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Judgment
Prabha Sridevan, J.—The second respondent herein was selected for training as Livestock Supervisor in the Programme conducted by the
Rural Unit for Health and Social Affairs (RUHSA) with effect from 1.6.1983. The RUHSA had rules providing for benefits to the employees under
the said Programme. In the year 1985, RUHSA was re-integrated with the Chritian Medical College and Hospital, Vellore. The second
respondent was asked to give his option and willingness to come under the discipline of CMCH. He gave an undertaking to abide by the CMCH
Staff Service Rules, Leave Rules, etc.
By order dated 16.10.1987, the CMCH, the second appellant herein, informed the second respondent that his term of appointment was
extended and he was posted as Livestock Assistant in the RUHSA Department at the institution for a period of three years from 1.7.1985. This
appointment letter had the usual clauses, viz. the appointment being temporary and terminable at any time without notice. By order dated
27.6.1988, his appointment was extended for one more period of one year from 1.7.1988 and then again for a period of six months from
1.7.1989 by order dated 9.6.1989. On 4.1.1990, his appointment was extended for one month. On 29.1.1990, he was informed that there would
be no further extension of his services because of reduction of funds and that his appointment will cease from 1.2.1990.
The second respondent and one C. Ramamurthy, similarly placed, raised industrial disputes in I.D. Nos. 420 and 421 of 1993. The Labour
Court at Vellore dismissed their claim for reinstatement and other benefits and held that, ""by no stretch of imagination, they could have reasonably
expected to be absorbed in the permanent vacancies under the second respondent-CMCH at Vellore and that the appointment had come to an
end by efflux of time"". The other employee, Ramamurthy filed W.P. No. 19562 of 1996 and the second respondent filed W.P. No. 2434 of 1996.
W.P. No. 2434 of 1996 was dismissed for default on 29.11.2001. he filed a restoration application on 15.12.2001 with a delay of 280 days. On
8.7.2003, the second respondent was appointed as a Temporary Junior Assistant in the Tamil Nadu Ministerial Services where he continues to
work till date. On 3.3.2004, the writ petition filed by Ramamurthy came to be allowed by this Court, which directed that he would be reinstated
with backwages, but with continuity of service. On 25.8.2005, the delay in re-presentation was condoned and the second respondent''s writ
petition was restored by order dated 10.9.2005, approximately four years from the date on which it was dismissed for default. On 27.9.2006, the
order that is challenged herein was passed by the learned single Judge directing reinstatement of the second respondent without backwages, but
with continuity of service.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-CMCH submitted that in the Hospital, there is no position where a Livestock Inspector
can be accommodated and merely because Ramamurthy was reinstated in obedience to this Court''s order would not give the second respondent
herein an automatic right of reinstatement. Learned Counsel also submitted that the second respondent should have been content to leave the writ
petition, which was dismissed for default, as it is, since he had got an appointment in the Tamil Nadu Ministerial Service. It was only because he
was inspired by the success of the other employee Ramamurthy that he had given life to the writ petition that was dismissed for default. Learned
Counsel submitted that the delay with which he had moved this Court for restoration must definitely be a factor which would disentitle him to have
the same benefit that Ramamurthy was given. Learned Counsel referred to the following decisions :
Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Vs. Neelam,
Smt. Renu Mullick Vs. Union of India and another,
Food Corporation of India Vs. S.N. Nagarkar,
Bank of India and Another Vs. Avinash D. Mandivikar and Others,
Learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent submitted that when both Ramamurthy and the second respondent had been inducted
under the same RUHSA Programme, they are entitled to be reinstated with the same benefits. Learned Counsel also submitted that during the
pendency of the court proceedings, it would be cruel to expect the litigant to starve and just because he takes up a temporary appointment, that
cannot be cited as a reason for not granting him his just relief. Learned Counsel submitted that if the appellant''s case that the second respondent is
not entitled to be given any appointment in the Hospital must be accepted, then the option letter given by them is meaningless. According to the
learned senior counsel, the fact that he gave the option letter asking him whether he was willing to abide by the CMCH Rules would show that he
was entitled to be absorbed as an employee of the Hospital. Learned Counsel also relied on the following decisions:
2002 (i) L.L.J. 460 [A.P.S.R.T.C., Cuddapah v. K. Bajjanna]
K.C. Sharma and others Vs. Union of India and others,
Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and Another Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others,
U.P.S.R.T.C. Ltd. Vs. Sarada Prasad Misra and Another,
Sengara Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others,
After hearing the matter, we asked the learned Counsel whether the Hospital was willing to pay some compensation which would be acceptable
to the second respondent. There was no meeting point with regard to the quantum of compensation offered and the quantum of compensation
expected. Further, it appears that being an employee of the Hospital has certain other benefits that cannot be matched by monetary benefits.
