The Manager & Anr. vs Minipriya R & Ors.

Muralee Krishna S., J.

Respondents 5 and 6 in W.P.(C)No.25535 of 2025, filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 16.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition.

The 1^st respondent-writ petitioner, who has been working as an Assistant Professor in the college of the appellants, filed W.P.(C)No.25535 of 2025 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:

Going by the averments in the writ petition, the 1^st respondent joined the college of the appellants as per Ext.P2 appointment order dated 04.07.2012 issued by the 1^st appellant and her probation was declared as completed as on 03.07.2013. According to the 1^st respondent, she is a Ph.D. holder in Hindi from Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kalady, and she worked in reputed educational institutions like Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit, Kalady, Stella Maris College, Chennai, and St. Thoma’s College, Thrissur, before joining the college of the appellants. In paragraph 3 of the writ petition, the 1^st respondent pleaded her academic and non-academic excellence.

The college of the appellants is an aided college affiliated to the 4^th respondent Mahatma Gandhi University (‘the University’ for short), Kottayam. The appointment of the 1^st respondent as Assistant Professor was approved by the Registrar of the University as per Ext.P2(a) order dated 04.02.2014.

The 1^st respondent states that she taught Hindi as an additional language at the college for the degree students of B.A., B.Sc., B.Com and B.A. English. She used to take a total sixteen hours of classes per week. According to her, over the past few years, she sensed a discernible shift in the attitude of the college management towards her. On 13.03.2024, she learnt that the 2^nd appellant, Principal of the college, was collecting complaints against the 1^st respondent from a section of students who were denied attendance for not attending classes. She further alleges that she came to know that the complaints were solicited from some parents and also from some of her colleagues.

Based on the complaints, the 1^st respondent was issued with Ext.P3 notice of suspension dated 03.05.2024 by the 1^st appellant on the very same day. Simultaneously, the college authorities initiated disciplinary proceedings against the 1^st respondent by appointing an Enquiry Officer to conduct the domestic enquiry.

Before issuing Ext.P3 notice of suspension, the 1^st respondent was served with Ext.P4 show cause notice dated 25.03.2024 by the 1^st appellant. Thereafter, the 1^st respondent approached the disciplinary authority with Ext.P5 request dated 27.03.2024, requesting copies of the complaints. According to her, the authorities did not serve her even the copies of the complaints produced before the Enquiry Officer, which were marked as Exts.M17 to M21, until she had to plead with them to issue the same. The college authorities constituted a College Level Grievance Redressal Cell (Committee), and the 1^st respondent claims that a student who gave complaint against the 1^st respondent was also a member of the said committee, which recommended her suspension and further action.

The 1^st respondent further states that she was not issued with any charge memo, nor was she issued with any statement of allegations on which each charge is based. The domestic enquiry was initiated and conducted in violation of the statutory provisions under the Mahatma Gandhi University Act, 1985 (‘University Act’ for short) and also the Mahatma Gandhi University Statutes, 1997 (‘University Statutes’ for short). Since the domestic enquiry could not be completed, the college sent Ext.P7 letter dated 25.11.2024 to the Registrar of the University, and the University sent Ext.P8 letter dated 13.12.2024 to the college enquiring about the reason for six months delay in seeking extension of time for concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Thereafter, by Ext.P8(a) communication dated 27.03.2025, the University extended the time for completion of the proceedings.

The 1^st respondent pleads that during the enquiry proceedings, she raised an objection pointing out the absence of a charge sheet, and the same has been recorded in the submissions made on 20.07.2024. However, the Enquiry Report dated nil marked as Ext.P9 in the writ petition was submitted by the Enquiry Officer against the 1^st respondent. Based on Ext.P9 enquiry report, the 1^st appellant issued Ext.P10 show cause notice dated 17.03.2025 to the 1^st respondent proposing to terminate her from service. To that show cause notice, the 1^st respondent submitted Ext.P11, a detailed reply dated 29.03.2025. However, the 1^st appellant issued Ext.P12 order dated 28.04.2025 terminating the 1^st respondent from service. She then approached the University by submitting Ext.P13 letter dated 02.06.2025, requesting it not to act on the termination order, contending that gross illegalities have been committed against her. Thereafter, the 1^st respondent approached this Court with the writ petition, seeking the reliefs mentioned above.

In the writ petition, on behalf of the 4^th respondent University, a statement dated 13.08.2025 was filed wherein it is stated that as per sub section (6) of Section 63, under Chapter VIII of the University Act, any teacher aggrieved by an order imposing on him any of the punishment/penalty may, within sixty days from the date on which a copy of such order is served on him, appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against the order of punishment.

In the writ petition, the 7^th respondent, University Grants Commission (‘UGC’ for short), filed a counter affidavit dated 13.08.2025, contending that the instant matter does not come under the purview of UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of the Standards in Higher Education. Rather, it is an internal matter of administrative governance and may be dealt with by the authorities in accordance with applicable norms.

