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Judgment
This writ appeal by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and its authorities is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 29.12.1999 made in W.P. No 9352 of 1999. That writ petition was filed by the respondents herein praying for the following relief:-
"...in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein the High Court will be pleased to issue a writ, order, direction, more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue section 4(1) notification and pay differential amount of compensation along with all statutory benefits under Land Acquisition Act and on par with the petitioner in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 as confirmed by W.A. No. 704 of 1998 dated 15.6.1998 as the petitioners are similarly placed, after declaring the action of the respondents in paying the compensation, under lapsed section 4(1) notification of 1988, as bad in law and non-payment of compensation by issuing fresh 4(1) notification of Land Acquisition Act by extending the benefit of Judgment in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 as confirmed by W.A. No. 704/98 to the petitioners is highly discriminatory and against Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in the interest of justice."
The background facts leading to the filing of the writ petition be noted brief ly as under: The writ petitioners are the cultivating tenants of certain lands, the description of which is not necessary for decision-making in this writ appeal. The lands of the petitioners were taken over by the R & B Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh on 1.10.1977 for formation of a metallic road between Nakkapalli and Pawnoor without initiating any land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act). Thereafterwards, a notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was issued vide G.O. Rt. No. 699 dated 22.7.1978 invoking the urgency clause u/s 17(4) of the Act. Thereafter section (9) notices were issued to the petitioners asking them to appear on 16.4.1990, 30.4.1990 and 12.9.1990. However, the said acquisition proceeding is allowed to lapse. Under those circumstances, W.P. No. 12519 of 1995 was filed in this Court by the cultivating tenants including the present writ petitioners seeking for a direction to the State and its authorities to pay compensation from September 1977 to August 1978 at the rate of 9%, from September 1978 till payment of compensation at the rate of 15% per annum, 30% solatitum, 12% additional market value etc., and for a further direction to the District Collector, Adilabad and the Revenue Divisional Officer, Macherla Division, the LAO, to pass an award as per the Act within a time-frame. On behalf of the State, it was contended before the Court in that writ petition that since the land acquisition proceedings initiated by issuing the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act vide G.O. Rt. No. 699 dated 22.7.1988 lapsed, the acquisition proceedings could not be continued and that if a direction is issued by the Court to continue the proceedings, they are willing to proceed with the same.
Taking into account the above submission of the State, a learned single Judge of this Court disposed of that writ petition by order-dated 26.3.1996 with the following direction:-
"Having regard to those admitted facts of the case, I am of the opinion that there could be a direction to the respondents to continue the proceedings in pursuance of the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act dated 22.7.1988, for which the petitioners also do not have any objection.
Hence I pass the following order:
"The respondent No. 6 is directed to continue the proceedings in pursuance of the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act on 22.7.1988 vide G.O. Rt. No. 699 and complete the same by passing Award within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, by determining the claims of each of the petitioner and also the compensation payable to each of them, on its own merits, in the light of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act."
The writ petitioners, however, not being satisfied with the said order of the learned single Judge, preferred W.A. No. 1229 of 1996. The Division Bench, opining that since the writ petitioners being mixed lot and that the pleadings filed before the Court were not adequate at all to decide the issue, held that the petitioners should have filed separate writ petitions to work out their legal remedies. The Division Bench disposed of the above writ appeal by order-dated 17.10.1996 with the following directions:
"....The petitioners being mixed lot, pleadings before the Court were/are not adequate at all.
It is a fit case, in our opinion, in which no order should be made in the instant proceeding as directed by the learned single Judge or any other order and the parties be asked to make proper applications with proper pleadings and disclosing the relevant facts.
With the observations as above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The writ petition is dismissed. It shall be open, however, to the petitioners-applicants to make independent applications, if so advised and if they have any case to make out."
As permitted by the Division Bench in the above Judgment, one Mr. L.Narasimha Reddy, who was one of the petitioners in W.P. No. 12519 of 1995 alone filed W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 praying for the following relief:-
"...that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein, the High Court will be pleased to issue writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay compensation as per Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land in Sy. No. 212, Kistapur (v) by awarding interest at the rate of 9% from 1.10.1978 to 1.10.1979, 15% from 1.10.1979 till passing of award and also pay 30% solatium etc., and pay 12% additional amount in view of Supreme Court decision reported in Assistant Commissioner, Gadag SUb-Division, Gadag Vs. Mathapathi Basavannewwa and others, and consequently pas award within 2 months from today."
The other writ petitioners in W.P. No. 12519 of 1995, it appears, did not file separate writ petitions.
The learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition by order dated 11.9.1997 with the following directions:-
"In the circumstances, the writ petition is being disposed of with a direction to the respondent-authorities to initiate proceedings by issuing a draft notification u/s 4(1) of the Act invoking urgency clause u/s 17(4) and declaration u/s 6 and to pass the award expeditiously.
It is further directed that the above exercise shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
With the directions as above, the writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs."
The State and its authorities, being aggrieved by the above order of the learned single Judge dated 11.9.1997 in W.P.
No. 18040 of 1997 preferred W.A. No. 704 of 1998. The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal by its order-dated 15.6.1998.
Pending the writ appeal, the Division Bench passed an interim order on 29.4.1998 directing the Government to pay compensation to the petitioner therein and in pursuance of that direction, award was passed on 24.6.1998 and compensation was paid to him. The resultant position is that the opinion of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 18040 of 197 that the original land acquisition proceedings have lapsed and the respondents have to issue fresh notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was affirmed by the Division Bench.
