AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
This writ petition has been filed challenging Ext.P1 order of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Kottayam, (hereinafter referred to as 'the CDRF') in C.C No.104 of 2016, and also Ext.P3 notice of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Kottayam issued under Section 72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Consumer Protection Act'), calling upon the officer-in-charge of the petitioner society to show cause as to why a non-bailable warrant should not be issued and as to why imprisonment should not be ordered as provided under Section 72 of the Consumer Protection Act for failure to comply with the directions in Ext.P1 order.
Ms. Amrutha Suresh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the husband of the 1st respondent/father of the additional 3rd respondent was a member of the Society and had maintained certain fixed deposits with the Society. It is submitted that he filed a Consumer Complaint as C.C No.104 of 2016, before the CDRF, which was disposed of by Ext.P1, directing the petitioner-Society to pay a total sum of Rs. 4,70,000/- with 11.5% interest from the date of deposit till date of payment, and a further amount of Rs.2,000/- as litigation cost to the complainant. It is submitted that an adjudicatory body constituted under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act does not have the jurisdiction to decide any complaint between the husband of the 1st respondent/father of the additional 3rd respondent and the petitioner. It is submitted that Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1969 Act’) provides an exclusive mechanism for the adjudication of disputes between the Societies and their members and/or anyone claiming through such member. It is submitted that the 1969 Act is a legislation relatable to Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India (hereinafter any reference to ‘entry’ and ‘list’ may be read as a reference to entries and lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India). It is submitted that since the 1969 Act is a legislation relatable to Entry 32 of List II, no provision in any legislation under List I can take away the exclusive jurisdiction provided by the 1969 Act. It is submitted that the Consumer Protection Act is a legislation relatable to Entry 97 of List I, as there is no other specific Entry either in List I or List III that would accommodate the legislative competence for enacting the Consumer Protection Act. It is submitted that if the Consumer Protection Act is a legislation relatable to Entry 97 of List I, that entry specifically provides for making legislation on any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III. It is submitted that for this reason also, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act cannot be invoked in the light of the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act. It is submitted that Section 69 of the 1969 Act starts with a non-obstante clause and, therefore, notwithstanding any other provision in any other enactment, including the Consumer Protection Act, the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act must prevail. It is submitted that the 1969 Act is a special legislation, whereas the Consumer Protection Act is a general legislation, and for this reason also, the provisions of the 1969 Act must prevail. It is pointed out that the provisions of Section 100 of the 1969 Act bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, and thus, Section 69 of the 1969 Act is the only remedy that was available to the husband of the 1st respondent/father of the additional 3rd respondent to have any claim against the petitioner Society adjudicated. It is submitted that the Consumer Court proceeded to exercise jurisdiction only for the reason that the petitioner-Society could not prove that the husband of the 1st respondent/father of the additional 3rd respondent was a member of the Society. It is submitted that the fact that the husband of the 1st respondent/father of the additional 3rd respondent was a member was not even disputed before the Consumer Court. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Monipally Marketing Co-operative v. District Consumer Redressal Disputes, 2022 KHC 1084 and contends that this Court has taken the view that in cases of complaints related to non-disbursal of fixed deposits, the CDRF constituted under the Consumer Protection Act does not have any jurisdiction. It is submitted that, though a Full Bench of this Court in General Manager, Telecom., BSNL v. Krishnan, 2003 KHC 138, had taken the view that the jurisdiction of the CDRF could be invoked notwithstanding the provisions contained in Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Telegraph Act’). The said decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in General Manager, Telecom, v. M. Krishnan & Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 481, holding expressly that in view of the provisions contained in Section 7B of the Telegraph Act, the jurisdiction of the CDRF was expressly barred. It is submitted that the Calcutta High Court, in Secretary, E & NF Railway Junior Co-operative v. Jyotish Chandra Sarkar and Anr.,2024 SCC OnLine Cal 1668, has also taken the view that, in view of the provisions of the Multi-state Co-operative Societies Act, 2002, which also has a provision similar to Section 69 of the 1969 Act, the jurisdiction of the CDRF was expressly barred. It is submitted that, in such circumstances, Exts. P1 and P3 are liable to be set aside.
