The Gurdaspur Central Cooperative Bank Ltd vs Bakshish Singh & Ors.

Sandeep Moudgil, J

Vide this common order, this Court shall dispose of above mentioned writ petitions as common questions of law and facts are involved therein.

For the sake of convenience, brief facts are being taken from CWP-10202-2024.

This Civil Writ Petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 (Annexure P-14) passed by respondent No.7 whereby the Appeal of the private respondents has been accepted setting aside the order dated 22.06.2017 (Annexure P-6) passed by respondent no.6.

The present writ petition has been filed by the Gurdaspur Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. assailing the order dated 07.12.2023 passed by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Hoshiarpur, whereby the appeals preferred by the private respondents were accepted and the earlier order dated 22.06.2017 was set aside. The controversy has its genesis in a fraud detected at the Kahnuwan Branch of the petitioner- Bank, involving 42 savings accounts and an amount stated to be approximately ₹1.50 crore. Pursuant thereto, departmental and criminal proceedings were initiated against the concerned employees and the Bank also invoked the mechanism of arbitration under Sections 55 and 56 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (in short ‘1961 Act’) seeking recovery of ₹6,07,200/- from the private respondents. The Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Gurdaspur, thereafter passed an award dated 23.01.2017 in favour of the Bank.

The aforesaid award was challenged in appellate proceedings and the order dated 22.06.2017 came to be passed setting aside the award. The matter thereafter travelled to this Court and, vide order dated 03.05.2023, the earlier appellate order was set aside and the appellate authority was directed to decide the appeals afresh in accordance with law, with two opportunities to each side to supplement the evidence already on record. Pursuant thereto, the matter was reheard by the Deputy Registrar, who, vide order dated 07.12.2023, again accepted the appeals of the private respondents and set aside the award dated 23.01.2017.

Aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 07.12.2023, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

The writ petition was initially dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 23.10.2024 on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy of revision under Section 69 of the 1961 Act. The learned Single Judge noticed the stand of the State that the impugned order had been passed by the Deputy Registrar in his capacity as appellate authority and that, read with Section 3(5) and Section 69 of the 1961 Act, a revision against the said order was maintainable.

The petitioner carried the matter in appeal wherein the Division Bench, vide order dated 10.09.2025, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and remanded the writ petitions for consideration on merits. However, the Division Bench expressly kept the question of law qua maintainability of revision before the Government open. Hence, this petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present writ petition is maintainable and ought to be examined on merits. It is contended that the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 was passed by the Deputy Registrar pursuant to the directions of this Court and that the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court against the said order. It is further submitted that the earlier order dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy was set aside by the Division Bench and the matter was remanded for consideration on merits.

On merits, learned counsel submits that the appellate authority failed to properly appreciate the material available on record concerning the alleged fraud involving 42 savings accounts and the loss suffered by the Bank. It is contended that the absence of certain original records could not have been treated as fatal to the Bank’s claim and that the impugned order is contrary to the material and the directions issued by this Court on 03.05.2023.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the efficacious statutory remedy of revision available under Section 69 of the 1961 Act. It is submitted that the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Registrar in his capacity as appellate authority and, having regard to Sections 3(5) and 69 of the Act, is amenable to revisional jurisdiction before the competent authority. It is thus contended that the petitioner ought not to be permitted to bypass the statutory remedy.

On merits, learned counsel submits that the impugned order was passed after adequate opportunities were afforded to both sides and upon consideration of the material produced during the rehearing. The Bank, according to the respondents, failed to produce the requisite original record to substantiate the alleged fraudulent transactions and its claim against the respondents. The appellate authority, therefore, rightly accepted the appeals and set aside the award dated 23.01.2017.

Having heard the submissions raised and the material placed on record, the question which arises for consideration at the threshold is whether this Court, notwithstanding the statutory revisional remedy available under Section 69 of the 1961 Act, ought to exercise its extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and examine the correctness of the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 (P-14).

It is pertinent to note that it is settled that the existence of an alternative remedy does not necessarily take away the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India but at the same time, the exercise of such jurisdiction is discretionary and subject to self-imposed restraints evolved by constitutional courts. It is observed that where an efficacious statutory mechanism exists, the High Court should ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition by permitting the litigant to bypass the statutory forum.

This view of mine stands strengthened by the ratio laid in the judgment of “Radha Krishan Industries vs State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, (2021) 6 SCC 771”, wherein the Supreme Court has held that although the availability of an alternative remedy does not by itself divest the High Court of its writ jurisdiction, ordinarily a writ petition ought not to be entertained where an efficacious alternative remedy is provided by law. More significantly, where a right or liability is created by a statute which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing that right or liability, resort ought to be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226.

The relevant extract of Radha Krishan Industries’s (supra) case is as under:

The same principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in “M/s South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip, (2023) 7 SCC 321”, wherein it has been emphasised that the wide constitutional power under Article 226 has to be exercised judiciously and that, where the legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of grievance by way of appeal, revision or otherwise, the High Court should ordinarily refrain from entertaining a writ petition ignoring the statutory dispensation.

