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Judgment
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by consent of parties.
Petitioner/acquiring body takes exception to order dated 09.05.2025 passed by Civil Judge Senior Division, Chalisgaon below Exhibit-1 in Regular Darkhast respectively, whereby petitioner’s objection to executability of award passed under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act came to be rejected.
On 14.03.1996, notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act was published for acquisition of lands for Boris M.I. Tank, Taluka Chalisgaon. On 31.03.1999, Special Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred as ‘SLAO’) passed award under Section 11 of the Act. The respondents/land owners made references under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act seeking enhanced compensation. On 25.04.2000, Reference Court passed an award granting enhanced compensation. On 10.02.2004, petitioner filed First Appeals before this Court raising challenge to award passed by Reference Court. Meanwhile, respondents/claimants filed Regular Darkarst for execution of award. Meanwhile, acquiring body deposited part of awarded amount in Executing Court. Again on or about March 2010, acquiring body deposited further amount in Execution.
On 23.03.2010, respondents/claimants made application seeking permission to withdraw amount deposited by acquiring body. The Executing Court allowed their application. Thereafter, claimants filed pursis in execution stating that award has been fully satisfied, hence, execution petition be disposed of. Eventually, on 15.07.2010, Executing Court passed order below Exhibit-1 which reads thus :
“By way of Pursis (Exh.22), the D.H. has stated that the decree is fully satisfied. Hence, in view of the said pursis, the execution is disposed off”.
Even after disposal of execution proceeding, appeal filed by acquiring body against award passed by Reference Court was pending and ultimately came to be dismissed on 17.01.2017.
On 25.04.2024, respondents/claimants filed fresh proceedings for execution of award alleging that some part of awarded amount is still recoverable. Eventually, the SLAO issued letter to acquiring body to deposit compensation amount as claimed in execution. The petitioner responded to SLAO pointing out that entire amount as per award is deposited and execution proceeding filed by claimants has been disposed of being satisfied. The petitioner filed objection to maintainability of darkhast firstly on the ground that fresh darkhast is not maintainable in law as previous darakhast proceeding has been disposed on satisfaction of award. Secondly, darkhast is hopelessly barred by limitation.
The Executing Court rejected petitioner's objection holding that execution proceeding is well within limitation, as it has been filed within period of 12 years from the date of dismissal of appeal of petitioner/acquiring body. Secondly, there is no bar for taking up second execution, if earlier execution proceeding is closed on part payment of amount.
Mr. Tambe, learned advocate appearing for petitioner submits that pendency of First Appeal filed by petitioner or its dismissal in the year 2017 has no consequence upon counting of limitation period under Article 136 of Limitation Act. According to him, first darkhast initiated by respondents was disposed of being satisfied in the year 2010. Second darkhast for execution of self same award filed in the year 2024 i.e. after 12 years is barred by limitation prescribed under Article 136 of Limitation Act, so also same is not maintainable in law.
In support of his contention, he relies upon observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Manohar s/o Shankar Nale and Others Vs. Jaipalsing s/o Shivlalsing Rajpur reported in (2008) 1 SCC 520 to contend that decree becomes enforceable immediately after its passing and unless it is stayed, execution petition is required to be filed within a period of 12 years. He also relies upon observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Bimal Kumar and Another Vs. Shakuntala Debi and Others reported in (2012) 3 SCC 548 to contend that when no order of stay of operation of judgment and decree was passed by any court, decree becomes executable immediately. The application for execution of decree passed beyond 12 years would be barred by limitation. Filing of an appeal would not affect enforceability of decree, unless appellate court stays its operation. Only in case appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the Lower Court, Appellate Courts decree would become enforceable.
Per contra, Mr. P.B. Patil, learned advocate appearing for respondents/claimants heavily relies upon observations in case of Gajanan Vs. Pralhad in Civil Appeal No.3524 of 2026 decided on 18.03.2026, wherein Supreme Court clarified that dismissal of an appeal for default amounts to a final disposal and such dismissal has effect of confirming lower court's decision on merits. Hence, execution application filed within 12 years from the date of appellate court's dismissal order is within limitation period. Mr. Patil would further submit that merely because earlier execution petition was disposed of as per pursis filed by respondents/claimants, they would not lose their right to seek further execution of award, till decree is satisfied in real sense.
