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Judgment
G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice
The present judgment shall dispose of four Letters Patent Appeals, i.e. LPA No.560 of 2026, titled as the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Dalhousie Vs. Amar Singh, arising out of the judgment passed in CWP No. 5629 of 2026, LPA No.561 of 2026, titled as the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Dalhousie Vs. Kamal Nath, arising out of CWP No. 5623 of 2026, LPA No.569 of 2026, titled as the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Dalhousie Vs. Chaman Singh, arising out of CWP No. 5624 of 2026, all dated 22.04.2026 and LPA No.582 of 2026, arising out of the judgment passed in CWP No. 6933 of 2026, dated 07.05.2026.
The learned Single Judge, in sum and substance, has upheld the orders passed by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Kangra at Dharamshala, (for short ‘the Labour Court’), dated 16.09.2025 (in LPA Nos. 560 of 2026, 561 of 2026 and 569 of 2026) and dated 17.10.2025 in LPA No. 582 of 2026, whereby applications filed by the respondents-workmen under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’) had been allowed and directions had been issued that the workmen were entitled to the quantified amount towards full wages from the date of the award to the date of their re-engagement alongwith interest @ 6% per annum till its realization.
The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge to uphold the said order passed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act was that the Award had been subject matter of an unsuccessful challenge, firstly, by way of a Writ Petition and secondly, by way of a Letters Patent Appeal, and thereafter by way of a Special Leave Petition. The workmen had resorted to execution proceedings on account of the Civil Court having directed so. Since the workmen were eventually reinstated during the pendency of the litigation, in such circumstances, they were entitled to claim wages for the intervening period during which they were kept out of service, despite being successful in the Award.
The argument which has been raised by the learned Counsel for the State is that the applications filed under Section 33-C (2) of the Act were not maintainable and, therefore, the Labour Court erred as such in entertaining the said applications.
Keeping in view the fact that the question of law is similar, we take the facts from LPA No. 560 of 2026, which arises out of Civil Writ Petition No. 5629 of 2026, in the case of Amar Singh.
The undisputed facts are that the workman, having been employed as a daily-waged Beldar in July, 1995, had found himself unemployed on account of the termination notice dated 09.11.2000. Resultantly, a Reference was made to the Labour Court by the State as to whether the termination was justified and whether the employee was entitled to back wages, seniority, past service benefits, etc.
The Labour Court vide its order dated 14.05.2013, came to the conclusion that there was a violation of the provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and resultantly, directed the immediate reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service and seniority from the date of his termination i.e. 15.11.2000, while denying back wages. Directions were also issued to the respondent-State to consider the case of the workman for the regularization of his services in accordance with the policies framed by the State Government from time to time.
The Award was subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 4370 of 2014, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another Vs. Amar Singh, wherein it was noticed that juniors as such had been employed and that the workman had duly completed 240 days in each calendar year from 1996 to 2000. Resultantly, the writ petition was dismissed on 20.08.2016.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the State had filed LPA No. 59 of 2018, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & another Vs. Amar Singh, which had also been dismissed on 12.12.2018.
Thereafter, the State preferred an appeal before the Apex Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.(s) 41349/2019, which was also dismissed 08.01.2020.
Apparently, during the proceedings, an application bearing No. 234/2018 was filed for execution of the Award dated 14.05.2013 passed by the Labour Court, in the year 2018, which was further transferred to the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Dalhousie for adjudication, which upon hearing the matter on 18.10.2019, issued a warrant for attachment against the moveable property of the office of the Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Dalhousie.
In view of the said coercive steps, vide letter dated 06.11.2019, permission was granted for the re-engagement of the employee, subject to the final outcome of the Special Leave Petition proposed to be filed against the dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal.
The relevant part of the said order reads as under:-
“Whereas this office therefore further obtained legal opinion from Govt. vide letter No. IPH-A-E (3) 127/2019 dated 26.09.2010 to assail further in the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which is proposed to be filed against the dismissal of the LPA in the instant matter.
Whereas Sh. Amar Singh has filed an application U/S 29 of the Industrial Dispute Act for execution of the award dated 14.05.2013 passed by the Ld. Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Dharasmhala, which was further transferred to Hon'ble Ld. Civil Judge Jr. Division, Dalhousie for adjudication. After hearing the matter on 18.10.2019, Hon'ble Ld. Civil Judge Jr. Division, Dalhousie issued the warrant for attachment of moveable property to the office of Executive Engineer, I&PH Division, Dalhousie.
Whereas this office again submitted the case to the Govt. for re-engagement of the applicant through Engineer-in-Chief, I&PH Department, Shimla letter No. IPH-(LC) LPA No. 59/2018 (Amar Singh)-3768-70 dated 24.10.2019 and the Secretary (I&PH) to the Govt. of HP, Shimla vide letter No. IPH-A-E (3) 133/2019 dated 08.11.2019 grant the permission/sanction/approval to re-engage the petitioner Sh. Amar Singh (Beldar) subject to final outcome of the SLP, proposed to be filed against the dismissal of the LPA in the Instant matter.
Therefore, in view of permission/sanction/approval accorded vide worthy Secretary (I&PH) letter mentioned above, Sh. Amar Singh S/O Kimat Ram, Beldar (applicant/petitioner in CWP No. 4370/2014) is hereby re-engaged on daily wages Beldar with immediate effect on purely on daily wage basis.”
Vide order dated 19.12.2019, the pay of the workman was fixed subject to the pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court and he was also granted the benefit of regularization.