This Court deems it appropriate to reiterate that constitutional courts have, as a matter of judicial self-restraint, imposed certain limitations upon the exercise of their writ jurisdiction. One such well-settled limitation is the availability of an effective and efficacious alternative remedy, in which event the High Court would ordinarily refrain from exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

However, the rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, and is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions. The High Court may nevertheless exercise its writ jurisdiction, inter alia, in cases:

where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights;

where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice;

where the order or proceedings impugned are wholly without jurisdiction; or

where the vires of a statute or statutory provision is under challenge.

Applying the above principle in the present case. The impugned order dated 07.12.2023 (Annexure P-14) is not an order passed by an authority wholly lacking jurisdiction. It is an order passed by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Hoshiarpur, while exercising appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the earlier directions of this Court. Indeed, the very stand taken on behalf of the State before the learned Single Judge was that, having regard to Sections 3(5) and 69 of the 1961 Act, the order was amenable to revision before the Government. It was on this precise basis that the learned Single Judge declined to entertain the writ petition.

Equally significant is the nature of the challenge raised by the petitioner. The grievance essentially relates to the manner in which the appellate authority appreciated the material placed before it, the evidentiary record concerning the alleged fraud, and the conclusions drawn by it while setting aside the award dated 23.01.2017 (Annexure P-5). The petitioner itself has placed before this Court the competing factual positions regarding the availability of the original record, the 42 alleged fraudulent entries, the material relied upon during the arbitration proceedings and the subsequent proceedings before the appellate authority. Such matters fall within the statutory adjudicatory and revisional framework and do not, by themselves, furnish a reason for bypassing the statutory forum.

It is equally necessary to bear in mind that the present case does not involve a challenge to the vires of any provision of the 1961 Act nor is the writ petition founded upon enforcement of a fundamental right. There is also no demonstrated case of denial of an opportunity of hearing. On the contrary, the record shows that, pursuant to the order dated 03.05.2023 (Annexure P-8), the appellate authority reheard the matter and the parties were afforded opportunities to supplement the evidence already on record. The challenge is, therefore, essentially to the legality and correctness of the decision rendered by the statutory appellate authority.

The Court is conscious that Article 226, Constitution of India confers wide powers but the distinction between existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction is fundamental and the fact that this Court can entertain a writ petition does not mean that it must entertain every writ petition notwithstanding the availability of a statutory remedy. Constitutional jurisdiction by it’s very nature is extraordinary and discretionary and it cannot ordinarily be permitted to operate as a substitute for the statutory appellate or revisional machinery consciously created by the legislature.

To entertain the present writ petition and undertake an examination of the correctness of the findings recorded by the appellate authority, while the statutory remedy of revision remains available, would effectively place this Court in the position of the revisional authority contemplated by Section 69 of the 1961 Act. Such a course would render the statutory mechanism susceptible to being bypassed at the option of a litigant. The legislature, having created a hierarchy of authorities and provided a specific revisional forum, is presumed to have intended that the statutory process be followed before the extraordinary constitutional remedy is invoked.

It is noted that the expression “alternative remedy” in such circumstances cannot be reduced to a mere technical objection. It represents a principle of institutional discipline. The statutory authority entrusted by the legislature with revisional jurisdiction must ordinarily be permitted to exercise that jurisdiction in the first instance. The legal enunciation has time and again cautioned precisely against such bypassing of statutory mechanisms.

The order of remand passed by the Division Bench recorded the joint request of the parties that the writ petitions be decided on merits rather than the appellant being sent to avail the remedy of revision, and accordingly remanded the matters while expressly keeping the question of law regarding maintainability of revision open. The said order cannot be read as a declaration that the statutory remedy stands extinguished or that the settled principles governing the exercise of Article 226 cease to apply. The question having been expressly kept open, it remains available for consideration in accordance with law.

This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the present case does not fall within any of the recognised exceptions warranting interference in writ jurisdiction despite the availability of an efficacious statutory remedy. The petitioner has not demonstrated any jurisdictional error of such nature as would justify bypassing the statutory forum; nor has it established violation of natural justice, challenge to the vires of the statute, or infringement of a fundamental right.

Consequently, it would be contrary to the settled discipline governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, Constitution to examine the correctness of the impugned order dated 07.12.2023 (Annexure P-14) when the statute itself provides a revisional mechanism for that purpose. The Court would be trenching upon the legislative scheme if it were to assume the revisional role which the legislature has entrusted to the competent authority under Section 69 of the 1961 Act.

Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the rival claims, or on the correctness of the findings recorded in the impugned order dated 07.12.2023, the present writ petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of the alternative statutory remedy. The petitioner shall be at liberty to avail the remedy of revision under Section 69 of the 1961 Act, in accordance with law. All questions on merits are left open to be considered by the competent statutory authority.

The present bunch of writ petitions is dismissed being non maintainable.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.