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Judgment
M. Jaichandren, J.—The Writ Petition has been filed praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to the
order passed in ID No. 354 of 1997, dated 05.09.2000, on the file of the first respondent and quash the same.
Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as for the respondents.
The brief facts of the case, as stated by the petitioner, are as follows:
The petitioner is the Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ''Corporation''). The
second respondent was employed as a conductor in the Corporation. While so, he was punished on several occasions for serious irregularities,
including the punishment of removal from service. Later, the second respondent had been reinstated in service, under a settlement concluded in
accordance with Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Inspite of the punishments imposed on him, the respondent continued to
commit various Irregularities. On one such occasion, the second respondent had collected a sum of Rs. 2.70 per ticket from a group of 13 persons
while he was working as a conductor, on 02.02.1994, while plying on the route Mahabalipuram to Chennai. When the Checking Inspectors
checked the bus, at about 6.45 P.M. on 02.02.1994, they had found that the second respondent had collected a sum of Rs. 50/- from a group of
13 persons for a fare of Rs. 2.70/- per head but had not issued the tickets. Therefore, the charges were framed against the second respondent
based on the report of the Checking Inspector for alleged misappropriation. Since the explanation submitted by the second respondent was not
satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was ordered. After sufficient opportunity was given to the delinquent employee to defend his case, the Enquiry
Officer completed the proceedings, following the principles of natural justice. Based on the evidence and the documents available, the Enquiry
Officer held that the charges were proved. Therefore, the Management of the petitioner corporation had issued a second show cause notice,
proposing to remove the petitioner from service. After the receipt of the said notice, the second respondent had submitted his explanation. Since
the explanation submitted by the second respondent was not satisfactory, the petitioner management had removed the second respondent from
service by an order, dated 04.04.1996. Therefore, the second respondent had raised an industrial dispute before the second Additional Labour
Court, Chennai, in I.D. No. 354 of 1997. The Labour Court by its award, dated 05.09.2000, had ordered reinstatement of the second
respondent in service with back wages and continuity of service. Challenging the said award of the Labour Court, dated 05.09.2000, the petitioner
corporation had filed the present writ petition stating, inter alia, that the delinquent employee was removed from service by the petitioner
corporation only after following the due process of law and by conducting an enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner corporation had submitted that the Labour Court had failed to analyse the case in full,
including the report of the Enquiry Officer, before coming to the conclusion that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were incorrect. Further, it was
stated that the statements made by the second respondent relating to the events that had taken place on 02.02.1994, were not true. Even though
there was clear evidence against the second respondent to find him guilty of the charges framed against him, the Labour Court had come to a
wrong conclusion of ordering reinstatement of the second respondent in service with back wages and continuity of service, by its award, dated
05.09.2000, made in I.D. No. 354 of 1997.
On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent had contended that the second respondent had entered
the service, under the petitioner corporation, as a conductor, on 08.08.1968, and was working faithfully and efficiently and to the satisfaction of his
superiors. Based on certain false and frivolous allegations, the second respondent had been terminated from service, on 04.04.1996. At the time of
his termination from service, he was drawing a salary of Rs. 4,082/- per month. The second respondent was issued a charge memo, dated
05.02.1994, alleging that he had collected a fare of Rs. 2.70/- each from a group of 13 persons traveling from Mutukadu to Thiruvanmayur and
that the second respondent had attempted to misappropriate the money belonging to the petitioner corporation. The second respondent had
submitted an explanation, dated 23.02.1994, stating that 13 persons had boarded the bus at Kanathur and when they were questioned about their
destination the passengers were discussing among themselves without informing the second respondent, the place to which they were traveling.
While so, the Checking Inspectors of the petitioner Corporation had boarded the bus and on seeing the checking inspectors the passengers had
taken out Rs. 50/- asking the second respondent to give tickets. However, the Checking Inspectors had refused to permit the second respondent
to issue the tickets, as requested by the passengers. The issues, which have been framed by the labour court, are as follows:
Whether it is true that the respondent management had dismissed the petitioner on 4.4.1996 illegally and contrary to the principles of natural
justice. If correct, what is the relief that the petitioner would be entitled to?
The charges that were framed against the second respondent are as follows:
Even though you had received a sum of Rs. 2.70/- each from a group of 13 passengers, who had boarded the bus in Muttukkadu being route
No. 19-B, Bus No. 0391, in which you were working as conductor, bound to Thiruvanmiyur, you did not issue them tickets till the bus reached
the stage at VGP Golden Beach, on 02.02.1994.
