High CourtsDivision Bench(2018) 01 MAD CK 0546

The District Collector vs V.Jeyakodi

Madras High Court · Decided on 3 January 2018

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.Sathyanarayanan, R.Hemalatha
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
187 of 2017

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Judgment

102 paragraphs · 2,076 words
1.

The respondent herein made a challenge to the order, dated 10.03.2006, passed by the Collector of Theni District, with a consequential

direction, directing the said official to include his name in the approval list of Tahsildars, for the year 2005 according to his seniority with all

benefits, within a stipulated time frame. The writ petition, after contest, came to be disposed of, on 03.09.2010, by directing the said respondent to

include the name of the respondent herein, for the year 2006.

2.

Thereafter, the respondent herein, filed W.P(MD)No.11771 of 2012, praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing the Principal

Secretary and Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chennai - 5 to pass appropriate orders on the proposal sent by the District Collector of

Theni District, vide his letter, dated 02.02.2011, based on the order, dated 03.09.2010, passed in W.P(MD)No.4503 of 2006, within the

stipulated time frame, as may be fixed by this Court. The said writ petition was disposed of, on 30.03.2016, by directing the first respondent

therein to pass orders on the proposal sent by the second respondent, dated 02.02.2011, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt

of a copy of that order. The sole official respondent in W.P(MD)No.4503 of 2006, aggrieved by the nature of disposal given, vide order, dated

03.09.2010, came forward to file the writ appeal, with a delay of 2219 days and in order to condone the same, the present petition has been filed.

3.

It is relevant to extract paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition:

I submit that the order was passed on 03.09.2010. Order copy was received on 27.10.2010. Thereafter papers were sent to the higher officials

for administrative sanction. As per the direction of Higher Officials we have approached Additional Government Pleader, for opinion which was

given to the effect that it may not fit case for appeal on 26.11.2010. The same was forwarded to Higher officials seeking appropriate orders for

implementation, by respondents'' proceedings dated 02.02.2011. However, the papers got mixed up with other bundles at Secretariat and despite

hectic efforts could not be traced out. Due to change of officers, no further steps seems to have been taken thereafter. Only when Judgment dated

30.03.2016 in W.P(MD)No. 11771 of 2012 was brought to knowledge of Revenue Administration Commissioner, the issue came to light. After

hectic efforts, files were traced in the mid of November 2016 and second opinion from Additional Advocate General sought for and opinion was

given to the effect fit case for appeal on 22.11.2016. Thereafter papers were sent for administrative sanction. Thereafter the appeal was made

ready and given for filing with a delay of 2219 days. The delay in filing is due to the bonafide reasons afore stated and it is neither willful nor

wanton. If the said delay was not condoned it will cause grave prejudice and irreparable hardship and heavy loss to the petitioner on the other

hand no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to the respondent"".

4.

The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the petitioner/appellant would submit that on the crucial date, i.e., on 01.07.2006, the

respondent was given punishment of censure, vide proceedings, dated 27.08.2005 and a charge under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil

Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, came to be framed on 10.04.2002 and as such, his name could not be considered for promotion on

01.07.2006 and the said aspect has been completely overlooked, while disposing of the said writ petition. In so far as the delay in filing this writ

appeal is concerned, it is the submission of the learned Additional Government Pleader that due to administrative reason, as narrated in paragraph

4 of the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the writ appeal could not be filed in time and the delay in filing the same cannot be construed as

neither willful nor wanton and prays for condonation of delay.

5.

However, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the learned Single Judge after taking note of the entire materials,

has passed a detailed order, disposing of the writ petition in a prospective manner and based on which, the Collector of Theni District has also

forwarded the proposal and since it was not given disposal, the respondent herein, again filed W.P(MD)No.11771 of 2012, which also came to

be disposed of, on 30.03.2016 and after waiting for nearly seven years and odd, the very same official, who made recommendation, thought fit to

file the appeal with enormous delay and the mere administrative delay cannot be construed as a plausible explanation to condone such huge delay

and hence prays for dismissal of this petition.

6.

This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the materials placed before it.

7.

The question arises for consideration in this petition is whether the administrative delay can be construed as a reasonable and plausible

explanation to condone the delay of 2219 days in filing the writ appeal.

8.

In (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 157 [Maniben Devraj Shaj v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai], there was a administrative delay

of more than seven years in filing the appeal and the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India has taken into consideration various decisions and allowed

the appeal, thereby set aside the impugned order, allowing the application, for condonation of delay. It is relevant to extract paragraphs 23, 24 and

25:

23.What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has

acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24.What colour the expression ""sufficient cause"" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the

explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona

fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly

negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

25.In cases involving the State and its agencies/ instrumentalities, the court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision-

making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/

instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that

dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest"".

9.

In 2013(11) SCALE 418 [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others], similar issue arose for

consideration and here again the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India has relied on earlier decisions and culled out lot of principles and it is relevant to

extract paragraphs 15 and 16:

15.From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

(i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the

courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii)The terms ""sufficient cause"" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are

basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

(iii)Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv)No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note

of.

(v)Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

(vi)It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required

to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

(vii)The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

(viii)There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted

whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

(ix)The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as

the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle

cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

(x)If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other

side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

(xi)It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of

limitation.

(xii)The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is

founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

(xiii)The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16.To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

(a)An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the

courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

(b)An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically

subjective.

(c)Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving

consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

(d)The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner

requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters"".

10.

The petitioner/appellant, in paragraph 4, would aver that the order in W.P(MD)No.4503 of 2006, was passed on 03.09.2010 and it was

received on 27.10.2010 and thereafter the papers were sent to the higher officials for administrative sanction and as per the direction, he

approached the Additional Government Pleader and opinion was given to the effect that it was not a fit case for appeal. The opinion was given on

26.11.2010, stating that it may not be a fit case for appeal and it was forwarded to the higher officials, seeking appropriate orders for

implementation and due to the papers got mixed up with other bundles at Secretariat and despite hectic efforts, it could not traced out, the delay

has occurred.

11.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the delay is hardly not satisfactory for the reason that the delay is about seven years and odd and no

relevant dates and specific particulars have been given in the said paragraph. It is also to be pointed out, at this juncture, that the very same

petitioner/appellant also made a proposal for implementation of the said order and then made a turn around, thought fit to prefer this appeal with

such an enormous delay. In the considered opinion of this Court, the delay, which is on the higher side, has not been explained properly and in the

absence of any plausible reason or acceptable explanation, such a huge delay cannot be condoned. Therefore, this petition is dismissed. No costs.

Consequently, connected W.A(MD)SR.No.49528 of 2016 is rejected.