Sri. Ananthakrishnan A. Kartha, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/the additional 3rd respondent, submits that the Consumer Protection Act can only be a legislation relatable to Entry 11A of List III, as that Entry specifically deals with ‘administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts’. It is submitted that since ‘administration of justice’ is a specific subject under Entry 11A, the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act, which provides for adjudication of disputes, can only be seen as a provision drawing sustenance from Entry 11A of List III and not from Entry 32 of List II. It is submitted that if this view is taken, the Consumer Protection Act, being a Central legislation, would take precedence over the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act. It is submitted that this Court in Lathif U. A., MLA v. State of Kerala, 2023 KHC 700, has held that a legislation may draw sustenance from different Entries in the same ‘List’ or the ‘Concurrent List’ and the State can seek to support the legislation based on any other entry in any of the lists within the legislative competence of the legislature concerned. It is submitted that the view in Lathif U. A. (supra) supports the contention that Section 69 of the 1969 Act is a provision relatable to Entry 11A of List-III and not to Entry 32 of List-II. It is submitted that, thus, the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act can be invoked notwithstanding the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1/additional respondent No.3 places reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Life Insurance Agents Co-operative Society Ltd v. Nelson David, 2024 (4) KHC 366, to contend that the very same question had been considered and it has been held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act are supplemental to the remedy provided under the 1969 Act. The learned counsel also relies on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has clearly held (after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd V. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45) that the question of repugnancy between the law made by the Parliament and the law made by the State legislature may arise only in cases when both the legislations occupy the same field with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the ‘Concurrent List’ and a direct conflict is seen. It is pointed out that the said decision holds that if there is a repugnancy due to overlapping found between List-II on one hand and List-I and List-III on the other, the State law will be ultra vires and shall have to give way to the Union law.
Sri. P. B. Subramanyan, the learned Counsel, who was requested to assist this Court as amicus curiae, has placed for my consideration the judgment of the Supreme Court in UCO Bank and Ors. v. Dipak Debbarma and Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 585. He also placed for my consideration the recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Puthur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. No.345 v. Sethumadhavan and Ors.; 2026 KHC OnLine 423. It is submitted that, in UCO Bank (supra), the question of repugnancy between an earlier State law and a later Central law was considered. It is pointed out that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Monipally Marketing Co-operative (supra) followed the Larger Bench Judgment of this Court in Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. K. Santhosh, 2015 (4) KLT 163 (L.B.). It is submitted that the majority view in Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-operative Bank (supra) has been reversed by the Supreme Court in Annamma K. A. v. Secretary, Cochin Co-operative Hospital Society Ltd, 2018 (1) KHC 258.
Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and the additional 3rd respondent, the learned Senior Government Pleader and the learned amicus curiae, I am of the view that the petitioner has not made out any case for the grant of the reliefs sought in the writ petition. The judgment of this Court in Monipally Marketing Co-operative (supra), on which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, followed the Larger Bench decision of this Court in Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-operative Bank (supra). In Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-operative Bank (supra), the view of the majority was that a service dispute between a Co-operative Society and its employee has to be decided in terms of the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act, and not by the procedure contemplated by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. However, the Supreme Court in Annamma K. A (supra) held that the authorities under the 1969 Act and the authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, possess and enjoy concurrent jurisdiction to decide any service dispute arising between the Society and its employee. In the light of the fact that the majority view in Chirayinkeezhu Service Co-operative Bank (supra) has been reversed by the Supreme Court in Annamma K. A (supra), the view taken in Monipally Marketing Co-operative (supra) cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner.
A learned Single Judge of this Court in Life Insurance Agents Co-operative Society Ltd (supra) has considered the question as to whether the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act would oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum and held as follows:-
“22.Coming back to the question of ouster of jurisdiction of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, for applying the principles of ouster, there should have been explicit provisions under the Kerala Co - operative Societies Act, 1969 which also should have received the Presidential assent. Admittedly, that is not the case here. Reading of S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, it is not possible for this Court to conclude that the Jurisdiction of Consumer Forum will be ousted merely because of the presence of alternative Forum for redressal of the grievance of the respondents 1 and 2. The purposive interpretation given to the both enactments would lead to an irresistible conclusion that the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is supplemental to the remedy under the Kerala Co - operative Societies Act, 1969. Any other interpretation will not do justice to the cause.
