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Judgment
M. Chockalingam, J.—Challenge is made to an order passed by the first respondent in M.W.I.A. No. 63 of 2004 dated 3.6.2005,
whereby the delay occasioned in filing petition by the respondent-union claiming minimum wages under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act,
1948 is condoned.
The Court heard the learned Counsel appearing on either side and also looked into the materials available on record.
Concededly, 124 employees filed an application before the first respondent, whereby they sought for fixation of minimum wages by the writ
petitioner-Management. The period for which they sought for minimum wages was from January, 1999 to December, 2004. While they filed the
application, there was a delay of approximately six years. Hence, while they filed application for payment of minimum wages, an application to
condone the delay was also filed. The same was countered by the writ petitioner herein. The first respondent has condoned the delay by allowing
the application, which is the subject matter of this writ petition.
In support of the writ petition, learned Counsel would submit that when respondents 2 to 124 filed their application for payment of minimum
wages under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, they filed another application to condone the delay of six years. No reason much
less convincing or acceptable reason was adduced to condone such inordinate delay and thus the delay remained unexplained. The only reason
that was stated therein was only after joining the Union, they came to know that they are entitled for minimum wages and hence, they approached
the Court. The ignorance of law cannot be an excuse, but the Authority below, without considering the legal position, mechanically ordered,
allowing the application by condoning the delay and hence the said order has got to be set aside by issuance of a writ of certiorari.
In support of his contentions, learned Counsel relied on the following decisions:
(i) Management of Gandhiban Bus Service, Chingleput Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Others,
(ii) T.N.M. Bank Ltd. v. App. Auty., Shops Act 1990 (1) LLN 457
(iii) Binny Ltd. (Engineering Division) Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Labour and Others,
(iv) Kudumiyanmalai Primary Agrl. Bank Ltd. v. P.O., L.C. 2002 (3) L.L.N. 556
(v) Puthiavinayagam Pillai Vs. Sivasankaran Pillai,
(vi) Sundaram Steel Co. v. Lakshmi 1997 I MLJ 376
(vii) Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Divisional Office, No. 118-B, West Perumal Maistry Street, Madurai-1 Vs. T. Pitchaimani and others,
(viii) Raj Bahadur Sharma (Dead) Thr. L.RS. Vs. Union of India and Others,
(ix) Michal Gill v. M.P. Srtc, (2003) 1 LLJ 756 SC
(x) Management of GE Power Controls Private Ltd. and Another Vs. Workmen of GE Power Controls Pvt. Ltd. and Others,
(xi) The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai Division IV) Ltd. Vs. P. Ellappan,
Contrary to the above, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 124 would submit that in the instant case, the employees of the writ
petitioner-Management, which is having so many institutions, have filed a petition for payment of minimum wages. It is true that they applied for
minimum wages from January, 1999 to December, 2004 and they filed the said petition in January, 2005. As per the provisions of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948, the petition for payment of minimum wages should be filed within a period of six months from the time when the payment of
minimum wages becomes payable and the employee is entitled to get. Respondents 2 to 124 have stated two reasons for not filing the same in
time. In the instant case, the Authority below has considered the same and condoned the delay.
The writ petitioner-Management is liable to pay the minimum wages to the employees to which they are entitled to get. It is true, there was a
huge delay, but the Authority below allowed the petition, after taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the reason
that respondents 2 to 124 came to know that they are entitled to minimum wages only after they became the members of the union. In support- of
his contention, learned could relied on the decision reported in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and
Others,
Learned Counsel added further that in the instant case, even though the entire period of delay could not be condoned, the part of the period
could be condoned so that respondents 2 to 124 could have the minimum wages for that period. Accordingly, it has got to be ordered.
