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Judgment
P.C. Jain, J.—This judgment and order of ours would dispose of Civil Writs Nos. 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2088, 2112, 2135, 2147, 2153, 2165, 2172, 2161, 2162, 2196, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2185, 2202, 2212, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2224, 2230, 2383, 2387, 3033 and 3514 of 1971, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the lands leased out to them u/s 5 of the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), otherwise than in due course of law, as common questions of law and fact arise in all these petitions. In order to decide the points raised before us by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners, it would be appropriate to notice certain facts which I am narrating from the amended petition Civil Writ No. 2168 of 1971.
The Collector, Karnal, u/s 5 of the Act, leased out an area of 1154 Acres, situated in villages Pehowa and Murtzapur, jointly to the Karnal Co-oparative Farmers Society Ltd. Pehowa (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) and the Lyalpur Co-operative Joint Farming Society Ltd., Murtzapur (hereinafter referred to as the Lyalpur Co-operative Society). After the grant of the said lease, some dispute arose between the two Societies which was referred to the arbitration of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies who vide his award gave the entire village Murtzapur and 175 Acres of land in village Pehowa to the Lyalpur Co-operative Society and the remaining 375 Acres of land situated in village Pehowa to the petitioner. Ever since then the petitioner-society had been in exclusive cultivating possession of 375 Acres of land as a lessee and the lease deed in its favour was again extended for a period of 20 years by the Collector in the year 1958.
It is further stated that in the year 1970, the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil), Kaithal, purporting to act u/s 6 of the Act, issued notices and cancelled the leases of hundreds of Societies and individual lessees in a manner wholly unwarranted by law, giving rise to the legitimate inference that the wholesale mass cancellations were part of a policy to throw out Punjabi settlers from the Guhla Tehsil. That action of the Sub Divisional Officer was challenged by the aggrieved persons including the petitioner by way of writ petitions in this Court. The writ petition filed by the petitioner-society (Civil Writ No. 1416 of 1910) was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on April 15, 1971, on the ground that section 6 of the Act was ultra vires of the Constitution and any action taken under that section was void and ineffective.
It is further stated that on 17th May, 1971, the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) respondent No. 2, issued notice against the petitioner u/s 7 of the Act, saying that the original owners had filed an application for the return of the lands leased out to the petitioner as the lease period had expired, and further calling upon the petitioner-society not to cultivate the lands after Rabi 1971 so that the possession could be returned to the original owners and also requiring the petitioner-society to file any objections against the notice by the 3rd of June 1971. In pursuance of the notice, the President of the petitioner-society went to the Court of the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) to file objections; but the same could not be filed as the Sub Divisional Officer, respondent No. 2, was not holding the Court and the Reader asked the President of the Society, to come with the objections on 4th June, 1971. It is further stated that on 5th June, 1971, the Sub Divisional Officer passed an order rejecting the objections of the petitioner and directed the Tehsildar, Gulha, to take possession of the land and give actual possession of the land to the original owners. As earlier observed it is this action of the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil), which has been challenged by way of these petitions.
Written statements in all these petitions have been filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 in which the material allegations made in the petition have been controverted. In some of the writ petitions the land-owners also have filed written statements controverting the claim of the petitioners.
The main arguments were advanced by Mr. Anand Swarup, Senior Advocate, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, and are being disposed of first. These arguments were also adopted by the other Learned Counsel. However, in some cases additional arguments were advanced which I would be dealing with subsequently.