23.In National Seeds Corpn Ltd vs M.Madhusudhan Reddy, the Apex Court considered the question as to whether the provisions of Seed Act, 1966 would override the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Answering the question in negative the Apex Court held that merely because a mechanism is provided under the Seed Act, 1966 for farmers suffering from loss of crop due to defective seeds to seek for redressal of their grievance, the claim for damages under the provisions of Consumer protection Act, 1986 is not barred. Despite the Seed Act, 1966 being a special enactment, the Apex Court proceeded to hold that the provisions of the Seed Act will not oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum.
24.It is beyond doubt that Consumer Protection Act, 1986 being a beneficial legislation should receive a wider and broad interpretation. In Fair Air Engineers(P) Ltd Vs N K Modi, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is in addition to the remedy provided under the Arbitration Act. Relying on the provision under S.3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, it was held that the Forums created under the Act was competent to proceed with the disputes rather than relegating the parties to the Forum created under the Agreement.
25.In Secretary, Thirumurugan Co - operative Society v. Lalitha (dead) through L.Rs & Others reaffirming the view in Fair Engineers (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court considering the very same issue as to whether the provisions of the T.N Co - operative Societies Act will prevail over the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, have answered the question in negative and have held that the provisions of the State Co - operative Societies Act will not prevail over the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, it has to be held that jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is not ousted by virtue of the provisions of the Kerala Co -operative Societies Act, 1969.
26.Before concluding, it is necessary to consider the impact of the decision of the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Secy, E & NF Railway Junior Coop. Credit Society Ltd Eastern Railway (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. A reading of the said decision shows that the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court was called upon to decide the impact of S.84 of Multi State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002. Since the said Act contained a provision for arbitration, it was held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are not applicable. In arriving at such a decision, the learned Single Judge relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council. However, it is pertinent to note that the aforesaid decision in Thiruvallur Transport Corporation has been distinguished by the Apex Court in the decision in Secretary, Thirumurugan Co - operative Society (supra). Further more, a reading of the decision shows that none of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above in this judgment has been brought to the notice of the Single Bench of the Calcutta High Court and hence this Court is not inclined to the rely on the said decision, since it is rendered "per incuriam".
27.In view of the above discussions, the irresistible conclusion is that the provisions of the Kerala Co - operative Societies Act, 1969 does not oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Thus, Exts.P4 and P5 cannot be assailed on the question of jurisdiction. Hence, the writ petition fails and, accordingly, it is dismissed.”
A Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in Puthur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd (supra) has considered the question as to whether the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act will oust the jurisdiction of the bodies created under the Consumer Protection Act, and has held as follows:-
“5.It is well settled that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and its successor, the Act of 2019 is a Special law that has been enacted by the Parliament to protect the interest of consumers. Therefore, the provisions of the Special legislation overrides notwithstanding the provisions of S.69 and S.100 of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. Even assuming that the Consumer Protection Act is a general law, it is a settled position of law that if there is any inconsistency between two legislations, the later law, even if general in nature, would override an earlier Special law. Merely because the rights and liabilities are created between the members and the management of the Society under the Act and Forums are provided, it cannot take away or exclude the jurisdiction conferred on the Forums under the Consumer Protection Act which is provided intentionally to serve a definite cause in terms of the objects and reasons of the Act.
6.S.3 of the 1986 Act which corresponds to S.100 of the 2019 Act provides that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, even though the Cooperative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder provides for a mechanism for realisation of money by its creditors, the provisions in the Co - operative Societies Act do not oust the right of its creditors to recover the amount by invoking the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.”
It is to be noted that the facts of the present case are also identical to the facts of the case before the Division Bench in Puthur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra).
