The Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. vs Guruvammal and Another

A. Alagiriswami, J.—Civil Revision Petition No. 1681 of 1963 is filed u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to revise the decree

and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Madurai in S.C.S. No. 314 of 1961. C.R.P. No. 1682 of 1963 is a similar petition in respect of

the decree and judgment in S.C.S. No. 315 of 1961. The defendant is the petitioner in both the petitions. The plaintiffs in the two suits were two

workers whose services were dispensed with by the defendant, the Madurai Mills Co., Ltd. The plaintiffs filed the suits claiming that they were

entitled to retrenchment benefits u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The defence in effect was that the plaintiffs in both the suits were not

retrenched but that their services were dispensed with on the ground of ill-health and therefore Section 25-F would not apply. It was also

contended by the defendant that the proper remedy for the plaintiffs in both the suits was to have approached the Labour Court u/s 33-C of the

Industrial Disputes Act. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the disease from which both the plaintiffs were said to be

suffering was curable disease, that the Mills should have sent them for treatment, and that in the circumstances their discharge amounted to

retrenchment and therefore decreed the suit. On the question of jurisdiction the learned Subordinate Judge took the view that he had jurisdiction to

try the suits.

Now it is contended for the petitioners in these two petitions that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try the suits, and that in

any case his view that this was retrenchment is not the proper view in the circumstances of this case. u/s 33-C(2) as it stood before the amendment

in 1964 where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefits which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the

amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour

Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount as determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-

section (1). Under Sub-section (1) of Section 33-C where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or

under the provisions of Chapter V-A (under which the present case would come) the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of

recovery due to him make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of money due to him, etc. We thus find that there is a

specific machinery provided for a case as this. Instead of resorting to the machinery the plaintiffs in these two suits have resorted to the ordinary

civil Court. The question is whether the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Court is barred. In C.B.R. Ratnam and Co. Vs. D. Ekambaram and

Another, Rajagopala Aiyengar, J., held as follows:

If a statutory right is created in favour of a person, but this is made dependent on the existence of certain stated facts but the statute enacts no

special machinery for the ascertainment of the statutory conditions on which the right arises, such a matter could certainly be brought up before an

ordinary civil Court for its determination. The statutory right created in the workman would certainly be a ''civil right'' within the meaning of Section

9, Civil Procedure Code, attracting the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court, and as such a Court would under this section be deprived of its

jurisdiction only if these were barred expressly or by implication.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon the well-known principle that where a remedy not ordinarily founded in common law is newly

created and a new machinery is provided for enforcement of those rights, it is the new machinery created that should be resorted to and not the

ordinary civil Court, He also relies upon the second sentence in the judgment of Rajagopala Aiyengar, J. and says that because Section 33-C(2)

provides for a special machinery, by implication it bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court. On the other hand, the respondents rely upon the first

sentence in the judgment of Rajagopala Aiyengar, J., to contend that this is a matter which could be brought up before an ordinary civil Court for

its determination. But even in that sentence it is stated that this would be available only if the statute enacts no special machinery for the

ascertainment of the statutory condition on which the right arises. Therefore, it is clear that in the present case as the statute enacts a special

machinery to enforce specially created rights, the parties cannot approach the ordinary civil Court. The respondents rely upon River Steam

Navigation Company v. Inland S.N.W. Union (1964) 1 L.L.J. 98, where it has been held that provisions of Section 33-C of the Industrial

Disputes Act could not be pleaded as a bar in a civil Court entertaining a suit for declaration of certain rights involving interpretation of the

provisions of an award made by an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court, that Section 33-C(I) expressly provides that the remedy provided therein

is without prejudice to any other mode of recovery and in its context Subsection (2) also should be similarly read. But on a discussion the Division

Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that this was not a matter which could be decided under Sub-section (2) of Section 33-C and that is why

that section was not a bar to being filed before the civil Court. The learned Judges further held that because of Section 36-A which again was a

special procedure provided in a case where an interpretation of an award is required, no suit could be filed in a civil Court. This again is an

illustration of the principle that where a special machinery is provided for specific purpose, the civil Court cannot be approached. It follows,

therefore, that in this case the learned Subordinate Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the two suits. In this view, it is unnecessary to go into the

other question whether the discharge of the plaintiffs in this case was retrenchment or not. The decrees and judgments of the lower Court are set

aside and the revision petitions are allowed, but without costs.

The decision in these petitions certainly does not mean that the respondents'''' remedy under the law is barred.