The first contention raised by Mr. Anand Swarup, Learned Counsel, was that section 7 of the Act did not authorise the Collector to take possession of the land of which lease was created u/s 5 of the Act, by executive action. According to the Learned Counsel, the only remedy available to the Collector on the expiry of the lease period was to have recourse to a Court of law. I am afraid, I am unable to agree with this contention of the Learned Counsel. Before I deal with this contention of the Learned Counsel, it would be appropriate to reproduce the statement of objects and reasons which necessitated the enforcement of the Act. The statement of objects and reasons reads as under:-
It has been brought to the notice of Government that large tracts of fertile land might remain uncultivated due to the negligence or absence of displaced or local landlords. Government policy is not to leave an inch of cultivable land unsown as far as possible. Self-sufficiency in the matter of food was to be attained by the end of 1951, but this date has now been pre-dated by the Prime Minister of India as the end of 1950. It is really lementable that lands should be allowed to remain uncultivated in East Punjab which is a deficit province. If timely action is not taken, a large portion of the population will have to starve after 1950, then it is proposed to stop all imports of foodgrains from abroad. Government has tried its best to persuade such landlords, but still there is a likelihood of large tracts of fertile and cultivated lands remaining unsown during Rabi, 1949-50. The Bill is, therefore, aimed at bringing all available lauds in the East Punjab under fodder and foodgrain crops in order to attain self-sufficiency in the matter of food.
It was in order to achieve these objects that the Legislature enacted this Act. u/s 3 of the Act, a Collector is given power to take possession of any land which has not been cultivated for the last six or more harvests after following the procedure laid down therein. u/s 4, provision is made for the payment of compensation with regard to the land of which possession has been taken u/s 3. Thereafter u/s 5 the Collector is given power to lease out that land of which possession has been taken u/s 3 on such terms and conditions as he may deem fit for the purpose of growing feed and fodder crops In this section it is provided that the period of lease shall not be less than seven years or more than 20 years. Section 6 as it stood earlier prescribed power of the Collector to determine lease in certain cases. This section reads as under:-
(1) If a person to whom land has been leased u/s 5 commits a breach of any of the terms and conditions thereof, the Collector shall, without prejudice to any right or remedy against him, have the power to determine the lease and take possession of the land.
(2) Where lease has been determined by the Collector, the lessee shall not be entitled to any compensation.
However, as earlier observed, the vires of this section was challenged and it was held to be void and unconstitutional by this Court. Thereafter the State of Haryana substituted a new section by virtue of the East Punjab Utilization of Lands (Haryana Amendment and Validation) Act, 1971 (Haryana Act No. 35 of 1971) which is in the following terms:-
Power of Collector to determine lease in certain cases.
(1) If a tenant commits a breach of any of the terms and conditions of his tenancy, the Collector shall have the power to determine the lease and take possession of the land after affording a reasonable opportunity to the tenant to show cause why his lease should not be determined and the possession of the land taken.
(2) Where lease has been determined by the Collector under sub-section (1), the tenant shall not be entitled to any compensation.
(3) The principles embodied in the various provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall not apply to any proceedings under this Act.
(4) No civil or revenue Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of the determination of lease or eviction of a tenant.
By this Act section 6 reproduced above was given retrospective effect from 29th July, 1957, u/s 7 on the basis of which the contention was advanced by Mr. Anand Swarup, Learned Counsel, power is given to the Collector to effect delivery of possession on the termination of lease. This section may be reproduced in extenso: -
(1) Where any land taken possession of by the Collector u/s 3, is on the expiry of the lease to be returned to the owner, the Collector may after making such inquiry, if any, as he considers necessary, specify by order in writing the person to whom possession of the land shall be given.
(2) The delivery of possession of land to the person specified in any order made under sub-section (1) shall be a full discharge of the Collector from all liability in respect of such delivery but shall not prejudice any rights in respect of the land which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom possession of the land is so delivered.
(3) Where the person to whom possession of any land is to be given cannot be found and has no agent or other person empowered to accept delivery on his behalf the Collector shall cause a notice declaring that the land is released to he affixed on some conspicuous part of the land.
(4) On issue of the notice referred to in sub-section (3) the land specified in the notice shall be deemed to have been delivered to the person entitled to the possession thereof, and the Government or the Collector shall not he liable for any compensation or other claim in respect of the land for any period after the said date.
