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Judgment
ORDER
The Appellant questions the Impugned Order dated 11.12.2024, as it was rendered in IA/2379(CHE)/2023 preferred in IBA/1424/2019, under Section 60(5) of the I & B Code, 2016, to be read with Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016.
It is apparent from the impugned order itself that the Appellant was represented in the proceedings, which was held before the Ld. NCLT on 11.12.2024, which reflects that the Appellant was conscious of the proceedings when the Impugned Order was rendered on 11.12.2024. It could be seen from the records itself that the Appellant had applied for the certified copy of the order on 22.01.2025, which was received by him on 23.01.2025. At this stage, since the application for procuring the certified copy of the orders itself was filed after the expiry of 30 days of limitation, as prescribed under Section 61(2), the extension of limitation as contemplated therein in the proviso cannot be granted to the Appellant in accordance with the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of V.Nagarajan and limitation has to be construed from the date of the order itself.
Apart from the aforesaid reason, the learned Senior counsel for the Appellant has submitted that:
1.For the purposes of consideration of the Delay Condonation Application a liberal view has to be adopted by the Tribunal. The argument that liberal view has to be adopted while considering the Delay Condonation Application, we are in respectful disagreement, with the argument for the reason being that the provision contained under Section 61(2) since it is a self-contained provision that contains the aspect of limitation and prescribes the upper limit up to which the delay could be condoned and hence the general principles of limitation as sought to be attracted owing to the implications flowing from Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable, when limitation is governed by Special Statute.
2.He also submits that the reason for the delay has chanced because of the intervening Christmas Holidays and Pongal Holidays. As far as the Christmas Holidays and Pongal Holidays are concerned they are not holidays in continuation, there are intervening working days between the Christmas Holidays and Pongal Holidays, and apart from that, even after conclusion of the Pongal Holidays, which is on 14.01.2025, the Appeal was e-filed only on 28.01.2025, which was yet again after about 14 days of the Pongal Holidays. Since the Appellant had applied for the certified copy itself after beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the statute, the delay of 17 days which has chanced in preferring the appeal cannot be considered to be condoned since the time taken for filing the Appeal is beyond the upper limit of 45 days as prescribed under Section 61(2).
The learned Counsel for the Appellant had argued that if the language of Section 61(2) is taken into consideration, it uses a word that a satisfactory reason has to be given while seeking Condonation of Delay in filing the appeal and the same has been attempted to be read in reference to the use of word “satisfactory reasons” as it has been contained under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There cannot be a harmonious construction of the term ‘sufficient reasons’ as provided under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, because they independently operate on two distinct fields. Further ‘sufficient reasons’ can help in Condoning delay upto 15 days beyond the limitation of 30 days and not beyond that. Thus, when the proviso to Section 61(2) creates a restriction that the Tribunal cannot Condone the Delay beyond the period of 45 days, which is the upper limit prescribed therein, the prayer of the Appellant cannot be granted.
Thus, the Delay Condonation Application being IA No. 343/2024 would stand ‘rejected’ consequently the appeal too would stand ‘dismissed’.