Thereafter, on 01.10.2024 the workman preferred an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, quantifying the amount claimed to be due to him for the intervening period from the passing of the Award till the date of his joining. The said application was allowed by the Labour Court vide order dated 16.09.2025, determining the computed amount at Rs.19,52,998/-. It was specifically mentioned in the said order that the applicant remained un-employed and was not gainfully employed in any Government or Semi-Government Department w.e.f. 14.05.2013 to 05.11.2019 (i.e from the date of the Award till the date of his actual re-engagement) and that on 10.06.2013, he had appeared for re-engagement before the Executive Engineer and he was informed that the Department was going to file a Civil Writ Petition against the Award and resultantly, CWP No. 4370 of 2014 was filed before this Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 20.08.2016. It has also been mentioned that thereafter, Letters Patent Appeal No. 59 of 2018 was filed against the judgment passed in the aforesaid writ petition, which was also dismissed vide order dated 12.12.2018. Thereafter, the workman again represented before the respondent-Department for re-engagement in service, but he was not re-engaged and was kept unemployed for a long time. On account of failure to implement the Award, he filed an application under Section 11(9) of the Act, for execution of the Award which was sent to the Civil Court.
In the reply filed to the said application, the plea taken by the State is that the applicant never approached the Department for re-engagement and that the Award now stands implemented, once the Department lost its legal battle. As he had not filed any application under Section 17(B) of the Act, he could not be allowed the wages/salary for the period during which he had not actually performed any work with the respondent-Department. Apparently, no objection was raised regarding the maintainability of the petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, which is now sought to be argued by the learned State Counsel.
The Labour Court vide its order dated 16.09.2025, keeping in view the affirmative statement made on affidavit, was of the considered opinion that the applicant remained unemployed and was not gainfully employed in any Government or Semi-Government Department during the said period. It further noted that no stay order was operating nor had any notice been issued to the respondent to join the service. His joining was permitted only after the execution of the Award without any fault on part of the workman, thus, the State had deliberately delayed the joining of the writ petitioner and, therefore, he was entitled to wages as per the regular pay scale. Resultantly, he was entitled to the amount, which had been duly quantified.
We are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly relied upon the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 9008 of 2022, titled as D.N. Krishnappa Versus the Deputy Manager, dated 12.12.2022, wherein the issue had also been raised whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, awarding wages for the period in question, i.e from 18.07.2007 to 23.09.2013, (from the date of award to the date of reinstatement).
In the said case, reliance upon the judgment in Bombay Chemical Industries Vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner & Another, 2022(5) SCC 629 had been rejected by the learned Apex Court, by coming to the conclusion that the employee could not be made to suffer when the employer was litigating and had obtained a stay regarding reinstatement and eventually, had been unsuccessful as such. The order of reinstatement would relate back to the original order passed by the Labour Court and accordingly, the judgment in Bombay Chemical Industries’ case, (supra), had been distinguished on the ground that it did not involve an un-adjudicated claim. In the present case, as noticed, the claim already stood adjudicated inter-se the parties, since there was an Award dated 14.05.2013 in favour of the workman.
Reference can be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak (1995) 1 SCC 235, whereby it has been held that the Labour Court’s jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is like that of an executing Court and that it can only interpret the award or settlement, on which the claim is based. As noticed, there was a pre-existing benefit flowing as such and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court could not be excluded.
The provisions of Section 33-C(2) read as under:-
“(2)Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months.”
From a perusal of the aforesaid, it can be made out that the entitlement to receive a benefit from the employer was capable of being computed in terms of money and, therefore, the petition as such was maintainable for the execution of the Award in question.
In similar circumstances, in the judgment rendered in LPA No. 458 of 2012, titled as The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Cement Corporation of India & another Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court & others, dated 25.04.2026, we have held that if the claim is already ripe and in the form of execution, the application under Section 33-C (2), can be held to be maintainable. Once there is a pre-existing right already adjudicated upon, there would be no bar as such for the Labour Court. Resultantly, no fresh computation as such was required and the learned Single Judge was thus justified in dismissing the writ petition, as the State as such could not be permitted to benefit from failing to implement the Award for over four years.
In State Bank of India Versus Ram Chandra Debey & others, (2001) 1 SCC 73, a distinction between a pre-existing benefit and one flowing from a pre-existing right was kept in mind. It was accordingly held that a pre-existing right falls within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court while exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, whereas a claim without a pre-existing right may not as such. In the said case, the Apex Court was dealing with the Labour Court’s decision, whereby the computation of back wages had been done without any such benefit having been granted when the Award had been passed reinstating the workman in service. Resultantly, the appeal had been allowed and the Award of the Labour Court, as affirmed by the High Court, was set aside and the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act was dismissed.
In the present case, as noticed, a pre-existing benefit as such was being adjudicated upon by the Labour Court since directions had been given to reinstate the workman forthwith. Having not been successful in the challenge to the Award, the State was under an obligation to comply with the Award and cannot now submit that it is not liable to pay the dues for the intervening period.
The relevant portion of the Ram Chandra Debey’s case (supra) reads as under:-
“8.The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows:
Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C(2) of the Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered, just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages.”
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a piece of beneficial legislation enacted to ameliorate the difficulties of workmen. The workman having successfully secured an order of reinstatement, it was unjustified on the part of the State to deny the benefits of reinstatement for a long period, and, therefore, the responsibility has thus to be fixed on the State itself for not permitting the workman to join. Thus, it cannot shirk from its responsibility of paying wages for the intervening period. Once the Award was not stayed, the workman could not also file an application under Section 17-B of the Act for payment of last drawn wages also.
In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the present set of appeals. Accordingly, the same are dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.