You have attempted to misappropriate the income of the corporation for yourself.
Various documents have been marked as exhibits before the Labour Court. The charge memo has been marked as Exhibit M-6, the explanation
submitted by the second respondent has been marked as Exhibit -- M-7, the domestic enquiry proceedings has been marked as exhibit M-11, and
the final report of the Enquiry Officer has been marked as Exhibit M-12. Further, the second show cause notice sent to the second respondent by
the petitioner corporation has been marked as Exhibit M-13, and the explanation submitted by the second respondent for the second show cause
notice has been marked as Exhibit M-14, and the final order of dismissal passed against the second respondent has been marked as Exhibit M-15.
No documents were marked on behalf of the second respondent.
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on the following cases in order to support his contentions:
6.1. In Devendra Swamy v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation reported in 2002-I-LLJ, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
The Division Bench of the High Court relied on the decisions of this Court in State of Haryana and Another Vs. Rattan Singh, - U.P. SRTC v.
Basudeo Chaudhary, (1997) 11 SCC 370; U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma and Others, for forming
opinion that unless punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charge which has been proved, the punishment awarded by the disciplinary
authority should not be interfered in exercise of power of judicial review. In our opinion, the Division Bench was right in taking the view which it
has taken. The opinion formed by the Labour Court that punishment of dismissal imposed by the management on the workman was too harsh and
undeserved, was perverse finding and arrived at by ignoring the material as to previous acts of misconduct and punishments awarded to the
appellant brought to the notice of disciplinary authority and the Labour Court. We are also of the opinion that the gravity of charge of misconduct
for which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated and which charge was found to be substantiated by the Labour Court, seen in the light of
previous service record of the appellant fully justified I the punishment awarded by disciplinary authority.
6.2. In Management of Mahakavi Bharathiar Transport Corporation, Ltd. Udhagamandalam v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore and
Anr. reported in 2003 (3) L.L.N.734, this Court has held as follows:
...17. The Supreme Court as well as this Court time and again had pointed out that in the case of conductors, the quantum of amount
misappropriated is irrelevant and that even if the amount misappropriated is very small, having regard to the nature of the duties discharged by the
conductor and the fiduciary relationship with the management, if the misconduct is proved, the extreme penalty of dismissal from service would be
justified and that it would be a case of misplaced sympathy to reinstate them in service, vide judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka State
Road Transport Corporation v. B.S. Hullikatti 2001 (1) L.L.N.893. This judgment was also followed by a Division Bench of this Court in V. Kasi
v. Pandian Roadways Corporation. Ltd. 2003(2) L.L.N.642 cited above.
6.3. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. Ishwar Singh reported in 2005 (3) L.L.N. Delhi High Court has held as follows:
The only ground on which the issue No. 2 was decided against the petitioner Delhi Transport Corporation was non-examination of ticketless
passenger travellers, the position of law on this issue is well settled. It is surprising that inspite of the settled position of law laid down by the
Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh 1977(2) L.L.N 50, wherein it has been held that non-examination of ticketless
passengers should not be a ground setting aside the domestic enquiry, the counsel for Delhi Transport Corporation do not cite this and other
relevant judgments before the Tribunal. A learned Single Judge of this Court, Madan Lokur J., in an exhaustive judgment in Delhi Transport
Corporation v. N.L. Kakkar and Anr. 2004(2) L.L.N.992, summarised the position of law by referring to the following judgments:
(a) State of Haryana v. Ram Chancier 1976 (2) S.LR.690
b) State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (vide supra)
c) Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Mohinder Singh,
I respectfully concur with and indeed bound by the position of law summed up by the learned Single Judge in Delhi Transport Corporation v. N.L.
Kakkar case (vide supra) .
Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent has relied on several decisions to support his contentions:
7.1. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Bhik Nath reported in 2005 (2) L.L.N. 1, the Supreme Court has held as
follows:
We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. We are of the opinion that on facts the contention of the learned
Counsel for the appellant as well as finding of the learned Single Judge that no opportunity was given to the appellant to lead evidence to prove its
case of misconduct is incorrect. When the matter was pending before the Labour Court no application was filed by the appellant seeking
permission to lead evidence. On the contrary when the Labour Court found difficulty in accepting the finding of the disciplinary authority as to the
guilt of the respondent, the appellant as well as the respondent consented that the Labour Court could go into the merits and demerits of the case
on the basis of the material available on record and decide the correctness of the finding of the inquiry officer as well as that of the disciplinary
authority. This concession is recorded in the following words of the Labour Court in its award:
Both the parties had given their consent to decide the case on the basis of evidence and material available in the file of the domestic inquiry. I heard
the arguments of both the parties and perused the file carefully.
