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Judgment
Ranjit Singh, J.—Mahavir Jain Girls High School, Jind has filed this Regular Second Appeal to impugn the judgment passed by the Additional District Judge, Jind. The respondent-plaintiff was appointed as S.S. Teacher in the appellant-High School, which is Government aided institution. She complained that at the time of making appointment her signatures were obtained on the blank paper. This was being followed as a practice by the management of the school. This paper was converted into resignation letter to show the respondent-plaintiff had resigned her job and she was relieved on 04.08.1991. The respondent-plaintiff accordingly challenged the validity of the impugned order/acceptance of the resignation which as per her, she had never submitted. It was stated that this order had also not been got approved by the District Education Officer.
The suit was resisted by the appellant-institution by stating that suit for declaration was incompetent. It was also objected on the ground of being barred by limitation. The validity of the order, however, was reiterated and it was submitted that the respondent-plaintiff had resigned of her own, alongwith other persons, which was in protest against the termination of few junior teachers. It was accordingly pleaded that the respondent-plaintiff was estopped by her own act and conduct by filing the suit as she had joined the government service in the District Adult Education Officer as Supervisor w.e.f. 01.10.1982.
Trial proceeded on the following issues:
Whether the order dated 4.8.1981 terminating the service of the plaintiff is liable to be set-aside on the grounds mentioned in the paragraph No. 5 of the plaint? OPP.
Whether the plaintiff submitted her resignation on 30.4.81 as alleged in paragraph No. 3 of the written statement filed by defendant No. 3? OPP.
Whether the plaintiff is still in service of the defendant No. 3 and she is entitled for her pay and other arrears since 30.4.1981? OPP.
Whether the suit for mere declaration is not maintainable? OPD.
Whether the plaint is vague and indefinite? OPD.
Whether the suit is bad on account of non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD.
Whether the suit should have been for cancellation of order dated 4.8.81? If so, to what effect? OPD.
Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD.
Whether any notice was required to be given to the defendant No. 3, as alleged in paragraph No. 6 in the written statement? If so, to what effect? OPD.
10.Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction?If so, to what effect? OPD.
11.Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by her act and conduct? OPD.
12.Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands and has concealed the real facts. If so to what effect? OPD.
13.Relief.
Issues No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 11 decided in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Issues No. 5, 8, 10 and 12 were disposed of as not pressed. Management, accordingly, filed an appeal, which was also dismissed.
Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has made an attempt to submit that the evidence was not rightly appreciated to say that the respondent-plaintiff had not voluntarily submitted the resignation. Whether any resignation letter was submitted or it was obtained at the time of offering the appointment is purely a factual controversy, which was required to be appreciated and decided on the basis of the evidence led. Nothing could be pointed out before me to show that the evidence in this case was not properly appreciated. The submission that the resignation letter was submitted in protest on account of some junior employees having been terminated apparently is not possible. The letter or resignation being undated could rightly be construed as one which was submitted at the time of offering appointment. Accordingly no substantial question of law would arise for adjudication in this case. However, learned Counsel for the appellant to an extent is justified with regard to payment of backwages and the right of the respondent-plaintiff to rejoin the service.
On 28.04.2010, counsel for respondent No. 1 was given time to have instructions whether the respondent-plaintiff was interested in reinstatement and backwages. Though the counsel today submits that the respondent-plaintiff would not be interested in joining in service as she has already attained the age of superannuation but would submit that her right to have the backwages would be available, especially so, in view of the undertaking given on behalf of the appellant on 28.02.1989.
While admitting the Regular Second Appeal, the operation of the judgment and decree of the impugned order was ordered to be stayed till further orders. It appears that the respondent-plaintiff had filed an application for vacation of this stay, when the following order was passed:
Counsel for the appellant undertakes to pay the entire arrears of salary and allowances admissible to the respondents in the eventuality of RSA being dismissed from the date of her dismissal till the date of her reinstatement, in spite of the fact that she might remain employed during the pendency of the appeal. The undertaking may be filed within three weeks. If no undertaking is filed within the stipulated period, the stay order shall stand vacated.
Though there is some justification in what the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff states. As per the counsel, the appellant would now be bound to pay the back wages, if RSA is dismissed, in terms of undertaking aforementioned. Right to get backwages, especially so when reinstatement is not being asked, would depend upon the gainful employment of the respondent-plaintiff, which may have to be proved by the appellant if they intend to deny any backwages.
The Regular Second Appeal is however, dismissed.