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Judgment
Sethuraman, J.—In this reference under s. 256(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, the following question has been referred to this court :
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 4,305 is chargeable to Income Tax ?
The assessee was incorporated as a public limited company by guarantee and runs a club for its members. Its objects are to promote social
intercourse among the members of the club, their families and friends and to provide a club house and grounds for the accommodation of members
and their families and the friends of members temporarily staying with them. Noportion of the income or property is to be paid or transferred
directly or indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or otherwise by way of profit to persons who at any time were or have been members of the club
or to any one or more of them or to any person claiming through any one or more of them. Except with the previous approval of the Central Govt.
no remuneration or other benefit in money or money''s worth is to be given by the club to any of its members, whether officers or servants of the
club or not. The only exception made is in respect of payment of out-of-pocket expenses, reasonable and proper interest on money lent to the
company and proper rent on premises let to the club.
In accordance with the above objects, the assessee provided temporary accommodation in its premises in No 7, Commander-in-Chief Road,
Madras-8. There are furnished rooms within the club premises and during the year of account which ended on July 31, 1971, relevant to the
assessment year 1972-73, it received a sum of Rs. 4,305 by way of rent from the occupation of these rooms. Treating this as income from house
property, the ITO brought to tax a sum of Rs. 2,054. On appeal, the AAC upheld the order of the ITO. The assessee took the matter on further
appeal to the Tribunal and contended that the receipts from the members for the stay in the club premises did not represent any income, but a
receipt as a result of mutual association. For the department the contention was that the assessee being a public limited company, there was no
identity between the shareholders and the assessee and that the income from the property was liable to be assessed under the provisions of ss. 22
to 27. In the view of the Tribunal, the principle of the mutuality did not apply to the income received from renting out the premises along with the
amenities to the members. The assessment was thus confirmed by the Tribunal also. The assessee has brought the matter on a reference to this
court with reference to the question set out earlier.
The Supreme Court has examined the question of taxability of profits of a members'' club in CIT v. Royal Western India Turf Club :
[1953]24ITR551(SC) . The assessee in that case was also a company limited by guarantee. It carried on the business of maintaining a race course
and of licensed victuallers and refreshment purveyors. There were two categories of members who, on their election as members, paid an entrance
fee and periodical subscriptions, which were not charged to tax. Members were provided with a separate enclosure to watch the races for which
an admission fee was charged and non-members were not admitted to this enclosure. The non-members were given, in a separate enclosure, the
facility of watching the races and betting on the horses. All of them could use the totalizator and the facility for refreshment. The assessee claimed
that in computing its total income, certain receipts from members should not be taxed. The High Court held that some of those items were not
taxable either under s. 10(1) or under s. 10(6) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, while the amounts of income received from the members whose horses
did not run in the race during the season were liable to be taxed. The Supreme Court held that there was not mutual dealing between the members
inter se, and that all the items of receipts were received from the members in the course of a business with its members within the meaning of s.
10(1) and, therefore, assessable to tax. In the course of the judgment, the earlier cases decided in U.K. have been considered at p. 565. After
referring to the earlier decision on the point, it was observed (p. 565) :
As already stated, in the instant case there is no mutual dealing between the members inter se and no putting up of a common fund for discharging
the common obligations to each other undertaken by the contributors for their mutual benefit. On the contrary, we have here an incorporated
company authorised to carry on an ordinary business of a race course company and that of licensed victuallers and refreshment purveyors and in
fact carrying on such a business. There is no dispute that the dealings of the company with non-members take place in the ordinary course of
business carried on with a view to earning profits as in any other commercial concern. It is further admitted that some of the dealings of the
company with its members take place in the ordinary course of business and the profits arising out of those dealings, e.g., the fourth item of receipt
of Rs. 82,490 (income from entries and forfeits received from the members whose horses did not run in the races during the season) are taxable.
The company gives to its members the same or similar amenities as it gives to non-members, namely, the use of an unreserved seat in a stand, the
facility to watch the races and to bet on the horses in the races, use of the totalisator in that stand and the facility for refreshment. In fact the daily
ticket fee for admission into the members'' enclosure is exactly the same as that for admission into the first-enclosure to which the public have
access. The only difference is that a separate enclosure with a separate totalisator is provided for the members where they can meet their follow
members and not be disturbed by the intrusion of non-members. This privilege is referable to their membership of the company for which they pay
an entrance fee on their election as members and for which they pay the periodical subscriptions both of which are not sought to be brought to
charge. The rest of the facilities mentioned above which the members get are in substance the same as those enjoyed by the public..... In the
circumstances, all the four items of receipts from members must be taken into account in computing the total income of the company.
