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Judgment
Markandey Katju, C.J.—Both the writ appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge dated 9.11.2004.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The writ petitions had been filed by the respondent in each writ appeal
praying for a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the second respondent in each writ petition and quash condition No. 3 in the
order dated 28.10.2004 in so far as it grants recognition to the writ petitioners only for the academic year 2005-2006 and not for 2004-2005. The
learned single Judge had allowed the writ petitions and had observed that it was not open to the respondents in the writ petitions to say that the
petitioners are not eligible to admit students for the session 2004-2005.
Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellants has invited our attention to section 14(1) of the National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993, which states as follows:
Every institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education on or after the appointed day may, for grant of recognition
under this Act, make an application to the Regional Committee concerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations.
Learned counsel has also invited our attention to Regulation 3(i) of the National Council for Teacher Education Regulations, 2002, which states
as follows:
An application for grant of recognition of/permission for teacher education institutions/programmes including application for additional intake in
respect of courses through face to face mode shall be submitted to the Regional Committee concerned in the form given in Appendix 1-A. The list
of essential documents to be attached to the application shall be as given in Appendix 1-B. The land title certificate by a local practicing lawyer
shall be submitted as per the format at Appendix 1-C. An undertaking on a non-judicial stamp paper shall be submitted as per the format at
Appendix 1-D.
Appendix 1-B of the aforesaid Regulations states, thus:
Appendix 1-B - List of essential documents.
Application for grant of recognition including permission for additional intake should be submitted in triplicate in the format given at Appendix 1-A
to the concerned Regional Committee along with the following essential documents.
(i).....
(ii) ""No Objection Certificate"" from the State Govt./UT Administration (in original).
....
....
Note: (1) If the application is found incomplete i.e. without all the essential documents, the institution may be asked to make good deficiencies in
the application on or before the last date prescribed in the regulations.
(2) In the event when deficiencies in an application get removed only after the last date, the application of institution shall be carried forward by the
Regional Committee for consideration for the subsequent academic year i.e. for the course that would be offered one year later.
A perusal of the above Regulation shows that the application to the Regional Committee for recognition has to be submitted in the manner
mentioned in the Regulations. It is well settled that when the manner of doing something is prescribed, that thing has to be done in that manner
alone and not otherwise.
Regulation 3 has mentioned that certain essential documents as given in Appendix 1-B have to be attached to the application. One of such
essential documents is ""No objection certificate"" from the State Government/Union Territory. The ''note'' to appendix 1-B states that if the
application is found incomplete, the institution may be asked to make good deficiencies in the application on or before the last date prescribed in
the regulations. Regulation 7 states that the last date for making the application is 31st December of every year. Note (2) of appendix 1-B states
that if the deficiencies in an application get removed only after the last date, the application of the institution shall be carried forward by the
Regional Committee for consideration for the subsequent academic year i.e. for the course that would be offered one year later.
It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear, then a literal interpretation should be adopted. We see no ambiguity in the language
used in the Regulations and hence we are of the opinion that the order dated 28.10.2004 of the second respondent in each writ petition calls for no
interference.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents herein has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam v.
K.I. Abraham (AIR 1967 SC 1822) in which the Supreme Court, while interpreting the phrase ""in the prescribed manner"", observed that this
phrase does not authorise the rule-making authority to prescribe the time limit within which the declaration as contemplated in form ''C'' has to be
filed by registered dealer. The learned senior counsel has also relied on the decision of this Court in Solar Works Vs. Employees'' State Insurance
Corporation and Another, .
In our opinion, both the decisions are clearly distinguishable. It must be realised that decisions are not to be applied in a mechanical manner
without understanding the context. The decision in the Sales Tax Officer''s case cannot automatically operate as a precedent in interpreting a statute
relating to educational institutions. In educational institution usually an academic year is fixed and hence the applications have to be filed by the
prescribed time. Hence, while the phrase ""in the prescribed manner"" may not permit fixing the time limit in a sales tax statute, it will permit fixing the
time limit in a statute relating to educational matters. In our opinion, decisions should not be applied mechanically without looking into the context
and the object of the statute. The same phrase may have one meaning in one statute and may have a different meaning in another statute. As held
by the Supreme Court, the words in a judgment should not be treated as a legislative enactment vide Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa (2002
AIR SCW 4271). In the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court observed as follows:
So far as the observations made in Kamaksha Rai''s case (1999 AIR SCW 4173), it is to be noted that the decision in the said case was rendered
in a different factual scenario altogether. There is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they are words in a legislative
enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.