The appellants filed a counter affidavit dated 26.11.2025, opposing the pleadings in the writ petition and contending that the initiation, conduct and finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings against the 1^st respondent were properly held by following the relevant statutory provisions and Rules. According to the appellants, a proper punishment has also been imposed on the 1^st respondent.

After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the materials on record, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside Ext.P3 notice of suspension and Ext.P12 order of termination. The appellants were directed to reinstate the 1^st respondent in service with consequential benefits. In the judgment, the learned Single Judge found that Ext.P3 notice of suspension issued by the 1^st appellant does not satisfy the mandatory requirement of issuing a definite charge or charges pertaining to the allegations in respect of which the enquiry was decided to be initiated against the 1^st respondent. It is also found by the learned Single Judge that the punishment stipulated in Ext.P12 order is also not the one contemplated under the University Act and the University Statutes. Being aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present writ appeal.

Heard the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the 1^st respondent, the learned Senior Government Pleader, the learned Standing Counsel for MG University and the learned Standing Counsel for UGC.

The learned counsel for the appellants addressed extensive arguments by referring to the materials placed on record and the relevant provisions under the University Act and the University Statutes pertaining to disciplinary action against teachers of private colleges under the University. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that though Ext.P3 is titled as a notice of suspension, in fact, it contains all the charges levelled against the 1^st respondent, and she fully understood those charges and participated in the enquiry proceedings. The learned counsel further submitted that the 1^st respondent has not raised any objection against Ext.P3 at the earliest opportunity, raising a contention that the charges mentioned therein are vague and therefore she could not properly meet those charges. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the purpose of the issuance of the charge memo and the statement of allegations is to understand what is the allegations against the delinquent teacher, and in this particular case, Ext.P3 notice serves that purpose. The delinquent teacher, i.e., the 1^st respondent, was given full opportunity to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, as evident from Ext.P9 Enquiry Report and therefore, the 1^st respondent, on a later stage, cannot contend that the charges against her mentioned in Ext.P3 are vague. In support of his contention regarding the necessity to raise objection on the charges at the first possible opportunity, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (BASIC) [(2006) 7 SCC 558] and that of the High Court of Judicature, Karnataka, in D. Anandakumar v. Indian Airlines [1997 (1) L.L.N. 961]. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364], the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently submitted that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be held as vitiated unless the principles of natural justice are violated or prejudice has been caused to the delinquent. By pointing out Section 63(6) of the University Act, the learned counsel submitted that the 1^st respondent has got a statutory right to file an appeal against the punishment imposed on her by Ext.P12 order, before the Appellate Tribunal within sixty days from the date on which a copy of such order is served on her and therefore without exercising that right a writ petition is not maintainable before this Court. As far as the punishment imposed on the 1^st respondent is concerned, the learned counsel argued that the term ‘termination’ includes ‘removal from service’ or ‘compulsory retirement from service’ and also ‘dismissal from service’ and in the present case it can either be compulsory retirement from service or dismissal from service and therefore it cannot be held that the punishment imposed is outside the penalties prescribed under the University Statutes.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1^st respondent argued that Ext.P3 notice of suspension, at no stretch of imagination, can be taken as a substitute for the issuance of a charge memo and the statement of allegations that have to be accompanied with the same. The learned counsel, by relying on the counter affidavit filed by the appellants, pointed out that according to the appellants, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated and completed against the 1^st respondent in accordance with the Manual of Disciplinary Proceedings for State Government Servants. By pointing out Rule 7 pertaining to framing of charges in the Manual of Disciplinary Proceedings for State Government Servants, the learned counsel submitted that the contents of Ext.P3 notice of suspension do not satisfy the framing of charges mentioned therein. The learned counsel further submitted that during the enquiry proceedings, the 1^st respondent had raised the contention that the charges against her are very vague and no charge memo has been issued to her. The learned counsel further submitted that during the course of enquiry, matters outside those mentioned in Ext.P3 notice were brought out against the 1^st respondent and therefore the enquiry proceedings are vitiated. By pointing out Ext.P3 notice of suspension, the learned counsel submitted that the details of the allegations, such as when the incidents happened and who raised the complaints, etc., are conspicuously absent in Ext.P3. By relying on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in John Kuriakose (Dr.) v. State of Kerala [2015 (1) KHC 236], the learned counsel argued that when the disciplinary proceedings are initiated and completed in violation of the statutory provisions, a writ petition is maintainable. By pointing out Statute 73 of the University Statutes, the learned counsel argued that the termination of service is not one of the punishments prescribed in that Statute and therefore the punishment imposed on the 1^st respondent violates the statutory provisions.

The learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P3 cannot be treated as a substitute for the issuance of definite charge or charges before initiation of disciplinary proceedings, and similarly, Ext.P12 order of termination of punishment issued to the 1^st respondent was not in terms of the provisions under the University Act or University Statute governing the disciplinary proceedings and therefore, no interference is needed to the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge.

The learned Standing Counsel for the University addressed arguments, pointing out the relevant statutory provisions under the University Act and the University Statutes.

The learned Standing Counsel for the UGC submitted that the UGC has no role in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the 1^st respondent.

From the submissions made at the Bar and from the pleadings and materials placed on record, the points to be decided in this appeal are;

As mentioned hereinabove, the stand of the appellants is that though Ext.P3 is mentioned as notice of suspension, it contains the charges against the 1^st respondent, and fully understanding the charges against her, she participated in the enquiry proceedings. It is also the contention of the appellants that the 1^st respondent did not raise any contention regarding the vagueness of charges at the earliest possible opportunity.

On the other hand, the 1^st respondent contends that Ext.P3 is only a notice of suspension and the allegations in the complaints made against the 1^st respondent are vaguely stated in that notice of suspension, which cannot be treated as a substitute for the charge memo and statement of allegation that have to be issued to a delinquent officer before ordering a domestic enquiry.

To understand the nature of the allegations levelled against the 1^st respondent and also to appreciate whether Ext.P3 can be treated as a substitute for the charge memo and statement of allegations to be issued to a delinquent officer, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant portions of Ext.P3 hereunder:

A perusal of Ext.P3 would show that material particulars necessary in a charge memo are conspicuously absent in that notice. In that respect, it is relevant to note that according to the appellants, the disciplinary action taken against the 1^st respondent is in accordance with the Manual of Disciplinary Proceedings for the State Government Servants. Therefore, it is worth to extract Rule 7 of the Manual of Disciplinary Proceedings for the State Government Servants, which states about framing of charge. One of the Model forms of memo of charges, which shall be accompanied by a statement of allegations, provided in that Rule, is also extracted hereunder for proper appreciation of the contents to be stated in the charge memo:

The purpose of issuance of a memo of charges accompanied with a statement of allegations containing definite particulars of the allegations is to understand the charges against the delinquent and provide her an opportunity to meet those allegations by appropriately explaining the same, even prior to the initiation of enquiry. If the disciplinary authority is satisfied with the explanation offered by the delinquent officer to the charges, the disciplinary proceedings can be closed even without ordering an enquiry. But in the instant case, Ext.P3 notice of suspension do not mention the date or time of the incidents forming the causation of that notice. It does not indicate as to which students gave the complaints against the 1^st respondent and on whom she shouted as mentioned in Ext.P3. With respect to the Co-teachers also, Ext.P3 is silent as to in respect of which teachers the 1^st respondent had made remarks disrespectfully and derogatorily.

As noted by the learned Single Judge, Ext.P3 does not indicate on which dates the 1^st respondent had taken combined classes against the request of one Professor Shyamlal and against the directions of the management. Similarly, Ext.P3 is silent as to when the management had given written instructions to the 1^st respondent requiring her not to conduct classes by combining students from different classes. It is also interesting to note that in Ext.P3 notice itself, the 1^st appellant has decided to conduct a domestic enquiry against the 1^st respondent by appointing an Enquiry Officer, which ought to have been done only after receiving an explanation for the charges levelled against the 1^st respondent. In such circumstances, we find no reason to hold Ext.P3 as a substitute for the definite charges to be intimated to the delinquent with an accompanying statement of allegations.

In Om Prakash Mann [(2006) 7 SCC 558], relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, the Apex Court held that the appellant therein, who participated in the disciplinary proceedings without demur, is estopped from raising contentions regarding the vagueness of the charge sheet. But in that case, the appellant therein was served with a charge memo raising allegations of intentional serious dereliction of duty, misappropriation of funds, etc., and he replied to those charges and participated in the enquiry proceedings without raising any objections. But in the instant case, no such charge memo has been issued to the 1^st respondent, and she raised objection regarding the vagueness of the charges during the enquiry proceedings, and therefore, the judgment in Om Prakash Mann [(2006) 7 SCC 558] is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

Similarly, in the case of D. Anandakumar [1997 (1) L.L.N. 961], a memo of allegations and a charge memo were served on the petitioner therein, alleging certain irregularities which would come within the meaning of the expression misconduct and the petitioner therein had denied the allegations made in the memo of allegations and the charge memo. Without raising the contention of vagueness in the charge memo during enquiry proceedings, the writ petitioner therein approached the High Court with the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and hence it was held by the High Court of Judicature, Karnataka, that the objection about the vagueness of the charge has to be raised by the employee at the first instance before disciplinary proceedings and it cannot be raised for the first time in the writ petition. Since the facts as noted above are different, the judgment of the High Court of Judicature, Karnataka, in D. Anandakumar [1997 (1) .LL.N. 961] is also not applicable to the facts of the case in our hand.

