of the High Court, supporting the respondent''s case for reimbursement of the fee. It is stated in the aforesaid representation that tuition fee at Rs.20/- per child per month was being reimbursed by the Social Welfare Department. Along with the representation, letters dt. 10--5-86 issued by the respondent under the signature of Smt. Devaki Secretary and Correspondent, addressed to the parents were submitted. The letters dt. 10-5-86 addressed by the respondent to the parents of the students contain a statement to the following effect

"You have to clear the following dues within 5 days failing which the progress-cards and other documents cannot be issued to your child/ward;

(for table see below)

It is clear from the aforesaid letters issued in May, 1986 by the respondent-institution that an account of outstanding dues has been maintained by the respondent-institution.

(contd on cot 2)

15.. In the circumstances, it is not possible 6 accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent-institution was not collecting fees from the Scheduled caste students. The claim made before the Director of Social Welfare was only for reimbursement of the fees so hat the amounts could be re-paid to the students. In any event, the learned counsel categorically admitted that he is not in a position to substantiate his contention that he Director of Social Welfare is under an Obligation to make outright grant of tuition fee at the rate of Rs.20/- per student per month. On the contrary, the learned Advocate General asserted that the scheme formulated by the Government is only to reimburse the mounts collected by the schools from the scheduled caste candidates, subject to the fulfillment of the conditions specified in GOMS. No. 181 dt. May 15, 1984. Learned Advocate General further stated that there was no scheme under which the Director of Social Welfare is under an obligation to pay outright grant, as alleged by the respondent. Learned Advocate General clarified that the averment in para 9 of the counter filed was, only to the effect that tuition fees (by way of reimbursement) are sanctioned by the director of Social Welfare. Although reimbursement is not expressly mentioned the counter, learned Advocate General submitted that is what was sought to be conveyed. We are inclined to accept the submissions of the learned Advocate General.

If the respondent''s claim should be considered for purpose of reimbursement he further question for consideration is whether reimbursement can be made without the fulfillment of the conditions specified in the aforementioned G. O. Whether the andirons should be relaxed in any given set

OUTSTANDING DUES

____________________________________________________________________

Year Period Amount

____________________________________________________________________

1984-85 Nov. 84 to May, 1985 Rs.140-00

1985-86 June 85 to May, 1986 Rs.240-00

___________

Rs.380-00

___________________________________________________________________

of circumstances is a matter for the Government to decide. We do not think that it is the function of the courts to direct relaxation of the conditions. If the respondent- institution is not in a position to fulfil some of the conditions, whatever be the reasons, it is for the respondent-institution to make a representation to the. authorities concerned ,and explain why the conditions could not be satisfid. Admittedly, in the present case, no such endeavour was made by the respondent- institution. We have already referred to the fact that, while the appeal was pending directions were given by this court on June 17,1986 requiring the respondent-institution to produce all the relevant records before the appellants. The Regional Joint Director of School Education has since filed before this court a copy of the Memo. No. 2523/02/ 85.7 dt. 11-7-1986, wherein he had, in great detail set out developments subsequent to the order passed by this court. It was pointed out that an aggregate sum of Rs.44,360/- had been paid to the respondent till November, 1984 by way of reimbursement and the authorities wanted to make sure that the !.respondent-institution did in fact reimburse the scheduled caste students the amount collected from them. For that purpose, the. respondent-institution was called upon to produce the acquittance registers, containing the signatures of the recipients to whom monies were reimbursed. It is stated that the respondent-institution promised to produce the cash-book for the years 1983-84 and 1984- 85 and also the acquittance register, in respect of tuition fee reimbursed for the years 1983. 84 and 19~5, but never produced them The result was that no proof is forthcoming that the respondent institution reimbursed the scheduled caste students the amount of fees C61lected from them after receiving the reimbursement from the Director of Social Welfare. he respondent further farmed the Regional Joint Director that fees collection registers, along with receipt-books for the years 1984 and 1984-85 and receipt books pertaining to reimbursement of tuition fee to scheduled caste students for the years 1983-84 and 1984-85 were not maintained. In the absence of these important records, it is not possible to verify the extent of fees collected by the respondent-institution initially and ultimate destination of the sum of Rs.44,360/- reimbursed by the Director of Social Welfare. The sums reimbursed till November, 1984 by the Director of Social Welfare constituted a fairly substantial sum and the respondent- institution was under an obligation to satisfy the authorities that the fees reimbursed paid back to the scheduled caste students and were not misappropriated. The authorities were perfectly justified in insisting on the respondent-institution that unless appropriate records, registers and proof of reimbursement of the sums previously sanctioned were established, it would not be possible to make further reimbursement, relating to the period ,commencing from November, 1984. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, we are satisfied that the authorities declined to reimburse the amounts to the respondent- institution from November, 1984 with sufficient justification.

In the result, we allow the appeal and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent-institution. No costs.

Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the counsel for the respondent- writ petitioner made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance or any question of law, which requires to be settled by the Supreme Court, involved in this case.

Hence leave declined.

Appeal allowed.