The context in which the judgment was delivered, the object and the nature of the statute regarding which the judgment was delivered and other
factors have all to be examined before applying a judgment as a precedent, otherwise the law will become artificial. Hence, we are of the clear
opinion that the decisions cited by the learned senior counsel for the respondents are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present
case.
Learned senior counsel for the respondents then contended that an opportunity of hearing as required by proviso to section 14(3)(b) of the
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 was not given to the writ petitioners. In our opinion, this submission has no merit because the
appellants have in fact given recognition to the institutions for the year 2005-2006, which was all that was possible in the circumstances of the case.
It was the writ petitioner in each writ petition itself which was responsible for filing an application for recognition on the very last date on which it
could have been filed it i.e. 31.12.2003. Hence the writ petitioner in each writ petition itself is to be blamed for the delay and no one else. No
useful purpose would have been served by granting further opportunity of hearing on the facts of this case. It is well settled that the rules of natural
justice are not a strait jacket formula vide The The Maharashtra State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. Suvarna Board Mills and another, Bar
Council of India v. High Court of Kerala ( JT 2004 (Supp. 1) SC 428 (para 47) = 2004 4 L.W.1), Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel
and Others, . Natural justice is not an unruly horse vide Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant ( (2001)1 SCC 182) The
Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Another Vs. Ramjee, , Channabasappa Basappa Happali Vs. The
State of Mysore, etc.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners (respondents in the appeals) referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in St.
Johns Teachers Training Institute Vs. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher Education and Another, and has invited our attention to
paragraph 19 of the aforesaid decision. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision does not in any way help the writ petitioners. It must be understood
that the object of obtaining no objection certificate from the State Government is that since the State Government has to grant aid to the institution,
it naturally wants to be satisfied that the institution has proper land, building, equipments etc, otherwise it may be granting aid to an institution which
may be existing only on paper. While it is true that the grant or refusal of no objection certificate is not conclusive or binding on the Regional
Committee yet it is certainly a matter of great importance as ultimately it is the State Government which has to mobilize funds for the running of the
institution.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners (respondents in these appeals) submitted that several other institutions, which were
granted no objection certificate after 31.12.2003, were granted recognition for the academic year 2004-2005 and hence he has alleged that there
is discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India against the writ petitioners. In support of this contention, learned senior
counsel for the writ petitioners (respondents in the appeals) filed copies of certain documents before us along with an affidavit stating that such
other institutions were granted no objection certificate by the Government of Pondicherry subsequent to 31.12.2003 and yet recognition was
granted to those institutions for the academic year 2004-2005.
We are not inclined to permit the learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners (respondents in the appeals) to raise those arguments
before us because he had not made those factual averments before the learned single Judge in the writ petitions.
It is well settled that ordinarily no fresh evidence is allowed in appeal and the arguments in an appeal have to be made on the basis of the
materials filed before the original court or authority. The affidavit filed before us today by the learned senior counsel for the respondents in the
appeals and the copies of certain documents, which he has filed to show that other institutions were granted no objection certificate subsequent to
31.12.2003, had not been filed before the learned single Judge in the writ petitions and we are not inclined to permit such fresh evidence to be filed
before us in these appeals. There was nothing to prevent the writ petitioners from making all these factual averments and filing all these materials
before the learned single Judge and taking the point of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India before him. However, this was not done
and no such argument was raised before the learned single Judge. It is well settled that when a party advances a plea of violation of Article 14 of
the Constitution, the burden of proof to show such violation is on the writ petitioner, whereas when there is allegation of violation of Article 19 of
the Constitution, all that the writ petitioner has to do is to show prima facie violation of Article 19 and then the burden shifts on the State authority
to show that the restriction imposed was reasonable. This is the difference of burden of proof when we are considering the violation of Article 14
and violation of Article 19 of the Constitution. Since in the present case the allegation is that Article 14 of the Constitution was violated, it was
incumbent on the writ petitioner to have advanced all the factual pleas in support of this argument before the learned single Judge, which was not
done. We, therefore, do not permit this point to be raised before us. In view of the above, we allow both the writ appeals and set aside the
judgments of the learned single Judge dated 9.11.2004 and dismiss both the writ petitions. No costs. Consequently, WAMP Nos. 7737 and 7738
of 2004 are closed.