The Municipal Council vs H.H. The Maharana of Limbdi by Power Agent, Sri. V.C. Gopalaratnam, Advocate

Ramachandra ayyar, C.J.—By Government Order No. 2710, Health, dated 29th July 1960, the Government of Madras sanctioned a

Town-Planning Scheme for the Tiruchirappalli Municipality, known as Salai Road Extension Town-Planning Scheme. The Maharana of Limbdi

had two items of properties within the scheme area. Although the scheme was promulgated as early as the year 1950, the Municipality appears to

have been quite indifferent about the levy of betterment contribution for some time. In May 1953 it appears to have approached the Government

for the appointment of an Arbitrator u/s 27 of the Madras Town-Planning Act. The time fixed by the scheme for filing claims for betterment

contribution before the Arbitrator had already expired. The Government was also moved, in pursuance of Clause 21(a) of the scheme, to extend

the time. The Government responded to the request of the Municipality and issued G.O. Ms. No. 683,. Health, dated 22nd March 1954,

appointing an Arbitrator to discharge the duties under Clauses (a) to (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 27 and also extending the time till 21st

November 1954 for submission of the Municipality''s claims for betterment contribution under a power vested in it under Clause 21(a) of the

Scheme. The Arbitrator then entered upon his duties and fixed the market value of the properties which were liable for betterment contribution. His

award was impugned by the Respondent the Maharana of Limbdi, principally on the ground that the Government had no authority to extend the

period of time originally fixed under the scheme. The learned District Judge accepted that contention and set aside the assessment of betterment

contribution.

Chapter III of the Madras Town-Planning Act provides for the making, variation and revocation of schemes. Section 14 which occurs in that

chapter empowers the Government to sanction the scheme as passed or adopted by the Municipal Council after hearing objections, if any, and

making such enquiry as it may think fit. Once the scheme is sanctioned and published, it will have effect from the date of publication of the

notification and the execution of the scheme should be commenced forthwith. Section 15 of the Act provides for variation or revocation of the

scheme once promulgated. Section 23 which confers a power in the Municipal Council to levy betterment contribution, states:

Whereby the making of any town-planning scheme (the value of any property has increased or is likely to increase), the Municipal Council, if it

makes a claim for the purpose within the time (if any) limited by the scheme (not being less than three months) after the date of publication of a

notification of the (State Government) sanctioning a scheme u/s 14, shall be entitled to recover from the owner of such property an annual

betterment contribution for such term of years and at such uniform percentage of the increase in value not exceeding ten per centum as may be

fixed in the scheme:

Provided that the aggregate amount of the contributions so recovered shall not exceed one-half of the maximum increase in value during the

aforesaid term of years as ascertained under the next following section.

In the present case the relevant clause is Clause 21(a) of the scheme, as originally sanctioned, ran as follows:

Claims for betterment contribution u/s 23 of the Act shall be submitted to the Arbitrator within two years of the date of the scheme unless the

Government Order otherwise. The case for the Municipality is that inasmuch as the Government by G.O. Ms. No. 683, Health, dated 22nd March

1954, has extended the time till 21st November, 1954 the proceedings now initiated by the Municipality would be valid. The learned District

Judge, however, thought that the clause unless the Government otherwise order could not relate to the period within which the claim had to be

made, but it would relate to the person to whom the claim for betterment contribution should be made. We cannot accept this interpretation.

Clause 21 is clear and there is not even any ambiguity in it. What it intends to do is to confer on the Government a power to limit the period of time

within which the claim for betterment contribution should be made.

But that view does not dispose of the matter. It has been argued for the Respondent that the expression in Clause 21(a), namely, Unless the

Government order otherwise;

which has the effect of conferring power on the Government to extend or modify the period of time fixed by the scheme, is ultra vires. The time

within which the claim for betterment contribution is to be made, is a matter coming within the provisions of the scheme in the instant case. Any

alteration of it would involve an amendment of the scheme, which can be done only after the formalities prescribed by the statute have been gone

through. Section 23 of the Act says that the Municipal Council should make a claim for betterment contribution within the time limited by the

scheme. That implies that it is only the scheme that can fix the time and that it will not be open to any other authority to do so at any rate where the

scheme has fixed a time no other authority can change it. The scheme, therefore, which should be in conformity with the statute, cannot authorise

the Government to fix the time within which the claim for betterment contribution should be made. I am, therefore, of opinion that the clause unless

the Government order otherwise, which implies a power in the Government to extend or reduce the time fixed by the scheme, will be invalid, being

contrary to the provisions of Section 23 of the Act.

Mr. V. Ramaswami appearing on behalf of the Petitioner has, invited my attention to the decision in Ranganathan v. Krishnayya (1946) 1 M.L.J.

255, where it was held that it was not essential for a scheme under the Act to prescribe the time within which the claim for betterment contribution

to be made. That may be so. But the question here is, where the scheme does fix a time, whether it will be open to any other authority to modify it

except by amending the scheme. Section 15(2) of the Act recognises a power in the Government, at any time, to vary or revoke a scheme

sanctioned u/s 14. The power to vary can be exercised only after publishing, in the prescribed manner, a draft of such variation and observing the

other formalities prescribed in that provision. In the present case the Government could have exercised its undoubted powers u/s 15 for amending

the scheme, so as to alter the date of receipt of claims for betterment contribution. But that is not what they did.

It was then argued on behalf of the Petitioner that the entirety of Clause 21(a), relating to the time within which the claims have to be made,

should be regarded as invalid and in that event, the principle of the decision in Ranganathan v. Krisnayya (1946) 1 M.L.J. 255 would apply to the

case. I am unable to accept this argument, as the objectionable clause in it is severable from the rest of it. It was within the competence of the

authority which made the scheme to prescribe the time within which the claim for betterment contribution should be made. It fixed it as two years.

That was a valid provision. Instead of stopping there, it proceeded to confer a power on the Government to modify that time. This, in my view,

cannot be done, having regard to the provisions of Section 23 , which contemplates the scheme itself fixing the time. The clause unless the

Government order otherwise being severable from the rest, can be regarded as invalid without the rest of that clause being considered invalid.

The result is that the assessment of betterment contribution, in the present case, should be regarded as illegal. It will be open to the authorities to

recommence the proceedings, in case the Government sanctions a modification of the scheme. The civil revision petitions fail and are dismissed.

No costs.