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Judgment
M.N. Chandurkar, C.J.—The only question which arises in this appeal is whether the first respondent herein (petitioner in W.P. 2882 of
1982) satisfies the requirements of a ''handicapped person'' as prescribed by the Government of India for the purpose of employment in the
Railway administration. By a circular in D.O. No. E(NG) II 80 RC1/67 dated 14th August, 1980 blind persons are included in the category of
handicapped persons for the purpose of reservation and employment in the Railway administration, and three per cent of posts in groups C and D
are reserved for such handicapped persons. In so far as blind persons are concerned, the degree of handicap is stated as follows:
The blind are those who suffer from either of the following conditions:
(a) Total absence of sight;
(b) visual activity not exceeding 6/60 or 20/200 (snellen) in the better eye with correcting lenses;
(c) limitation of the field of vision subtending an angle of 20 degrees or worse.
The first respondent admittedly is blind by one eye and his ophthalmic examination also revealed that his left eye is completely normal. He was
sponsored by the Employment Exchange as a blind person for being considered against groups C and D vacancies. The first respondent claiming
that since he was blind by one eye, he was entitled to be considered in the three per cent reservation of vacancies in groups C and D, made a
grievance that though his turn to be considered for appointment had come by April 1980, he was singled out and was not considered by the then
Chief Personnel Officer since he (the first respondent) belonged to the scheduled caste community. He therefore filed the writ petition in which he
prayed for the issue of a Mandamus directing the Chief Personnel Officer of the Southern Railways, Madras, to consider his sponsorship in the
quota for the physically handicapped persons in groups C and D. The appellants herein in their counter filed in the writ petition contended that the
first respondent cannot be considered as a physically handicapped person, and he could not therefore be considered for appointment in the
vacancies reserved for handicapped persons. The learned single Judge (Ramanujam, J.) who disposed of the writ petition relied on a Government
Order made by the Social Welfare Department of the State Government in G.O.Ms. No. 31 dated 4th January, 1979, according to which, the first
respondent was entitled to be treated as a handicapped person and entitled to all the benefits as a handicapped person. The learned Judge, no
doubt, mentioned in his order that the Railway administration was not bound by the order of the State Government. But according to the learned
Judge since the Railway Board was anxious to help as many blind persons as possible, the approach of the Railway authorities that the first
respondent could not be treated as a handicapped person because he was not completely blind, was not a humanitarian one. The learned Judge
took the view that a one-eyed person cannot be taken as a normal person and therefore he should be treated as a handicapped person especially
when the Railway Board has shown anxiety to help as many blind persons as possible. The learned Judge seemed to feel that instead of going in
search of persons completely blind, the authorities can as well consider the claim of partially blind persons. Accordingly, the learned Judge directed
the Railway administration to consider the case of the first respondent herein as against the reservation quota for groups C and D. It is this order of
the learned Judge that is challenged in this appeal.
Mr. G. Ramaswami, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that unless the first respondent''s blindness is brought within any of the
categories mentioned in the circular, there is no legal obligation on the part of the Railway administration to give employment to the first respondent.
The learned counsel for the first respondent however, contended that when clause (a) in the circular relating to blindness referred to ''total absence
of sight'', it does not say that the total absence of sight must be for both eyes. According to the learned counsel, since one eye of the first
respondent is totally blind, the first respondent would fall within clause (a). Even with regard to clause (b), learned counsel contends that his one
eye must be considered as the better eye and the benefit of clause (b) should be given to him.
It is now obvious that the learned Judge fell into a serious error when he tried to import the requirements specified in G.O.Ms. No. 31, Social
Welfare Department, dated 4th January, 1979, into the Railway Board Circular, for the purpose of deciding whether for the purposes of
employment under the Railway administration the first respondent was a physically handicapped person. In the said Government Order, admittedly
the State Government accepted the proposal of the Director of Employment and Training as recommended by the Director of Medical Education
and directed that one-eyed persons should be classified as physically handicapped persons. The Government Order stated that one-eyed persons
will be eligible for the various concessions and benefits extended by the Government to the physically handicapped other than the old age pension
for physically handicapped destitute sanctioned in G.O.Ms. No. 1042, Finance, dated 6th November, 1974. The fact that the State Government
classified one-eyed person as a handicapped person is wholly irrelevant for determining whether such a person has a right as against the Railway
administration to be considered for employment in the quota reserved for persons, who according to the Railway administration, were
handicapped persons. When a criterion was prescribed by the railway administration to determine what person should be classified as a
handicapped person, that was the criterion that was relevant for determining the rights of persons like the first respondent vis-a-vis the Railway
administration. Whether a particular criterion suffered from want of humanitarian approach or not was not relevant for deciding whether under the
said criterion a person was entitled to the benefits or not. The order of the learned Judge has really the effect of amending the criterion issued by
the Railway administration which clearly he was not entitled to do.
Undoubtedly, clause (a) refers to ''total absence of sight''. The very fact that that clause does not refer to total absence of sight in one eye would
indicate that the words in the said clause would normally mean total absence of sight in both eyes. That clause contemplates a person who has no
sight at all. If that clause has to be construed in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the first respondent, the words ''in any eye'' would
have been found in that clause. We have no doubt that what was intended by that clause was to provide for a person whose both eyes were blind.
So, far as clause (b) is concerned, admittedly the left eye of the first respondent herein is completely normal and there was no question of the
visual acuity of the eye not exceeding 6/60 or 20/200 with correcting tenses. The very fact that the left eye was completely normal itself would take
the case of the first respondent out of clause (b). It has been argued before us that the first respondent has set out the names of three other persons
who, according to him, were similarly handicapped and who were given appointments in the reserved quota. This is disputed by the Railway
administration. According to the Railway administration, these persons have been given employment in the regular quota and not in the reserved
quota. We do not therefore find any substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent. Accordingly, the order of the
learned Judge is set aside, the writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs in this
appeal.