In the background of this concession and in the absence of seeking permission for leading evidence in support of its charge by the appellant it
cannot be now permitted to question the procedure adopted by the Labour Court based on consent of the parties. Even the, learned Single Judge
erred in wrongly recording a finding that the appellant was not given an opportunity to lead evidence. As a matter of fact a perusal of the award
clearly shows that both the parties addressed arguments on merits and demerits on the basis of the evidence on record and after considering the
same the Labour Court by a reasoned order agreed with the inquiry officer that though in the two cases in regard to which an inquiry was
conducted the respondent workman has not issued tickets to 3 and 2 passengers respectively, the material on record and explanation given by the
respondent sufficiently proved that he had good reasons for not having issued the tickets when the checking staff came for checking and the
respondent workman had no intention of defrauding the Corporation. This is a finding of fact based on the material on record accepted by the
inquiry officer, the Labour Court and the Division Bench and we find no reason whatsoever to differ from this finding. We are also of the opinion
that since the Labour Court had formed an opinion that the disciplinary authority had not properly considered the evidence on record while coming
to a contrary conclusion the Labour Court was justified in going into the question of fact that too as consented by the parties and giving a finding.
7.2. In S. Shenbagaraj v. Additional Commissioner of Industries and Commerce, Chepauk and Ors. reported in 2004 (4) L.L.N.691, this Court
has held as follows:
Therefore, the said contention of the petitioner also falls to the ground. In this context, the reliance placed upon by the learned senior counsel
on the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme court can also be usefully referred to, namely, U.P. S.R.T.C. and Others Vs. Har Narain Singh and
Others, and Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors. (2003) (2) L.L.N.313. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the scope of
judicial review under Article 226 is not like an appellate authority and its jurisdiction is circumscribed by the limits of judicial review to correct only
the errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of natural justice. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that such a
judicial review is not akin to appreciation of the case on merits as an appellate authority. In Paras 16 and 17C Pages 317 and 318 of the judgment
reported in Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors. (2003) (2) L.L.N.313 (vide supra), can be usefully referred to which reads as under:
It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and
different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against
him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence
should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different.
(See State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena.) 1996 (2) L.L.N 1269 In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application.
The doctrine of ''proof beyond doubt'' has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at
the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct.
While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is
circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of
natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.
7.3. In Shaw Wallace and Company Ltd v. Presiding Officer, Second Additional Labour Court, Madras and Anr. reported in 2002 (1)
L.L.N.317, this Court has held as follows:
In order to find out as to whether the second respondent is a workman or not, it must be seen that the writ-petitioner-management itself while
issuing chargesheets, dated 9 August 1980 and 27 December 1980, has treated the second respondent as a workman as found from the contents
of the charges. In the chargesheet, dated 27 December, 1980, it is stated as follows:
You were on duty on the ''B'' shift on 26, December, 1980.
It is alleged that at about 4.30 P.M. on 26, December, 1980, you abused a co-employee C. Palayam using vulgar words and threatened him of his
life. It is also alleged that you were in a drunken state when you were on duty, and created disturbance inside the factory. It is further alleged that
you were found missing from the factory from 7.30 P.M. till the end of the shift.
The above allegations, if proved will amount to misconduct within the meaning of Clauses 14(ii), 8,16,21 and 28 of the Standing Orders of the
company and you are requested to submit your explanation in writing within 3 days of receipt of this letter, why disciplinary action should not be
taken against you.
