The Life Insurance Corporation of India vs The Government of Tamil Nadu and Others

G. Ramanujam, J.—The Life Insurance Corporation of India is the petitioner herein. It acquired the assets of the South India Teachers''

Union Protection Fund Limited, which included five buildings bearing Door Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 in S.I.T.U. Colony, Raja Annamalaipuram four

of which are residential buildings. At the time of acquisition respondents 2 to 6 who were not the employees of the Corporation, were occupying

separate portions of the said residential buildings. Since the Corporation felt considerable need for providing residential houses for the occupation

of its staff, it has been persuading respondents 2 to 6 to give vacant possession of the portions of the premises in their occupation. When it could

not get possession of the portions from them, it applied to the first respondent to exempt the premises Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7 u/s 29 of the Tamil Nadu

Act XVIII of 1960 from the provisions of Section 10(3) of the said Act.

The two grounds that were urged in support of the application for exemption are : (1) that it is not possible for the Corporation to file an

application for eviction u/s 10(3) before the Rent Controller on the ground that the premises are required for housing its staff and (2) that the staff

of the Corporation who had to be provided with houses are pressing for providing residential accommodation. The said application for exemption

filed before the first respondent seems to have been, sent to the Accommodation Controller for remarks. The Accommodation Controller had

reported that the Corporation can file an application for eviction before the Rent Controller u/s 10(3) of the Act and that the hardship that will be

caused to the tenants will outweigh the benefits which will accrue to the Corporation by exemption of the buildings. Taking note of this report from

the Accommodation Controller, the Government passed an order in. G.O. Rt. No. 4319, Home, dated 13th October, 1972 rejecting the

petitioner''s application for exemption on the ground that the Corporation has got a remedy to evict the tenants under the Act and that therefore

there is no justification for granting exemption u/s 29 of the Act. The said order of the Government, dated 13th October, 1972 has been challenged

in this writ petition.

According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the view taken by the Government that the Corporation has got a remedy of seeking

eviction before the Rent Controller u/s 10(3) of the Act is erroneous and that in fact having regard to the purpose for which the building is required,

the remedy by way of application for eviction before the Rent Controller is not available to the petitioner. Therefore we have to see whether the

petitioner can approach the Rent Controller for eviction of the Respondents 2 to 6 u/s 10(3) of the Act.

Section 10(3)(b) is as follows:

Where the landlord of a building, whether, residential or non-residential, is a religious, charitable, educational, or other public institution, it may, if

the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply to the Controller, subject to the provisions of Clause (d) for an order directing the

tenant to put the institution in possession of the building.

In this case, the petitioner is seeking possession of the building on the ground that the building is required for the occupation of its employees and

not for its own occupation. Therefore, the Corporation cannot be taken to require the premises for its purposes so as to enable it to invoke Section

10(3)(b) of the Act for getting possession of the building from the tenants. Therefore, the Life Insurance Corporation cannot be said to have

remedy u/s 10(3)(b). Ananthanarayanan, C.J., has taken a similar view in N. Bhaktavatsalu Chetty and Others Vs. M. Natesa Achari (decd.) and

Others, . In that case, a building was owned by a charitable trust. That building was occupied by a tenant. The trust filed an eviction petition u/s

10(3)(b) on the ground that the building was required for letting it out as a Kalyana Mandapam with a view to get a higher income to the trust. The

learned Chief Justice held that so long as the celebration of marriages in a mandapam is not one of the objects for which the trust was founded, that

the object of establishing a Kalyana Mandapam cannot be said to be for the purpose of the trust and that therefore the trust cannot be taken to

require the building for its own use. Veeraswamy, J. as he then was in Official Trustee, Madras v. Gopalji Chamshi and Co. (1967) 1 M.L.J. 45 :

(1967) 80 L.W. 17, has held that the Official Trustee''s application u/s 10(3)(b) for possession in the occupation of a tenant building on the ground

that the trust requires the building for conversion as a Kalyana Mandapam does not fulfil the criteria of requirement for the purposes of the trust, as

the trust does not require possession of the building for its own purposes, and therefore Section 10(3)(b) cannot be invoked.

In this case, as already stated, the Life Insurance Corporation is not requiring the building for its own use or for its own purposes, i.e., for

carrying on the life insurance business. The building is required by the Corporation to provide housing accommodation for its own employees.

Provision of housing accommodation for its employees has nothing to do with its business or the purposes for which the Corporation has been

established. Though the Corporation may be morally obliged to provide its staff housing accommodation it cannot be taken to be the purpose of

the Corporation. In these circumstances, therefore, the Corporation cannot file an application u/s 10(3) for eviction, of the tenants for the purpose

of providing, house accommodation to its staff.

The only reason given in the impugned order of the Government is that the Corporation has got a remedy to evict the tenants under the

provisions of the Rent Control Act. Now that it has been found that the provisions of the Rent Control Act, cannot be invoked by the Corporation

and that the only reason given in the impugned order is quite unsustainable, the Government has to reconsider the petitioner''s request for

exemption afresh and dispose of the same in the light of this judgment. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner''s application for exemption was

filed as early as 15th June, 1971, nearly six years before, the Government will pass final order''s at least, within two months from the date of

receipt of this order. This writ petition is ordered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.