Having considered submissions advanced by learned advocates appearing of respective parties, this Court finds that following points arise for consideration in this appeal :
Whether execution proceeding filed by respondents is barred by limitation?
Whether second execution proceeding is maintainable once first execution proceeding has been disposed on satisfaction recorded by decree holder?
Undisputedly, on 25.04.2000, Reference Court passed an award under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act granting enhanced compensation to respondents/claimants. They filed execution proceeding. The petitioner/acquiring body initially deposited part of awarded amount which was permitted to be withdrawn by respondents/decree holders. Later on, petitioner/acquiring body deposited second installment of compensation amount on or about 05.03.2010. The respondents/claimants were permitted to withdraw amount deposited by petitioner. Eventually, they filed pursis regarding satisfaction of decree. Accordingly, Executing Court disposed darkhast by order dated 15.07.2010. It is also admitted that acquiring body had filed first appeal raising challenge to judgment and award passed by Reference Court and same has been dismissed by this Court in the year 2017. Pertinently, this Court had never stayed execution of decree passed by Reference Court. In this backdrop, respondents filed fresh execution proceeding in the year 2024 alleging that there is still balance to be recovered as per award of Reference Court.
Prima facie, if limitation is counted from date of award of Reference Court or even from date of disposal of first execution proceeding, second execution proceeding filed in the year 2024 is beyond 12 years. However, if date of dismissal of appeals filed by acquiring body is considered, second execution proceedings are within limitation period of 12 years prescribed under Article 136 of Limitation Act. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the very same issue in case of Gajanan (Supra) and observed in para 21 and 22 which reads thus :
“21.The upshot of this discussion is that an appeal is intrinsically a continuation of the suit and thus, even if an appeal against an order or decree of the Trial Court is dismissed on any preliminary or technical ground, such as limitation or non-prosecution, rather than the merits of the case, it still gives rise to a fresh starting point for the limitation period for execution of such order or decree. The original decree of the Trial Court cannot be deemed as "final" as long as the appeal against the same remains pending. Thus, the order of dismissal of the appeal finally disposes of the matter and confirms the decree of the Trial Court, even if such dismissal is for reason of non-prosecution.
22.The order dated 25.11.2004, which dismissed the appeal in default, was thus a "final order" as it finally confirmed the decree of the Trial Court and disposed of the appeal. Therefore, the limitation period for execution of the decree dated 03.12.1999 accrued on the date of dismissal of the appeal i.e. 25.11.2004 and the execution application filed on 04.12.2015 was within time, if we compute the period of 12 years from 25.11.2004.”
In light of aforesaid exposition of law, in facts of present case, limitation period needs to be reckoned from dismissal of appeals filed by petitioner against award of Reference Court. Since petitioner's appeal has been dismissed by this Court on 17.01.2017, execution proceeding filed on 25.04.2024 by respondents/decree holders would be within period of limitation.
Second point is as regards to maintainability of second execution proceeding for recovery of compensation amount. This Court finds that previous execution proceeding filed by petitioners was disposed on their pursis stating that they have received amount and execution proceeding may be disposed of. The order passed below Exhibit-1 in execution shows that it has been disposed in view of pursis. Neither petitioners had given exact calculation of compensation amount which was recoverable by them, nor deposits made by petitioner were tallied with dues of award. In this backdrop, unless there is specific finding of Executing Court that award as passed by Reference Court is fully satisfied and decree holders have received entire amount of compensation or they specifically waived balance to be received, disposal of execution proceeding would not bar filing of consecutive execution proceedings for recoverable dues of compensation amount. Nothing is brought to the notice of this Court that second execution would be barred, if respondents/decree holders can demonstrate on the basis of arithmetical calculations that there are recoverable dues as per award from judgment debtor.
In result, this Court finds no fault in impugned order passed by Executing Court while rejecting petitioner's objection. Needless to state here that this Court has not expressed any opinion, as to whether there is recoverable amount or dues of compensation amount as per award. The petitioner shall be at liberty to demonstrate that decree/award as passed by Reference Court is fully satisfied and no dues recoverable have been left as per award.
Hence, writ petitions stand dismissed with aforesaid observations.
Rule is discharged.
At this stage, Mr. Tambe, learned advocate appearing for petitioner seeks continuation of interim relief for four weeks, since petitioner may explore possibility of approaching Supreme Court. In light of submissions advanced, interim relief that was operating till today to continue for further four weeks.