In pursuance of the direction issued by this Court in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997, a fresh notification was issued u/s 4(1) of the Act and compensation was paid to the petitioner in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 on the basis of that notification. Insofar as the other petitioners in W.P. No. 12519 of 1995 are concerned, awards are passed on the basis of the earlier notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act which was allowed to lapse as noticed above. Under those circumstances, the petitioners filed W.P. No. 9352 of 1999 praying for the relief noticed above.
Opposing the writ petition, a counter affidavit was filed by the LAO. The contention in the counter-affidavit is that in the case of the writ petitioners, the question of lapse of Section 4(1) notification does not arise as possession was taken over from them in pursuance of the notification issued earlier u/s 4(1) of the Act invoking urgency clause u/s 17(4) of the Act. It is also contended that the writ petitioners are not parties to W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 and the orders passed by this Court in the said writ petition as well as W.A. No. 704 of 1998 are not applicable to the case of the petitioners.
It is also contended that the award was passed on 24.6.1998 and compensation was paid to the petitioners in pursuance of the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act on 22.7.1988 and in that view of the matter, the petitioners cannot seek a direction to issue fresh notification and the writ petition filed by them is not maintainable in law. A separate counter was filed by the Executive Engineer opposing the writ petition. At this stage itself, it needs to be noticed that both the LAO and the Executive Engineer in their counter affidavits, however, admitted that the earlier notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act dated 22.7.1988 had lapsed as no award was passed within a period of two years.
The learned single Judge on consideration of the rival contentions of the petitioners and the State authorities has opined that the declaration made by this Court in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 and W.A. No. 704 of 1998 that the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act dated 22.7.1988 in respect of the lands in question had lapsed is a declaratory order and the benefit of that declaration accrues not only in respect of the land covered by the order made in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997, but also to all other lands covered by the Section 4(1) notification and so opining the learned Judge held that the petitioners are entitled to the relief sought by them. Accordingly, the learned single Judge directed the respondent-State authorities to issue fresh notification u/s 4(1)4(1) of the Act in respect of the lands of the petitioners and pay the differential amount of compensation along with other benefits to which they are entitled in law. Hence this writ appeal by the State and its authorities.
The learned GP for Land Acquisition contended that as regards the lands of the petitioners are concerned, possession was taken over after issuing notification u/s 4(1) of the Act and invoking the urgency clause u/s 17(4) of the Act and, therefore, the question of lapse of section 4(1) notification does not arise.
It is relevant to notice that similar contention was raised before the Division Bench in W.A. No. 704 of 1998 placing reliance on the observations of the Apex Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 of its Judgment in Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, . In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the above Judgment, the Supreme Court held-
"14. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made u/s 11.
Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it.
This is what section 16 states.
The provisions of section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration u/s 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of section 11-A, lapse.
When section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award u/s 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land, which is vested in the Government.
Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms.
Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisition u/s 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.
Further, section 17(3-A) postulates that the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to 80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the land before the Government takes possession of it u/s 17(1).
Section 11-A cannot be so construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land without the obligation to determine compensation, make an award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount of the award and the amount of 80 per cent of the estimated compensation."
The Division Bench, on consideration of the above observations of the Supreme Court in paras 14 and 15, rejected the above contention of the learned GP for Land Acquisition and held-
"The contextual facts, however, tell a different story.
Question of applicability of Section 17 in the facts of the matter under consideration does not and cannot arise. The learned single Judge observed that the proceedings lapse and we record our concurrence in regard thereto. As such, question of there being any assessment after long lapse of 21 years does not and cannot arise. The learned single Judge, in our view, has in no way exceeded his jurisdiction in the matter of coming to the conclusion as regards the lapse of the proceedings, neither the order of the learned single Judge can be said be said to be erroneous in any way. In that view of the matter, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
The payment already made in terms of the earlier order of this Court shall be taken note of at the time of assessing final compensation in terms of the order of the learned single Judge. Be it noted that this is apart from the issue of limitation. Since we have dismissed the appeal on merits, we are not recording our observations in regard thereto. Suffice, however, to record that the submissions of the learned Advocate appearing in support of the writ petitioner-respondent have some force that the appeal as framed is not maintainable by reason of the same being barred by the laws of limitation."
We are in respectful agreement with the above opinion of the coordinate Bench of this Court and consequently the above contention of the learned GP for Land Acquisition is not acceptable to us.
Above all, if the stand taken by the State Government is accepted, we are of the considered opinion that it would amount to the State Government practising an invidious discrimination. We opine so, because, the lands of the petitioners as well as the petitioner in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 were all initially acquired under the same
Section 4(1) notification dated 22.7.1988. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are equals in every respect and, therefore, the State and its authorities are not justified in treating them differently, particularly in view of the declaration made by this Court in W.P. No. 18040 of 1997 and WA. No. 704 of 1998 that the land acquisition proceedings initiated in pursuance of the notification issued u/s 4(1) dated 22.7.1988 had lapsed and the State is bound to issue fresh notification to acquire the lands covered by the earlier notification dated 22.7.1988. Since the guarantee of equal protection enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution embraces the entire realm of ''State action'', it would extend not only when an individual is discriminated against in the matter of exercise of his rights or in the matter of imposing liabilities upon him, but also in the matter of award of compensation to persons who are deprived of their lands by virtue of the exercise of the eminent domain power vested in the State. ''Equals should be treated alike'' is the constitutional creed flowing from Art. 14 of the Constitution and the State and its authorities should not only profess this creed but also practise the same. In that view of the matter, the direction issued by the learned single Judge in his order impugned in this writ appeal, we hold, is in consonance with the mandate of Art. 14 of the Constitution. and we do not find any substantive ground to interfere with the said order.
In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the writ appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.