High CourtsSingle Bench(2013) 07 P&H CK 0896

The Gurgaon Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Another vs Presiding Officer and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 1 July 2013 · Citation: (2013) 3 SCT 768

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajiv Narain Raina, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CWP No. 12852 of 2013

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

6 paragraphs · 620 words

Rajiv Narain Raina, J.—The challenge in this petition is to the award dated 14.3.2013 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II, Gurgaon in Reference No. 3 of 2007. The reference has been partially accepted. Reinstatement has not been awarded and in lieu thereof, a lump sum compensation of Rs. 30,000/- has been directed to be paid within three months from the date of the award failing which the Management will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum till payment. The facts which are not disputed are that the respondent-workman was appointed as a Peon on 27.1.2000 in the petitioner-bank on muster rolls basis on minimum wages fixed by the Deputy Commissioner for the post of Peon in the district concerned. It is also not disputed that he was relieved from duty by an order dated 31.5.2004 issued by the Managing Director to the Branch Manager directing him to relieve four peons posted in different stations, one of which was Rajinder, the workman in the present case. This order is placed on record as Annexure P-2. No reason has been assigned in the order furnishing ground of termination.

2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on Rule 9.4 of the Haryana State Central Cooperative Bank''s Staff Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1975 to argue that the method of appointment laid down in the rule was not followed as the said Rule envisioned prior advertisement and calling of names from the Employment Exchange before selection and appointment. The respondent-workman is said to be a back-door entry to service of the petitioner-bank. Learned counsel argued that the respondent was engaged on muster rolls basis for doing the work of a peon at minimum wages fixed by the Deputy Commissioner. The appointment order dated 27.1.2000 (P-1) had been passed by the Managing Director of the Bank. The respondent had put in over 4 years and 4 months service with the bank before he was disengaged. It was argued on the strength of the appointment letter that the present case falls in the exception Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. To determine this defense, the appointment order would need to be reproduced. It reads as follows:-

Order

Sh. Rajinder s/o Sh. Chander Singh r/o Vill. Mohd. Pur (Jharsa) Distt. Gurgaon is engaged on muster rolls basis for the work of peon at D.C. rates with immediate effect and posted in B.O. Farrukh Nagar till further order.

Sd/- Managing Director

3.

This order does not fix any time or duration of employment or termination by efflux of time. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel that the case falls within the exception clause of Section 2(oo) is misdirected and misplaced. The present is not a case of termination of contract by an efflux of time. The termination would, therefore amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Retrenchment has been defined to mean "termination" by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise, then as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. Learned counsel relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar (2006) 3 SCC 81 to bring the case within the fold of Section 2(oo)(bb). The ratio of decision is in fact against the petitioner. The second part of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act postulates termination of contract of employment in terms of a stipulation contained in that behalf in the appointment letter. In the present case, there is no stipulation recited in the contract of employment. This petition is devoid of merit and is consequently dismissed at the threshold as not warranting admission for any further probe.