High CourtsSingle Bench(2010) 07 MAD CK 0336

The Land Acquisition Officer, Revenue Divisional Officer vs Govindhasamy and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 27 July 2010 · Citation: (2010) 5 CTC 640 : (2011) 6 RCR(Civil) 2394

HON’BLE JUDGES
K. Chandru, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
A.S. No''s. 45 to 52 of 2010 and M.P. No''s. 1 of 2010

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Judgment

18 paragraphs · 1,989 words

K. Chandru, J.—Heard Mr. V. Ravi, learned Special Government Pleader for the Appellant, Mr. D. Veerasekaran, learned Standing Counsel for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Mr. S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel for P.S. Kothandaraman, learned Counsel appearing for the land owners/claimants in all the Appeals filed against various judgments and decrees passed by the Additional District Sessions Court, Fast Track Court No. 1, Thirupathur. The following Table will indicate the number of the LAOPs, the corresponding Appeals and name of the claimants.

2.

The acquisition was made on behalf of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board by the Land Acquisition Officer cum Revenue Divisional Officer, Thirupathur for formation of a Neighbourhood Scheme. The Neighbourhood Scheme consists of developing the plots into housing plots and selling it to the needy public both as constructed houses as well as vacant lands. A 4(1) Notification was issued by the State Government and published in the Gazette on 17.12.1983. After following the due procedure, the lands came to be vested with the State Government.

3.

With reference to the compensation, in the award passed by the acquiring Authority, it was indicated that the land of the Respondent/claimants will be paid Rs. 96.15 per Cent for the dry land and Rs. 99.50 for manavari dry land and Rs. 110/- for irrigated dry land. Admittedly, all the lands in question are coming under the Phase I of the Neighbourhood Scheme and subsequently the acquisition was also done for Phase II of the Neighbourhood Scheme. In this case, we are concerned with only Phase I Scheme. The affected land owners raised objection with reference to the low rate of compensation. Therefore, the references were made u/s 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for determination of market value by the jurisdictional Reference Court and finally it was allotted to the Additional District and Sessions Court, Tirupathur. The references were registered as various LAOPs as indicated above.

4.

A joint trial was conducted. The evidence was let in L.A.O.P. No. 74 of 2002. Before the Reference Court, on behalf of the claimants, 17 persons gave deposition and were examined as C.W.1 to C.W.17. On their side, 3 documents were marked and recorded as Ex.C.1 to C.3. Curiously, on the side of the acquiring authority, neither any witnesses were examined nor any records were produced. Ex.C.1 is the Sale Deed dated 5.5.1982. Ex.C.2 is the Sale Deed dated 29.2.1984. Ex.C.3 is the Sale Deed dated 12.12.1984. Admittedly, Ex.C.1 is the only document which would come into existence before the date of 4(1) Notification. The Reference Court took the exception to the Acquiring Authority not examining any witnesses.

5.

Only the judgment of this Court was produced with the consent of the parties, namely A.S. Nos. 811 to 817 of 1997 in the Special Tahsildar, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Tirupathur, North Arcot Ambedkar District vs. A.P. Gnanaprakasam and others. The Reference Court held that in the judgment passed by the Division Bench, the compensation relates to the award No. 2/87 dated 6.11.1987. Not satisfied with the compensation awarded by the Acquiring Authority, the claims were made before the Reference Court. The Reference Court on such reference awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 7/- per sq.ft. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Reference Court, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board had filed an Appeal. In that Appeal, the Division Bench of this Court allowed the Appeal and fixed the market value at the rate of Rs. 4.50 per sq.ft. With reference to the statutory amount payable, in paragraph 6, the Bench had held as follows:

With regard to the statutory amounts payable to the claimants, it is made clear that they (claimants) are entitled to 30% solatium for the market value of the land acquiring. Further, they are entitled to an additional amount at 12 per cent per annum from the date of 4(1) Notification till the date of passing the award of delivery of possession, whichever is earlier. In addition to this, they are also entitled interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of possession for a period of one year and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum till the date of deposit. The claimants are not entitled on solatium and additional amount in view of the fact that issue regarding grant of interest on solatium is pending before the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, depending upon the outcome of the decision. The claimants are permitted to file appropriate Petitions before the Sub-Court

6.

Therefore, in the present case, the Reference Court did not take into account the huge amounts demanded by the Respondents/claimants, on the other hand followed the earlier Division Bench judgment, which arose out of Award No. 2/1987. In these cases, it is not clear as to why the Acquiring Authority has come up on Appeal when the Court below followed a well considered Division Bench judgment of this Court.

7.