In the course of the judgment, reference was made to United Service Club v. Emperor, ILR 2 Lah 109; AIR 1921 Lah 208. There, the club
was an incorporated company having no dealings with and, therefore, deriving no profit from outsiders. The question raised was whether the
income derived from its members was taxable profit. It was held that the income derived by the club from its members was not liable to tax. The
proposition was found by the Supreme Court to overlook the real grounds of the decision of the English Cases which were applied therein. It was
pointed out that the decision in that case could be supported only on the ground that the club did not really carry on any business with its members
with a view to earning profits and, therefore, the surplus of receipts from the members with a view to cover the expenditure could not be said to be
profit of any business which could be assessed to tax. This case is thus an authority for the proposition that unless a trade with a profit motive was
indulged in by the club, whether exclusively with members or with non-members also, there could be no assessable income. In the case of a club
which was carrying on business, whether with the members alone, or with the members and outsider, the business activity which yields profits
would be of a commercial nature, and merely because a club indulges in it, it would not give it any exemption. However, the position of a club
which does not carry on any commercial activity would be wholly different. The basic principle of mutuality, that one cannot make any profit out of
himself, would apply to all non-commercial activities.
The learned counsel for the Commissioner relied on two decisions in support of his contention that the income was liable to be taxed. The first
decision is that of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax,Madras Vs. Kumbakonam Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd., . In that case, a
company carried on banking business restricted to its shareholders. It received monthly contributions by way of recurring deposits from the
shareholders, and, at the end of a fixed period, returned an amount covering the deposits and guaranteed interest thereon for that period. Loans
were granted to those shareholders who applied for them and interest was realised on those loans. A shareholder was entitled to participate in the
profits as and when dividend was declared, even though he had not taken any loan from the company. The question was whether the company
was assessable to tax on the profits derived from the transactions with its shareholders. It was held that the principle of mutuality did not apply and
that the profit of the company was taxable in its hands. The essential feature in that case to be noticed can be brought out from a passage, which
occurs at page 249 and which runs as follows :
It seems to us that it is difficult to hold that Styles'' case (1889) 2 TC 460 applies to the facts of the case. A shareholder in the assessee company
is entitled to the participate in the profits without contributing to the funds of the company by taking loans. He is entitled to receive his dividend as
long as he holds a share. He has not to fulfil any other condition. His position is in no way different from a shareholder in a banking company,
limited by shares. Indeed, the position of the assessee is no different from an ordinary bank except that it lends money to and receive deposits from
its shareholders. This does not by itself make its income any the less income from business within section 10 of the Indian Income Tax Act.
Even where a club was taken to indulge in a profit-making activity, it was held in National Association of Local Government Officers v. Watkins
(1934) 18 TC 499 that the liability would be confined to the profits made from the non-members. That was a case where a trade union had an
object of promoting the physical and social welfare of its members. It purchased a holiday camp to provide cheap holiday facilities for its members,
their wives, families and friends. In the year of purchase, however, it accepted bookings from non-members who had previously used the camp.
The question was whether the surplus arising from occupation of the camp by the members and non-members was liable to be taxed. It was held
that the liability was confined to the profits made from non-members. In the course of the judgment, Finlay J. pointed out at p. 506 :
It may be that where you have a separate entity, where you have a company, in a great many cases the test is that you have to look at the
subscribers, look at the participants, and see if they are the same. Here, it seems to me to lie at the root of the thing that the property was not the
property of the association; it was the property of the members themselves, and in a case such as that, I think it is impossible-at least, so it seems
to me, with the utmost deference-to apply the Solicitor-General''s principle. I cannot think that you can, in the case of a club, isolate the dining
room, the library, or the other various facilities which are offered by the club. The truth of the matter is, I think, that the members own the whole.
The members have a right to participate in the whole. Some members will participate in some things. Some members will participate in other things,
but to no members can there truly be said to be a sale. There is, I think, no trade among the members. The cannot trade with themselves. It is upon
that ground, I am afraid very imperfectly expressed, but which is fundamental and lies at the root of the thing, that I think that, so far as this camp
was used by the members, no profit could accure from its user. Noprofit could accrue, any more than profit could accure from any particular thing
done, from the management, say, of the dining room of an ordinary club.
It is common ground that incorporation by itself does not authorise the charge to tax of the surplus arising to the club. As pointed out by the
Supreme Court in CIT v. Royal Western India Turf Club : [1953]24ITR551(SC) :
The principle that no one can make a profit out of himself is true enough but may in its application easily lead to confusion. There is nothing per se
to prevent a company from making a profit out of its own members. Thus a railway company which earns profits by carrying passengers may also
make a profit by carrying its shareholders or a trading company may make a profit out of its trading with its members besides the profit it makes
from the general public which deals with it but that profit belongs to the members as shareholders and does not come back to them as persons who
had contributed them. Where a company collects money from its members and applies it for their benefit not as shareholders but as persons who
put up the fund the company makes no profit. In such cases where there is identity in the character of those who contribute and of those who
participate in the surplus, the fact of incorporation may be immaterial and the incorporated company may well be regarded as a mere instrument, a
convenient agent for carrying out what the members might more laboriously do for themselves. But it cannot be said that incorporation which brings
into being a legal entity separate from its constituent members is to be disregarded always and that the legal entity can never make a profit out of its
own members. What kinds of business other than mutual insurance may claim exemption from tax liability u/s 10(1) of the Act under the principles
of Styles'' case (1889) 2 TC 460 need not be here considered; it is clear to us that those principles cannot apply to an incorporated company
which carries on the business of horse racing and realises money both from the members and from non-members for the same consideration,
namely, by the giving of the same or similar facilities to all alike in course of one and the same business carried on by it.