The Court paid its anxious consideration on the submissions made by either side. It is not in controversy that respondents 2 to 124 are actually
employed under the writ petitioner-Management from 1999 onwards. The question whether they are entitled for minimum wages or not is to be
decided on the merits of the claim by the first respondent herein. The question that arose for consideration before the Authority below at the time
of filing of the petition for minimum wages is for condonation of delay in making such application. It is not in controversy that there was a delay of
more than six years. A reading of the order would clearly indicate that there was no sufficient or acceptable or convincing cause to condone such
inordinate delay. It would be more apt and appropriate to reproduce Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 as follows:
Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a
registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority
appointed under Sub-section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction under Sub-section (3):
Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages (or other amount) became
payable:
Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had
sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
Further, it is not the case where the first respondent has powerless to condone the delay, but he must strictly follow Section 20(3) of the
Minimum Wages Act, 1948, which reads as follows:
When any application under Sub-section (2) is entertained, the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give them an opportunity of
being heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, may without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer
may be liable under this Act, direct--
(i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the
minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not
exceeding ten times the amount of such excess;
(ii) in any other case, the payment of the amount due to the employee, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think
fit, not exceeding ten rupees,
and the Authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee
before the disposal of the application.
Now in the instant case, the delay caused is more than six years. The Court is of the considered opinion that such an inordinate delay, in the
absence of any unacceptable and convincing reason, cannot be condoned, but the Lower Court, accepting the reason given by respondents 2 to
124, condoned the delay. The Court is of the considered opinion that the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported in the case of
T.N.M. Bank Ltd. v. App. Auty., Shops Act 1990 (1) LLN 457 is more applicable to the present facts of the case, wherein it is held as follows:
The propositions contained in the observations extracted above will not apply to the facts of the present case. It is contended by learned
Counsel for the second respondent that refusal to condone the delay in this case will result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. We do not agree. If a litigant has chosen to come to Court after considerable delay for which he has
no explanation, he has to blame himself for his matter being thrown out without the merits being considered. He cannot make a complaint that the
cause of justice has been defeated because of his own delay. No litigant can take advantage of his own fault and demand a premium therefor. It is
next argued that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done. This argument is based upon an unwarranted presumption that
the other side is claiming a vested right in injustice. When the matter has not been gone into on merits, there is no question of taking the view that
the other side is taking advantage of a vested right in injustice. It is a matter which can be decided only where merits are considered on the basis of
evidence. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot
be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserved to be
preferred as against technical considerations. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. Rules of
limitation are based on principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. Is a litigant liable to have a Damocles'' sword hanging over his
head indefinitely for a period to be determined at the whims and fancies of the opponent?
From the very reading of the decision, it is quite clear that if such an inordinate delay, that too in the absence of any convincing and acceptable
reason is condoned, it is nothing but extending the limitation period on unequitable grounds, which should not be done by the Court. The contention
put forth by the learned Counsel for respondents 2 to 124, that it is a case where it has got to be looked into liberally, cannot be accepted for the
reason that for such an inordinate delay substantial justice or technical consideration should not be taken into consideration and the question of
condoning the delay would be nothing but making the claim to have vested interest for injustice being done to set aside, which should not be done
in the considered opinion of the Court. Hence the order of the Lower Authority in condoning the delay cannot be justified.
At the same time the request put forth by the learned Counsel for respondents 2 to 124 has some force in asking for minimum wages for the
delay that was condoned viz. six years. It is brought to the notice of this Court that even if delay is not condoned, the entire claim for minimum
wages cannot be rejected. The petition filed by respondents 2 to 124 should be entertained from the period of January 2004 and thus, it would be
fit and proper to condone the delay which is for a period of six months commencing from January, 2004. The Court feels that it would be fit to
condone the delay that was occasioned from January, 2004 and entertain the application as it stands before the Court in respect of the merits of
the matter. Taking into consideration the payment of minimum wages, the first respondent is directed to dispose of the application on merits and in
accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. With these observations, the writ petition is
disposed of. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.P. and W.V.M.P. are closed. No costs.