While coming to the second point, i.e., pertaining to the punishment imposed on the 1^st respondent, as already mentioned hereinabove, the appellants contend that the punishment of termination from service is one of the punishments, though in some other words, provided in Statute 73 of the University Statutes. It would be appropriate to extract Statutes 73 and 75 of the University Statutes to better appreciate these contentions of the appellants, which read thus:

The major penalties provided under Statutes 73(5), (6) and (7) are compulsory retirement, removal from private college and dismissal from the private college. In the case of removal from the private college, it shall not be a disqualification for future employment. Whereas in the case of dismissal from the private college, it shall be a disqualification for future employment in any of the institutions maintained by or affiliated to the University. During the course of arguments, though, a specific query was made to the learned counsel for the appellants as to in which of these punishments under Statutes 73(6) and (7), the termination of service imposed on the 1^st respondent would fall, the learned counsel answered that it would fall either under Statutes 73(6) or 73(7). But while imposing a punishment, the disciplinary authority cannot take such a stand, since the impact of the punishments provided under Statutes 73(6) and 73(7) is different, as mentioned above. When the punishment provided under Statute 73(6) does not disqualify the delinquent from future employment, Statute 73(7) disqualifies the employee. In common parlance, termination of service is the severance of or separation of the employer and employee relationship. But that term cannot be used as a substitute for any of the punishments or penalties prescribed under Statute 73 as mentioned above, which have a different effect in the future service of the delinquent employee.

At this juncture, the learned counsel for the appellants, by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Deputy Commissioner, KVS v. J. Hussain [(2013) 10 SCC 106], argued that if the penalty imposed is found as disproportionate, the court has to send back the matter to the disciplinary authority to impose an appropriate punishment. But while going through the facts of J. Hussain [(2013) 10 SCC 106], we notice that in that case, the High Court by considering the proportionality of punishment substituted one punishment for another, and therefore the Apex Court held that it is the disciplinary authority that has to prescribe the punishment and the High Court ought to have send back the matter to the disciplinary authority instead of reducing or imposing lesser punishment. But in the case in our hand, the punishment imposed itself is not the one prescribed under Statute 73 of the University Statutes. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the learned Single Judge rightly held that the punishment imposed on the 1^st respondent is illegal and unsustainable.

While coming to the point of maintainability of the writ petition, Section 63(6) of the University Act, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants, reads thus:

As per the provisions under Section 63(6) of the University Act extracted above, against the imposition of a major penalty in disciplinary proceedings, the delinquent teacher has a statutory right of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. But it is trite that when the disciplinary proceedings are initiated in violation of the statutory provisions, and the punishment imposed is also not in accordance with the statute, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable. In John Kuriakose (Dr.) [2015 (1) KHC 236], the Full Bench of this Court, by relying on the judgments of the Apex Court in Andi Mukta S.M.V.S.S.J.M.S. Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691] and Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [(2012) 12 SCC 331], held that a writ petition is maintainable if there is violation of statutory obligation. In that particular case, the Full Bench further held that the service conditions of a principal and teachers of an affiliated college are governed by the statutory provisions, and the writ petition at the instance of such teacher or principal is thus clearly maintainable. In the instant case, as noted above, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, conducted and completed and thereafter, punishment was imposed in utter violation of the statutory provisions. At this juncture it is appropriate to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111], which was referred by this Court in Corporate Manager, Travancore Devaswom Board v. Dr. Sangetha.S [2025 KHC Online 1030], wherein the Apex Court held that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities, while acting under the said Act, are only creatures of statutes. They must act within the four corners thereof. The post of Manager is a creature of respective statutes. A Manager cannot act outside the authority given by the statutes concerned. Therefore, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the 1^st respondent-writ petitioner as maintainable is perfectly justified.

Having considered the pleadings and the materials on record and the submission made at the Bar, we find no patent illegality or perversity in the finding of the learned Single Judge that Ext.P3 notice of suspension issued by the 1^st appellant cannot be treated as a substitute for the definite charge or charges to be issued accompanied by a statement of allegations to the 1^st respondent and Ext.P12 order of termination issued to the 1^st respondent is not in accordance with the penalties prescribed under Statute 73 of the University Statutes. However, while considering the entire facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge, while setting aside Ext.P3 notice and Ext.P12 order of termination of the 1^st respondent, ought to have granted liberty to the 1^st appellant to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings from the stage of issuance of memo of charges, if so advised.

In the result, this writ appeal stands dismissed; however, leaving open the right of the 1^st appellant to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the 1^st respondent from the stage of issuance of memo of charges, in accordance with law, if he is so advised.