High CourtsDivision Bench(2001) 07 MAD CK 0012

The District Collector, The Secretary to Government, Rural Development Department, The Director of Rural Development and The Commissioner of Panchayat Union vs J. Jagaraja and The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal

Madras High Court · Decided on 16 July 2001

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.S. Sirpurkar, J · P.K. Misra, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 1071 of 1999 and W.M.P. No. 1482 of 1999

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Judgment

63 paragraphs · 1,313 words

P.K. Misra, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the District Collector, Thanjavur, the Secretary to Government, Rural Development

Department, Chennai and two other officials challenging the order dated 12.10.1998 in R.A. No. 88 of 1996 in OA. No. 556 of 1993 passed by

the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal.

2.

First Respondent is the son of one Thiru S. John Boomani. Aforesaid John Bwmani died in harness on 29.6.1977 while working as Rural

Welfare Officer Grade-I. His date of superannuation would have been 31.3.1987, had be not expired on 29.6.1977. The first Respondent is the

second son of the aforesaid deceased person, who had left behind his widow, a daughter and another son. The first Respondent was temporarily

appointed as Junior Assistant on compassionate ground by the District Collector, Thanjavur, by the proceedings in Rc. No. 7960/88-1 dated

16.2.1988. Subsequently proposal was sent to the Government for regularising the appointment of the first Respondent. The Government after

examining the papers, instructed the first Petitioner to terminate the services of the first Respondent as per the Government letter No. 61334/E-

4/89-7 RD dated 25.07.1990 on the ground that at the time of death of late John Boomani, his widow, who is the mother of the first Respondent

was employed as a teacher in Panchayat Union School. However, Collector the first Petitioner, submitted a reply that by the time of appointment

of the first Respondent, his mother, the widow of late John Boomani had already retired from the service and appointment of the first Respondent

on compassionate ground was proper. Subsequently the second Petitioner directed to terminate the services of the first Respondent and

accordingly necessary orders were issued by the first Petitioner in proceedings RC.24643/87/K-3 dated 18.1.1993 terminating the services of the

first Respondent.

3.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, the first Respondent filed OA. No. 556 of 1993 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative

Tribunal. The Tribunal after hearing both the parties, allowed the application of the first Respondent and quashed the order of termination dated

18.1.1993 and directed reinstatement of the first Respondent in service by the order dated 17.11.1995. The Tribunal was of the view that the

impugned order terminating the services of the first Respondent had been passed without following the principles of natural justice, as admittedly no

opportunity has been given to the first Respondent in the matter relating to termination of his service. Thereafter the present Petitioners filed a

Review Application before the Administrative Tribunal in R.A. No. 88 of 1996, which was dismissed by the order dated 12.10.1998. Aforesaid

subsequent order of the Tribunal rejecting the Review Application is being impugned in the present Writ petition.

4.

We have heard Thiru S. Srinivasan, Government Advocate representing the Petitioners. However the counsel for the first Respondent was

absent at the time of hearing.

5.

learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that at the time of death of John Boomani, his wife, the mother of the present first Respondent was

in service and the order of appointment on compassionate ground had been made on the basis of a misrepresentation about true state of affairs,

and therefore, the services of the first Respondent was rightly terminated and the Tribunal should not have interfered in such an order of

termination.

6.

It is to be noted that the Tribunal had quashed the order of termination solely on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been

followed while terminating the services of the present first Respondent. It is of course true that the first Respondent had been temporarily

appointed.

7.

In the present case, the termination was on the allegation that at the lime of initial appointment, there had been misrepresentation. Since

termination was made on the basis of certain factual assumptions which might or might not have been correct, principles of natural justice required

that an opportunity should have been given to the first Respondent to explain the circumstances. Even from the subsequent reply of the Collector,

the first Petitioner, it appears that at the time of appointment of the first Respondent, his mother had already retired. Materials on record indicate

that the proposal for appointment of the first Respondent was made in the year 1988 and by then the mother of the first Respondent had already

retired from services. Prima facie it cannot be said that there had been any misrepresentation on the part of the first Respondent in the absence of

specific materials on record. Moreover, even assuming that there had been any misrepresentation before terminating the services, the first

Respondent should have been given an opportunity to explain the circumstances. It cannot be said that the Tribunal had committed any error of law

apparent on the face of record while allowing the application of the first Respondent and in quashing the order of termination.

8.

It is to be noted that foe decision of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 556 of 1993 has not been impugned and only the subsequent order rejecting the

Review Application lias been impugned in the present Writ petition. Even though there is a provision u/s 23(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunal Act

enabling the Tribunal to review its own decision, the law is well settled that power of review cannot be equated with power of appeal. Reviewing

Authority can review the earlier decision only on certain United grounds and the power of review cannot be exercised merely on the ground that he

earlier decision was erroneous. A power to review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected

but lies only for correcting paten error apparent on the face of the record. Since there was no such patent error in the earlier order of the Tribunal,

it cannot be said that the Tribunal has committed any error of law by rejecting the Review Application.

9.

Law is settled that the High Court while dealing with Writ of Certiorari does not sit as an appellate court over the decision of the Tribunal and

there cannot be interference in such matters, unless there is error of law apparent on the face of record. In the present case, upon the facts and

circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the Tribunal while rejecting the Review Application of the present Petitioners has committed any

error of law apparent on the face of record. The Tribunal had allowed the Original Application mainly on the ground of violation of principles of

natural justice. In the peculiar facts and circumstance of the case, even though the first Respondent was a temporary government servant, we are of

the view that before terminating his services on the assumption that there had been misrepresentation of facts, principles of natural justice should

have been followed,

10.

In the present case, the Tribunal had directed reinstatement of the first Respondent. Even assuming that at the time of death of his father, he

was not eligible to be appointed on compassionate ground as his mother was working as teacher, the order of appointment on compassionate

ground need not be nullified as a matter of course in exercise of Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled

that Writ of Certiorari is a high prerogative writ and not a writ of course. Even assuming that there had been some illegality in the order of Tribunal,

since substantial justice had been done by directing reinstatement of the first Respondent in service, it is not a fit case where the order of the

Tribunal should be interfered with.

11.

For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merits in the Writ Petition which is accordingly dismissed along with W.M.P. No. 1482 of 1999.

However, since there is no appearance of the counsel for the first Respondent at the time of hearing, we do not impose any costs on the

Petitioners.