However, Mr. D. Veerasekaran, learned Counsel for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board on pointing out the topo plan attempted to submit that in respect of Phase II, the compensation awarded so far was only Rs. 1,200/- per Cent and even in the areas nearby, the same rate of compensation was ordered. But, insofar as the Phase I is concerned, another Division Bench of this Court in Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Tirupathur, North Arcot District v. D.K. Narasimhan, A.S. No. 1261 of 1998, by judgment dated 10.7.2001 granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per cent and 20% was deducted towards development charges. Therefore, Rs. 1,200/- per cent is the reasonable amount fixed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 10.7.2001.

8.

He also subsequently brought to the notice of this Court another set of Division Bench judgment in A.S. Nos. 805 to 812 of 2006, wherein this Court ordered compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per cent. A perusal of that order shows that it was the order passed on consent of both sides. The following passage can be extracted from the said judgment:

Learned Counsel on either side also submits that in that case the compensation in respect of the lands has been fixed at the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per cent and the same may be fixed in these cases also as the issue are one and the same and the public purpose for which the lands have been acquired is also one and the same.

9.

It must also be noted that the order in A.S. No. 1261 of 1996 was relating to only one claimant and the order in A.S. Nos. 811 to 817 of 1997 dated 8.3.2001 is in a batch of cases. Though the present attempt is made to distinguish the topograph of the lands acquired, it must be stated that the lands under the present issue relates to Phase I and before the Court below on the side of the Acquiring Authority, no attempt was made to make any distinction between the land under the present dispute as well as the land covered by the judgment of the Division Bench in A.S. No. 811 of 1997 and batch cases. In fact, the said judgment was marked by consent of the parties before the Reference Court and therefore the Reference Court did not commit any illegalities in following the Division Bench order.

10.

Under the circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the judgment passed by the Reference Court only on the basis that there were some conflicting orders before the Court. The Reference Court while resisting the huge compensation claimed by the land owners kept in mind the orders passed by the Division Bench. It cannot be said that this Court, only on the basis of the subsequent orders, which incidentally the latest order is only the consent order, should attempt to reduce the compensation without there being any material before this Court.

11.

Time and again, the Supreme Court has indicated that in the matter of land acquisition and the award of compensation, the Court has to go only on the basis of the relevant issues raised before the Reference Court. It has also been indicated by the Supreme, Court that the Reference Court does not act like an Appellate Authority betas a original Court. Therefore, it is open to the parties to let in appropriate evidence to determine the correct market rate of the value of the land. In the present case, the evidence of the claimants was that it is already a developed land and several commercial establishments including the Government Offices are situated nearby and most of the witnesses deposed that the lands can be used for building houses and they are sold as house plots. If at all there would be any development charges, they should let in evidence that the land requires development and therefore certain percentage should be deducted. Since such a plea was not taken either by the Acquiring Authority or the Requisition Authority, this Court in an Appeal u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot entertain such pleas.

12.

The Supreme Court recently in Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar Vs. State of Maharashtra, has held that the burden of proof of the true value of the acquired property is on the State. With reference to any inconsistency or infirmity in the testimony of the witnesses, the burden of proof in Civil cases is that of ''balance of probability'' and not that of ''beyond reasonable doubt''. In the present case, the evidence available before the Reference Court is only that of the claimants.

13.

The Supreme Court very recently in Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Karigowda and Others, observed as follows:

75.

It is a settled principle of law that lands of adjacent villages can be made the basis for determining the fair market value of the acquired land. This principle of law is qualified by clear dictum of this Court itself that whenever direct evidence i.e. Instance of the same villages are available, then it is most desirable that the Court should consider that evidence. But where such evidence is not available Court can safely rely upon the sales statistics of adjoining lands provided the instances are comparable and the potentiality and location of the land is somewhat similar. The evidence tendered in relation to the land of the adjacent villages would be a relevant piece of evidence for such determination. Once it is shown that situation and potential of the land in two different villages are the same then they could be awarded similar compensation or such other compensation as would be just and fair.

76.

The cases of acquisition are not unknown to our legal system where lands of a number of villages are acquired for the same public purpose or different schemes but on the commonality of purpose and unite development. The parties are expected to place documentary evidence on record that price of the land of adjoining village has an increasing trend and the Court may adopt such a price a the same is not impermissible. Where there is commonality of purpose and common development, compensation based on statistical data of adjacent villages was held to be proper. Usefully, reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kanwar Singh v. Union of India and Union of India v. Bal Ram.

Therefore, it can be safely said that the Phase I of the Neighbourhood Scheme can have an uniform rate of compensation. Under the circumstances, all the Appeal Suits stand dismissed. However, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed. It is indicated that Mr. V. Ravi, learned Special Government Pleader (AS) and Mr. D. Veerasekaran, learned Counsel for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board are entitled to separate set of fees though a common judgment is pronounced in all the Appeals.