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Judgment
Lakshmiah, J.—This is an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus seeking a declaration that the order dated 3-9-1978 passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies at Medak is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction .
The petitioner was the President of the large-sized Co-operative Society Limited at Medak, referred to hereinafter merely as "the Society".
The Society was registered under Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. The Managing Committee of the petitioner-Society comprised eight members. The Committee was duty elected on 29th June, 1975. As per the applicable bye-law the term of the Managing Committee should expire after completion of three years'' period by 28th June, 1978. It is stated by the petitioner in the writ petition that the Managing Committee had been demanding the 1st respondent to conduct the elections. The election was not conducted by the 1st respondent, and the 1st respondent declared that the elections would be conducted soon and that in the meanwhile the present managing committee can continue to function and as such they have been continuing.
In the capacity of themselves being the managing committee they all applied for loans from the Co-operative Central Bank at Sangareddy and the loans were granted and also released. These loans were distributed to the respective members. The loans were released by the Bank to the petitioner in the capacity of himself being President of the petitioner-Society on 22-8-78 and 24-8-78. While so, the 1st respondent passed orders dated 3-9-1978 by which Sri K. Prakasarao, 2nd respondent Co-operative Sub-Registrar, Medak was appointed as a part-time person-in-charge to manage the affairs of the large seized Co-operative Society for a period of three months from the date of taking charge of the Society. It is this order that was impugned in this writ petition. A counter-affidavit was filed.
Sri Subhashan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is bad in law, and the committee is entitled to continue in office as per the G. Os. issued from time to time, by the Government. As against this the learned Government Pleader contended that by the time when the impugned order was passed there was no legally constituted committee of the Society and as such the 1st respondent is well within his limits in appointing the 2nd respondent as the person-in-charge.
The point therefore that arises for consideration is whether the order dated 3-9-1978 passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies at Medak, 1st respondent herein, u/s 32 (7) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, referred to herein merely as "the Act'', is liable to be set aside as contended for by the petitioner?
The impugned order was passed on 3-9-1978. The 1st respondent as per the impugned order was of the view of that there was no legally constituted committee for the Society in question as the Committee then in office became functus officio, and as it is not possible to conduct elections of the members of the committee of the Society immediately, and as it is expedient to provide for the management of the affairs of the Society till an elected committee assumes office, the 1st respondent in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under clause (a) sub-section (7) of Section 32 of the Act appointed the 2nd respondent as a part-time person-in-charge to look after the affairs of the Society for a period of three months from the date of taking charge of the Society.
Sri Subhashan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner-committee is entitled to continue in office till the end of the year 1978 and thereafter till the end of March. 1979, as per the G. Os. issued from time to time. The learned Government Pleader contended on the other hand that the G. Os. only authorised the concerned authorities to exercise discretion in the matter of extending the term of the office of the committee but they do not operate automatically resulting in automatic extension of the term of the members of the committee without an order to that effect by the authorities concerned. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the committee was required to continue as per the oral instructions. But it is asserted in the counter on the basis of the contents of the impugned order that by the time the impugned order came to be passed no legally constituted committee was existing.
As per Section 31 (2) (a) of the Act, the term of the Committee or any of its members shall, be for such period, not exceeding three years, as may be specified in the bye-laws. As per sub-clause (b) notwithstanding anything in clause (a), if for any reason the election of the members of the Committee is not held by the time of the expiration of the term of the existing committee, the Registrar may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the term of office of that committee shall extend up to such time as such election is held, which extension shall not ordinarily exceed one year.
It has already been noticed that the managing committee of the petitioner society was elected on 29th June, 1975 for a period of three years as per the bye-laws of Society. The managing committee therefore accordingly continued to function till 28th June 1978. Thereafter it shall have to continue only by specific orders passed in that direction by the authorities concerned.
On 3-9-1978 while the impugned order was passed, according to the 1st respondent, there was no legally constituted committee of the Society. The petitioner''s counsel has not placed before me any orders passed by the authorities concerned u/s 31 (2) (b) of the Act which provides for the exercise of the power by the Registrar regarding extension of the term of the office of the committee. The Registrar is obliged as per the provision of law to record his reasons in writing before he directs the term of the office of the committee to be extended. No such order seemed to have been passed nor any such order seemed to have been passed nor any such order is placed before me. I shall have to take it then that the assertion made on behalf of the respondents that there was no legally constituted committee in existence at the time when the impugned order was passed u/s 32 (7) (a) of the Act is correct. Under that provision of law, if there is no committee or if in the opinion of the Registrar it is not possible to call general meeting for the purpose of conducting election of the members of the committee (he) may appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the Society for a period not exceeding six months and he may as per the proceeding of the Government from time to time extend such period from six months, so however, that it shall not exceed two years.
The condition precedent for the exercise of power u/s 32 (a) of the Act is that there should be no committee in existence. The expression ''the Committee'' means a validly constituted committee. That such a committee should be validly constituted one was the opinion expressed by my learned brother Kondaiah, J. in Syed Qutbuddin v. State of A. P. (1971) 2 An WR 172 while interpreting Section 32 (7) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act. According to that decision the expression committee in Section 32 (7) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act should not be interpreted as any committee or a pretence or farce of a committee and unless and until the committee is valid and subsisting on the crucial date, it cannot be held to be a committee in the eye of law. That was the view taken by the learned Judge. Following that observation I hold that by the time the impugned order came to be passed there cannot be any committee in existence, the term of which according to the petitioner was continuing as per the oral orders in the teeth of provisions contained in Section 31 (2) (b), as per which, the Registrar has been required to state the reason for extending the term of the office of the committee. In view of the fact that there is no such order passed, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that no committee was in existence, and as such, the 1st respondent is well within his jurisdiction in exercising power u/s 32 (2) in appointing the 2nd respondent as the person-in-charge, as there was no legally constituted committee by them. I am satisfied that the impugned order is valid and there are no merits in this writ petition.
It is also to be noticed that the period fixed in the impugned order expired and for that reason also the writ petition become infructuous.
In the result, the writ petition is dismissed, but in the circumstance without costs. Advocate''s fee Rs.200/-.
Petition dismissed.