The Management of Majestic Theatre, Moga vs Workmen of The Majestic Theatre, Moga and Others

Falshaw, C.J.—This is an appeal filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the management of the Majestic Theatre, Moga, against the order of a learned Single Judge accepting a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by the workmen of the theatre.

The facts are that the management of the cinema which had ten workmen in its employment at that time dismissed Sham Singh, a gatekeeper, on the 14th of March 1960 and dismissed Sham Lal. an operator, and Paras Bahadur a chaukidar, on the 29th and 30th of May respectively. The Government considering that a dispute existed between the management and the workmen of the cinema referred the dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act to the Labour Court presided over by Shri Jowala Das. The question referred to the Labour Court was whether the dismissals of the workmen, which were referred to as a dismissal in the case of Sham Singh and the termination of services in the cases of the other two, were justified and in order.

The management raised the preliminary objection that the dispute was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, but simply an individual dispute with the workmen concerned, and a preliminary issue whether the dispute to which the present reference relates is not an industrial dispute but is an individual dispute was decided by the learned Presiding Officer in favour of the management by his award dated the 25th of January 1961.

The writ petition was filed in this Court by the workmen of the theatre through the President of the Cinema Workers Union, Moga and by Sham Singh and Sham Lal, two of the workmen concerned. The learned Single Judge accepted the petitioners contentions and held that the dispute was an industrial dispute and therefore ordered that the matter be decided by the Labour Court on the merits.

In the order of the learned Presiding Officer no reference at all was made to any adoption of the cause of the aggrieved workmen by any union, and the matter was simply decided on the question whether their cause had been supported by a sufficient number of workmen in that particular establishment which was found to be lacking. The learned Single Judge has referred to the Union the President of which has drafted and filed the writ petition on behalf of the workmen of the cinema, but accepted the proposition that mere adoption of the cause of a workman would not turn an individual dispute into an industrial dispute. However, he found that there was substantial support from the other members of the establishment.

In my opinion the question of any union''s support for the workmen cannot be raised in this petition, since it was not raised before the learned Presiding Officer, whose order appears to indicate that the so-called Cinema Workers Union of Moga was not even representing the workmen before him, their representation being described as Shri Brij Lal Legal Secretary, General Labour Council, Moga. The question is therefore to be decided by the determination of the question whether the dismissed workmen were supported by an appreciable number of their fellow workman of the Majestic Theatre, as held in The Bombay Union of Journalists and Others Vs. The ''Hindu'', Bombay and Another,

The facts as found by the learned Presiding Officer are that the cause of the workmen whose services had been terminated was only. supported by one member of the establishment named Mat Raj. It seems that Paras Bahadur, the dismissed chaukidar, had already settled his dispute with the management and had acknowledged in a document exhibited as M. 1 that he had received arrears of wages and compensation and that he withdrew his cLalm. The learned Presiding Officer did not think that the support of the one fellow workman Mat Raj a counted to the support of a substantial portion of the establishment small as that establishment may have been.

The learned Single Judge was of the opinion that Paras Bahadur must be regarded as an additional supporter of Sham Lal and Sham Singh and that this turned the scale. He seems to have assumed that Paras Bahadur could he regarded as a supporter in the light of the decision in Working Journalists of The Hindu v. ''The Hindu''2 in which Rajamanar C.J. and Verraswami J. had held that an industrial dispute did not cease to be so because subsequent to the date of its reference some of its sponsors or supporters had withdrawn their support, the crucial date being the date of the reference, and if at that time a substantial number of employees had supported the dispute it was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be.

It seems to me that where the learned Single Judge has fallen into an error is in regarding Paras Bahadur as a supporter of the workmen involved in the dispute. If that had been the case, and assuming that the view taken by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court is correct, there might then have been some ground for concluding that the workmen still involved in the dispute had the support of two of their fellow workmen, and the decision whether this number amounted to substantial support from their fellow workmen so as to turn the dispute into an industrial dispute would be a nice point.

In my opinion, however, the workmen involved in the dispute cannot ordinarily set themselves up as supporters of each other, and the fact remains that there was only one supporter from the establishment of workmen involved in the dispute.

The learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously contended that in a matter of this kind the workmen involved in the dispute are supporters of each other''s cause and that therefore the total number of the original establishment of ten supporting the cause of the workmen involved in the dispute numbered four which could not be regarded as insubstantial. On this point he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi) Vs. Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi), . In that case the employer who was carrying on business as a perfumer and tobacconist of Delhi employed 45 workmen. There was no union of the workers of that establishment, but on the 16th of July 1961, 18 of the employees joined a registered trade union called the Mercantile Employees Association, and on the 28th of July, 1961 the employer passed an order dismissing all these 18 employees, whose cause was taken up by the outside union which they had joined. On a reference to an Industrial Tribunal the objection was raised by the employer that there was no industrial dispute, partly on the ground that the cause of the 18 dismissed employees was not supported by any of their fellow workmen, and partly because of the decisions to the effect that the adoption of the cause of aggrieved workmen by an outside union would not turn the dispute into an industrial dispute.

On the workmen''s appeal to the Supreme Court the latter principle was somewhat modified, it being held that if an outside union takes up the cause of the workmen working in an establishment which has no union of its own, it would be unreasonable to hold that the dispute does not become an industrial dispute merely because the union which had sponsored it is not the union exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. The discussion on this topic takes up almost the whole of the judgment, but in the last short paragraph the following passage occurs:-

Besides, there is another way in which this question can be considered. If eighteen workmen are dismissed by an order passed on the same day, it would be unreasonable to hold that they themselves do not form a group of workmen which would be justified in supporting the cause of one another.

This observation was evidently thrown in as an additional ground for accepting the workmen''s appeal, and obviously it is based entirely on the circumstances of that case. There seems to be no doubt in fact that the 18 employees were dismissed by a single order passed on the 28th of July 1961 simply because they had joined an outside union and they thus had a common cause, and in my opinion the simultaneous dismissal of 18 out of 45 employees, i.e. two-fifths of the total establishment, for a single cause would in itself give rise to an industrial dispute, whether any union were brought into the matter or not.

In the present case, however, as far as can be seen from the record three workmen, an operator, a gateman and a chaukidar, were dismissed on different dates for different reasons and they cannot be regarded as supporters of each other so as to turn an individual dispute into an industrial dispute, and the only effect in my opinion of retirement of the chaukidar Paras Bahadur from the scene by reason of his settlement with the management was that he totally disappeared from the scene and he cannot be regarded as a supporter of the other two, who equally cannot be regarded as supporters of each other. From this it follows that the conclusion of the learned Presiding Officer was correct and that the two workmen regarding whom the dispute still subsisted were supported by only one of their fellow workmen which even in a small establishment like that in the present case would certainly not be sufficient to turn the management''s dispute with Sham Singh and Sham Lal into an industrial dispute. The result is that I would accept the appeal and dismiss the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the parties may be left to bear their own costs.

Mehar Singh, J.

I agree.