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Judgment
R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.—Heard. Rule. The petitioner by the present petition seeks to quash and set aside the judgments dated 16th August 2007 and 30th January, 2008 passed by the respondent No. 1. The challenge is mainly on the ground that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the earlier order dated 26th August, 1995. It is the contention on behalf of the respondent that the said order was passed by the authority U/s.74 of the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act,1984. It is further contention on behalf of the petitioner that since the order was passed under the provisions of Maharashtra Co-operative societies Act, the question of entertaining the appeal against the same by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Multi State Co-operative Act, 2002 could not arise. Therefore, the concerned authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. On the other hand, it is the contention on behalf of the respondent that since the order was passed in exercise of the powers under Multi State Co-operative Societies Act,1984, taking into consideration the provisions of Section 126 of Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 r/w. Section 90 of the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 1984, no fault can be found for the exercise of the powers by the Registrar and, therefore, he was not without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In that regard, it is further the contention of the petitioner that even assuming that the order was passed in exercise of section 74 of the old Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, even then, the Registrar could not have exercised the powers to entertain the appeal in the year 2005 against the order which was passed in the year 1995, ignoring the provisions of Section 84 of the new Act.
Considering the provisions of law referred to by the learned Counsel for the parties, it is apparent that in terms of section 126 of the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 the old Act stood repealed and in terms of subsection 6 thereof, only the legal proceedings pending in any court or before the Central Registrar or any other authority at the commencement of the new Act are saved and it further provides that such proceedings shall continue in that court or before the Central Registrar or that authority as if the new Act had not been passed. In other words all those pending proceedings on the day the new Act had come into force, only those have been saved. In the case in hand, the order which was sought to be challenged by way of appeal in the year 2005 was passed on 26.8.1995. The new Act came into force w.e.f. from 19/08/2002. The appeal was filed in the year 2005 in terms of provisions of Section 90(2) of the old Act. The period of limitation was 60 days. Undoubtedly, Subsection 3 thereof also empowers the appellate authority to condone the delay. However, in terms of the provisions of Section 90(2) the right of appeal was subsisting in favour of the appellant in relation to the order dated 26.8.1995 for a period of 60 days from the date of the order, excluding the period which was spent in obtaining certified copy of the said order. In the matter in hand, since the appeal was filed nearly 10 years after the passing of the order, prima facie it appears that there was no right subsisting in favour of the respondent to file the appeal on the day on which it was filed. The provisions of Section 84 of the new Act clearly provides that, the proceedings for reference of the dispute should be by way of arbitration and in that regard the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 have been made applicable to such proceedings. What is saved U/s.126(6), relates the pending proceedings. In the case in hand, merely because the respondent No. 3 claims that they were not aware of the order passed in 1995, it cannot be said that the proceedings as far as the respondent No. 3 is concerned were still pending under the old Act. Hence, it appears that all the orders have been passed without jurisdiction. Hence, prima facie case has been made out for the grant of stay to the operation of the impugned judgments and interim relief in terms of clause (C) (i)(ii). At this stage, it has also been submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that the respondent No. 3 has already deposited decreetal amount and, therefore, status-quo in relation to sale of property should be maintained. On the other hand, the Counsel for the petitioner submitted that already auction was concluded and the property was purchased by the Bank and now the Bank has entered into the Agreement to sale with a third party. As regards the claim about the deposit of decreetal amount, the same is sought to be disputed on behalf of the petitioner. Be it as it may, there is no application as such on behalf of the respondent for the grant of any interim relief which would justify any such relief in their favour and that too in the petition filed by the petitioner. Hence, the request by the respondent No. 3 for grant of status-quo is rejected.