From the bare reading of sections 6 and 7, it is clear that section 6 deals with those types of cases where the lease is determined by the Collector before the expiry of the period of lease while section 7 envisages those cases where proceedings are initiated by the Collector on the expiry of the term of the lease. Section 7, as is clear from its plain reading, provides a method to deliver possession to the owners of that property of which they were deprived u/s 3 of the Act After the expiry of the term of the lease, no right is left in the lessee who obtains the same u/s 5 of the Act The question of proceedings against the lessee in the ordinary Court of law hardly arises. After the expiry of the period of lease, on the asking of the Collector, the lessee is legally bound to return possession of the leased land. In order to achieve the object of the Act, the legislature in its wisdom provided this summary method of ejectment. If the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted to be correct, then the entire object of the Act would be frustrated. Sub-section (1) of section 7 only says that if the land of which possession has been taken by the Collector under sub-section (3) and has to be returned to the owner on the expiry of the lease, the Collector after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, specify by order in writing the person to whom possession of the land has to be given. The enquiry, that is conducted by the Collector, is only to find out the person to whom possession of the land is to be given u/s 7. The Scheme of the Act is such that the ejectment has to take place automatically in the cases falling u/s 7 of the Act and the lessee has no right to object to his ejectment and is left with no option but to vacate the land. When proceedings u/s 7 start the only objection available to the lessee is that the lease period has not come to an end.
It was also sought to be argued that unguided and arbitrary powers are given to the Collector u/s 7 of the Act to give possession of the land to the original owners. But this contention again, to my mind, is hardly tenable. The question of exercise of arbitrary power does not arise in the cases covered by section 7. As earlier observed, section 7 comes into play only when the full term of the lease has come to an end. The Act u/s 5 prescribes the maximum period of lease and it is only for that period that the Collector is authorised to lease out the land. The moment that period expires, the Collector gets power under the Act to deliver possession of the land to the original owners who were temporarily deprived of their right in the land in view of the disability as envisaged u/s 3 of the Act with which they suffered. Moreover, against any order of the Collector, an appeal is provided before the Commissioner and a revision before the State Government or the Financial Commissioner. In the cases falling u/s 7 of the Act the question of the exercise of the power by the Collector in an arbitrary manner would never arise because that power is liable to be exercised only when the lease period comes to an end. Thus viewed from any angle, I find no substance in this contention of the Learned Counsel.
At this stage a contention raised by Mr. U.S. Sahni, Learned Counsel, which was advanced to support the first contention of Mr. Anand Swarup, may also be noticed. The sum and substance of his contention was that section 7 of the Act is ultra vires of the Constitution. According to the Learned Counsel, the provisions of section 7 were hit by Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India as in exercise of the power u/s 7 of the Act, the lessees, right to property was being taken away without payment of compensation. In support of his contention, reliance was placed by the Learned Counsel on the latest decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in H.H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior and Others Vs. Union of India and Another, and Khem Chand Vs. Union of India (UOI), In my view, this contention again is fallacious on the face of it. The contention has been advanced on the supposition that some right of the lessee to the property was being taken away without payment of compensation. The question that arises for determination is whether any right of the lessee to property is really being taken away by the Collector while exercising power u/s 7 of the Act, and in my view, the reply simpliciter is in the negative. No right of the lessee in the property was being taken away nor was any acquired and the question of paying compensation did not arise. As earlier observed, in order to achieve the aims and objects on the basis of which the Act was enacted by the Legislature, the lessee got a limited right for a limited period in the land of the original owner and for exercising that right he made payment to the Collector in the shape of rent. The decisions referred to by the Learned Counsel, in my view, are wholly inapplicable and besides the point.
It was next contended by Mr. Anand Swarup, Learned Counsel, that the Collector did not determine the amount of compensation for the improvements effected by the lessees on the land and that the lessee could not be ejected without payment of such compensation. In support of this contention, reliance was placed by the Learned Counsel on sections 64 and 68 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act), which reads as under:-
Title of tenants not having right of occupancy to make improvements.
(1) A tenant not having a right of occupancy may make improvements on his tenancy with the assent of his landlord.
(2) If at any time the question arises whether or not the landlord assented to the making of an improvement by a tenant not having a right of occupancy, the assent may be inferred from circumstances.
Liability to pay compensation for improvements to tenant on ejeciment or on enhancement of his rent.
Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Chapter a tenant who has made an improvement on his tenancy in accordance with this Act shall not be ejected, and the rent payable by him shall not be enhanced, until he has received compensation for the improvement.
It was also contended by the Learned Counsel that though clause 10 of the lease deed provided that the lessee snail have no right to claim compensation for the improvements effected by him nor shall he be entitled to remove, without the previous consent in writing of the Collector, any material or equipment or machinery attached by him to the land, but that clause would be void in view of the provisions of section 110 of the Tenancy Act the relevant provision of which reads as under:-
110 Nullity of certain agreements contrary to the Act.
(1) Nothing in any agreement made between a landlord and a tenant after the passing of this Act shall-
(a) * * * * * *
(b) take away or limit the right of a tenant as determined by this Act to make improvements and claim compensation therefor, or where compensation for disturbance can be claimed under this Act to claim such compensation, or
(c) * * * * * *
I am afraid I am unable to agree with the contention of the Learned Counsel which proceeded on the assumption that even to those cases which are covered by the provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Tenancy Act with regard to payment of compensation are applicable. It has already been observed by me that the Act is a specific statute enacted to achieve a specific purpose and is a complete code in itself. It provides a machinery for acquiring land for certain objects in a particular manner if certain conditions given therein are satisfied. It further provides the recovery of the land from the lessees and delivery of the same back to the original owners, in the manner prescribed under the Act. If the Legislature had intended to provide giving of compensation to a lessee for the improvements which he makes on the land during the tenure of the lease, then it would have been so specifically provided. In my view, in the Act no provision for the payment of compensation has been rightly made because the lessee gets the lease for a minimum period of seven years or for a maximum period of 20 years and during that period it he makes any improvements, he does so only with a view to achieve best results from the land which he has taken on lease. Moreover, there was no bar for the Legislature to have specifically provided in the Act that with regard to payment of compensation, provisions of the Tenancy Act would apply and having not done so, the lessees cannot take advantage of those provisions. Further if the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is taken to a logical end, then it would follow that even with regard to other matters, e.g., in the case of ejectment also the provisions of the Tenancy Act, would apply; but to that extent even the Learned Counsel for the petitioners was not prepared to go.
The matter can be looked at from another angle. Under the Act the ''tenant'' has been defined as "''tenant'' means a person to whom land is leased by the Collector under the provisions of this Act." The definition of the word ''tenant'' as given in the Tenancy Act has not been imported in the Act. Further there is no definition of ''Landlord'' given in the Act nor has it been imported from the tenancy Act. The only definition relevant for our purpose is that of ''Collector'' which means Collector of the District where the land is situated. From the scheme of the Act I am inclined to take a view that the intention of the Legislature was never to create a relationship of landlord and tenant between the Collector who had the authority to grant lease and the person to whom the lease was granted, as envisaged under the Tenancy Act or the Security of Land Tenures Act. As earlier observed, the Act has been enacted in order to achieve a specific object and provides a complete machinery for carrying out that object and any person taking benefit of the provisions of the Act cannot legitimately and justifiably claim benefit of the provision of any other statute until and unless he can show that such provisions have specifically been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act by the Legislature.
At this stage an argument which had been advanced by Mr. Achhra Singh, Learned Counsel, may also be noticed. It was contended by him that the petitioners could be ejected only under the provisions of the Punjab security of the Land Tenures Act (hereinafter referred to as the Land Tenures Act) and to support this contention, a reference was made to section 21 of the Land Tenures Act which reads as under:-
21 (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under Government, or local bodies in the State, or any unallotted evacuee land.
(2) The provisions of sections 9, 9A and 18 shall not apply to lands leased out by the Punjab State Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited established under the Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act, 1957.