The Supreme Court in UCO Bank (supra) considered the alleged repugnancy between the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Reinforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SARFAESI Act’) and Section 187 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960. Under the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960, which was under consideration in UCO Bank (supra), there was a legislative embargo on the sale of mortgaged properties to any person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe. The Supreme Court held that the moment Parliament had stepped into enact the SARFAESI Act, a legislation relatable to Entry 45 of List-I, the provisions of the State enactment to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act must give way. The Supreme Court held that, in such circumstances, the dominant legislation would be the Central legislation. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court reads as follows:-
“9.The second situation of repugnancy or inconsistency as in the present case is between a subsequent Central law (2002 Act) covered by Entry 45 of List I and an earlier State law (Tripura Act of 1960) relatable to Entries 18 and 45 of List II. How such a situation is to be resolved and answered and which legislation would have primacy is the moot question that arises for consideration in the present appeals.
10.Article 246 of the Constitution of India is in the following terms……….”
11.In interpreting Article 246 regard must be had to the constitutional scheme which visualises a federal structure giving full autonomy to the Union Parliament as well as to the State Legislatures in their respective/demarcated fields of legislation. The problem may, however, become a little more complex than what may seemingly appear as the two legislations may very well be within the respective domains of the legislatures concerned and, yet, there may be intrusion into areas that fall beyond the assigned fields of legislation. In such a situation it will be plain duty of the constitutional court to see if the conflict can be resolved by acknowledging the mutual existence of the two legislations. If that is not possible, then by virtue of the provisions of Article 246(1), the parliamentary legislation would prevail and the State legislation will have to give way notwithstanding the fact that the State legislation is within the demarcated field (List II). This is the principle of federal supremacy which Article 246 of the Constitution embodies. The said principle will, however, prevail provided the pre-condition exists, namely, the parliamentary legislation is the dominant legislation and the State legislation, though within its own field, has the effect of encroaching on a vital sphere of the subject or entry to which the dominant legislation is referable. This is the principle that is discernible from the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of W.B.v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights . Paras 25, 26 and 27 which illuminates the issue may be conveniently extracted below : (SCC p. 585)
“25.The non obstante clause in Article 246(1) contemplates the predominance or supremacy of the Union Legislature. This power is not encumbered by anything contained in clauses (2) and (3) for these clauses themselves are expressly limited and made subject to the non obstante clause in Article 246(1). The State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule and it also has the power to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List). The exclusive power of the State Legislature to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II has to be exercised subject to clause (1) i.e. the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in List I. As a consequence, if there is a conflict between an entry in List I and an entry in List II, which is not capable of reconciliation, the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter enumerated in List I must supersede pro tanto the exercise of power of the State Legislature.
26.Both Parliament and the State Legislature have concurrent powers of legislation with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III. The words “notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3)” in Article 246(1) and the words “subject to clauses (1) and (2)” in Article 246(3) lay down the principle of federal supremacy viz. that in case of inevitable conflict between the Union and State powers, the Union power as enumerated in List I shall prevail over the State power as enumerated in Lists II and III and in case of an overlapping between Lists II and III, the latter shall prevail.
27.Though, undoubtedly, the Constitution exhibits supremacy of Parliament over the State Legislatures, yet the principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to unless there is an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in the Union and the State Lists. Thus, there is no quarrel with the broad proposition that under the Constitution there is a clear demarcation of legislative powers between the Union and the States and they have to confine themselves within the field entrusted to them. It may also be borne in mind that the function of the lists is not to confer powers; they merely demarcate the legislative field.”
12.Equally illuminating is the view available in the opinion of this Court rendered in Special Reference No. 1 of 2001, In re, which is reproduced below : (SCC pp. 499-500, paras 13-15)
“13.The Constitution of India delineates the contours of the powers enjoyed by the State Legislature and Parliament in respect of various subjects enumerated in the Seventh Schedule. The rules relating to distribution of powers are to be gathered from the various provisions contained in Part XI and the legislative heads mentioned in the three lists of the Schedule. The legislative powers of both the Union and State Legislatures are given in precise terms. Entries in the lists are themselves not powers of legislation, but fields of legislation. However, an entry in one list cannot be so interpreted as to make it cancel or obliterate another entry or make another entry meaningless. In case of apparent conflict, it is the duty of the court to iron out the crease and avoid conflict by reconciling the conflict. If any entry overlaps or is in apparent conflict with another entry, every attempt shall be made to harmonise the same.