A reading of the above chargesheet indicates that the second respondent was treated as a workman and was called for explanation as to the
charges of misconduct within the meaning of Clauses 14(ii) 8,16,21 and 28 of the Standing Orders which are applicable to the workmen. Having
treated the second respondent as a workman, whether it would be permissible and would be open to the writ-petitioner to take a different stand
before the Labour Court contending that the second respondent is not a workman. In my view, such a stand taken by the writ-petitioner-
management cannot be permitted as the writ-petitioner-management are estopped from taking such a stand when the second respondent himself
was treated as a workman by the writ-petitioner-management while issuing the chargesheet for the alleged misconduct and for violation of some of
the provisions of the Standing Orders applicable to the workman. Whether an individual is a workman or not is to be decided on the facts and
circumstances of each case. When the management treated the second respondent as a workman for the purpose of issuing chargesheet and
conduct of enquiry, allowing the same management to take a different stand before the Labour Court would be otherwise encouraging the
management to shift its stand according to the needs and choice and hence the same cannot be permitted. That apart, on merits, the evidence of
M.W.1 would also disclose the technical duties which the second respondent was asked to perform. When the evidence of the management
witness himself speaks to the nature of duties of the second respondent as technical one also, the Labour Court on appreciating the nature of duties
of the second respondent both as a supervisor and as technical, had come to the conclusion that the second respondent is a workman only taking
into the dominant nature of technical work. The power of this Court Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the appreciation of the evidence of
the Labour Court and to re-appreciate the same is very limited. When the Labour Court on facts concluded as to the nature of the work of the
second respondent as a workman within the meaning of Section (2)(s) of ""the Act"", this Court exercising powers of judicial review under Article
226 will not interfere with that finding as to whether the nature of duties of the second respondent is supervisory or technical as the same is based
on evidence which could be appreciated by the Labour Court as has been done in the case. I do not find any reason to interfere with the said
appreciation of evidence by the Labour Court based upon the evidence of M.W.1 as to the nature of duties of the second respondent. In this
connection, it would be relevant to point out the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Overseas bank case 2000 (2) L.L.N.930 (vide supra),
wherein the Supreme Court has held, that:
the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal could not be disturbed for the mere reason that the findings were based on material or evidence not
sufficient or credible in the opinion of the Writ Court to warrant those findings as long as they were based upon some material which were relevant
for the purpose or even on the ground that there was another view which could be reasonably and possibly taken.
In view of the above categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court and in view of the limited scope for this Court to review the findings of the
Labour Court on evidence, I do not find any merit to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court holding the second respondent as a workman.
In view of the above, the judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1969 II L.L J.870 (vide supra), is not useful to
the petitioner on the facts and circumstances of this case.
...9. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that, there is no finding as to the punishment of dismissal as disproportionate to
the proved charges. In the absence of such finding, the Labour Court was not right in modifying the punishment by exercising its power u/s 11A of
the ""the Act."" For the said submission, the learned Counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1988 (1) L.LN.9, Christian
Medical College Hospital Employees'' Union and Anr. v. Christian Medical College Vellore Association and Ors. The Supreme Court while
considering the power of the Labour Court has held as follows:
...Section 11A which has been introduced since then into the Act which confers the power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to
substitute a lesser punishment in lieu of the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the management again cannot be considered as conferring an
arbitrary power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court. The power u/s 11A of the Act has to be exercised judicially and the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court is expected to interfere with the decision of a management u/s 11A of the Act only when it is satisfied that the
punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. The Industrial Tribunal or the
Labour Court has to give reasons for its decision. The decision of the Industrial Tribunal or of the Labour Court is again, as already said, subject to
judicial review by the High Court and this Court.
Based upon the said judgment, the learned Counsel submitted that the award of the Labour Court in directing reinstatement cannot be sustained
since the Labour Court had not given any reason for modifying the punishment more particularly, as to 4 whether the punishment of dismissal was
disproportionate to the proved charges. While exercising the power u/s 11A of ""the Act,"" the Labour Court had taken note of the fact that the
management witness -- Sri Thangaraj was secretary of the union to which the second respondent was also a member, there was a previous enmity
between the said Thangaraj and the second respondent over the union activities. In view of the same, the said Thangaraj had to leave the union.
The Labour Court on the basis of the evidence found that there was only an altercation between the second respondent and the said C. Palayan
and for the said misconduct the punishment of dismissal would be disproportionate. Morover, it is also worth mentioning that none of the
management witnesses have spoken to of any specific words used by the second respondent which could be termed as vulgar as stated in the
chargesheet, dated 27, December, 1980. Even in the said chargesheet, all that has been stated is that the second respondent has abused the co-
employee C. Palyan using vulgar words and threatened him of his life. The said chargesheet does not indicate of any specific words which could be
termed as vulgar. The charge itself is vague. For such a misconduct of mere altercation as found by the Labour Court, the punishment of dismissal
would be disproportionate as was found by the Labour Court. Further, the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere
with the discretion exercised by the Labour Court u/s 11A of ""the Act"" is also very limited. While the Parliament enacted Section 11A of ""the Act
by Amendment Act, 45/71 with effect from 15 December 1971, had advisedly left the individual discretion in the Labour Court or the Tribunal to
go into the quantum of the punishment imposed by the management and that unless there was any perverse or shockingly unreasonable view which
no reasonable person with an obligation to judiciously determine a question would have come to, has been shown or found to have been taken in
any case, the exercise of power to interfere in the said discretion is not available. The judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are not akin to appellate powers, over the awards passed by the Tribunal or Labour Courts exercising jurisdiction under the
provisions of ""the Act"". As has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in 2001 (2) L.L.N.460, G. Jayaraman v.
Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Madras, and Anr. the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is designed to correct
jurisdictional errors or patent error of law or decisions arrived at in an arbitrary manner, so arbitrary that no judicial authority entrusted with the
task of deciding or adjudicating a dispute or an issue could have overcome to such a conclusion. In view of the above principle of law, the finding
of the Labour Court that for the proved misconduct of altercation of words, the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate cannot be
considered as one which could be termed as perverse or shockingly an unreasonable view which no reasonable person with an obligation to
judiciously determine a question would have come to, has been shown or found to have been taken away. The Supreme Court in the judgment
reported in 1984 (1) L.L.N.649, Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan, Ltd. and Anr. While considering the scope of the
exercise of powers of the High Court to interfere in the discretion of the Tribunal u/s 11A of ""the Act"" has held as follows, ""Under Section 11A
advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power though as a superior Court, it is vested with the right of superintendence.
The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinize the orders of the subordinate Tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it
could in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and
directions, if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the
Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it....
The Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 1983 (2) L.L.N.655, Hindustan Machine Tools, Ltd., Bangalore v. Mohammed Usman and Anr.
while considering the scope of the exercise of powers of the High Court to interfere in the discretion of the Tribunal u/s 11A of ""the Act"" has
observed as follows:
...Section 11A confers power on the Labour Court to evaluate the severity of misconduct and to assess whether punishment imposed by the
employer is commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. This power is specifically conferred on the Labour Court u/s 11A. If the Labour Court
after evaluating the gravity of misconduct held that punishment of termination of service is disproportionately heavy in relation to misconduct and
exercised its discretion, this Court in the absence of any important legal principle, would not undertake to re-examine the question of adequacy or
inadequacy of material for interference by Labour Court. We are, therefore, disinclined to interfere with the order passed by the Labour Court....
Equally the Labour Court while considering the past record of service found that the second respondent was only warned for certain misconduct
and there was no past record over any serious or major misconduct. The Labour Court further found that the management itself has issued
certificates marked as Exhibits W2 and W3 certifying the conduct of the second respondent as good. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the
petitioner reported in 1988 (1) L.L.N.9 (vide supra), to canvass the submission that there was no finding as to the punishment of dismissal as
disproportionate is not helpful to the petitioner as on facts the Labour Court has given its own reason for modifying the punishment. Equally the
judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in 1995 (2) L.L.N.968 (Kerala Solvent Extractions, Ltd v. A.
Unnikrishnan and Anr.), to contend that the Court cannot modify the order on misplaced sympathy is also not applicable to the facts of this case
since the Labour Court has modified the sentence only on the ground that the past record of the second respondent was not so adverse which
could weigh in the mind of the Court to confirm the order of dismissal. In fact, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the second
respondent was only warned from some minor lapses and has also relied upon the certificate of good conduct issued by the writ-petitioner-
management in favour of the second respondent. Therefore, the above judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also of no
use. For all the above reasons, I do not find any reason to interfere in the award of the Labour Court, dated 25 May 1994, passed in I.D. No.
339 of 1988. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.
7.4. In Management of Kongarar Spinners Limited, Pethappampatti, Udumalpet v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Anr. reported in 2002 II
LLJ, it has been held as follows:
Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act has left the discretion in the Labour Court to go into the quantum of punishment imposed by the
management and that unless there was any perverse or shockingly unreasonable view which no reasonable person with an obligation to judiciously
determine a question would have come to has been shown or found to have been taken in any case the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India ought not to be exercised by this Court as if an appellate authority.