We will look at the words in the option letter given by the second respondent which reads as follows:
I am working as a Animal Husbandry Supervisor is RUHSA from 1.6.83 having been appointed by the Programme Director, RUHSA.
Consequent on the re-organisation of RUHSA and (integration of RUHSA with CMCH), I hereby give my option and willingness to come under
the discipline of CMCH and also to work in any Unit/Department of CMCH or RUHSA department as the case may be. I shall abide by the
CMCH Staff Service Rules, Leave Rules and other Rules and regulations.
The learned single Judge who decided the case of Ramamurthy held that while it is true that CMCH had the discretion to keep the workman
either under the RUHSA Project or under their own establishment until the Project continued, but once the RUHSA Project concluded, it was
obligatory on the part of the respondents to have transferred the writ petitioner to any other department of CMCH. That would be the natural
outcome for the petitioner, he having exercised his option. The learned single Judge held that otherwise, there was no purpose in calling for an
option. In the order under challenge with regard to the second respondent, the learned single Judge was of the opinion that there is no reason why
the management should discriminate between the petitioner and Ramamurthy when both their cases rest on almost identical facts.
Now, we will look at the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the appellants. In Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Vs.
Neelam, , the respondent was appointed as a Typist on an ad hoc basis with the appellant-Bank. She did not possess the requisite qualification.
Her appointment was extended from time to time on several occasions. On 30.5.1986, it was discontinued. Thereafter, she joined the services of
Haryana Urban Development Agency. Others who had also been appointed on an ad hoc basis as the respondent before the Supreme Court got
some relief in the industrial dispute raised by them. Inspired by that, the respondent filed the writ petition and then she prayed for permission to
withdraw the writ petition so that she can approach the labour court. The labour court dismissed her claim as belated. Against that, she filed a writ
petition and the High Court allowed the writ petition directing her to be reinstated with continuity of service, but without backwages. Aggrieved by
that, the Bank moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that indisputably, the respondent had filed the writ petition only after the other
workman had obtained some relief and that the belated claim was justifiably taken note of by the labour court. The Supreme Court set aside the
order passed by the High Court and allowed the appeal. According to the appellant herein, the above case is identical to the case on hand since
here also, the second respondent was content with the status quo of the dismissed writ petition, but only inspired by Ramamurthy''s success, had
belatedly moved the restoration petition, though it was undoubtedly filed earlier.
Insofar as the judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, in Bank of India and Another Vs. Avinash D. Mandivikar and
Others, , the argument was that the relief given in another case where an equitable view had been taken must be applied to the respondent before
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that, that was given under the peculiar factual background of that case. Similarly, the
learned Counsel for the appellant here submitted that the fact that Ramamurthy was granted reinstatement and absorbed cannot ipso facto mean
that the second respondent herein should also be given the same benefit. In Smt. Renu Mullick Vs. Union of India and another, , the Supreme
Court had commented about the extension of constitutional remedy only to persons with clean hands and honest conscience. In Food Corporation
of India Vs. S.N. Nagarkar, , the Supreme Court had held that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court may mould the relief having regard
to the facts of the case and interest of justice. According to the learned Counsel, except for compensation, no other relief can be granted in this
case.
