The Punjab State Handloom Weavers Apex Society Ltd. vs The State of Punjab and Others

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—Is the remedy of a revision u/s 69 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 barred in a case where a provision for an appeal against an order of punishment passed by the society is maintainable before an officer exercising the powers of the Registrar? This is the short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition.

The Punjab State Handloom Weavers Apex Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Weavco), is the petitioner. Respondent No.3 was employed with the petitioner as a purchase Assistant and was Incharge of a show Room at Sangrur. On September 18, 1974, a charge sheet was issued to the respondent. It was alleged that he had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 1185/- on account of the cost of 10 blankets which had not been entered in the books of account. Vide order dated December 17, 1986, his services were terminated. He filed an appeal vide order dated September 3, 1987, the order of punishment was set aside and a de novo enquiry was ordered to be held. Mr. M.P. Aggarwal, Manager (Marketing) was appointed as the Enquiry Officer vide order dated September 23, 1987. Almost simultaneously, another charge sheet was issued to the third respondent alleging that he had created indiscipline in the office on October 13, 1987 and had remained wilfully absent from duty from September 24,1987 to October 16, 1987. The Enquiry Officer submitted two separate reports on April 9, 1988 and April 28, 1989 respectively. The charges were held to have been proved. A show cause notice dated July 29, 1989 was issued to the respondent. After receipt of reply, his services were terminated. He filed an appeal which was heard by the Additional Registrar (General). It was dismissed. The respondent filed a revision petition u/s 69 before the Commissioner (Appeals), Government of Punjab, Chandigarh. It was dismissed in limine. The third respondent approached this Court through C.W.P. No. 5746 of 1992. Vide order dated October 29, 1992, the Bench allowed the writ petition with the following observations:-

"After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the orders dated 26th January, 1992 passed by Learned Commissioner (Appeals), Jalandhar Division (Annexure P.5) disposing of the statutory revision petition filed by the petitioner u/s 69 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 is not a speaking order.

Consequently, we set aside the said order dated 24th Jan. 1992 (Annexure P.5) and remit the case back to the Learned Commissioner (Appeals), Jalandhar Division for fresh decision on merits in accordance with law, after hearing the parties. The parties, through their counsel have been directed to appear before the learned Commissioner (Appeals) on 24th November, 1992. This petition stands allowed."

On remand, the revisional authority examined the matter in details. The plea raised by the present petitioner against the maintainability of the revision was rejected. It was finally held that the punishment was dis-proportionate to the charges proved against the employee. Accordingly, the punishment was reduced to the stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect. The period during which the employee remained out of service was directed to be treated as leave without pay. Aggrieved by this order, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure P.8 with the writ petition, the petitioner has approached this Court through the present writ petition.

We have heard Mr. D.V. Sharma, learned counsel for the Weavco and Mr. B.S. Khoji for respondent No.3. The solitary argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the revision petitions against an order passed by an officer exercising the power of Registrar under the bye-laws of the Society is not competent. The claim has been controverted by the learned counsel for the third respondent.

Before proceeding to consider the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is apt to notice the provision contained in Section 69. It reads as under:-

"69. REVISION. The State Government and the Registrar may, suo moto or on the application of a party to a reference, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which no appeal u/s 68 lies to the Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case, it appear to the Government or the Registrar that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or revised the Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, may, after giving persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard, pass such order thereon as it or he may deem fit."

A perusal of the above provision shows that the State Government as well as Registrar have been empowered to examine the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by a Society. They can do so either suo moto or on the application of a party to a reference. The power is not subject to any provision of the rules or the bye-laws. It is in the nature of a supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the Government and the Registrar. In the very nature of things where an order has been passed by the Registrar, the power vests in the State Government.

Mr. D.V. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the bye-laws of a society are not law. They are not a part of the Act. Consequently, any order passed in exercise of the power under a bye-law can''t be subjected to the revisional jurisdiction of the Government under the Act. We are unable to accept this contention.

It is true that the bye-laws of a Society are not a part of the Act. However, it is equally clear that the jurisdiction conferred by the Legislature on the State Government or the Registrar cannot be taken away by a Society by framing the bye laws. If that were permitted, it would become possible for a society to make the provisions of the Act which provide for an Appeal and a Revision totally otiose. Such cannot be the state of law.

There is another aspect. The third respondent had filed C.W.P.No. 5476 of 1992. This petition was allowed and the case was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals). The Weavco never objected to the maintainability of the Revision Petition at that stage. Having accepted that order, it cannot now urge that the Commissioner (Appeals) should not have decided the case.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the commissioner (Appeals) had acted arbitrarily in reducing the punishment of dismissal from service to that of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect. It may be that two opinions are possible. However, we do not find the order to be either perverse or grossly arbitrary so as to call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Accordingly, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is dismissed in limine.