The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd vs Shobhana Chandran & Ors.

This appeal has been preferred by the insurance company against the award dated 27.02.2025 in O.P.(MV) No.147 of 2022 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha.

The sole contention raised in the appeal is with respect to the delay in filing the claim petition. It is the primary contention of the appellant that the accident occurred on 08.04.2014 while the deceased was travelling as a pillion rider on a motorcycle ridden by the 3^rd respondent through the Kuttikanam–Peruvanthanam Public Road. It is alleged that, when the 3^rd respondent turned the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner, he lost control of the vehicle, causing it to capsize. As a result, the deceased was thrown onto the road, sustained grievous injuries, and succumbed to the injuries on 13.04.2016. The 3^rd respondent is none other than the son of the deceased.

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the claim petition was filed by respondents 1 and 2 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha, after a lapse of eight and a half years from the date of the accident. On receipt of notice, the appellant entered appearance before the Tribunal and filed a written statement admitting that the offending vehicle was covered by a valid insurance policy, while, among other grounds, contending that the claim petition was barred by limitation.

In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to the decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jojo T.G. [2019 KHC 682], wherein this Court held that a claim which has long remained un asserted; one that is first asserted after an unexplained delay which is so long as to render it difficult or impossible for the Court to ascertain the truth of the matter in controversy and do justice between the parties, or as to create a presumption against the existence or validity of the claim, or a perception that the claim has been abandoned or satisfied, can be said to be a stale claim. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that, though a Special Leave Petition was preferred before the Apex Court, the Apex Court did not interfere with the order except to the extent of preventing recovery.

The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 contended that, in the decision in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya [1996 KHC 309], the Apex Court considered the effect of the deletion of Sub Section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short, "the Act"). It was held in paragraph 7 of the judgment that, although the Amending Act does not indicate that Sub Section (3) of Section 166 has been deleted retrospectively, there is nothing in the Amending Act to suggest that the benefit of the deletion of Sub Section (3) of Section 166 is not available to pending claim petitions in which a plea of limitation has been raised. The Apex Court explained the effect of the deletion by way of an illustration. It observed that, if an accident had occurred two years prior to 14.11.1994 and no claim petition had been filed till that date, the question would arise whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 could be rejected on the ground that the period of limitation prescribed under the erstwhile Sub Section (3) of Section 166 had expired and that the right to file the claim petition stood extinguished. The Apex Court answered the question in the negative and held that, consequent upon the deletion of Sub Section (3) of Section 166, the Tribunal is required to entertain a claim petition without reference to the date on which the accident occurred or the period of limitation prescribed under the deleted provision.

However, in reply, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the aforesaid position has been overruled by the Apex Court in the subsequent decision of a three-Judge Bench in Purohit and Company (M/s.) v. Khatoonbee and Another [2017 (2) KHC 102], wherein the Apex Court considered the issue of the reasonableness of the delay in filing the claim petition. The Apex Court held that the question of reasonability would naturally depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. However, it observed that a delay of 28 years, even without reference to any other fact, could not be considered, prima facie, to be a reasonable period for approaching the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The Apex Court further noticed that the only justification offered by the claimants for initiating the proceedings after a lapse of 28 years was the averment contained in paragraph 4 of the application for condonation of delay filed before the Tribunal, which reads as follows:

Heard Sri.S.K.Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Mathews K. Philip, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2.

On evaluating the contentions raised before this Court, it appears that the issue was raised before the Tribunal. The appellant, in the written statement, specifically questioned the maintainability of the Original Petition on the ground that it was barred by limitation, as it had been filed after a lapse of eight years from the date of the alleged accident. Since the accident occurred on 08.04.2014, a criminal case was registered on the basis of a private complaint on 06.01.2015, and the deceased, Chandran, succumbed to the injuries on 13.04.2016. The appellant contended that the accident occurred solely due to the negligence of the 3^rd respondent, who was riding the motorcycle under the influence of alcohol. However, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 pointed out that in paragraph 3 of the written statement, the appellant had merely stated that the Original Petition was barred by limitation and liable to be dismissed. The said pleading has been extracted in paragraph 5 of the award. However, no specific contention was raised with respect to the delay in filing the claim petition. On a perusal of the written statement, I do not find any specific pleading with respect to the delay, except for the passing contention that the Original Petition was barred by limitation, which has already been noticed by the Tribunal. No further plea in that regard was raised by the appellant.

From the records, it appears that the wife of the deceased, who is the 1^st claimant in the Original Petition, was examined as PW1. A detailed explanation regarding the delay was offered by PW1 in her deposition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal on 21.01.2025. However, it appears that the Tribunal did not properly consider the issue of delay while deciding the maintainability of the claim petition. Even then, taking note of the fact that the delay in the present case is only eight years, the explanation offered was that the claim papers had initially been entrusted to a lawyer, who failed to file the Original Petition. It was further explained that, owing to personal enmity with the said lawyer, who is none other than a relative of the claimants, the Original Petition was not filed within the prescribed time. According to the claimants, this resulted in a delay of eight years in filing the claim petition. However, the Tribunal did not discuss the same but condoned the delay and considered the matter on merits.

Taking note of the above circumstances, it appears to me that an explanation has been offered for the delay. Although the Tribunal has not discussed the said explanation in detail, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from Jojo T.G (supra), where no specific explanation for the delay had been offered. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. A similar situation arose in Purohit and Company (M/s.) (supra), where the claim petition had been filed after a delay of 28 years. The Apex Court distinguished the decision in Dhannalal (supra) on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and held that the claim had become stale and ought to have been treated as a dead claim when the respondents approached the Tribunal by filing the claim petition on 23.02.2005 in respect of an accident that had occurred on 02.02.1977. The factual circumstances of the present case are entirely different and, therefore, cannot be compared with those in Purohit and Company (M/s.) (supra).

Taking note of the fact that, at the time of the accident, there was no provision prescribing a period of limitation or governing the delay under Sub Section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the contention raised by the appellant that the claim petition is barred by limitation cannot be accepted solely on the ground of delay.

Moreover, the fact remains that, due to certain unavoidable circumstances, the filing of the claim petition was delayed by eight years. Under such circumstances, I do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the contention that the claim petition is barred by limitation cannot be accepted at this stage.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.