Now, we will look at the decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the second respondent. In K.C. Sharma and others Vs. Union of India
and others, , in view of the decision of a Central Administrative Tribunal declaring certain notification as invalid, the appellants claimed the same
benefit, though with delay. The Supreme Court held that it was a fit case where the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in filing the
application and the appellant should have been given the relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. In Sengara
Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, , the Supreme Court held that when the petitioners and others were wrongly dismissed and
some others were reinstated, the petitioners were also entitled to be treated on par. In U.P.S.R.T.C. Ltd. Vs. Sarada Prasad Misra and Another, ,
the Supreme Court held that when the employee had raised an industrial dispute after a period of seven years, he was entitled only to 50% of the
backwages. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent, moulding of the relief could only mean that he was not entitled
to backwages, but he should be granted all other benefits. In Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and Another Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, ,
the Supreme Court held as follows:
Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 16 - Extension of benefit to similarly situated persons - Proposition of law accepted that wrong decision in
one case could not be extended to others - But held on facts, once a judgment had attained finality, it could not be termed as wrong, and its benefit
ought to have been extended to other similarly situated persons - Service Law - Promotion - Service Recruitment rules - Relaxation of - Service
Law - J & K Police Manual - Ch. VII, Regn. 174.
In 2002 (I) L.L.J. 460 (supra), the Supreme Court held as follows:
The Supreme Court found that a similarly placed workman had been given the relief of reinstatement with back wages by the appellant-
Corporation. There was no reason why the respondent placed in similar circumstances should not be granted similar relief. The appellant was
therefore directed to pay the respondent workman back wages , subject to his placing materials before the competent authority to show that he
was not gainfully employed during the relevant period.
On a reading of the option letter, we are not persuaded to hold contrary to what the learned single Judge had held in Ramamurthy''s case.
There was no meaning in asking the employee whether he was willing to come under the CMCH Rules if the possibility of CMCH taking him into
its services did not exist. Otherwise, the offer could not have been made and when the offer has been made and accepted, the CMCH was bound
to abide by the offer it had made. Therefore, clearly the second respondent is entitled to reinstatement. Now the question is, what further relief is
he entitled to.
Though the above decisions would show that persons similarly placed should be treated similarly, we are not sure that the second respondent
and the aforesaid Ramamurthy are similarly placed. The observation of the Supreme Court in Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank Vs.
Neelam, apply to an extent in the present case. There too, the proceedings seeking the relief of reinstatement were not agitated vigorously, as in
this case, perhaps because the second respondent herein had got an appointment with the Tamil Nadu Ministerial Service. In the case before the
Supreme Court, the workman had secured employment with HUDA. Similar feature is not found in Ramamurthy''s case or at least it is not brought
to our knowledge. It is only because Ramamurthy achieved success that the application for restoration filed on behalf of the second respondent
was immediately brought up. Otherwise, it was lying in the Registry for years without any effort to secure orders. It was repeatedly submitted
before us that for the delay that occurs in the Court, the workman cannot be punished. If really there had been urgency, the restoration petition
would have immediately been moved. In fact, the restoration petition itself was filed with delay. The second respondent has been working as Junior
Assistant in the Tamil Nadu Ministerial Service and his salary was Rs. 4,000/- per month initially. Therefore, there are several features which make
this case different from the case of the other employee Ramamurthy, and therefore, the relief we grant to the second respondent herein must be
moulded suitably.
The writ appeal is allowed to the following extent. We modify the order passed by the learned single Judge only with regard to granting of
consequential benefits of continuity of service. With regard to reinstatement and regularization without any backwages, we confirm the order of the
learned single Judge. But as regards the benefits flowing from continuity of service, that will be restricted only to his terminal benefits. For all other
purposes, no benefit will flow from continuity of service. The appeal is partially allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, M.P.
No. 1 of 2009 is closed.