This contention of the Learned Counsel, on the face of it, seems to be fallacious. Sub-section (1) provides that nothing contained in the Land Tenures Act shall affect any land held by a tenant or lessee under Government, or local bodies in the State, or any unallotted evacuee land, meaning thereby that tenants of such lands are not entitled to avail themselves of the rights granted to them under the Land Tenures Act. I fail to understand how this provision helps the Learned Counsel for the petitioner in his contention that the lessees can be ejected only under the provisions of the Land Tenures Act and not otherwise. Further my reasons given for making the provisions of Tenancy Act inapplicable to the leases created under the Act, equally apply to this contention of the Learned Counsel.
It was also sought to be argued by Mr. Anand Swarup, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that after taking possession of the land u/s 3 of the Act, compensation is paid as provided u/s 4 of the Act, and the Government becomes the owner of the property and the original owner is not left with any right in it. This argument, I suppose, was advanced by the Learned Counsel only to substantiate his contention that the Government having become owner of the property, was bound to pay compensation to the lessees, before resuming its possession, for the improvements made by them on the land during the period of lease. This contention, though novel, seems to be without any grounding. Under the Act, compensation is paid u/s 4 to the original owners not for the ownership rights which they possess in the land but for the temporary deprivation of their right to hold the land, cultivate the same and get profits out of it. Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has been made applicable only to find out the quantum of compensation for the temporary deprivation of the right of the original owners in the property. If the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then section 7 of the Act becomes redundant because after paying the compensation the Government would become the owner of the property, and after the expiry of the lease period the question of returning the same u/s 7 of the Act to the original owner would not arise. Thus this contention, as earlier observed, is wholly devoid of force. On the question of compensation an argument was also tried to be built up on the basis of the amended section 6 enacted by the Validation and Amendment Act, which has been reproduced in extenso in the earlier part of the judgment. The contention of Mr. Anand Swarup, Learned Counsel, was that the Legislature took away the right of payment of compensation only in those cases which fall under the four corners of that section, that is where the lease was determined by the Collector before the expiry of the lease period because of some breach of condition having been committed by the lessee. According to the Learned Counsel; if the intention of the legislature was to deprive the lessees of the payment of compensation even in the cases where the period of lease had come to an end which were covered by the provisions of section 7, then a similar provision for the non-payment of compensation would have been made u/s 7 of the Act. This contention again, in my view, is untenable. In section 6, a specific provision had to be made for the non-payment of compensation because it gives power to determine the lease even before the expiry of the maximum period of lease granted by the Collector if a breach of any condition of the lease is committed. If such a provision had not been made then in cases where lease was determined prior to the expiry of the lease by the Collector, legitimately a claim could have been made for the payment of compensation on the ground that the lessee made the improvement taking into consideration the period of lease. But that analogy cannot be applied to the cases u/s 7 of the Act as in these cases the lease is not determined prior to the expiry of the period of lease. The tenant gets the land for a fixed period and is expected to make only such improvements on the land which are necessary for achieving better results from the land. If the contention of the Learned Counsel on the question of payment of compensation with regard to cases falling u/s 7 of the Act is accepted to be correct, then a clever lessee can make the restoration of the land back to the original owner impossible on the expiry of the lease by making costly improvements on the land. In that case he would claim compensation which it may not be possible to pay and in this manner the original owner would be deprived to get back the possession of the land of which he is the owner. At this stage it would not be out of place to mention that in the lease deed the lessees have specifically agreed not a claim compensation for the improvements effected by them except in cases provided for in the Act or expressly in the lease deed. Neither in the Act is there a provision for payment of compensation nor in the lease deed it is provided that the petitioner would be entitled to compensation for the improvements made by him. Thus viewed from any angle, this contention too is without any substance.
It was also argued by Mr. Anand Swarup, Learned Counsel, that the order is illegal and suffers from infirmity because it was not in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 7. The contention of the Learned Counsel was that under sub-section (1) of section 7, the Collector was required to specify in writing the names of all the persons to whom possession of the land was to be given. According to the Learned Counsel, what the Collector has done in some cases is that he has first directed that warrant of possession be issued in the name of the Tehsildar, Guhla, who would first take the possession of the land from the lessees as representative of the Collector and then deliver the actual possession to the concerned owners. Mr. Anand Swarup contended that this method adopted by the Collector, on the face of it, was contrary to law.
