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Judgment
ALKA SARIN, J. (Oral)
CM-123-FCARB-2023
For the reasons mentioned therein, the application seeking condonation of delay of 31 days in refiling the appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the delay of 31 days in refiling the appeal is condoned.
FAO-CARB-39-2023
Challenge in the present appeal is to the impugned judgment dated 17.01.2023 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Chandigarh on an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1996 Act’) for setting aside the award dated 19.12.2016 passed by Shri B.K. Srivastava, IAS (Retd.), Sole Arbitrator, Markfed, Chandigarh.
Brief facts relevant to the present lis are that during the year 2004- 2005, the appellant-Markfed procured paddy at the support price being one of the procuring agencies of the State Government for custom milling of paddy and delivery of milled rice to the Food Corporation of India in Central Pool. An agreement dated 01.10.2004 was executed between the appellant-Markfed through its District Manager, Mansa and the respondent-Firm to shell the paddy for the paddy crop year 2004-2005 to be supplied by the appellant-Markfed under the terms and conditions agreed to between the parties. In accordance with the agreement, the appellant-Markfed supplied the paddy as under :
“'A' Grade 50419 Bags weighing 17646.65 Quintals. Out of this paddy the Miller has delivered the due rice i.e. 11823.30 Quintals filled in 23784 bags to Food Corporation of India in Markfed account.”
The Food Corporation of India on 30.4.2013 had deducted ₹17,23,420 from the regular bills of the appellant-Markfed due to below rejection level rice supplied by the respondent-Miller. The appellant-Markfed issued a notice dated 13.09.2013 whereby the respondent-Miller was directed to deposit ₹17,23,420/- with appellant-Markfed by 20.09.2013 failing which the appellant-Markfed would initiate proceedings against it as per the terms and conditions of the agreement. Since the respondent-Miller failed to pay the aforesaid amount, arbitration proceedings were initiated. The dispute was referred to the sole arbitration of Shri B.K. Srivastava, IAS (Retd.). The Arbitrator dismissed the claim of the appellant-Markfed vide its award dated 19.12.2016. The dismissal of the claim was challenged by the appellant-Markfed by filing an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The said application was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh vide the impugned judgment dated 17.01.2023. Hence, the present appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the merits of the case have not been discussed and dealt with in the impugned judgment.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant.
In the present case, none of the ingredients as laid down in Section 34 of the 1996 Act are made out. Rather, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the merits of the case have not been touched. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Konkan Railway Corporation Limited Vs. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking [2023 (9) SCC 85] has held as under :
“14.Analysis: At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act. Scope of interference by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted and subject to the same grounds as the challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
15.Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal appellate jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle courts to reverse the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal. In Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited (2019) 20 SCC 1, this Court held:
"24.There is no dispute that section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.
25.Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under section 34 of the Arbitration Act."
In view of the above and keeping in view the scope of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, no ground is made out to entertain the present appeal. The appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed off.