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Judgment
G. Narendra, J.—Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Respondent No. 3 has remained ex-parte.
The facts of the case is as follows: -
"One Yamanurappa was employed as a driver by the third respondent in the vehicle bearing registration No. MEZ-7932 and has been paid a monthly salary of Rs. 4,500/- and he was aged about 25 years as on the date of the accident."
On 30.04.2005 when the said Yamanurappa was proceeding on the instructions of third respondent from Bagalkot to Hospet on NH-13, and when the said vehicle reached the limits of Munirabad Police Station, another lorry dashed against this vehicle due to which the said vehicle slid into the ditch and sustained damage. The said Yamanurappa was shocked by the accident, as a result of shock, he committed suicide in the vicinity of the accident spot. Consequent to the suicide the jurisdictional police have registered a case against the deceased in U.D.R. No. 16/2005 and with regard to the accident a case was registered in Crime No. 83/2005. Hence, the claimants being the LRs of the deceased Yamanurappa filed the petition for compensation. The respondent No. 3/employer appeared before the Commissioner and has filed statement admitting the employment, the accident, and committing of suicide by the deceased.
The appellant herein who is the insurer appeared before the Commissioner and filed the statement and contended that the death by suicide is not death on account of an accident arising out of or in the course of employment. It was also contended that the deceased was not licensed to drive the offending vehicle, which is a heavy goods vehicle and the deceased possessed a license only to drive the Light Motor Vehicle. It was also contended that the deceased was not a workman. The Commissioner framed six issues;-
The second issue is relevant for consideration i.e. if the deceased is considered to be a workman, whether the accident (suicide) occurred when the deceased was in the course of employment or arising out of the employment. The Commissioner has rendered a finding in the affirmative holding that the deceased committed suicide on account of the accident which had occurred and as the accident had occurred in the course of his employment i.e. while discharging his duty as a driver and he committed suicide on account of his apprehension regarding the repercussion that he may have to face at the hands of the owner would amount to arising out of the employment and hence it was held by the Commissioner that the appellant insurer is liable to compensate the claims on behalf of the employer insured.
The matter is listed for admission as the matter pertains to the year 2010 and is in respect of a claim pertaining to the year 2005, it is taken up for final disposal with the consent of the counsels and the following substantial question of law is framed:--
"Whether a suicide amounts to death on account of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment"?
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the suicide can never be equated to a death occurring in the course of or arising out of an employment. He would submit that the policy does not relate to and cover a death caused on account of suicide and the purport and the objective of the policy is only to cover death or injuries occurring on account of an accident which is caused in the course of employment or arises out of employment. He would further submit that the Act of suicide is a punishable offence and anyone who attempts to commit suicide is liable to be punished with simple imprisonment which may extend up to one year or with fine or with both as per the provisions of Section 309 of IPC. He would also draw the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 306 of IPC, which makes abetment to suicide punishable by a term which may extend up to 10 years. Thus he would state that the order of the Commissioner amounts to unjust and richment of a tortfeaser. He would submit that death by suicide is not visualized under the W.C. Act, and he would also take this Court through Part I and II of Schedule I to demonstrate that apprehension or the state of mind is not deemed to be an injury. He would also draw the attention of the Court to Schedule III, which details the list of occupational deceased and mental condition is not one of them. He would argue that unless and until death or injury is caused on account of any one of the decease listed in Schedule III or on account of an accident subject to the condition that the accident occurs in the course of or arises in the course of employment, no liability can be fastened on the insurer and he would pray for setting aside of the impugned award of the Commissioner.
Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that the deceased committed the suicide only on account of his fear of the repercussions that he may have to face at the hands of the owner of the offending vehicle on account of the accident. He would state that is the reason that has been ascribed by the cleaner, who was accompanying the deceased and that has been investigated and accepted by the investigating authority. He also submits that though there is no statutory liability on the part of the insurer. He would submit that the compensation awarded is sustainable on account of the contractual liability as mandated under the provisions of Section 147 of M.V. Act and he would submit that the proximate cause for the suicide is accident. He would submit that the suicide has been committed in the vicinity where the accident took place and hence he would submit that it must be deemed to be an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
To sum up the contention of the respondents, it is nothing but equating deliberate and motivated act of an individual to an accident. The above facts reveal that the death is on account of suicide only and the same is also demonstrated by the police records and the post mortem report. Though the suicide as such is not punishable under the Indian Penal Code because the offender is no more available for law to take its course nor can a dead person be proceed against. But attempting to suicide is punishable offence. The Legal and Medical Dictionary describes suicide as follows;
"A suicide "is one who deliberately puts an end to his own existence, or commits any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death, as if, attempting to kill another, he runs upon his antagonist''s sword, or, shooting at another, the gun bursts and kills himself."
The word suicide is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as follows;
"the action of killing oneself intentionally"
This conjoint reading of the description and the definition of the word suicide, the view point that can be unanimously arrived at, without any quarrel is that it is an act of destruction which is committed intentionally with the objective of achieving his desired end.
The word accident is neither defined under the W.C. Act or the M.V. Act and rules or the IPC. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the accident as "unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally, typically result in damage or injury".
The word accident means an act involving a fortuitous or sudden or unintended occurrence or is an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
The meaning ascribed as to the respective words, both in the English Dictionary and in the Legal and Medical Dictionary, clearly brings out the distinction between the said two acts. An Accident is misfortune or unintended act and is neither deliberate nor the result is intended or desired. In contradiction the act of suicide, is an act which is executed to achieve the intended or desired results. That being the case, it cannot be stated that a suicide is an act of a mishap or misfortune neither is it one that takes place on one''s foresight or expectation.
Now the questions that arises are,
"Whether the Workmen''s Compensation Act or the Motor Vehicles Act entitle the heirs or legal representatives of a deceased workman to compensation where the death is on account of accident or suicide?"
A reading of Section 3 Chapter II of the Workmen''s Compensation Act clearly states that employers liability for compensation is on account of a personal injury caused to a workman by ''accident'' arising out of and in the course of his employment. The intendment of both the Acts is to compensate a person who is not a tortfeasor and to compensate a person if he has suffered any misfortune on account of any incident arising out of or in the course of employment.
The contention of the respondent that it is a contractual liability on account of the insurer having obtained extra premium is unacceptable. He would also point out that there is no condition or the term in the policy which prohibits suicide and hence, he would submit that it must be inferred that the insurer is also liable to compensate on account of a death arising out of a suicide. He would admit that the terms and conditions of the policy specifically do not entitle one to compensation on account of suicide. But the same must be inferred because the same is not the terms and conditions on which the insurer can reject his liability and absolve himself. The contention does not hold water for the simple reason that suicide is an offence as is a punishable offence under the Indian Penal Code and there cannot be any contract, which would reward the commission of an offence.
In view of the above facts and discussion, it is held that the very claim petition itself is not maintainable. Hence, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant. Accordingly, appeal is allowed. The order of the Commissioner for Workmen''s Compensation dated 22.01.2010 is hereby set aside.
Amount in deposit is directed to be refunded to the appellant along with the accrued interest.