However, the Labour Court considering the circumstances of the case has passed the award of reinstatement with continuity of service along
with 50% back wages as it felt that the punishment of dismissal from services is highly excessive. I am also of the view that the conduct of the 2nd
respondent is also not absolutely without any blame as such the denial of 50% of back wages is justifiable. Therefore I do not find any infirmity in
the award passed by the Labour Court and hence the same is confirmed and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
The Labour Court by its award, dated 05.09.2000, made in I.D. No. 354 of 1997, had come to the conclusion that the management of the
petitioner corporation had illegally terminated the second respondent without following the principles of natural justice and therefore, the second
respondent is entitled to be reinstated in service with back wages and continuity of service with all attendant benefits. No witnesses were examined
during the proceedings before the Labour Court, either by the second respondent or by the petitioner corporation. During the domestic inquiry,
one Loganathan, who was enquired as a witness by the management, had stated the facts as alleged by the management. The second respondent in
his explanation, while stating the events that had occurred on 02.02.1994, Had submitted that he had asked the passengers, who had boarded the
bus, about their destination and had also asked them to buy the tickets. When the passengers were discussing amongst themselves the Checking
Inspectors had boarded the bus for checking the tickets of the passengers. Thereafter, the passengers had given the amount of Rs. 50/- and the
Checking Inspectors had prevented the second respondent from issuing the tickets to the passengers.
The Enquiry Officer had concluded that the second respondent had failed to issue the tickets after receipt of the money, even though no excess
amount was detected to be in the custody of the second respondent. The Labour Court had not accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer.
Further, it has held that the second show cause notice was issued to the second respondent on the basis of the charges leveled against him, from
the final order passed by the petitioner management, it is seen that the past punishments were taken into consideration while passing the said order
without mentioning, specifically, the previous punishments. It is also seen what no opportunity was given to the second respondent to explain all the
aspects based on which the impugned order was passed. Therefore the Labour Court had set aside the order of dismissal and had ordered
reinstatement of the second respondent in service, with back wages and continuity of service.
The Labour Court, while coming to its conclusion, as stated above, had relied on the fact that the second respondent''s bag was not checked at
the time of the incident. Further, it was not the case of the petitioner Management that excess amounts were found in the bag. The Labour Court
had held that the passengers connected with the case were daily Labourers and that they could not have left the balance amount with the
Conductor after purchasing their tickets without asking for the same. There was no evidence recorded on behalf of the petitioner Management to
show that the passengers had asked the second respondent for the balance amount. Further, the Labour Court had held that it would not be
practicaly possible for the Conductor of the bus to enquire every passenger, at the time of their boarding, as to their destination. In such
circumstances, the second respondent''s version of the incident that had taken place, on 2.2.1994, could be taken to be correct. The Labour Court
had also found that the Domestic Enquiry Officer had come to his conclusions, in his enquiry report, holding the second respondent guilty of the
charges, only on the basis of the contradictory statements allegedly made by the second respondent. The Labour Court had held that the
conclusions arrived at by the Domestic Enquiry Officer was without any basis. Therefore, it was held that the order of dismissal from service
passed by the petitioner Management against the second respondent was arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the principles of natural justice.
On a perusal of the records available and on analysing the rival contentions putforth by the learned Counsels for the parties, this Court is of the
considered view that the first respondent Labour Court had rightly come to the conclusion that the charges against the second respondent were not
proved. It is seen that the petitioner Management has not been in a position to disprove the statements made by the second respondent during the
enquiry. Even though the Enquiry Officer had not accepted the explanation of the second respondent, the Labour Court found it fit to accept the
explanation, while coming to its conclusion. There is nothing on record to show that the Checking Inspectors checked the cash bag of the second
respondent at the time of the alleged incident. There is also no finding by the Enquiry Officer that Rs. 50/- was found to be with the second
respondent as excess amount. The Labour Court had found the sequence of events, as narrated by the second respondent, be correct. Based on
the evidence on record, cogent reasons have been given by the Labour Court in finding that the charges against the second respondent were not
proved. Further, the petitioner Management seems to have relied on the charges framed against the second respondent, based on the earlier
incidents, to convince the Labour Court to confirm the order of dismissal from service passed against the second respondent. However, it is found
that the earlier charges against the second respondent had been closed and such incidents cannot be relied upon by the petitioner management,
while imposing the punishment of dismissal from service, in the present incident under scrutiny. Further, the second respondent had no opportunity
of defending himself against such allegations, which were said to have happened earlier. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view
that the Labour Court had rightly come to its conclusions, while passing its award, dated 5.9.2000, in I.D. No. 354 of 1997. Hence, the writ
petition is dismissed as devoid of merits. No costs.