14.When the question arose about reconciling Entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and Entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of the Government of India Act, 1935, Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J. in Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, In re, FCR at pp. 42 & 44 observed : (SCC OnLine FC)
‘… A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense, but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implications of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act.’ It was further observed : (SCC OnLine FC)
‘… an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where necessary, modifying, the language of the one by that of the other. If indeed such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will the non obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail.…’
15.Although Parliament cannot legislate on any of the entries in the State List, it may do so incidentally while essentially dealing with the subject coming within the purview of the entry in the Union List. Conversely, the State Legislature also while making legislation may incidentally trench upon the subject covered in the Union List. Such incidental encroachment in either event need not make the legislation ultra vires the Constitution. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes invoked to find out the nature and content of the legislation. However, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two legislations, the Central legislation shall prevail. However, every attempt would be made to reconcile the conflict.”
13.The federal structure under the constitutional scheme can also work to nullify an incidental encroachment made by the parliamentary legislation on a subject of a State legislation where the dominant legislation is the State legislation. An attempt to keep the aforesaid constitutional balance intact and give a limited operation to the doctrine of federal supremacy can be discerned in the concurring judgment of Ruma Pal, J. in ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, wherein after quoting the observations of this Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, the learned Judge has gone to observe as follows : (ITC Ltd. case, SCC p. 282, paras 93-94)
“93.… ‘276. The fact that under the scheme of our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-à-vis the States does not mean that States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, States are supreme. The Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly, the courts should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the States.’ (S.R. Bommai case, SCC pp. 216-17, para 276)
94.Although Parliament cannot legislate on any of the entries in the State List, it may do so incidentally while essentially legislating within the entries under the Union List. Conversely, the State Legislatures may encroach on the Union List, when such an encroachment is merely ancillary to an exercise of power intrinsically under the State List. The fact of encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment. [A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras ; Chaturbhai M. Patel v. Union of India; State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla and Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.] This principle commonly known as the doctrine of pith and substance, does not amount to an extension of the legislative fields. Therefore, such incidental encroachment in either event does not deprive the State Legislature in the first case or Parliament in the second, of their exclusive powers under the entry so encroached upon. In the event the incidental encroachment conflicts with legislation actually enacted by the dominant power, the dominant legislation will prevail.” (emphasis supplied)
The question raised also appears to be covered against the petitioner on account of the findings in the 3-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Co-op Society & ors, (2003) 2 SCC 412. There, while considering a challenge to the Constitutional validity of the Consumer Protection Act (the 1986 Act), the Supreme Court held that the legislative competence for the Consumer Protection Act flows from Entry 11-A of List III of the Constitution of India. Further, it was held:-
“46.By reason of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, it is evident that remedies provided thereunder are not in derogation of those provided under other laws. The said Act supplements and not supplants the jurisdiction of the civil courts or other statutory authorities.
47.The said Act provides for a further safeguard to the effect that in the event a complaint involves complicated issues requiring recording of evidence of experts, the complainant would be at liberty to approach the civil court for appropriate relief. The right of the consumer to approach the civil court for necessary relief has, therefore, been provided under the Act itself.
48.The provisions of the said Act are required to be interpreted as broadly as possible. It has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint despite the fact that other forums/courts would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. [See Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. v. N. K. Modi] and Satpal Mohindra v. Surindra Timber Stores.”
On an analysis of precedent, it is clear that the questions raised are covered against the petitioner. The provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986/2019 are in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Thus, even if the 1969 Act starts with a non-obstante clause, the provisions of Section 69 of the 1969 Act do not oust the jurisdiction of the forums under the Consumer Protection Act. No other point arises for consideration. The writ petition fails, and it is accordingly dismissed.
I would be failing in my duty if I do not record my appreciation for the assistance rendered to this Court by counsel on both sides and Mr. P. B Subramanyan, the learned amicus curiae. Their assistance was invaluable and is greatly appreciated.
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 3026 OF 2024
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.10.2017 IN CC.NO.104/2016 OF THE SECOND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE E.A. NO.22/2020 29.09.2021 IN E.P.NO.22/2020 DATED 21.08.2020 FILED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE SECOND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 16.12.2023 OF THE SECOND RESPONDENT