After giving my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, I find myself unable to agree with the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner. The Collector has virtually complied with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 7. He has given the names of the original owners to whom the possession has to be delivered. In some cases it is correct that he has used the word ''etc.''; but that by itself would not make the order illegal or void. As to how possession would be delivered to the owners, no specific procedure is provided in the Act. As such there was nothing wrong for the Collector to direct that the warrant of possession be issued in the name of the Tehsildar, Guhla who would take possession on his behalf and thereafter shall deliver the same to the owners. u/s 12, the Collector has a right to delegate any of his powers and functions under the Act to any officer of the Revenue or Rehabilitation Department in his District either by name or designation. Moreover, even for the sake of argument if I accept the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner to be correct, then also it can at the best be said to be a mere irregularity which by itself cannot make the impugned order, or the proceedings of ejectment to be null and void. The petitioners, who are the lessees, are legally bound to restore possession of the land and on the basis of such irregularity, if any, they cannot resist the delivery of possession. Their right to hold the possession of the land comes to an end on the expiry of the period of lease provided by the statute. Thus viewed from any angle, as earlier observed, this contention is again devoid of any force.
This brings me to the contention of Mr. R.N. Narula, Learned Counsel, who contended that the Collector had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings u/s 7 of the Act and that the only remedy available to the Collector was to refer the matter to the arbitration of the Commissioner of the Division according to clause 16 of the lease deed which reads as under: -
If any question or dispute shall at any time arise between the Collector and the lessee with respect to the meaning or effect of any clause in this deed or the rights or liabilities of the parties thereto, then all such questions or disputes, save in so far as their decision is provided for in the said Act shall be referred to the arbitration of the Commissioner of the Division acting as such at the time of reference, whose decision shall be conclusive and binding on the parties.
In my view, the contention of the Learned Counsel is fallacious. The bare reading of clause 16 shows that it is not at all applicable to the facts of the cases in hand where proceedings have been initiated validly u/s 7 of the Act and no dispute with regard to the meaning or effect of any clause in the lease deed or the rights or liabilities of the parties under the lease deed arose.
This brings me to the contention of Mr. Kesho Ram Mahajan, Learned Counsel appearing in Civil Writs Nos. 2135 and 2153 of 1971. In these cases there is no dispute that the petitioners are sub-lessees. According to the Learned Counsel, even the sub-lessees are also entitled to be heard during the proceedings initiated by the Collector u/s 7 of the Act. It was contended by the Learned Counsel that as no notice was issued to the petitioners, the action of the Collector in taking proceedings for the ejectment of the petitioners from the land in their possession was without jurisdiction. I am afraid, I am unable to agree with this contention of the Learned Counsel. The lease was created under the Act in favour of the original lessee and u/s 7 of the Act, notice was required to be issued to him only. The sub-lessees have no independent right in the land and they cannot object to the delivery of possession to the landowners on the ground that no notice was served upon them before initiating proceedings u/s 7 of the Act. The person to whom notice is required to be issued under the Act and who has a right to raise any objection, is the lessee to whom lease is granted under the provisions of section 5 of the Act.
In Civil Writ No. 2171 of 1971, Mr. Ashri, Learned Counsel, submitted that the petitioners had purchased six acres of land from the original landowners and as such the Collector could not legally disposses the petitioners from that portion of the land. Mr. Chetan Dass, learned Additional Advocate General very fairly conceded that in case this area has been purchased by the petitioners, then they would not be dispossessed from the same and in case they have been dispossessed, the possession would be restored to them In view of this concession made by the learned Additional Advocate General, it is no more necessary to-deal with the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners, on merits.
No other point was urged by any of the counsel in the writ petitions.
For the reasons recorded, above, these petitions are dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. So far as Civil Writ No. 2171 of 1971 is concerned, as conceded by Mr. Chetan Dass, learned Additional Advocate-General, the appropriate relief would be given to the petitioners in case they establish that six acres of land were purchased by them from the original landowners. In all other respects this writ petition also stands dismissed with no order as to costs.