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Judgment
Devan Ramachandran, J.
To the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him, the appellant mounted a defence that he cannot be so proceeded against, on account of the provisions of Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. He contends that the imputations against him, being those related to actions in furtherance of his activities as a member of a registered Trade Union, no disciplinary action could have been taken in respect thereof by the respondents.
The ambit of the afore contention would become discernible, when the essential facts are seen.
Sri.Abdul Jawad K. - learned counsel for the appellant, explained that his client is the General Secretary of the Federal Bank Employees’ Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Union’ for short); and that, in such capacity, he was leading certain movements against the Bank, in pursuit of the legitimate interests and rights of the employees. He explained that his client was part of a strike called by the Union and asserted that the same was hugely successful, with thousands of employees joining in; but alleged that he was then singled out, to be issued with Ext.P2 notice, threatening disciplinary action; followed by Ext.P4 Charge Memo and Ext.P9 intimation of commencement of enquiry. He contended that these actions fall foul of the protection his client statutorily obtains as a member of the registered Trade Union, guaranteed under Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). He alleged that the learned Single Judge, however, did not consider his client’s contentions in its proper perspective, thus to dismiss the Writ Petition; and prayed that, therefore, this Appeal be allowed.
Sri.Benny P. Thomas, learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Sri.D.Prem Kamath – learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, countered the afore submissions, first pointing out that the ‘Act’ now stands repealed by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (for short ‘the Code’); and further that an examination of Exts.P2, P4 and P9 would render it indubitable that the disciplinary action has been proposed against the appellant in his personal capacity for violating the discipline of the institution, as also the standing orders/regulations; and not in his role as leader of the Union. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the allegations against the appellant, inter alia, are that he has absented from work unauthorisedly and had violated lawfully issued instructions from the superior officers, which fall within the sweep of mischief under the Bipartite Settlement dated 10.04.2002; and hence that his clients were fully justified in initiating action against him.
Sri.Benny P. Thomas added that the provisions of Section 18 of the ‘Act’ or for that matter Section 16 of the ‘Code’, would never come to play in this case because, for one, the strike call made at the instance of the appellant was in violation of Section 22 of the ‘Act’ (as it stood then) since no prior notice had been issued; and for the second, his actions were ex facie in violation of discipline, forcibly inciting several others, who were otherwise unwilling, to break law. He asserted that, therefore, the impugned judgment is without error; and prayed that this Appeal be dismissed.
When one examines the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition, finding the same to be not maintainable, since challenge to Exts.P2, P4 and P9 proceedings – which initiates disciplinary action against the appellant – to be not tenable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
As recorded above, the thrust of the argument of the appellant is that proceedings like Exts.P2, P4 and P9 could not have been issued against him because, the allegations impelled are in his capacity as the leader of the Trade Union; and consequently, that the provisions of Section 18 of the ‘Act’ would come to operate.
For the sake of ease of reference, we extract the above said Section (which is pari materia to Section 16 of the ‘Code’) as under:
18. Immunity from civil suit in certain cases
- (1) No suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable in any Civil Court against any registered Trade Union or any 1[office-bearer] or member thereof in respect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute to which a member of the Trade Union is a party on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment, or that it is in interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or of his labour as he wills.
(2)A registered Trade Union shall not be liable in any suit or other legal proceeding in any Civil Court in respect of any tortious act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute by an agent of the Trade Union if it is proved that such person acted without the knowledge of, or contrary to express instructions given by, the executive of the Trade Union.
It is apodictic from the afore that it protects a Trade Union or its members from suits and other legal proceedings before a Civil Court in respect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute alone. Such protection does not, however, offer immunity to violations of discipline or justify conduct in breach of settlements – which are of a personal nature, in contradistinction to civil law liabilities qua a class action.
As far as this case is concerned, the allegations in Exts.P2 and P4 are that the appellant had violated the disciplinary regulations of the institution and had absented from duty in spite of lawful instructions. Of course, there is also an insinuation that he incited various other workers to go on a strike, which was called in violation of Section 22(1) of the ‘Act’.
By any manner of reading of the impugned orders, it does not disclose that the appellant is being proceeded against for action in his capacity as the member of the Union, than for his conduct as an employee of the Bank - which are alleged to be in violation of the Bipartite Settlement and other applicable regulations/instructions relating to discipline.
We cannot find favour with the submissions of Sri.Abdul Jawad that, if a person is a member/leader of a Trade Union, he cannot be proceeded disciplinarily for any action he commits, purportedly in furtherance of a claim or dispute; and that even actions which are contrary to law stand protected. The capacity of the appellant – as he himself professes – is that of an employee and the leader of the Union. His actions as a member of the Union perhaps can attract the protection under Section 18 of the ‘Act’, but only with respect to suits and legal proceedings before a Civil Court. This provision will surely not protect him from the consequences of his action as an employee, particularly when the impugned proceedings impute that he had absented from duty without permission; and when he is alleged to have violated stipulations of Bipartite Settlement qua maintenance of discipline.
We, therefore, find favour with the impugned judgment; and consequently dismiss this Appeal.
APPENDIX OF WA NO. 1562 OF 2025
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure-A1 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH RESPONDENT DATED 17/07/2023
Annexure-A2 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL) DATED 16/10/2024
Annexure-A3 A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO OF CHARGES ISSUED AGAINST THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE APPELLANT DATED 18/07/2024