These principles were applied in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Madras Race Club, . In that case, there was participation in horse racing by
members and non-members. The question was whether the surplus attributable to members'' subscriptions was not chargeable to Income Tax.
After examining several decisions, the legal principle was set out in the following words at pp. 443-444 :
The first concept is that the principle of mutuality is based on the doctrine that no person can make a profit out of himself.... There is, however,
nothing per se to prevent a company making a profit out of its own members.....
The second aspect relates to cases of absence of a trade or business which produced profits. For instance, a members'' club is intended to
promote social intercourse among the members. It does not purchase or sell commodities. It is merely a convenient instrument for the purpose of
providing facilities for the members.
The eligibility for exemption based either on mutuality or absence of profit motive was emphasised at page 446 in the following words :
..... a company may be eligible for exemption of any surplus derived from the dealings of the members either on the principle of mutuality based on
the doctrine that no one can make profit out of himself or on the basis that there is no trading or profit motive in the transactions between a club
and its members.
The legal position applicable to a members'' club was reiterated at page 450 as follows :
This is not also a case of a mere members'' club which comes into existence for the purpose of providing certain amenities to the members without
any business element as such as in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Merchant Navy Club, .
On the facts of that case, it was held that the surplus arising out of the members'' subscriptions was also taxable, as there was no essential
difference between members and non-members in the matter of participation in the races, which were run as a business proposition.
As the assessee has not indulged in any trade or business as such, it is not necessary to go into the question whether it made any profit out of
its members in the same way as it could, if it had dealt with strangers as in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Madras Race Club, . The
assessee here is merely organising a social activity confined to its members. The rooms were put up out of the funds of the club which arose to it
from the contributions of the members. The character in which the contribution was made was that of a member. Whoever occupies the premises
did so as a member of the club. Any surplus was not distributed among the members as dividends or bonus or otherwise, as the club was
prevented from doing so by the clauses in the memorandum already adverted to. It would therefore, follow that this is a case where there is no
activity which was designed to make any profit as such, and the profit, if any, was only incidental to the activities which are mutual in nature. The
benefit, if any, arising from the surplus would only reach the members in their character as members and not otherwise. The mere circumstance that
all the members of the club do not occupy the premises cannot have any significance, and it is impossible in the nature of things in a members'' club
that there should be any such simultaneous participation by all the members. It is in this context that the passages extracted earlier from National
Association of Local Government Officers v. Watkins [1934] 18 TC 499 at p. 506, a decision cited with approval by the Supreme Court in CIT
v. Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. : [1953]24ITR551(SC) , throws some light.
The learned counsel for the Commissioner relied on another decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow
Vs. Wheeler Club Ltd., Meerut, . In that case, the assessee, a limited company, was running a club for its members, and not for any outsiders,
providing amenities like residential quarters exclusively to its members on payment of rent. The assessee received a sum of Rs. 10,062 by way of
rent, and the income derived from the occupation of the rooms was brought to tax as income from property under s. 9 of the Act. The Allahabad
High Court held that the principle of mutuality did not apply to such a case and that the club was rightly taxed under s. 9. It was pointed out that,
only when the assessee''s income was from business, the principle of mutuality would be applicable. We are unable, with respect, to agree with this
decision. We have already seen that the Supreme Court has indicated how the principle of mutuality applies to cases other than business. If a club
sets about on an adventure of a commercial nature, it would lose its identity as a club, as comprehended by law or in popular parlance and it
cannot lay any special claim for exemption. The statute does not provide for any such exemption in the case of clubs merely because they call
themselves so. In so far as the decision of the Allahabad High Court runs counter to that of the Supreme Court, it would not be good law.
The whole concept of a members'' club is alien to profit-making. It is a sharing of common amenities in a spirit of camaraderie. The separate
payment for some of the amenities is only a mode of contribution and does not bring its case within the vortex of taxation. The question whether
even in a case of a members'' club, the profits arising from transactions with non-members could be subjected to tax, will have to be considered in
the light of the decisions in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Madras Race Club, , Carlisle and Silloth Golf Club v. Smith [1913] 6 TC 198 and
National Association of Local Government Officers v. Watkins [1934] 18 TC 499. So long as the occupation of the room is referable to the
amenity provided for the members for themselves, no income can be said to be earned, so as to be brought to tax by the provisions of the I.T. Act.
We have taken the same view in a sales tax case in The State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Indian Officers'' Association, . In that case, apart from the
persons belonging to the families of the members occupying some rooms provided by the association, there was also provision of food for them. In
other words, the amenities were in the shape of what could be found in a hostel. It was held that there was no sale to the inmates, as the
organisation of a mess by the students themselves and dividing the expenditure among themselves was purely in the nature of mutual service and
amenity. The same principle would apply here.
In this view, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee would be entitled to its costs. Counsel''s fee
Rs. 500.
